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C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 4512 SECTION ONE OF THREE

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WEEKA

RSR

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 52

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXTERNAL - 1. FIFTH CHICOM NUCLEAR EXPLOSION; 2. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS; 3. CRITICISM OF YUGOSLAVIA:

4. TWO EDGED SWORD?; 4. UN KOREAN RESOLUTION DENOUNCED; 5. CHICOMS ON MACAU; 6. PEKING EXTOLS ROLE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE IN VIETNAM.

INTERNAL - 7. CULTURAL REVOLUTION MOVES INTO INDUSTRY; 8. CONFESSIONS, ARRESTS.

EXTERNAL

1. FIFTH CHICOM NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

A. CHICOM PRESS COMMUNIQUE ON FIFTH CCNE DEC 28 PROVIDED NO DETAILS ON NATURE OF DEVICE TESTED, CLAIMING

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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STATE GRNC
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1966 DEC 29 PM 11 36

HONG KONG 4512 JW 52 12-30-66

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WEEKA

RSR

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 52

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXTERNAL - 1. FIFTH CHICOM NUCLEAR EXPLOSION; 2. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS; 3. CRITICISM OF YUGOSLAVIA:

A TWO EDGED SWORD?; 4. UN KOREAN RESOLUTION DENOUNCED; 5. CHICOMS ON MACAU; 6. PEKING EXTOLS ROLE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE IN VIETNAM.

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EXTERNAL

1. FIFTH CHICOM NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

(1) A. CHICOM PRESS COMMUNIQUE ON FIFTH CCNE DEC 28 PROVIDED NO DETAILS ON NATURE OF DEVICE TESTED, CLAIMING

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ONLY THAT IT HAD RAISED CHINA'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN FIELD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO "NEW LEVEL." IT ATTRIBUTED SUCCESS TO TEACHINGS OF MAO AND INCLUDED REFERENCE TO LIN PIAO'S "CALL" AS FACTOR IN CHINA'S NUCLEAR PROGRESS. NEW ELEMENT WAS DESCRIPTION OF TEST AS "NEW, RICH FRUIT OF GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION."

B. COMMUNIQUE INCLUDED FOR FIRST TIME SALUTE TO PERSONNEL "ENGAGED IN RESEARCH, MANUFACTURING AND TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS." EARLIER ANNOUNCEMENTS HAD REFERRED TO THOSE WHO "CONTRIBUTED TO TEST" OR

PAGE 3 RUMJDH 4512/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WERE ENGAGED IN "DEVELOPING GUIDED MISSILES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS." USE OF TERM "MANUFACTURING"APPEARS INTENDED CREATE IMPRESSION THAT CHICOMS HAVE PROGRESSED FROM DEVELOPMENT STAGE TO POINT WHERE THEY NOW IN POSITION PRODUCE AND POSSIBLY STOCK-PILE WEAPONS.

C. AS IN OCT COMMUNIQUE, TEST WAS PORTRAYED AS BLOW TO U.S. AND SOVIET "NUCLEAR MONOPOLY AND SABOTAGE," AND BY SAME TOKEN AS "GREAT ENCOURAGEMENT" FOR VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. COMMUNIQUE REITERATED PREVIOUS ASSURANCES THAT CHICOMS WOULD NEVER BE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT OMITTED CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO BAN AND DESTROY ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS; INSTEAD, PEKING CONFINED ITSELF TO PLEDGING (AS IT HAD IN OCTOBER) TO "STRUGGLE" FOR PROHIBITION AND DESTRUCTION OF SUCH WEAPONS. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

A. MEETING OF COMMUNIST PARTIES: CHICOM CADRES AND GENERAL PUBLIC WHO HAVE NO ACCESS TO FOREIGN NEWS MEDIA, OR RADIO WERE GIVEN ONLY VAGUE INKLING OF SOVIET DRIVE TO CONVENE INTERNATIONAL MEETING OF COMMUNIST PARTIES

PAGE 4 RUMJDH 4512/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
UNTIL DEC 26, WHEN NCNA PUBLISHED DETAILED SUMMARY OF DEC 13 ALBANIAN PARTY ORGAN'S DISCUSSION ON SUBJECT. NCNA SUMMARY INFORMED CHINESE READERS OF BREZHNEV STATEMENTS RE MEETING AT BULGARIAN AND HUNGARIAN PARTY

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

CONGRESSES, AND LEFT LITTLE AMBIGUITY ABOUT PURPOSE OF MEETING BEING "TO STRIKE AT CCP." INCLUDED IN NCNA SUMMARY WERE ALBANIAN ALLEGATIONS THAT RESISTANCE TO "REVISIONIST" POLICIES OF KHRUSHCHEV'S SUCCESSORS HAD PRODUCED "SECRET REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES" IN SOVIET UNION AND LED TO FORMATION OF "MARXIST-LENINIST" (I.E., PRO-PEKING) PARTIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS POLAND.

B. ALLEGED CHICOM STEEL SALES TO U.S.: NCNA DEC 26 ISSUED "AUTHORIZED STATEMENT" DENYING THAT PEKING HAD SOLD STEEL TO U.S. FOR USE IN VIETNAM AND CHARGING THAT RUMOR OF STEEL SALES WAS "OUT-AND OUT LIE AND SLANDER SPREAD WITH ULTERIOR MOTIVES." COMPANION NCNA STORY TRACED RUMOR TO IZVESTIA, WHICH IN TURN HAD CULLED ITEM FROM BRITISH PUBLICATION. NEVERTHELESS, NCNA ASSERTED, "TRUE AUTHOR IS SOVIET

PAGE 5 RUMJDH 4512/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
REVISIONIST LEADERSHIP."

C. SOVIET SHIP IN CHINESE HARBOR INCIDENT: ACCORDING NCNA DEC 28, DAIREN HARBOR SUPERINTENDENT ORDERED SOVIET VESSEL "ZAGORSK" OUT OF HARBOR, PERMANENTLY BANNED ITS CAPTAIN FROM CHINESE PORTS AND ISSUED SERIOUS WARNING TO ITS CHIEF OFFICER. CHICOM OFFICIALS'S ACTION AROSE FROM ALTERCATION BETWEEN CAPTAIN AND CHINESE PILOT ASSIGNED TO SHIP AS IT WAS ABOUT TO SAIL. PORT OFFICIAL COMPLAINED THAT CAPTAIN HAD REFUSED TO OBEY PILOT, THAT PILOT HAD BEEN INSULTED BY CHIEF OFFICER, AND MATTERS MADE WORSE BY SOVIET EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVE'S SUPPORT FOR "BIG-NATION CHAUVINIST ATTITUDE" OF CAPTAIN. INCIDENT IS FIRST OF ITS TYPE REPORTED SINCE CHICOMS ISSUED MORE STRINGENT REGULATIONS FOR NAVIGATION IN BORDER RIVERS EARLIER THIS YEAR, ALTHOUGH APPLICABLE REGULATIONS FOR OCEAN PORTS APPEAR TO DATE BACK TO OCTOBER 1961. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. CRITICISM OF YUGOSLAVIA: A TWO EDGED SWORD?

A. WHILE PEKING CONDEMNATION OF YUGOSLAVIA OCCASIONS LITTLE SURPRISE, DEC 24 NCNA CORRESPONDENT REPORT

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

PAGE 6 RUMJDH 4512/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
DATELINED PEKING ON "INTERNAL STRUGGLE FOR POWER WITHIN THE TITO RENEGADE GROUP" IS PRESENTED IN TERMS SO HIGHLY APPLICABLE TO PRESENT CHICOM POLITICAL SCENE THAT FEW READERS, EITHER CHINESE OR FOREIGN, WILL MISS THE OBVIOUS PARALLEL BETWEEN THE ALLEGED CHAOS AND DISUNITY IN YUGOSLAVIA AND RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS ON THE MAINLAND. AS EXAMPLE, REPORT SPEAKS OF "ACUTE INTERNAL STRIFE EARLIER THIS YEAR" WITHIN YUGOSLAVIA LEADERSHIP; OF TITO'S RESORT "IN PAST FEW MONTHS (TO) NATION-WIDE PURGE TO WEED OUT DISSIDENT ELEMENTS AND THOROUGHLY REORGANIZE THE CENTRAL ORGANS OF THE LYC;" AND, OF "OUSTER OF RANKOVIC, NUMBER TWO MAN IN YUGOSLAVIA...(WHICH SHOWS) THAT LONG-STANDING STRIFE FOR POWER WITHIN TITO RENEGADE GROUP HAS DEVELOPED TO A POINT WHERE IT NO LONGER RECONCILABLE."

B. OTHER SIMILAR EXAMPLES ABOUND IN ARTICLE AND ONE IS TEMPTED CONCLUDE THAT, IN WORDS OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE SAYING, NCNA CORRESPONDENT'S INTENT WAS "TO MAKE NOISE IN THE EAST IN ORDER TO STRIKE IN THE WEST." (UNCLASSIFIED)

GP-3
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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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STATE GRNC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 4512 SECTION TWO OF THREE

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1966 DEC 29 PM 10 59

POUCH: (2) BANGKOK, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, CANBERRA, DARESSALAAM, DJAKARTA, KARACHI, KATHMANDU, KUALA LUMPUR, LONDON, MANILA, MOSCOW, MUNICH, NEW DELHI, PRAGUE, RANGOON, RAWALPINDI, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SOFIA, SINGAPORE, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, CINCPAC, COMNAVPHL, COMUSTDC, 13AFMANILA

WEEKA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 52

4. UN KOREAN RESOLUTION DENOUNCED

A. PEKING'S ANNUAL DENUNCIATORY FOLLOW-UP TO UN RESOLUTION ON KOREA WAS PRESENTED IN NCNA REPORT AND PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTATOR ARTICLE ON SUBJECT, BOTH DATED DEC 24. MAJOR DEPARTURE FROM REGIME'S PAST TREATMENT OF ISSUE, AND ONE THAT REFLECTS EXTENT OF COOLNESS BETWEEN PEKING AND PYONGYANG, WAS ABSENCE IN EITHER ARTICLE OF ANY REFERENCE TO DPRK GOVERNMENT AND FAILURE TO DATE OF REGIME MEDIA TO MAKE ANYMENTION OF DPRK FONMIN DEC 17 STATEMENT ON UN RESOLUTION. ANOTHER INNOVATION WAS ACCUSATION THAT SOV PERFORMANCE IN UN DEMONSTRATED MOSCOW'S INTENT "TO BRING KOREAN QUESTION INTO ORBIT OF SOV-U.S. COLLABORATION FOR DOMINATION OF WORLD." FINALLY, MISSING FROM THIS YEAR'S COMMENT WAS TRADITIONAL DEMAND THAT UN "CONDEMN" U.S. AS AGRESSOR IN KOREA AND SECURE WITHDRAWAL ALL U.S. TROOPS FROM THAT COUNTRY. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

5. CHICOMS ON MACAU

A. CHICOM TREATMENT OF MACAU SITUATION DURING LAST WEEK INDICATES CONTINUING, BUT NOT INCREASED, PRESSURE ON PORTUGUESE, WITH THE EMPHASIS NOW ON PUBLIC APOLOGY FROM MACAU AUTHORITIES AND SUPRESSION OF ALLEGED U.S.-GRC ACTIVITIES IN THE COLONY. THESE LATTER DEMANDS WERE MAIN THEME OF MASS RALLY HELD DEC 27 IN CHUHAI COUNTY (NEXT TO MACAU) AT WHICH A REPRESENTATIVE OF RED GUARDS READ A TELEGRAM, ALLEGEDLY SENT TO PRESIDENT SALAZAR THROUGH MACAU GOVERNOR CARVALHO, WARNING THAT IF PORTUGUESE "DARED TO IGNORE THE JUST DEMANDS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE, THEY WILL BE DESTROYED." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. PEKING EXTOLS ROLE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE IN VIETNAM

A. IN INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE ON "NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE IN OUTH VIETNAM" WHICH FIRST APPEARED IN NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY ORGAN, NCNA ON DEC 27 DECLARED "GUERRILLA WARFARE IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS NOW PLAYING AN IMPORTANT ROLE AND, AS IT TURNS OUT, CONSTITUTES THE BASIC AND PRIMARY NORM OF PEOPLE'S WAR. IT SERVES AS THE BASIS OF REGULAR WARFARE AND WITH IT DECIDES THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR." EARLIER IN WEEK, NCNA DEC 24 REPORT DATELINED HANOI, DESCRIBED IN GLOWING TERMS ALLEGED MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF GUERRILLA FORCES IN TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

B. COMMENT: PEKING'S TREATMENT OF SUBJECT IN PART REPRESENTS EFFORT TO MAKE A VIRTUE OUT OF VC NECESSITY AVOID LARGE-SCALE CLASHES WITH U.S. FORCES. IT ALSO ADDS WEIGHT TO THESIS THAT CHICOMS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH MAO'S TACTICAL THINKING, HAVE FOR SOME TIME REGARDED VIETCONG RETURN TO PHASE II OF PEOPLE'S WAR AS APPROPRIATE UNDER CONDITIONS OF MASSIVE U.S.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0207

INVOLVEMENT. BY QUOTING FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY SOURCE, PEKING MAY ALSO BE STRIVING TO SHOW THERE ARE NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HANOI AND PEKING IN REGARD TO VC MILITARY STRATEGY. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

INTERNAL

7. CULTURAL REVOLUTION MOVES INTO INDUSTRY

A. PEOPLE'S DAILY DEC 26 EDITORIAL "WELCOME GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN INDUSTRIAL AND MINING ENTERPRISES" REPRESENTS FURTHER RECENT INDICATION THAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION HAS ENTERED NEW PHASE AND IS CURRENTLY BEING EXTENDED TO MINES AND FACTORIES ON LARGE SCALE. PREDICTING THAT "SERIOUS STRUGGLES WILL BE NECESSARY," EDITORIAL IMPLIES THAT MAJOR PURGE OF RECALCITRANT ELEMENTS IN ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IS

CONTEMPLATED, WITH ALLEGATION THAT "MANY OF OUR INDUSTRIAL AND MINING ENTERPRISES...ARE SERIOUSLY INFLUENCED BY CAPITALISM, REVISIONISM AND EVEN FEUDALISM."

B. EDITORIAL'S PRESCRIBED CURE FOR ABOVE SITUATION IS TO RELY ON WORKERS WHO BY DEFINITION "CAN BEST UNDERSTAND MEANING OF TAKING A FIRM HOLD OF REVOLUTION (AS MEANS) TO STIMULATE PRODUCTION." EDITORIAL CALLS ON WORKERS, IN STYLE OF PARIS COMMUNE, TO ELECT "CULTURAL REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS, COMMITTEES AND CONGRESSES" AND WHILE IT DOES NOT INDICATE WHETHER THESE WORKER-ELECTED GROUPS ARE TO BE IN CHARGE OF PRODUCTION, THERE IS IMPLICATION THEY EXPECTED TO PLAY IMPORTANT PART IN MANAGEMENT.

C. IN CONTRAST TO PREVIOUS EFFORTS PROTECT PRODUCTION NROM ONSLAUGHT OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS EDITORIAL FORECEFULLY CONDEMNS "CAPITALIST AND BOURGEOIS" ELEMENTS WHO "SEEK TO SURPRESS THE REVOLUTION UNDER PRETEXT OF TAKING A FIRM HOLD ON PRODUCTION." IT MAY THUS REPRESENT SET BACK FOR CHOU EN-LAI WHO HAS PUB-

0208

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

LICLY APPEARED AS CHAMPION OF EFFORTS MINIMIZE ADVERSE IMPACT OF REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS ON ECONOMY.

D. WHILE EXTENSION OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION INTO INDUSTRIAL SECTOR WOULD SEEM TO BE INEVITABLE PRODUCT OF MAO'S LONG-STANDING CONVICTION THAT BOURGEOIS INFLUENCES REMAIN STRONG IN THIS SPHERE OF ACTIVITY, TIMING OF DECISION PROBABLY DETERMINED BY CURRENT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. IT COINCIDES WITH STEPPED-UP ATTACKS ON LIU SHAO-CHI AND TENG HSIAO-PING (ITEM 8) ALLEGED LEADERS OF AN OPPOSITION WHICH HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH MANIPULATING MASS ORGANIZATIONS OF WORKERS AND STUDENTS, SOWING DISCORD, CREATING FACTIONS AND INSTIGATING STRUGGLE BY FORCE.

E. EDITORIAL'S ALLEGATION OF WILLFUL OPPOSITION TO MAO-LIN LINE AND VENGEANCE WREAKED ON WORKER-ACTIVISTS BY SOME PARTY AND LEADERSHIP ELEMENTS WITHIN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES PROVIDES SUBSTANTIVE BACKING FOR ITS ASSERTION THAT IMPLEMENTATION CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN THIS SPHERE WILL INVOLVE "SERIOUS STRUGGLE."

GP-3
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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* P&L 2-1 CHICOM

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POUCH: (2) BANGKOK, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, CANBERRA, DARESSALAAM, DJAKARTA, KARACHI, KATHMANDU, KUALA LUMPUR, LONDON, MANILA, MOSCOW, MUNICH, NEW DELHI, PRAGUE, RANGOON, RAWALPINDI, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SOFIA, SINGAPORE, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, CINCPAC, COMNAVPHL, COMUSTDC, 13AFMANILA

WEEKA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 52

F. ASIDE FROM STRUGGLE ASPECT, POLICY ITSELF EMBODIES STRONG ANARCHIST TENDENCIES, REMINISCENT OF RED GUARD MOVEMENT IT WOULD APPEAR PAVE WAY FOR UNDISCIPLINED AND CAPRICIOUS ACTS BY WORKER ACTIVISTS IMPRESSED BY NEW-FOUND SENSE OF POWER. INDEED BRITISH IN PEKING REPORT THAT ONE PRACTICAL MANIFESTATION OF THIS "NEW STAGE" IN CULTURAL REVOLUTION HAS BEEN APPEARANCE ON PEKING STREETS OF INCREASING NUMBERS OF WORKERS BEARING ARMBAND "WORKERS LIAISON TEAM." IN ADDITON, FOOCHOW DOMESTIC SERVICE IN DEC 26 BROADCAST CLAIMED THAT "MORE THAN 10,000 RED GUARDS IN AREA HAVE RECENTLY GONE TO FACTORIES TO EXCHANGE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCES WITH WORKERS," AN INDICATION THAT UNDER IMPETUS OF "NEW PHASE" PREVIOUS STRICTURES TO RED GUARDS TO KEEP OUT OF THE FACTORIES HAVE GONE BY THE BOARDS.

G. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO IMAGINE THAT "LIAISON ACTIVITIES" OF WORKERS AND RED GUARD VISITS TO FACTORIES WILL NOT HAVE AN ADVERSE AFFECT ON PRODUCTION. IN SHORT WE FEEL THAT INTRUSION OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION INTO ECONOMIC SPHERE CARRIES WITH IT OMINOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA'S ECONOMIC WELL-BEING. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

8. CONFESSIONS, ARRESTS

ATTACKS ON EARLIER TARGETS

A. ACCORDING JAPANESE REPORTS, POSTERS APPEARING DEC 23 ANNOUNCED ARREST BY RED GUARDS OF LO JUI-CHING, FORMER PLA CHIEF OF STAFF. REPORTED POSTERS CAST DOUBT ON EARLIER RUMORS THAT LO, ALONG WITH FORMER CCP PROPAGANDA HEAD LU TING-YI AND YANG SHANG-KUN, ALTERNATE MEMBER PARTY SECRETARIAT, HAD COMMITTED SUICIDE. ALSO REPORTED ARRESTED ALONG WITH LO WERE LIANG PI-YEH, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PLA GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT AND EX-LT. GEN. HSIAO HSIANG-JUNG. WHILE THIS IS FIRST TIME LATTER TWO HAVE BEEN REPORTED UNDER ATTACK, LIANG HAS NOT APPEARED IN PUBLIC SINCE FEBRUARY AND HSIAO NOT SINCE NOVEMBER 1965. COINCIDENCE OF ARRESTS SUGGESTS THESE TWO HAD BEEN ALLIED WITH LO IN PRESUMED OPPOSITION TO MAO-LIN.

B. DEC 29 PRESS REPORTS FROM PEKING CITE RED BANNER, ORGAN OF RED GUARD OF PEKING AVIATION INSTITUTE, AS SOURCE OF NEWS OF DEC 24 ARREST IN CHENGTU OF PENG TE-HUAI, LIN PIAO'S PREDECESSOR AS DEFENCE MINISTER WHO WAS PURGED IN 1959 BUT NEVER PUBLICLY DENOUNCED.

C. COMMENT: EXPLANATION FOR THESE REPORTED ARRESTS OF ALREADY DISGRACED OPPONENTS OF MAO IS PROBABLY FOUND IN RED GUARD DESCRIPTION OF DEC 12 PUBLIC TRIAL OF PENG CHEN AS "FORMAL WARNING TO A SMALL GROUP OF PEOPLE," (WEEKA 51). INTERESTING THAT PENG, A HUNANESE, REPORTEDLY SEIZED IN SZECHWAN, WHICH MAY WELL BE A STRONGHOLD OF RESISTANCE TO MAO.

ATTACKS ON LIU-TENG

A. BRITISH SOURCES REPORT THAT POSTERS IN FRONT OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE BUILDING CONTINUE TO DEMAND "DRAG OUT REVISIONIST ELEMENT LIU." JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS REPORTED 100,000 STRONG RALLY OF RED GUARDS AND WORKERS DEC 27 TO DENOUNCE LIU AND TENG. CALLING LIU "KHRUSCHEV OF CHINA," THEY DEMANDED REMOVAL OF BOTH LIU AND TENG FROM OFFICE FOR CRIME OF PURSUING "BOURGEOIS REACTIONARY LINE TO FURTHER OWN AMBITIONS."

B. ACCORDING TO ASAHI REPORT CARRIED LOCAL PAPERS DEC 27, 28, NEW WALL POSTERS CLAIM LIU AND TENG ADMITTED THEIR ERRORS AT OCT 23 "PARTY MEETING." ALTHOUGH SOURCE FAR FROM AUTHORITATIVE, "CONFESSIONS" ARE REPORTED IN SOME DETAIL, HAVE RING OF AUTHENTICITY BUT MAY BE CAREFULLY EXCERPTED TO PRESENT MOST DAMNING CASE. IN REPORT OF TENG'S "SELF-CRITICISM" HE ALLEGEDLY SAID "LIU AND I ARE REPRESENTATIVES OF

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

BOURGEOIS REACTIONARY LINE IN CURRENT CULTURAL REVOLUTION MOVEMENT" AND LIU IS QUOTED AS SAYING "I MUST BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJORITY OF ERRORS COMMITTED IN LEADING CULTURAL REVOLUTION DURING FIFTY DAYS FOLLOWING JUNE 1." BOTH LIU AND TENG CENTERED THEIR CONFESSIONS ON ERRORS CONCERNING DISPATCH OF WORK TEAMS AND THEIR OPPOSITION TO DECISION TO WITHDRAW TEAMS.

C. COMMENT: ADMISSIONS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY LIU AND TENG SIMILAR TO ERRORS CHARGED TO THEM IN PEKING UNIVERSITY'S 20-PAGE PAMPHLET (WEEKA 47) AND IN TAO CHU'S DEC 13 SPEECH, PARTICULARLY, ALLEGATION THAT THEY VIOLATED MAO'S LINE AND SUPPRESSED THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT BY ASSUMING CHARGE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION DURING MAO'S ABSENCE FROM PEKING.

D. WHILE GROWING INTENSITY OF CAMPAIGN AGAINST LIU AND TENG INDICATES THAT MAO-LIN RETAIN THE INITIATIVE, ESCALATION OF STRUGGLE AGAINST THESE TWO FIGURES MAY BE A FORCED RESPONSE TO DEAL WITH CONTINUING RECALCITRANCE NOT ONLY OF LIU AND TENG BUT OF OTHERS. IN THIS CONTEXT, CONTINUING APPEARANCES OF LIU AND TENG AND THE FITFUL AND HESITANT NATURE OF THE ATTACKS ON THEM UNTIL RECENT WEEKS MAY MEAN THAT LEADERSHIP HAD NOT ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO CARRY CAMPAIGN SO FAR, BUT HAVE BEEN COMPELLED TO MOVE STRUGGLE FROM INTRA-PARTH CONFINES TO PUBLIC REALM IN HOPE THAT PUBLIC DISGRACE OF LIU AND TENG WOULD SERVE TO DISCREDIT THEM TOTALLY AND DEMORALIZE OTHER OPPONENTS. (CONFIDENTIAL)

GP-3
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CU INFO RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
USIA STATE GRNC
NSC BT
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TRSY
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
RSR
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CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 51
ABLE OF CONTENTS

EXTERNAL-1. VIETNAM: NLF ANNIVERSARY MARKED:

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 4399/1 C O N F I D E N T A L
BOMBING PROTESTED; 2. CHICOMS EASE PRESSURE ON MACAU;

3. PEKING EVALUATES UNGA 21ST SESSION; 4. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS; NEWSMEN EXPELLED; AFRO-ASIANWRITERS MERBAL DUEL.

INTERNAL-5. EFFORT TO PURGE LIU AND TENG INTENSIFIED;

6. CENTRAL-SOUTH PAPER SUSPENDED.

EXTERNAL

1. VIETNAM: NLF ANNIVERSARY MARKED; BOMBING PROTESTED

A. COINCIDENCE OF U.S. BOMBING IN HANOI ENVIRONS, SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDING OF NLF, AND NVN ARMY DAY GAVE RISE TO GREATEST FLOOD OF LEADERSHIP AND MASS AFFIRMATIONS OF

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

-2- HONG KONG 4399, 230158Z DEC 66, SECTION ONE OF THREE

SOLIDARITY WITH "VIETNAMESE PEOPLE" SINCE LAST JULY. THIS ATTENTION TO VIETNAM-- WHICH INCLUDED CPR GOVERNMENT STATEMENT, FONMIN STATEMENT, NATION-WIDE RALLIES AND MEETINGS, DIPLOMATIC BANQUETS AND MESSAGES, AND TWO PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIALS-- FOR MOST PART OFFERED ROUTINE DENUNCIATIONS OF US, SHOP-WORN ATTACKS ON SOVIETS, AND VAGUE CLICHES REGARDING COMMITMENTS OF "CHINESE PEOPLE" TO SUPPORT VIETNAMESE BRETHREN. FOLLOWING ARE SOME OF MORE INTERESTING POINTS WHICH EMERGED.

PAGE THREE RUMJDH 4399/1 C O N F I D E N T A L

B. CHEN YI, SPEAKING AT PEKING RALLY OF 100,000 ON DEC 18, ESSENTIALLY RESUSCITATED FORMULATION OF CHICOM SUPPORT FOR VIETNAMESE WHICH HAD BEEN IN VOGUE UNTIL AUTUMN 1965. HE SAID CHINESE PEOPLE WOULD "UNITE WITH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND FIGHT TOGETHER WITH THEM," BUT UNLIKE 1965 PRONOUNCEMENTS, FAILED TO INCLUDE QUALIFIER "AS NEEDED BY HANOI." ANOTHER NEW TWIST WAS ADDED IN RALLY DECLARATION (AND ECHOED THROUGHOUT PROVINCES) WHICH EXPRESSED CHINESE READINESS "MARCH TO FRONT." IN DECLARATION AND MANY REPORTS FROM PROVINCES, THIS PHRASE WAS USUALLY, BUT NOT ALWAYS, CONDITIONED UPON VIETNAMESE "REQUIREMENTS" AND/OR ISSUANCE OF ORDER BY MAO, LIN PIAO OR "OUR GREAT SOCIALIST MOTHERLAND." CONSPICUOUSLY ABSENT WERE ANY REFERENCES TO "VOLUNTEERS."

C. NVN AND NLF SPEAKERS AT RALLIES AND MEETINGS IN CHINA DID NOT PICK UP THEME OF CHINESE PEOPLE "MARCHING TO FRONT" BUT INSTEAD EMPHASIZED ABILITY OF VIET CONG TO ACHIEVE ULTIMATE VICTORY THROUGH OWN EFFORTS.
MARKED RESTRAINT WAS DISPLAYED BY VIETNAMESE IN EVALUATION

PAGE FOUR UMJDH 4399/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

CURRENT CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND CONCOMITANT ADULATION OF MAO. HOWEVER, NVN AMB -- PERHAPS WITH ADVANCE PROMPTING FROM HOSTS--DEPARTED FROM THIS ALOOFNESS AT BANQUET GIVEN DECEMBER 19 BY CHEN YI IN HONOR NLF ANNIVERSARY. AS REPORTED BY NCNA, HE SAID,"ALTHOUGH MATERIAL AID TO VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IS IMPORTANT, MAO TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT IS TRULY OUR PRICELESS TREASURE."

D. ONE FACTOR IN REGIME'S STANCE OF INDIGNATION OVER BOMBING OF HANOI AREA WAS DAMAGE REPORTEDLY SUFFERED BY CHICOM EMBASSY IN HANOI. FONMIN STATEMENT PROTESTING "DELIBERATE" AIR ATTACK ON EMBASSY AND NEARBY NCNA OFFICE VIEWED IT AS LATEST US "WAR PROVOCATION" AGAINST CHINA. PEKING PLAYED UP SENSE OF OUTRAGE AND DETERMINATION TO STAND BY VIETNAMESE PEOPLE
[illegible]LY FELT BY CHICOM PERSONNEL IN NVN, BUT REPORTED NO
HANOI TOOK PUBLIC NOTE OF DAMAGE AND SUBSEQUENT PRESS
Y CHICOM AMBASSADOR, BUT BREVITY OF ITS TREATMENT

BEST AVAILABLE
Every Technical Effort Has
Been Made To Ensure Legibility

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IMPLIED NO INCLINATION [illegible] CHICOMS IN STIRRING UP TEMPEST.

E. BELIEF THAT "VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE HAS NOW ENTERED

CRUCIAL STAGE" WAS NOTED BY LIN PIAO IN MESSAGE TO GEN GIAP ON NVN ARMY DAY AND ALSO BY PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL ON NLF ANNIVERSARY DEC 20. EDITORIAL DID NOT EXPAND ON THEME, WHILE LIN SIMPLY PREDICTED ULTIMATE VICTORY "AFTER TRAVERSING THIS ARDUOUS SECTION OF ROAD" (A PARAPHRASE OF MAO) WHICH SUGGESTS THAT IN LIN'S VIEW PERIOD OF TRIAL REMAINS AHEAD FOR NLF. LIN REITERATED CHINESE SUPPORT FOR STRUGGLE, BUT DECLARED HIMSELF "FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT HEROIC VIETNAMESE PEOPLE CAN BREAK THROUGH ALL DIFFICULTIES AND OBSTACLES, BRING IMMENSE STRENGTH OF PEOPLE' WAR INTO PLAY (AND)...DEFEAT U.S.

F. RUNNING THROUGH ALL OF REGIME'S OUTPUT DURING WEEK WAS EXAGGERATED EVIDENCE ADDUCED TO PROVE U.S.- SOVIET COLLUSION AIMED AT INDUCING PEACE TALKS, COUPLED WITH CONSTANT WARNINGS (PRESUMABLY TO NVN) NOT TO HEED SIREN SONG OF U.S. AND SUCH "LACKEYS" AS THE POPE AND U THANT. IMMEDIATE CONCERN OF PEKING OFF-CHANCE THAT CHRISTMAS TRUCE MIGHT LEAD TO EXTENDED APPEARED TO BE TO COMBAT/BOMBING PAUSE AND EVENTUALLY TO NETOTIATIONS. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. CHICOMS EASE PRESSURE ON MACAU

A. INCIDENT FREE WEEK NOW DRAWING TO A CLOSE AMIDST CLEAR INDICATIONS THAT NEGOTIATONS BETWEEN PORTUGUESE AND CHICOMS BEGINNING TO BEAR FRUIT ON BASIS PEKING'S DEMANDS. DECEMBER 20 NCNA ARTICLE ANNOUNCED MACAU GOVERNMENTS'S ACCEPTANCE OF "FOUR POINT PROPOSITION" OF KWANGTUNG FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUREAU AND SIX POINT DEMAND OF REPRESENTATIVES "ALL MACAU CIRCLES." ATTRIBUTING PORTUGUESE ACQUIESENCE TO "PRESSURE" EXERTED BY "MASSES AND RED GUARDS OF THE GREAT SOCIALIST MOTHERLAND" AND TO "STRUGGLE OF CHINESE COMPATRIOTS IN MACAU." ARTICLE ALSO NOTED WITH APPARENT SATISFACTION REMOVAL FROM OFFICE OF ARMY COMMANDANT CERVEIRA AND OTHER PORTUGUESE OFFICIALS. LEST MACAU AUTHORITIES BE LULLED INTO FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY, HOWEVER, OTHER NCNA ITEM ON MACAU SAME DAY CARRIED SUGGESTIVE QUOTE FROM MAO TO EFFECT THAT "JUST BECAUSE WE HAVE WON VICTORY, WE MUST NEVER RELAX VIGILANCE...." GP-3 RICE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 4399 SECTION TWO OF THREE

1966 DEC 22 PM 10 53 020048

POUCH: (2) BANGKOK, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, CANBERRA, DARESSALAAM, DJAKARTA, KARACHI, KATHMANDU, KUALA LUMPUR, LONDON, MANILA, MOSCOW, MUNICH, NEW DELHI, PRAGUE, RANGOON, RAWALPINDI, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SOFIA, SINGAPORE, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, CINCPAC, COMNAVPHL, COMUSTDC, 13AFMANILA

WEEKA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

NOFORN

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 51

B. ON DECEMBER 21, NCNA CONFIRMED RUMORS CIRCULATING LOCALLY BY REPORTING THAT MACAU AUTHORITIES

"AD BEEN COMPELLED TO RETURN SEVEN AGENTS OF THE CHIANG KAI-SHEK GANG." ARTICLE CALLED MOVE "PRELIMINARY VICTORY" WHILE REITERATING WARNING THAT "CHINESE PEOPLE IN MACAU ARE FOLLOWING ATTENTIVELY FUTURE ACTIONS OF PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES IN MACAU." ON SAME DAY ANOTHER NCNA ITEM REVEALED THAT KWANGTUNG GOVERNMENT IN REPRESENTATION TO "GOVERNOR" OF MACAU DEMANDED: (1) IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION FOUR POINT DEMAND OF KWANGTUNG GOVERNMENT AND SIX POINT DEMAND OF MACAU RESIDENTS; (2) DESPATCH OF REPRESENTATIVE FOR TALKS WITH AN OFFICIAL OF KWANGTUNG FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUREAU

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"WITHIN 72 HOURS" IN ORDER PRESENT "CONCRETE MEASURES" ON IMPLEMENTATION OF DEMANDS; (3) SURRENDER OF ANY AGENTS AND MATERIALS PERTINENT TO CASE "WITHIN 48 HOURS." AS INDICATED BY ANNOUNCEMENT OF RETURN OF AGENTS, PORTUGUESE APPARENTLY COMPLYING WITH THESE DEMANDS.

C. COMMENT: PEKING'S DISCLOSURE OF DETAILS OF CONFRONTATION ARE TAKEN BY US AS EVIDENCE THAT REGIME SEES MATTER AS DRAWING TO A CLOSE. ASIDE FROM DEMONSTRATING

PAGE 3 RUMJDH 4399/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
EXTENT OF PORTUGUESE DEFEAT ON ISSUE AND ASSURING LATTER'S COMPLIANCE WITH DEMANDS, PEKING'S PRESENT HANDLING OF AFFAIR APPEARS DESIGNED TO LOWER TEMPERATURE OF MACAO CHINESE AND ASSURE THEM OF REGIME'S CONTINUED INTEREST IN THEIR WELFARE. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. PEKING EVALUATES UNGA 21ST SESSION

A. NCNA DECEMBER 21 REVIEW OF JUST CONCLUDED UNGA 21ST SESSION ARRIVES AT PREDICTABLE FINDING THAT "SALIENT FEATURE OF SESSION" WAS U.S. - SOV COLLUSION WHICH "DIRECTED AGAINST CHINA" AND WHICH HAD "TURNED UN INTO A DIRTY POLITICAL MARKET PLACE IN A WAY MORE FLAGRANT THAN EVER." NCNA REVIEW USED FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS IN SPECIFICALLY CITING VIETNAM, DISARMAMENT AND CHIREP AS ISSUES ON WHICH SOVS ALLEGEDLY HAD EITHER COLLABORATED WITH OR CAPITULATED TO U.S.

B. ONLY NEW ELEMENT IN NCNA REVIEW AS PEKING'S FIRST SUBSTANTIVE REACTION TO DRAFT TREATY ON PEACEFUL USE OF OUTER SPACE. IN CLEAR FORECAST OF CHICOM REJECTION OF TREATY, NCNA DESCRIBED SOV ADHERENCE TO IT AS

PAGE 4 RUMJDH 4399/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
"CONTEMPTIBLE ACT OF CAPITULATION AND BETRAYAL..." TO U.S. IMPERIALISM," WHILE TREATY ITSELF WAS TERMED "ANOTHER FRAUD CONCOCTED BY U.S. AND SOVS IN THEIR GLOBAL COLLABORATION."

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CM NCNA CONCLUDED THAT ONLY POSSIBLE GOOD RESULTING FROM 21ST SESSION WAS THAT IT MAY HAVE ENABLED PEOPLE OF WORLD TO SEE EVEN MORE CLEARLY HOW UN HAS DEGENERATED INTO U.S.-SOV MARKET PLACE AND ANTI-CHINESE, ANTI-COMMUNIST AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY INSTRUMENT OF THESE TWO POWERS.

D. COMMENT:REGIME'S TREATMENT OF UNGA SESSION, AND PARTICULARLY ITS HARSH DENUNCIATION OF WIDELY POPULAR MEASURES AIMED AT EASING WORLD TENSIONS, INDICATE THAT SUCCESSION OF DIPLOMATIC DEFEATS AND GROWING ISLOATION OVER PAST YEAR HAVE NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT IN THEMSELVES TO CONVINCE MAOIST LEADERSHIP OF NEED FOR GREATER TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: NEWSMEN EXPELLED: AFRO-ASAIN WRITERS VERBAL DUEL

PAGE 5 RUMJDH 4399/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
A. SOVIET CHARGE IN PEKING WAS INFORMED DECEMBER 16 THAT THREE OF SIX SOVIET CORRESPONDENTS IN CHINA MUST LEAVE COUNTRY BEFORE DECEMBER 25 BECAUSE OF THEIR "CONSISTENT ANTI-CHINA REPORTING." FONMIN INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL, AS REPORTED NCNA, ACCUSED NEWSMEN OF ABUSING "FACILITIES GIVEN THEM BY CHINESE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT" AND NOTED THAT CORRESPONDENTS HAD "IN PARTICULAR... SPREAD RUMORS AND SLANDERS ABOUT CHINA'S GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION." PEKING PRESERVED PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY BY ALLOWING THREE NEWSMEN TO REMAIN IN CHINA, POINTING OUT THAT ONLY THREE CHICOM NEWSMEN ASSIGNED IN USSR. CHICOM ACTION NOT SURPRISING SINCE DEMONSTRATED ACCESS OF SOVIET CORRESPONDENTS TO CHINESE PROVINCIAL PRESS AND PEKING POSTERS HAVE PRODUCED SOME OF MOST DAMNING (AND INFORMATIVE) REPORTS ON CULTURAL REVOLUTION. (HK 4291)

B. PEKING-BASED AFRO-ASIAN WRITERS BUREAU ISSUED STATEMENT DECEMBER 17 CONDEMNING "SPLITTIST" ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET FACTION OF A-A WRITERS MOVEMENT AT CAIRO MEETING IN MID-NOVEMBER. AMONG WORST SINS OF CAIRO MEETING, ACCORDING STATEMENT, WAS MOVE TO "HITCH WAGON (OF PRO-SOVIET A-A WRITERS) TO UNESCO."

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CHINESE FEDERATION OF LITERARY AND ART CIRCLES CHIMED IN WITH SARCASTIC SWIPE AT CAIRO MEETING'S INVITATION TO CHINA TO ATTEND "BOGUS" THIRD A-A WRITERS CONFERENCE IN BEIRUT NEXT FEBRUARY. IT ASKED WHY SOVIETS DID NOT INVITE GRC DELEGATION, IN VIEW OF MOSCOW'S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS WHERE GRC PRESENT OVER PAST YEAR. NCNA SAW ENTIRE DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO FACTIONS OF A-A WRITERS AS PART OF SOVIET "CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES FOR SPLITTING AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLES." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 4399 FINAL SECTION OF THREE

POUCH: (2) BANGKOK, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, CANBERRA, DARESSALAAM, DJAKARTA, KARACHI, KATHMANDU, KUALA LUMPUR, LONDON, MANILA, MOSCOW, MUNICH, NEW DELHI, PRAGUE, RANGOON, RAWALPINDI, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SOFIA, SINGAPORE, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, CINCPAC, COMNAVPHL, COMUSTDC, 13AF MANILA

WEEKA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

NOFORN

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 51.

INTERNAL

5. EFFORT TO PURGE LIU AND TENG INTENSIFIED

PAGE 2 RUMJDH 4399/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
A. EVENTS OF WEEK INDICATE THAT ALL-OUT CAMPAIGN BEGUN END NOVEMBER TO PURGE LIU SHAO-CHI AND TENG HSIAO-PING GAINING IN INTENSITY. BRITISH EMBASSY PEKING REPORTS TO LOUDSPEAKER BROADCASTS AND LARGE-SIZE RED GUARD POSTERS CALLING NOR REMOVAL OF LIU AND TENG, AND JAPANESE PRESS ACCOUNT OF DECEMBER 20 PEKING "PUBLIC TRIAL" AT WHICH EIGHT CULTURAL AND PROPAGANDA FIGURES DENOUNCED MAKE UP MOST RECENT AND SPECTACULAR EVIDENCE OF INTENSE NATURE OF STRUGGLE. SEVEN OF EIGHT WERE EARLY CASUALTIES OF MOVEMENT, AND TRIAL IS THEIR FIRST PUBLIC APPEARANCE SINCE REMOVAL IN EARLY 1966. IN DOCK WERE LU TING-YI, CHOU YANG, LIN MO-HAN, HSIA YEN, TIEN HAN, HSU LI-CHUN AND

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

CHI YEN-MING. ANOTHER TARGET PRESENT WAS LIN FENG, CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER AND PRESIDENT OF HIGHER PARTY SCHOOL, WHO HAD BEEN RUMORED PURGED SINCE HIS DISAPPEARANCE AFTER AUGUST 18 RALLY. CONSPICUOUSLY ABSENT WERE TWO CHARTER MEMBERS OF THE "BLACK GANG," WU HAN AND TENG TO, WHO, ACCORDING NORWEGIAN SOURCE, ARE RUMORED IN PEKING TO HAVE COMMITTED SUICIDE. OTHER

REPORTS RECEIVED DURING WEEK UNDERLINED DETERMINATION OF MAOIST AND REVEALED TERRORISTIC PURPOSE OF TRIALS. BRITISH ACCOUNT OF DECEMBER 12 "TRIAL" OF PENG CHEN REPORTS SPEAKERS DESCRIBED RALLY AS "FORMAL WARNING TO A SMALL GROUP OF PEOPLE," WHOSE END, IF THEY PERSIST, WILL BE SIMILAR TO PENG'S. IN LINE WITH THIS, POSTER REPORTS OF TAO CHU'S DECEMBER 13 ATTACK ON LIU-TENG SAID HE DENOUNCED THEM FOR SUPPRESSING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. ACCORDING TO SEVERAL EARLY DECEMBER POSTERS REPORTED BY JAPANESE PRESS, EVEN MAO HAS INDIRECTLY CRITICIZED LIU-TENG IN ALLEGED COMMENT THAT SOME PARTY MEMBERS OPPOSED CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND RESTRICTED RED GUARD ACITIVITIES.

B. THERE IS ALSO INCREASING EVIDENCE THAT CURRENT MARKED INTENSIFICATION MY THESE MAO-LIN ATTACKS HAS BEEN PREDICATED ON AND ACCOMPANIED BY STRONG RESISTANCE. ACCORDING ONE RED GUARD NEWSPAPER, POSTERS DENOUNCING CHEN PO-TA AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP APPEARED ON NOVEMBER 30, TWO DAYS AFTER MADAME MAO SPEECH TO CULTURAL RALLY, (WEEKA 45). ANOTHER RED GUARD NEWSPAPER REPORTED THAT SPEAKERS AT DECEMBER 2 RALLY DENOUNCING PENG CHEN TERMED HIS ARRENT "HEAD-ON BLOW AGAINST PRESENT COUNTER-CURRENT." REPORTED CLASHES BETWEEN IDENTIFIABLY MAOIST RED GUARDS AND WORKERS IN CHENGTU AND ELSEWHERE (WEEKA 50) MAY ALSO BE PART OF SAME PHENOMENON. IN OTHER EVENTS OF THE WEEK, RELATED TO OFFENSIVE, PEKING PAPERS DECEMBER 17 FEATURED LIN PIAO'S NEW FOREWARD TO SECOND EDITION OF "QUOTATIONS OF MAO TSE-TUNG" AND ON DECEMBER 19, CHIANG CHING, CHEN PO-TA AND CHOU EN-LAI ADDRESSED RALLY FOR PLA IN APPRECIATION FOR ARMY WORK WHICH "HAD ENABLED REVOLUTIONARY STUDENTS AND TEACHERS FROM ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY TO SEE CHAIRMAN MAO." WHILE LIN'S FOREWARD AND RALLY SPEECHS HAD LITTLE NEW CONTENT, PROPAGANDA HIGHLIGHTED STEADFAST UNITY OF MAO-LIN SIDE.

C. WHILE HAZARDOUS NOW TO TRY FORECAST OUTCOME, SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE MAO AND LIN HAVE BETTER THAN EVEN

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CHANCE OF OUSTING LIU AND TENG, HOWEVER, STRUGGLE HAS REVEALED EXTENT TO WHICH OPPOSITION HAS MOBILIZED

PAGE 5 RUMJDH 4399/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
AND "CONFUSED MASSES," SUGGESTING SOME WEAKNESS IN MAO-LIN POSITION AND DISRUPTIVE EFFECT OF OPPOSITION TACTICS. (CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)

6. CENTRAL-SOUTH PAPER SUSPENDED

A. CANTON RED GUARD NEWS (FORMERLY YANG CHENG WAN PAO) HAS NOT ARRIVED IN HONG KONG SINCE DECEMBER 13. SOURCE IN TOUCH WITH LOCAL NCNA PERSONNEL REPORTS FACTIONAL DISPUTE AMONG EDITORIAL STAFF HAS CAUSED SUSPENSION.

B. COMMENT: IF REPORT TRUE, SUSPENSION OF THIS IMPORTANT ORGAN OF CCP'S CENTRAL-SOUTH BUREAU REFLECTS ADVERSELY ON TAO CHU, FORMER FIRST SECRETARY THAT BUREAU AND STILL CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH POLITICAL FORTUNES OF REGION. (TAO HAS NOT BEEN IMMUNE FROM WALL POSTER CRITICISM. ACCORDING TO BRITISH SOURCES, ON NOVEMBER 16 HE WAS ATTACKED FOR PROTECTING "THE ERRING KWANGTUNG COMMITTEE" IN CONNECTION WITH THE CAMPAIGN TO REHABILITATE THE VICTIMS OF LAST JUNE'S WORK TEAMS IN THE UNIVERSITIES.) REPORTED SUSPENSION OF RED GUARD NEWS FOLLOWS CLOSELY ON HEELS BANNING OF SHANGHAI LIBERATION DAILY (WEEKA 50), AND THESE

PAGE 6 RUMJDH 4399/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
REPRESSIVE MEASURES INDICATIVE OF POLITICAL TURMOIL NOW PREVAILING ON MAINLAND. (CONFIDENTIAL).

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DATE: Dec 15 66 MSG NO.: 4245 TYPE: TE

FROM: HK TO: State

SUBJECT: Joint Market 50

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ✓ OTHER: _____

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. NDL 54-2

DATE: Dec 8 66 MSG NO.: 4100 TYPE: TEL

FROM: HK TO: State

SUBJECT: Trial Week No. 40

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ✓ OTHER: _____

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CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 48

EXTERNAL - - 1. PEKING LOSES GROUND IN UNGA CHIREP VOTE; 2. TAIWAN RECEIVES ATTENTION; 3. AFRO-ASIAN AFFAIRS: GANEFO AND AAPSO; 4. ALBANIAN NATIONAL DAY; 5. U.S. CONGRESSMAN APPLIES FOR CHICOM VISA; 6. PEKING DENOUNCES PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES OVER MACAO INCIDENT.

INTERNAL - 7. THE WEEK IN PEKING: END OF ANOTHER PHASE IN CULTURAL REVOLUTION?; 8. RECENT VIOLENCE REPORTED IN WALL POSTERS; 9. BIOGRAPHIC NOTES.

EXTERNAL

1. PEKING LOSES GROUND IN UNGA CHIREP VOTE.

A. UNGA VOTED NOV 29 BY 57-46 MAJORITY TO REJECT ALBANIAN RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD SEAT PEKING AND EXPEL GRC FROM U.N. COMPARED TO LAST YEAR'S VOTE OF 47-47 ON SIMILAR RESOLUTION, VOTE REPRESENTED SIGNIFICANT LOSS IN PEKING'S SUPPORTERS, MAINLY IN AFRICA. TO DATE, PEKING HAS NOT COMMENTED OR OR REPORTED U.N. VOTE. CHICOM INTEREST IN DEBATE BEFORE VOTE WAS REFLECTED IN NCNA REJECTION OF ITALIAN PROPOSAL FOR CHIREP STUDY COMMITTEE (WEEKA 47) AND NOV 25 PEOPLE'S DAILY

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"COMMENTATOR" ARTICLE WHICH ADAMANTLY OPPOSED CANADIAN "UNDISGUISED PLAN FOR) TWO CHINAS." LATTER ARTICLE APPEARED MILDER THAN PEKING PUBLIC STANCE ON U.N. OF LAST FALL AND WINTER AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT CRUX OF REGIME'S POSITION WAS OUSTER OF GRC FROM U.N. OMMENTATOR MADE NO MENTION OF HARSH, MULTIPLE CONDITIONS FOR CHICOM ENTRY INTO U.N. IMPLIED BY CHEN YI LAST SEPTEMBER SUBSTITUTING FOR THEM VAGUE ADMONITION THAT

"U.N. MUST FREE ITSELF FROM U.S. DOMINATION AND THOROUGHLY RECTIFY ITS OWN MISTAKES". (HK 3736)

B. COMMENT: WHILE PEKING WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SOONER OR LATER POINT TO CHIREP VOTE AS PROOF OF ITS CONTENTION THAT U.N. IS UNDER JOINT US-SOVIET CONTROL, WE IMAGINE THAT REGIME'S POOR SHOWING THIS YEAR REPRESENTS TO SOME WITHING CHINA YET FURTHER EVIDENCE OF NATION'S LOSS OF PRESTIGE RESULTING FROM CURRENT MILITANT INTRANSIGENT POLICIES. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. TAIWAN RECEIVES ATTENTION

A. PROBABLY STIMULATED BY CHIREP ISSUE, PEKING DURING WEEK TURNED ITS ATTENTION TOWARDS U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH TAIWAN. NCNA NOV 29 DEPICTED U.S. AS ENGAGED IN BUILDING UP TAIWAN AS BASE FOR "EXPANDING ITS AGGRESSIVE WAR IN VIETNAM" AND AS AN "ADVANCED STRONG-POINT FOR ITS AGGRESSION IN ASIA." U.S. PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES ON ISLAND WERE DESCRIBED AS "FEVERISH PLUNDER" OF TAIWAN'S CIVILIAN SUPPLIES, AND NCNA REITERATED ALLEGATION OF SEVERAL MONTHS STANDING THAT U.S. "PLANNING SHIFT" NUMBER OF B-52 BOMBERS FROM GUAM TO KUNG KUAN AIRFIELD. TAIWAN'S R AND R FUNCTION ALSO DREW PEKING'S FIRE, AND REGIME SOMEHOW LINKED ESTABLISHMENT JOINT US-GRC "VEGETABLE...AND

BAMBOO RESEARCH CENTERS" TO U.S. PLOT EXERT "STRANGLE HOLD ON TAIWAN'S ECONOMY...AND HARNESS (IT) TO U.S. EXPANDING AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM." ONE NOTE-

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

WORTHY OMISSION IN NCNA'S PRESENTATION WAS ANY REFERENCE TO U.S.USE OF TAIWAN IN CONTEXT OUR SEEKING "IMPOSE WAR ON HEADS OF CHINESE PEOPLE".

B. IN MORE POLITICAL VEIN, NCNA NOV 20 ADVERTISEMENT IN NEW YORK TIMES AND NOV 21 STREET DEMONSTRATION IN TOKYO ON BEHALF TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE AS EVIDENCE OF THIS. U.S. MOTIVE IN ALLEGEDLY PUSHING TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE FAMILIARLY DESCRIBED AS SEEKING "LEGALIZE OCCUPATION OF CHINA'S TERRITORY... AND PROLONG DEPRIVATION CPR'S LEGAL RIGHTS IN U.N." ARTICLE AVOWED CHINESE PEOPLE WOULD DEFINITELY LIBERATE TAIWAN". (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. AFRO ASIAN AFFAIRS: GANEFO AND AAPSO

A. FIRST ASIAN REGIONAL GAMES OF NEW EMERGING FORCES (GANEFO) OPNED NOV 25 IN PHNOM PENH AND WERE HAILED BY CHICOM EDITORIALS, MESSAGES, MASS RALLY IN PEKING, AND VOLUMINOUS NCNA RPORTS OF CONTESTS. CHICOMS, WHO FOOTED LARGE PORTION OF BILL, EXPRESSED PLEASURE

THAT ASIANS HAD "FRUSTRATED U.S. IMPERIALIST SCHEMES TO SABOTAGE GANEFO." PEOPLE'S DAILY "COMMENTATOR" NOV 30 WENT SO FAR AS TO LINK ALLEGED US-RVN VIOLATIONS OF CAMBODIAN BORDER WITH OPENING OF GAMES. IN ABSENCE STRONG TEAMS FROM MANY PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES, CHICOMS DOMINATED EVENTS BY LOPSIDED MARGINS. NOT SURPRISINGLY, NCNA ATTRIBUTED VICTORIES TO MAO-THOUGHT AND REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT. FOR EXAMPLE, CHINESE GYMNAST IN WINNING GOLD MEDAL "TO STRAINS OF CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY LYRICAL SONG, TURTHFULLY AND GRAPHICALLY BROUGHT OUT HER PROFOUND FEELINGS FOR CCP IN SERIES OF WHIRLWING SOMERSAULTS, JUMPS AND BODY TURNS".

B. MEANWHILE, PEKING-BASED AFRO-ASIAN WRITERS BUREAU DISPATCHED DELEGATION (WHICH LATER DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS) TO AFRICAN AND ASIAN COUNTRIES WITH OSTENSIBLE OBJECT OF DRUMMING UP SUPPORT FOR 1967 A-AWRITERS CONFERENCE TO BE HELD IN PEKING. DELEGATIOONS WERE FOLLOWED TWO WEEKS LATER BY TWO SIMILAR "FRIENDSHIP" MISSIONS FROM PEKING HEADQUARTERS OF A-A JOURNALISTS

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ASSOCIATION.NCNA REPORTS OF DELEGATIONS ACTIVITIES SUGGEST THAT JUNKETS APPARENTLY PART OF PEKING EFFORT NOTED IN PAST TWO MONTHS TO BLOCK MANEUVERS BY SOVIETS

AND OTHERS TO SHIF SCHEDULED 1967 AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION (AAPSO) MEETING AWAY FROM PEKING.

C. COMMENT: AMOUNT OF ENERGY, PUBLICITY AND FUNDS EXPENDED ON SUCH TRIFLES AS GANEFO AND VARIOUS AFRO-ASIAN FIGURES WHOSE MAIN ACCOMPLISHMENT TO DATE IS FREELOADING AT CHINESE EXPENSE INDICATIVE OF REGIME'S FRANTIC AND UNREALISTIC EFFORT TO PURSUE THAT WILL OF THE WISP, WORLD REVOLUTION, AND TO DEMONSTRATE "CHINA HAS FRIENDS ALL OVER". (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. ALBANIAN NATIONAL DAY.

-. CHICOM HIGH-LEVEL REACTION TO RECENT SOVIET INITIATIVES DESIGNED ISOLATE CHINA IN INTERNALTIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT CAME IN CHOU ENLAI SPEECH AT NOV 29 ALBANIAN EMBASSY NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION. ACCORDING NCNA, CHOU DECLARED THAT "CPSU LEADING CLIQUE HAS RECENTLY USED FORUMS OF CONGRESSES OF SOME PARTIES TO MAKE UNBRIDLED ATTACKS ON CCP AND STIR UP NEW ANTI-CHINESE TIDE IN VAIN ATTEMPT... ISOLATE CHINA."

B. SPEECHES EXCHANGED AND OTHER SINO-ALBANIAN EXERCISES IN PEKING WERE GENERALLY ON PAR WITH LAST YEAR AND ECHOED RECENT CHICOM DISPLAY OF SOLIDARITY

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

WITH TIRANA AT ALBANIAN PARTY CONGRESS (WEEKA 45). ONLY ON CHICOM CULTURAL REVOLUTION WAS SIGNIFICANT DISPARITY IN CHINSE AND ALBANIAN ATTITUDE NOTICEABLE. ALBANIAN SPEAKERS AT PEKING RALLY AND EMBASSY RECEPTION CONFINED THEMSELVES TO "GREETING" CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND DID NOT COMENT, AS CHINESE SPEECHES HAD, ON ITS CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. HOWEVER, VISITING ALBANIAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER IN LESS FORMAL CONTEXT OF MEETING WITH RED GUARDS WAS QUOTED AS SAYING "ALBANIAN PARTY AND PEOPLE WARMLY WELCOME CULTURAL REVOLUTION (AND) SUPPORT RED GUARD MOVEMENT." (HK 3856)(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE).

5. U.S. CONGRESSMAN APPLIES FOR CHICOM VISA

A. CONGRESSMAN LESTER WOLFF (DEM-NY) ON NOV 30 SUBMITTED THROUGH LOCAL OFFICE CHINA TRAVEL SERVICE AN APPLICATION FOR A CHICOM ENTRY VISA.THE CONGRESSMAN WAS RECEIVED POLITELY AT CTS AND INFORMED THAT HIS APPLICATION WOULD BE FORWARDED TO PEKING.HE WAS PROMISED A REPLY WITHIN A FEW DAYS.

B. COMMENT: IT IS NOT UNUSUAL FOR CTS TO ACCEPT POLITELY A VISA APPLICATION FOR FORWARDING TO PEKING WITOUT ANYTHING MORE COMING OF IT; THIS REPRESENTED A SLIGHT COURTESY, HOWEVER, SINCE ON SEVERAL RECENT OCCASIONS CTS HAS INFORMED APPLICANT HE SHOULD SUBMIT VISA APPLICATION TO PEKING HIMSELF, RATHER THAN THROUGH CTS. (WEEKA 36) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. PEKING DENOUNCES PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES OVER MACAO INCIDENT

A. NCNA NOV 30 DESPATCH (ECHOED BY RADIO PEKING, ACCORDING REUTERS) DENOUNCED PORTUGUESE POLICE ACTION AGAINST TAIPA ISLAND RESIDENTS ON NOV 15 ARISING OUT OF DISPUTE OVER CONSTRUCTION PROJECT. PEKING CHARGED PORTUGUESE WITH "BLOODY FASCIST BEHAVIOUR." REPORT DECLARED THAT "PORTUGUESE IMPERIALISTS HAD CONSISTENTLY HARMED INTERESTS OF CHINESE COMPATRIOTS " RESIDING IN MACAO AND VOICED STRONG SUPPORT FOR "FIVE DEMANDS" ADVANCED BY LOCAL CHINESE.

B. COMMENT: PEKING HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET ON MACAO FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND PROBABLY WAS IMPELLED TO SPEAK OUT ON INCIDENT BY FORCE OF LOCAL EVENTSN

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

RATHER THAN AS PART OF PRECONCEIVED PALN INCREASE PRESSURES ONPORTUGUESE AT THIS TIME. NCNA STORY DID

NOT INTERJECT PEKING DIRECTLY INTO AFFAIR, CONFINING ITSELF TO REITERATION, AND STRONGLY IMPLIED SUPPPORT, OF LOCAL DEMANDS, NEVERTHELESS, PEKING CLEARLY HOPES THAT PORTUGUESE WILL DRAW PROPER INFERENCE FRO M REGIME'S GROWNING INTEREST IN AFFAIR AND SUBMIT TO LOCAL CHINESE DEMANDS. ONE POSSIBLE REASON FOR REGIME'S DECISION PUBLICIZE INCIDENT MAY BE EFFORT IMPRESS ON NEWLY ARRIVED PORTUGUESE GOVERNOR NEED TO TAKE REGIMES INTERESTS AND DESIRES INTO ACCOUNT IN GOVERNING AREA(HKM BIWEEKAS 23 AND 24)(CONFIDENTIAL).

INTERNAL

7. THE WEEK IN PEKING: END OF ANOTHER PHASE IN CULTURAL REVOLUTION?

A.EVENTS OF PAST WEEK SUGGEST THAT ANH HE OF THE CULTURALTIEVOLUTION HAS ENDED. EIGHTH AND FINAL RED GUARD RALLY HELD NOV 25 AND 26 BROUGHT CURTAIN DOWN ON PEKING MASS-MEETING ACT OF RED GUARD DRAMA, AND WHILE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS AND ACCOUNTS PROMISED A RESUMPTION OF TRIPS TO PEKING NEXT SPRING, IN INTERIM RED GUARDS HAVE BEEN URGED TO UNDERTAKE "LITTLE LONG MARCHES," PROPAGATING THOUGHT OF MAO EN ROUTE. ASIDE FROM THIS THERE WERE NO SPEECHES NOR ANY AUTHORITATIVE EDITORIAL COMMENTARY Re RED GUARD MANDATE

IN MONTHS TO COME. RALLY EXCEPTIONAL ONLY AS LAST OF SERIES. TWO DAY FORMAT, IDENTICAL TO SEVENTH RALLY, PROVIDED FEW SUPRISES. MAO AND LIN PIAO APPEARED BOTH DAYS. LIU SHAO-CHI AND TENG HSIAO-PING, BOTH UNDER CRITICISM DURING WEEK APPEARED, ALTHOUGH PEKING PARTY FIRST SECRETARY LI HSUEH-FENG, ANOTHER RECIPIENT OF SUSTAINED WALL POSTER ABUSE, MISSED HIS FIRST RALLY IN ENTIRE SERIES.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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B. ACCORDING TO REUTERS (QUOTING CZECH PRESS REPORT) SEVENTY TRAINS WITH TOTAL OF 50,000 RED GUARDS LEAVING PEKING EVERY DAY SUBSEQUENT TO LAST RALLY. IN ADDITION, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF REMAINING RED GUARDS HAVE ALSO APPARENTLY BEEN CURTAILED ALTHOUGH WE HAVE RECENTLY RECEIVED WORK OF VIOLENT INDICENTS IN MID-NOVEMBER INVOLVING RED GUARDS (ITEM 8) AND OF FURTHER FRICTION BETWEEN COMPETING RED GUARD UNITS AT SAME LOCALE. WE HAVE RECEIVED NO WORD OF DENUNCIATIONS CONTINUING AFTER JAPANESE PRESS REPORTS OF WALL POSTER ATTACKS ON WANG JEN-CHUNG AND ON LIU SHAO-CHI/ TENG HSIAO-PING FEW DAYS EARLIER ON NOV 24. THE 20-PAGE PAMPHLET CRITICIZING LIU SHAO-CHI AND TENG HISAO-PING, ISSUED BY PEITA STUDENTS ON 23RD, WAS REPORTEDLY REMOVED THE NEXT DAY (TOKYO 4009). FURTHERMORE, ACCORDING TO CZECH NEWS SERVICE, STATE COUNCIL POSTER ANNOUNCED ON NOV 30 THAT FROM NOW ON IT WOULD ONLY ISSUE ORDERS, AND STOP ANSWERING QUESTIONS PUT BY RED GUARDS.

C. THE APPARENT DAMPING OF RED GUARDS AND CULTURAL REVOLUTION HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY CONTINUED LACK OF OFFICIAL ACTIVITY OR COMMENT. NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL MEDIA HAVE SPENT THEIR TIME PUFFING SUCH FILLER ITEMS AS LOCAL ACCLAIM FOR THE EIGHTH RALLY, ADULATION FOR LATEST PLA HERO TSAI YUNG-HSIANG (WEEKA 44) AND CRITICISM OF EARLIER CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC TARGETS CHOU YANG, HOU WAI-LU, AND SUN YEH FANG. ONLY EXCEPTION TO ROUTINE WAS CHOU EN-LAI'S REMARK IN NOV 2 SPEECH AT ALBANIAN NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION THAT "PROLETARIAN REVOLUTIONARY LINE REPRESENTED BY COMRADE MAO TSE TUNG HAS WON VICTORY, AND BOURGEOIS LINE OPPOSED TO REVOLUTION HAS BEEN DEFEATED."

D. ALTHOUGH CHOU'S STATEMENT IS MOST POSITIVE VICTORY CLAIM WE HAVE SEEN SINNCE JULY 1, IT MAY REPRESENT FACE-SAVING FORMULA FOR PHASING OUT RED GUARD ATTACKS ON PARTY - GOVERNMENT FIGURES. TO OUR VIEW, EVENTS OF PAST WEEKS, INCLUDING DEPARTURE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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AND SOME APPARENT MUZZLING OF RED GUARDS, AND ACONCERN SHOWN OVER ECONOMY, HARDLY ADD UP TO A WIN FOR THE EXTREMIST APPGOACH APPARENTLY REPRESENTED BY MAO AND LIN.(CONFIDENTIAL)

3. RECENT VIOLENCE REPORTED IN WALL POSTERS.

-. SEEMING DRIFT OF EVENTS AND LACK OF SIGNIFICANT OFFICIAL ACTIVITY OR COMMENT IN PEKING DURING MOST OF NOVEMBER HAS APPARENTLY TAKEN PLACE AGAINST A BACKDROP OF CONSIDERABLE VIOLENCEM FOR FIRST TIME SINCE RED GUARDS PHYSICALLY CONFRONTED PROVINCIAL PARTY AUTHORITIES IN LATE AUGUST AND EARLY SEPTEMBER, NUMBER OF WALL POSTERS ARE BEGINNING TO APPEAR WHICH REFER TO VIOLENT INCIDENTS OF SPECIFIED AND RECENT DATE, INVOLVING BOTH STUDENTS AND ADULTS.

B. SHANGHAI WALL POSTERS SEEN BY BRITISH DIPLOMATS DESCRIBE SEVERAL VERSIONS OF INCIDENT AT AN TING (1344/0800) IN EAST CHINA ON NOV 9 THROUGH 11, WHICH STARTED WHEN "SEVERAL THOUSAND" SHANGHAI WORKERS FORCED THEIR WAY ONTO EXPRESS TRAIN BOUND FOR PEKING AND DISRUPTED RAIL TRAVEL FOR 30 HOURS UNTIL THEY PERSUADED RETURN BY CHANG CHUN - CHIAO.(BOTH A SHANGHAI PARTY COMMITTEE SECRETARY AND MEMBER CENTRAL COMMITTEE

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

CULTURAL REVOLUTION WORK GROUP) WHO ARRIVED FROM PEKING BY SPECIAL MILITARY PLANE [illegible]MED WITH MESSAGE FROM CHEN PO-TA.

2. LARGE HANDWRITTEN POSTER SEEN BY BRITISH OUTSIDE ENTRANCE TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE HEADQUARTERS IN PEKING REFERES TO BLOODY INCIDENTS IN PROVINCIAL CAPITAL HOFEI IN WHICH (ACCORDING TO ANOTHER POSTER) THREE PEOPLE KILLED AND 178 INJURED ON NOV 16 AND 17. DETAILS OF INCIDENT UNKNOWN, BUT CONTEXT OF POSTER SUGGESTS THAT BOTH RED GUARDS AND MILITARY INVOLVED. POSTER ATTACKS TAO CHU FOR ATTEMPTING TO EXONERATE ANHWEI FIRST SECRETARY LI PAO-HUA FOR RESPONSIBILITY OVER INCIDENTS.

3. ANOTHER RECENT VIOLENT INCIDENT WAS REPORTED IN TOKYO 'S 4089 SUMMARIZING MAINICHI REPORT OF NOV 14 DESCRIBING FREE FOR ALL BETWEEN RED GUARDS OF PEKING MACHINERY INSTITUTE AND WORKERS OF FIRST MACHINE TOOL FACTORY.

4. ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS SHOWS NO CLEAR PATTERN. SOME INVOLVED RED GUARDS, SOME WORKER, SOME BOTH. MILITARY ROLE EITHER UNCLEAR OR NONEXISTENT; TROOPS MAY POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN ONE INCIDENT. MOREOVER, WHILE IT IS TEMPTING TO TRY AND TIE INCIDENTS

DIRECTLY TO POWER STRUGGLE IN PEKING, EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT SUCH CONJECTURE. ABOT ALL THAT CAN BE SAID AT THIS POINT IS THAT DISRUPTION AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, A NATURALPRUDUCT OF "MSS DEMO-CRACY" LINE PROMULGATED BY MAO AND LIN, HAS INCREASED IN RECENT WEEKS, AND MAY HAVE PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT AMMUNITION FOR OPPONENTS OF MAO-LIN POLICIES AS WELL AS CONTRIBUTED TO DECISION TO PUT BRAKES ON RED GUARD MOVEMENT.
CONFIDENTIAL (NOFORN)

9. BIOGRAPHIC NOTES

LIN PIAO

PEOPLE'S DAILY NOV 30 REPORTED THAT MESSAGE TO RETURNED INDONESIAN OVERSEAS CHINESE EXPRESSED "SOLICITUDE OF CHAIRMAN MAO, VICE CHAIRMAN LIN PIAO AND PREMIER CHOU

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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EN LAI". THIS APPEARS TO CONFIRM OUR SPECULATION (WEEKA 37, SEPTEMBER 15) THAT AUGUST PLENUM MAY HAVE ABOLISHED FORM OF MULTIPLE VICE CHAIRMANSHIPS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE LIN WITH UNIQUE PARTY TITLE AND POSITION COMMENSURATE WITH HIS NEW ROLE AS NUMBER TWO IN THE CCP.

TAO CHU

THE CANTON HUNG WEI PAO (RED GUARD NEWS) OV NOV 23 IDENTIFIED TAO CHU AS "POLITICAL COMMISSAR OF PLA FORCES IN CANTON MILITARY REGION," INDICATING THAT TAO HAS HELD ON TO THIS POSITION (IN WHICH HE WAS FIRST IDENTIFIED IN 1958) DESPITE HIS REMOVAL TO PARTY CENTRAL AND REPLACEMENT AS CENTRAL SOUTH FIRST SECRETARY BY WANG JEN-CHUNG.

LI FU-CHUN

EIGHTH RALLY LIST RANKED LI IN HIS CUSTOMARY (I.E., POST-PLENUM) SLOT IN HIERARCHY (NO. 10).

HIS INCLUSION ON STANDING COMMITTEE POLITBURO WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ELEVATION HIS NAME IN PARTY LISTINGS, SUGGESTING THAT THE TWO ABOVE HIM, LIU SHAO-CHI AND CHU TEH, REMAIN STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBERS ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED AS SUCH SINCE BEFORE AUGUST PLENUM OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

TING KUO-YU

NCNA NOV 26 IN LISTING THOSE PRESENT AT RECEPTION FOR ALBANIAN DELEGATION NAMED TING "MEMBER OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE PEKING CCP CITY COMMITTEE."

TING, WHO HAD BEEN AMBASSADOR TO PAKISTAN NROM 1959 UNTILJULY THIS YEAR, IS A FORMER PLA GENERAL. IN THE KOREAN WAR, HE COMMANDED THE 42D ARMY UNDER LIN PIAO'S 4TH FIELD ARMY. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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49
Action
INR
Info
EA
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NSC
CIA
NSA
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AGR
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HEW
LAB
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POUCH: (2) BANGKOK, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, CANBERRA, DARESSALAAM, DJAKARTA, KARACHI, KATHMANDU, KUALA LUMPUR, LONDON, MANILA, MOSCOW, MUNICH, NEW DELHI, PRAGUE, RANGOON, RAWALPINDI, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SOFIA, SINGAPORE, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, CINCPAC, COMNAVPHL, COMUSTDC, 13AFMANILA, OTTAWA

WEEKA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 47

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXTERNAL - 1. PEKING ON CHIREP; 2. VIETNAM AND "WAR CRIMES;" 3. CHICOM FRICTION WITH BULGARIA, HUNGARY,

PAGE 2 RUMJDH 3723/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

USSR; 4. PEKING PROTESTS DEMONSTRATIONS AT EXHIBIT IN JAPAN.

INTERNAL - THE WEEK IN PEKING: INCREASING CLOUDINESS, VARIABLE WINDS; 6. CHANGE IN SINKIANG RED GUARD ORGANIZATION.

(1)

EXTERNAL

1. PEKING ON CHIREP

A. NCNA NOVEMBER 22 ARTICLE ON UNGA CHIREP DEBATE REVEALED PEKING'S SUPPORT FOR ALBANIAN-TYPE RESOLUTION

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

AND TERMED ITALIAN PROPOSAL FOR CHIREP STUDY COMMITTEE "AN ABSURD IDEA WHICH IN ESSENCE ADVOCATES TWO CHINAS." ARTICLE REFLECTED PEKING'S CONTINUED ADAMANT OPPOSITION TO "TWO-CHINA" FORMULA IN OR OUT OF UN, AS WELL AS APPARENT NEW-FOUND CONCERN THAT U.S. TAKING POLICY TACK WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN SHIFTING ONUS ONTO CHICOMS FOR REGIME'S FAILURE TO ENTER UN. THUS, NCNA ASSERTED THAT ITALIAN RESOLUTION HAD BEEN "MASTERMINDED" BY U.S. IN ORDER PORTRAY "DEPRIVAL OF CHINA'S LAWFUL RIGHTS AS HER 'SELF-ISOLATION' FROM UN WHEN CHINA REJECTS 'TWO-CHINAS' TRAP." HOWEVER, ARTICLE SAID NOTHING

OF CONDITIONS FOR PEKING'S ENTRY RAISED BY FONMIN CHEN YI AT SEPTEMBER 1965 PRESS CONFERENCE, DECLARING SIMPLY THAT "EVERYBODY KNOWS CHINA'S STAND TOWARD UN UNDER U.S.-SOVIET CONTROL."

B. LOCAL COMMUNIST PAPER (HONG KONG TA KUNG PAO, NOVEMBER 24) ECHOED MAINLAND VIEW OF CHIREP DEBATE, AND IN ADDITION SINGLED OUT CANADIANS AS SUPPORTERS OF U.S. INSPIRED TWO-CHINA SCHEME. PAPER SUGGESTED SLYLY THAT TO BE CONSISTENT, OTTAWA SHOULD APPROVE "TWO-CANADAS" SOLUTION FOR QUEBEC SEPARATISTS. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. VIETNAM AND "WAR CRIMES"

A. REGIME PRODUCED LITTLE COMMENT OF NOTE ON VIETNAM DURING PAST WEEK, BUT CHICOM MDEIA KEPT COVERAGE AT HIGH LEVEL BY PRINTING LENGHY EXERPTS FROM DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY HANOI AND VIET CONG COMMISSIONS ON ALLEGED U.S. "WAR CRIMES." PUBLICATION OF DOCUMENTS WAS ACCOMPANIED BY COORDINATED OUTBURSTS OF INDIGNATION IN FORM OF STATEMENTS BY CHICOM MASS ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH CONDEMNED U.S. "IMPERIALISTS" AND SOVIET "REVISIONISTS" WITH EQUAL

VEHEMENCE.

B. COMMENT: HANOI UNLIKELY TO DERIVE MUCH COMFORT FROM PEKING'S INSISTENCE UPON ATTACKING SOVIETS IN CONTEXT CONDEMNATIONS OF U.S. "WAR CRIMES." NORTH VIETNAMESE MAY ALSO BE WONDERING WHY CHINESE HAVE TO DATE REMAINED

0236
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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

SILENT ON BERTRAND RUSSELL'S SELF-APPOINTED "WAR CRIMES" TRIBUNAL. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. CHICOM FRICTION WITH BULGARIA, HUNGARY, USSR

A. BULGARIA: NCNA SOFIA CORRESPONDENT NOVEMBER 18 REPORTED "DISCRIMINATORY" MEASURES TAKEN BY BULGARIAN PARTY AND FONMIN OFFICIALS TO BAR HIM FROM BULGARIAN PARTY CONGRESS, INCLUDING EVEN PUBLIC OPENING SESSION. ACCORDING ARTICLE, BULGARIANS JUSTIFIED ACTION ON GROUNDS THAT CCP HAD NOT SENT DELEGATION TO CONGRESS. ARTICLE ASSERTED THAT TREATMENT OF NCNA MAN RESULTED FROM "BULGARIAN REVISIONIST LEADING CLIQUE...FOLLOWING ANTI-CHINA LINE OF SOVIET REVISIONIST CLIQUE."

B. HUNGARY: CHICOM FONMIN ONOTE OF NOVEMBER 17 ACCUSED HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT OF "SABOTAGING RELATIONS" BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES BY "TAILING AFTER SOVIET REVISIONISTS"

PAGE 5 RUMJDH 3723/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
IN EXPELLING FIVE CHICOM STUDENTS FROM HUNGARY. NOTE REVEALED THAT STUDENT EXCHANGE WITH HUNGARY HAD BEEN SUBJECT OF CONTENTION FOR PAST YEAR EVEN BEFORE PEKING ORDERED ALL FOREIGN STUDENTS HOME IN WAKE OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION. FONMIN ALSO TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO VOICE GENERAL DISAPPROVAL OF HUNGARIAN PRESS TREATMENT OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND CHICOM DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES.

C. CHICOM VERSION OF WHY SOVIET "FRIENDSHIP" DELEGATION LED BY PRAVDA COMMENTATOR MAYEVSKY SUDDENLY SUSPENDED CHINA VISIT MID-WAY THROUGH ITINERARY PREDICTABLY LAID BLAME AT FEET OF SOVIETS. NCNA NOVEMBER 23 DECLARED THAT SUSPENSION OF VIST, WHICH HAS BEEN ARRANGED IN ACCORDANCE EXCHANGE PLAN BETWEEN CHINESE AND SOVIET FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATIONS, REPRESENTED "SABOTAGE" OF SINO-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP AND HAD CREATED "UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT."

D. COMMENT: THREE INSTANCES CITED ABOVE, WHILE NOT HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT PER SE, REFLECT CORROSIVE EFFECT OF SINO-SOVIET POLEMIC ON PEKING'S DAY-TO-DAY STATE RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW AND ITS ALLIES. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

0237

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

4. PEKING PROTESTS DEMONSTRATION AT EXHIBIT IN JAPAN

A. PEKING CHOSE REVLATIVELY LOW LEVEL VEHICLE OF NCNA TO PROTEST DEMONSTARTIONS STAGED IN FRONT CHICOM ECONOMIC AND TRADE EXHIBIT IN NAGOYA BY "RIGHT WING HOOLIGANS... (ACTING) WITH CONNIVANCE OF SATO GOVERNMENT." NCNA CHARGED JAPANESE POLICE WITH STANDING BY WHILE ATTACKS WERE IN PROGRESS, AND THEN USING "BRUTAL FORCE" TO PREVENT CHINESE AND JAPANESE FRIENDS FROM PROTECTING EXHIBIT. NCNA ALSO REPORTED PRESS CONFERENCE CALLED IN NAGOYA BY JEN CHIEN-HSIN, DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL OF EXHIBIT DELEGATION, WHO "DEMANDED THAT SATO GOVERNMENT PUNISH CULPRITS AND GUARANTEE THAT SIMILAR INCIDENTS WILL NOT RECUR," THEREBY IMPLYING EXHIBIT WILL CONTINUE. JEN WARNED JAPANESE GOVERNMENT THAT "IN ALL SERIOUSNESS IT MUST SHOULDER ALL THE CONSEQUENCES (OF INCIDENT)," BUT ALSO EXPRESSED VIEW THAT JAPANESE AND CHINESE PEOPLE WOULD NOT ALLOW VARIOUS EVIL FORCES, INCLUDING COLLABORATION WITH SOVIET MODERN REVISIONISM, TO DISRUPT "SINO-JAPANESE FRIENDSHIP."

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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49
Action

INR
Info
EA
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NSC
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUASTP/AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
STATE GRNC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 3723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO

POUCH: (2) BANGKOK, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, CANBERRA, DARESSALAAM, DJAKARTA, KARACHI, KATHMANDU, KUALA LUMPUR, LONDON, MANILA, MOSCOW, MUNICH, NEW DELHI, PRAGUE, RANGOON, RAWALPINDI, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SOFIA, SINGAPORE, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, CINCPAC, COMNAVPHL, COMUSTDC, 13AFMANILA, OTTAWA

WEEKA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 47

B. COMMENT: NCNA TREATMENT OF INCIDENT INDICATES THAT PEKING DOES NOT VIEW IT AS REQUIRING MAJOR RETALIATORY ACTION. PEKING'S PRESENT APPRECIATION OF ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF JAPAN UNDOUBTEDLY A MAJOR FACTOR IN HOLDING IN CHECK THE TYPE OF

PAGE 2 RUMJDH 3723/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
EMOTIONS THAT PROMPTED REGIME IN 1958 TO SUSPEND VIRTUALLY ALL TRADE WITH JAPAN FOLLOWING NAGASAKI FLAG INCIDENT. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

INTERNAL

5. THE WEEK IN PEKING: INCREASING CLOUDINESS, VARIABLE WINDS

A. CHICOM INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE MARKED DURING PAST WEEK BY LACK OF SIGNIFICANT OFFICIAL ACTIVITY AND COMMENT PERHAPS AS SIGN. AS HAS OFTEN BEEN CASE IN

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PAST, OF IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS BELOW SURFACE. IN FACT, THOSE SHREDS OF NEWS AND NON-NEWS THAT HAVE EMERGED DURING PERIOD INDICATE THAT VITAL DISPUTE CONTINUES BETWEEN MEMBERS OR REGIME OVER MEANS OF DEALING WITH "SMALL HANDFUL" OF ENEMIES STILL ENTRENCHED IN PARTY, AND THAT ADVOCATES OF EXTREMIST APPROACH, I.E., REMOVAL OF ENEMIES FROM OFFICE, CONTINUING TO PRESS ATTACKS THROUGH RED GUARDS. ADDING TO OUR GACKGROUND INFORMATION, BOTH TONE AND CONTENT ON EARLIER DOCUMENTS WE RECEIVED DURING WEEK -- A LIN PIAO SPEECH TO THE ELVENTH PLENUM IN AUGUST AND CHOU EN-LAI INSTRUCTIONS TO A VISITING

GROUP OF RED GUARDS FROM HARBIN PROBABLY IN SEPTEMBER (HK 3721) STRENGTHEN IMPRESSION THAT LIN PIAO AND CHOU EN-LAI ARE PURSUING DIVERGENT COURSES AND STRATEGIES.

B. DURING MID-NOVEMBER, SEVERAL INDICATORS LED TO IMPRESSION OF POSSIBLE SWITCH IN MAO'S STRATEGY, A CHANGE OF DIRECTION IN THE PROSECUTION OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND STEP BACKWARD IN CAMPAIGN FOR REMOVAL HIS OPPOSITION (HK 3592). CHIEF AMONG THEM WERE: MAO'S PUBLIC CHAT WITH LIU SHAO-CHI ON NOVEMBER 10; LIN PIAO'S FAILURE TO APPEAR IN NOVEMBER 11 MOTORCADE AND APPARENT DECREASE IN PRESS MENTION; EDITORIAL CONCERN OVER THE CONOMY AND THE REVELATION OF ECONOMIC PLANNER LI FU-CHUN'S STANDING COMMITTEE STATUS; AND OFFICIAL EFFORTS TO REDUCE RED GUARD POPULATION OF PEKING.

C. HOWEVER, FOLLOWING INDICATIONS OF PAST WEEK TEND TO SUGGEST A MORE COMPLICATED PICTURE. TANJUG REPORTED NOVEMBER 21 THAT CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD ORDERED PUBLIC BURNING OF ALL FILES COMPILED BY REPUDIATED PARTY CULTURAL REVOLUTION WORK TEAMS. IF REPORT ACCURATE,

DESTRUCTION COULD INDICATE ATTEMPT ON PART OF EXTREMISTS TO REMOVE INFORMATION WHICH COULD SERVE AS BASIS FOR POSSIBLE RETALIATION FOR THEIR ATTACKS ON THESE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTY APPARATUS.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

D. ON NOVEMBER 25, REUTERS REPORTED THAT A 22 PAGE PAMPHLET BY PEKING UNIVERSITY RED GUARDS CRITICIZING LIU SHAO-CHI AND TENG HSIAO-PING HAD BEEN POSTED PROMINENTLY IN THE CAPITAL. THE REPORT CALLED THE POSTER THE MOST DETAILED AND AUTHORITATIVE DENUNCIATION YET, ONE WHICH APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN WRITTEN UNDER DIRECTION OF PERSONS WITH A CLOSE KNOWLEDGE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN HIGHEST LEVELS OF CCP. PAMPHLET CLIMAXED GROWING CRESCENDO OF REPORTS DURING PAST WEEK OF POSTERS CRITICIZING TEN AND LIU IN PEKING AND CANTON. ONE DIPLOMAT REPORTED HAVING SEEN A POSTER IN PEKING ACCUSING TENG HSIAO-PING OF "TAKING CAPITALIST ROAD," AND ANOTHER IN CANTON BEARING CHARGE THAT TENG WAS MASTERMIND BEHIND PENG CHEN'S "BLACK GANG" (CONGEN A3099).

E. FOR SEVERAL DAYS WE HAVE BEEN EXPECTING SOME

PAGE 5 RUMJDH 3723/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
CLARIFICATION OF CURRENT DIRECTION OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION AT WHAT HAS BEEN RUMORED AS THE LAST AND LARGEST OF RED GUARD RALLIES. PRESS REPORTS FROM PEKING INDICATE THAT RALLY FINALLY HELD TODAY NOVEMBER 25, BUT PREPARATIONS TOOK UNUSUALLY LONG TIME TO MAKE, AND WERE REPORTEDLY HALTED AT LEAST ONCE, A POSSIBLE FURTHER INDICATION OF INDECISIVENESS IN CAPITAL. NCNA HAS NOT YET REPORTED RALLY. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. CHANGE IN CINKIANG RED GUARD ORGANIZATION

A. RADIO URUMCHI (NOVEMBER 16) REPORTED ESTABLISHMENT OF "PROLETARIAN REVOLUTIONARY HEADQUARTERS" OF SINKIANG RED GUARDS OF NOVEMBER 14. NEW HEADQUARTERS APPARENTLY REPLACES SINKIANG "RED GUARD HEADQUARTERS FOR REVOLUTION AND REBELLION" ESTABLISHED LESS THAN THREE WEEKS AGO ON OCTOBER 27 (RADIO URUMCHI OCTOBER 29).

B. COMPARISON OF BROADCAST MATERIAL ACCOMPANYING ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO ORGANIZATIONS REVELAS FOLLOWING DIFFERENCES:

(1) REGIONAL MILITARY FIGURES NOT PUBLICLY MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH NEW ORGANIZATION AS COMPARED TO PROMINENT ROLE ACCORDED CHIEF OS STAFF OF SINKIANG MILITARY

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

PAGE 6 RUMJDH 3723/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
REGION AT CEREMONIES ESTABLISHING PREVIOUS HEADQUARTERS. PLA HAD ENT "WARM GREETINS" TO ORGANIZATION ESTABLISHED OCTOBER 27 WHILE AT NOVEMBER 14 MEETING, "WARM GREETINGS" CAME FROM SINKIANG PARTY COMMITTEE.

(2) BROADCAST ANNOUNCING NEW ORGANIZATION MILDER IN TONE THAN FOR PREDECESSOR. NOVEMBER 16 BROADCAST MAKES CORRECT NOISES ABOUT CARRYING CULTURAL REVOLUTION THROUGH TO END, BUT DOES NOT APPROACH FEROCITY OF OCTOBER 29 PLEDGE TO ORGANIZE ALL RED GUARDS TO "THOROUGHLY CRITICIZE BOUREOIS LINE, HIT HARD, PULL DOWN, AND COMPLETELY DISCREDIT THOSE IN PARTY TAKING CAPITALIST ROAD."

(3) PLA OFFICER WANG TSUNG-SHENG, A FORMER MAJOR GENERAL WHOSE LAST KNOWN POST WAS CHIEF OF STAFF OF PLA PRODUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION CORPS, HAS APPARENTLY REPLACED A CIVILIAN, FENG TA, LONG-TIME DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF SINKIANG UNITED FRONT WORK DEPARTMENT, AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF SINKIANG PARTY COMMITTEE CULTURAL REVOLUTION OFFICE.

D. SCANTY EVIDENCE AVAILABLE GIVES IMPRESSION THAT OVERT MILITARY ROLE IN RED GUARDS ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN MUTED IN SINKIANG, ALTHOUGH ACTUAL DEGREE OF PLA PARTICIPATION IN AND CONTROL OVER MOVEMENT HAS PROBABLY NOT DECREASED OWING TO APPOINTMENT OF MILITARY FIGURE AS NUMBER TWO IN KEY CULTURAL REVOLUTION OFFICE. (HK 3649) (CONFIDENTIAL).

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POUCH (2) BANGKOK, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, CANBERRA, DARESSALAAM, DJAKARTA, KARACHI, KATHMANDU, KUALA LUMPUR, LONDON, MANILA, MOSCOW, MUNICH, NEW DELHI, PRAGUE, RANGOON, RAWALPINDI, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SOFIA, SINGAPORE, (3) TAIPEI, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, CINCPAC, COMNAVPHIL, COMUSTDC, 13 AFMANILA

WEEKA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA [illegible] 46

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXTERNAL - 1. PEKING REPORTS U.S. ELECTIONS; 2. PEKING ON NONPROLIFERATION; 3. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: DISSATISFACTION AND DECADENCE AMONG SOVIETS; 4. LAOS ACCUSED OF ANTI-CHINESE ACTIVITIES; 5. PEKING SEES REVOLUTIONARY STORM BREWING IN INDIA; 6. CHICOM AID AGREEMENT WITH GUINEA.

INTERNAL -7. MORE RED GUARD RALLIES; 8. RED GUARDS ATTACK PEKING PARTY COMMITTEE AND MILITARY FIGURES; 9. PEKING CELEBRATES SUN YAT-SEN CENTENARY; 10. MORE CONCERN DEMONSTRATED OVER DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION ON ECONOMY; 11. LI FU-CHUN NAMED TO POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE.

MILITARY - 12. RED GUARDS AS PLA RESERVE.

EXTERNAL

CONFIDENTIAL

0243

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

1. PEKING REPORTS U.S. ELECTIONS

NCNA NOVEMBER 16 IN ONLY CHICOM REACTION WE HAVE SEEN TO U.S. ELECTION RESULTS PICTURED REPUBLICAN GAINS IN CONGRESS AND STATEHOUSES NOT AS SIGN OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR REPUBLICAN PARTY BUT OF "AMERICAN PEOPLE' DEEPENING DISCONTENT WITH RULING DEMOCRATIC PARTY." ARTICLE DECLARED THAT TWO PARTIES WERE IN ANY CASE "JACKALS OF SAME LAIR" AND NOTED THAT DESPITE REPUBLICAN CRITICISM OF VIETNAM POLICY, GOP HAD "NO PANACEA TO GET U.S. OUT OF ITS DILEMMA." NCNA

MENTIONED SEVERAL U.S. DOMESTIC ISSUES WHICH FIGURED IN ELECTION BUT STRESSED "FAILURE" OF U.S. TACTICS IN VIETNAM AS MAJOR DIFFICULTY CONFRONTING NATION. NEVERTHELESS, ELECTION OUTCOME WOULD NOT AFFICT U.S. "POLICIES OF AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM," SAID NCNA, CITING STATEMENTS OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CHAIRMAN BLISS TO THAT EFFECT. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. PEKING ON NONPROLIFERATION

A. AUTHORITATIVE PEOPLE'S DAILY "OBSERVER" ARTICLE NOVEMBER 15 DECLARED CHICOMS " WILL NEVER BE PARTY TO NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY." APPARENT AIM OF ARTICLE WAS (A) TO CONVINCE NON-NUCLEAR POWERS THAT SUCH TREATY NOT IN THEIR INTERESTS AND (B) PREPARE CHINESE PROPAGANDA APPARATUS FOR ATTACKS UPON TREATY, WHICH PEKING NOW SEEMS TO REGARD AS IMMINENT. OBSERVER LINKED NONPROLIFERATION WITH U.S.-SOVIET "MONSTROUS CONSPIRACY AGAINST CHINA," NOT IN SENSE OF THREAT TO CHICOM NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT BUT RATHER AS MOVE "TO LIMIT INFLUENCE OF CHINA." HE QUOTED OCTOBER 27

COMMUNIQUE ON NUCLEAR TEST TO REITERATE POINT THAT CHICOM NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT DESIGNED COUNTER "NUCLEAR MONOPOLY AND NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL BY U.S. AND SOVIET UNION ACTING IN COLLUSION." WITH EXCEPTION THIS QUOTATION HOWEVER, HE

0244

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

AVOIDED IMPLICATION THAT SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPACITY REPRESENTED WAR THREAT AND STRESSED THAT DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR EMANATED FROM U.S.

B. COMMENT: PEKING'S PREVIOUS ATTITUDE TOWARDS NONPROLIFERATION HAS BEEN NEGATIVE BUT RELATIVELY LOW KEY, POSSIBLY BECAUSE AN AGREEMENT WAS NOT REGARDED AS VERY LIKELY OR IMMINENT. OBSERVER ARTICLE APPEARS SIGNAL CHICOM INTENTION OPPOSE NONPROLIFERATION AGREEMENT WITH SAME VIGOR THEY DISPLAYED WHEN PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY WAS CONCLUDED. (HK 3467) (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: ALLEGED DISSATISFACTION AND DECADENCE AMONG SOVIETS

A. CHICOM MEDIA DURING WEEK CONTINUED TO STRESS THEME OF U.S.-SOVIET WORLD-WIDE "COLLUSION," BUT ALSO FOCUSED ON SOVIET SOCIETY ITSELF.

DISSATISFACTION: SOME NINE DAYS AFTER RALLY FOR CHINESE STUDENTS EXPELLED FROM USSR, NCNA NOVEMBER 14 PUBLISHED EXCERPTS FROM INFLAMMATORY RALLY SPEECH BY STUDENT CHANG PENG-YA "EXPOSING" CORRUPTION AND SELF-AGGRANDIZMENT OF UPPER STRATA OF SOVIET SOCIETY. CHANG SUPPORTED CHAR WITH MANY SPECIFIC EXAMPLES SUCH AS KICK-BACK SYSTEM IN SHOE REPAIR COOPERATIVE AND DESCRIPTION OF BLACK SEA VILLA OF "LEADING SOVIET REVISIONIST" WHICH HAD TWO SWIMMING POOLS. CHANG CLAIMED THAT HE FOUND "SIGNS THAT STRONG DISSATISFACTION OF SOVIET PEOPLE WITH LEADING REVISIONIST CLIQUE IS STEADILY GROWING TO POINT OF STRUGGLES AGAINST IT . . . . WE ARE ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT ONE DAY GREAT SOVIET PEOPLE . . . WILL RISE UP IN REBELLION AGAINST REVISIONIST LEADING CLIQUE."

B. COMMENT: PREVIOUS CHICOM OUTPUT ON ATTITUDES OF SOVIET PEOPLE HAS GENERALLY ACCENTUATED THEIR OSTENSIBLE YEARNING FOR MAO-THOUGHT AND VAGUE DISAPPROVAL OF CPSU "REVISIONIST LINE." CHANG SPEECH GOES CONSIDERABLY FURTHER IN IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC CAUSES OF SUPPOSEDLY WIDESPREAD DISCONTENT.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0245

AND HIS REMARKS SURPASS ANY RECENT INFERENCES IN CHICOM MEDIA THAT SOVIET PEOPLE WOULD EVENTUALLY REJECT LEADERS. WHILE HIS REMARKS OBVIOUSLY REFLECT REGIME SENTIMENTS, PEKING TO DATE HAS NOT EMBODIES THEM IN ITS OFFICIAL POSITION TOWARD SOVS.

C. DECADENCE: NCNA NOVEMBER 12 REVIEWED SOVIET EXHIBITION IN OSAKA, JAPAN, AND FOUND IT "VULGAR, DECADENT AND CAPITALIST." WORST FEATURE WAS FASHION SHOW WHERE SOVIET MODELS "MADE INDECENT SHOW OF THEMSELVES WITH ALL THEIR TWISTINGS AND HIP SWAYINGS" AGAINST JAZZ MUSIC BACKGROUND. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. LAOS ACCUSED OF ANTI-CHINA ACTIVITIES

A. NCNA NOVEMBER 13 REPORT AND PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTATOR ARTICLE FOLLOWING DAY CHARGED "VIENTIANE" AUTHORITIES WITH FAMILIAR SERIES OF "ANTI-CHINA ACTIVITIES." THESE INCLUDED PROMOTION U.S. INSPIRED "TWO CHINA SCHEME," SLANDER OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND COLLUSION WITH U.S. IN MILITARY BUILD-UP DESIGNED FOR "DIRECT ATTACK BY U.S. AGGRESSOR FORCE ON LAOTIAN LIBERATED AREAS." PEKING BRANDED LAOTIAN ANTI-CHINA ACTIONS AS "CLEARLY AIMED AT SUPPORTING U.S. IMPERIALISM'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES IN ESCALATING ITS WAR OF AGGRESSION IN INDO-CHINA AND ITS STEPPED UP EFFORTS TO ENCIRCLE CHINA."

COMMENTATOR ALSO WARNED VIENTIANE THAT "CHINESE PEOPLE WILL UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES TOLERATE YOUR BRAZEN PARTICIPATION IN U.S. PLOT CREATE TWO CHINAS AND YOUR FLIRTATION WITH CHIANG BANDIT GANG WHILE LAOS STILL MAINTAINS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CHINA."

B. COMMENT: NOTHING IN PROTESTS, WHICH MAY BE BELATED RESPONSE TO GRC OCTOBER 10 NATIONAL DAY ACTIVITIES IN LAOS, INDICATES THAT PEKING ACTIVELY CONSIDERING DIPLOMATIC MOVES AGAINST VIENTIANE. REGIME'S "PATIENCE" TOWARD LAOS PROBABLY DICTATED IN PART BY DESIRE PRESERVE FICTION OF LEGAL PRESENCE IN KHANG KHAY. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0246

5. PEKING SEES REVOLUTIONARY STORM BREWING IN INDIA

IN PAST FEW WEEKS, CHICOM MEDIA HAVE EXTENSIVELY EXPLOITED INDIAN DOMESTIC DISORDERS IN APPARENT EFFORT TO DISCREDIT GANDHI GOVERNMENT AND ADD SUBSTANCE TO REGIME'S CONTENTION THAT REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION THROUGHOUT WORLD IS EXCELLENT. AS EXAMPLE, A PEOPLE'S DAILY "COMMENTATOR" NOVEMBER 12 ARTICLE TOTALLY IGNORED RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF NOVEMBER 7 DELHI DEMONSTRATIONS AND INSTEAD DESCRIBED THEM AS "A VIOLENT ERUPTION OF INDIAN PEOPLES' PENT-UP FEELINGS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, AN INEVITABLE OUTCOME OF THE RETROGRESSIVE POLICIES PURSUED BY THE INDIAN REACTIONARY GOVERNMENT, AND A SIGNAL OF THE SHARPENING OF THE CLASS CONTRADICTIONS IN INDIA." AN NCNA ARTICLE PUBLISHED THE SAME DAY, RELATED INDIAN SITUATION TO MAO QUOTE THAT ". . . . IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THEIR (REACTIONARIES) PERSECUTION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE ONLY SERVES TO ACCELERATE THE PEOPLES' REVOLUTION ON A BROADER AND MORE INTENSE SCALE." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. CHICOM AID AGREEMENT WITH GUINEA

A. EITHER AT GUINEAN REQUEST OR ON OWN INITIATIVE, PEKING RUSHED INTO GAP CREATED BY THREATENED WITHDRAWAL U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO GUINES. NCNA REPORTED ARRIVAL IN PEKING ON NOVEMBER 10 OF GUINEAN MINISTER OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. ON NOVEMBER 16 NCNA ANNOUNCED SIGNING OF: "AGREEMENT AND A PROTOCOL ON SINO-GUINEAN ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION;" AND "AGREEMENT ON GRANTING OF TRADE LOANS BY CHINA TO GUINEA;" AND A 1967 TRADE PROTOCOL BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES. NO DETAILS WERE PROVIDED RE AGREEMENTS.

B. GUINEAN VISITORS HAVE BEEN TREATED TO SPEECH BY CHEN YI AND SERIES OF ARTICLES DENOUNCING U.S. "GRAVE PROVOCATIONS" AGAINST GUINEA AND PRAISING GUINEAN PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE AGAINST "U.S. IMPERIALISM."

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0247

C. COMMENT: AGREEMENTS APPEAR INVOLVE NEW EXTENSION OF CHICOM LOAN AID TO GUINEA, FIRST SINCE 1960. REGIME'S ANXITY UTILIZE GUINEAN SITUATION AS A CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF ITS WILLINGNESS COME TO AID OF THOSE WHO STAND UP TO "U.S. IMPERIALISM" DOES NOT ALTER BASIC PICTURE OF PAST TWO YEARS OF DECLINING NEW CHICOM COMMITMENTS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THIRD COUNTRIES, WITH EXCEPTION VIETNAM. (SEE WER 46) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

INTERNAL

7. MOR RED GUARD RALLIES

A. RED GUARDS AND REVOLUTIONARY STUDENTS AND TEACHERS VISITING PEKING WERE GIVEN TWO MORE OPPORTUNITIES TO SEE MAO IN TWO-PART RALLY ON NOVEMBER 10 AND 11. NOVEMBER 10 FESTIVITIES CONSISTED OF LEADERSHIP REVIEWING 500,000 RED GUARDS DRIVING PAST TIENANMEN ROSTRUM IN TRUCKS, WHILE ON NOVEMBER 11, LEADERSHIP DROVE AMONG 1.5 MILLION RED GUARDS AND STUDENTS IN MOTORCADE. FOLLOWING FEATURES OF LATEST MAO MANIFESTATION WERE MOST SIGNIFICANT.

(1) LIN PIAO, ON TIENANMEN STAND WITH MAO ON NOVEMBER 10, WAS NOT PRESENT FOR NOVEMBER 11 MOTORCADE ACCORDING TO BRITISH EMBASSY OBSERVER. CHOU EN-LAI AND CHEN PO-TA RODE IN LEAD JEEP WITH CHAIRMAN. THERE NO CLUES YET AS TO REASON FOR LIN'S UNPUBLICIZED ABSENCE, BUT WE FEEL THIS BREAK IN THE PREVIOUS PATTERN OF RALLY APPEARANCES MAY BE SIGNIFICANT. FAILURE OF ILLNESS ONE POSSIBLE CAUSE. LIN'S ABSENCE PERHAPS EXPLAINED BY NCNA TREATED EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 10 AND 11 AS ONE RALLY AND NEGLECTED TO RELEASE NAMES OF LEADERSHIP IN NOVEMBER 11 MOTORCADE.

(2) MAO SPOKE. BREAKING HIS LONG TRADITION OF AVOIDING MICROPHONE AT PUBLIC RALLIES, NCNA REPORTED THAT MAO

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0248

TSE-TUNG ON NOVEMBER 10 WISHED THE CROWD "LONG LIFE." NCNA THEN REPORTS THAT HE TOLD "A FEW RESPONSIBLE COMMRADES ATTENDING THE REVIEW" (NOT THE ENTIRE RALLY AS ALLEGED BY WESTERN PRESS REPORTS) TO PLACE POLITICS IN COMMAND, UNITE WITH MASSES AN CARRY REVOLUTION THROUGH TO END. MAO'S PUBLIC UTTERANCE, THOUGH TRUNCATED AND LACKING IN SUBSTANCE, DESIGNED TO FULFILL RED GUARD DEMANDS FROM PREVIOUS RALLIES THAT HE SPEAK, AND TO SCOTCH RUMORS THAT HE PHYSICALLY UNABLE TO DO SO.

(3) LIU SHAO-CHI, NORMALLY IN BACKGROUND AT PREVIOUS RALLIES, HAD LENGTHY AND APPARENTLY FRIENDLY CHAT WITH MAO ON ROSTRUM NOVEMBER 10. PEKING TV VIEWERS WHO NOTICED OCCURRENCE OF THIS CONVERSATION REPORT THAT MAO HAD EQUALLY LONG TALKS WITH LIN PIAO, CHOU EN-LAI, AND CHEN YI. RESULTANT TEMPTATION TO SPECULATE THAT LIU MIGHT BE EMERGING FROM POLITICAL DOGHOUSE WEAKENED TWO DAYS LATER WHEN, AT SUN YAT-SEN'S MEMORIAL CEREMONIES (ITEM 9), LIU PLAYED NO ROLE, EVEN THOUGH HE HAD LAST YEAR BEEN NAMED CHAIRMAN OF PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR SUN CELEBRATIONS.

(4) RALLY MECHANIZED. USE OF TRUCKS TO CARRY GUARDS PAST MAO ON 10TH, AND CARS TO CARRY MAO PAST GUARDS ON 11TH APPEAR EFFORT TO PROVIDE EXPOSURE OF MAO TO MAXIMUM NUMBER OF VISITING RED GUARDS APPARENTLY IN HOPE THAT HAVING SEEN CHAIRMAN, YOUNG REVOLUTIONARIES WILL BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO EFFORTS TO GET THEM HOME. ADDITIONAL POSSIBLE REASON FOR CHANGE TO MOBILE FORMAT COULD LIE IN UNCONFIRMED REPORTS PREVALENT IN PEKING THAT NUMBER OF RALLY PARTICIPANTS KILLED IN CRUSH IN FRONT OF TIENANMEN ROSTRUM ON NOVEMBER 3.

ACCORDING TO RECENTLY RETURNED DIPLOMAT, PEKING HAS QUIETED DOWN CONSIDERABLY SINCE NOVEMBER 11. AS OF NOVEMBER 14 LOUDSPEAKERS NOISE LEVEL HAD DROPPED NOTICEABLY AND RALLY LATRINES REMOVED. VISITOR COMMENTED THAT WHILE THERE NO WAY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0249

OF TELLING WHETHER THIS WAS LAST RALLY, IT APPARENT THAT SOME RED GUARDS LEAVING CITY. LARGE NUMBERS COULD STILL BE SEEN WANDERING ABOUT WITH NO APPARENT AIM OR PURPOSE, BUT OTHERS BEGAN TO APPEAR WITH PACKS ON BACKS, EITHER ARRIVALS OR IMMINENT DEPARTEES ON "LITTLE LONG MARCHES." LATTER THEME RECEIVED STEPPED-UP PROPAGANDA PLAY DURING WEEK WHEN CHOU EN-LAI AND OTHER MEMBERS OF TOP LEADERSHIP RECEIVED 30 GROUPS OF LONG MARCHERS FROM PLACES AS FAR AWAY AS

INNER MONGOLIA AND ANHWEI (HK 3468, 3397) (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. RED GUARDS ATTACK PEKING PARTY COMMITTEE AND MILITARY FIGURES

A. DURING PAST TWO WEEKS PEKING HAS BEEN SCENE OF CONTINUED RED GUARD POLITICAL ACTIVITY BESIDES RALLIES AND MARCHES. MOST NOTABLE WAS NOVEMBER 6 DEMONSTRATION AT PEKING MUNICIPAL PARTY HEADQUARTERS, DURING WHICH DISCIPLINED RED GUARD UNITS ENTERED BUILDING. EYE WITNESS REPORTS, FAR FROM CONFIRMING WESTERN PRESS SUGGESTIONS THAT HEADQUARTERS WERE SACKED, MAINTAIN RED GUARDS WITHDREW DISAPPOINTED AFTER WAVING RED FLAGS FROM WINDOWS OF UPPER FLOORS. DEMONSTRATION FILED TO ACHIEVE ITS APPARENT GOAL OF PRODUCING CONFESSION BY PARTY FIRST SECRETARY LI HSUEH-FENG. LI DID NOT EVEN SHOW UP ALTHOUGH RED GUARD SPOKESMEN TOLD CROWD HE HAD AGREED TO DO SO. FURTHERMORE, HE LISTED IN HIS CUSTOMARY PLACE WITHIN HIERARCHY AT NOVEMBER 10 MASS RALLY AND NOVEMBER 12 CEREMONY COMMEMORATING SUN YAT-SEN.

B. JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS (TOKYO 3621) REPORT WALL POSTERS DATED NOVEMBER 9 CRITICIZING PLA GENERAL READ SERVICES DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR CHIU HUI-TSO FOR ATTEMPTING TO SUPPRESS STUDENT REVOLUTIONARIES AND PLA VICE CHIEF OF STAFF LI TIEN-YU. ALTHOUGH UNNAMED OFFICIALS IN PLA MILITARY ACADEMY AND EX-PLA OFFICERS SERVING AS MINISTERS (IN MINISTRIES CON-

0250

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

CERNED WITH MILITARY PRODUCTION AND CULTURE) HAVE BEEN CRITICIZED, CHIU AND LI ARE FIRST SPECIFICALLY NAMED MILITARY FIGURES WITHIN PLA TO COME UNDER RED GUARDS ATTACK.

C. AT SAME TIME, RED GUARD POSTER ATTACKS ON EARLIER TARGETS OF CRITICISM HAVE NOT DIMINISHED. ACCORDING INDIAN DIPLOMAT HERE, POSTER ATTACKING TENG HSIAO-PING (ACCUSED IN POSTER OF BEING ANTI-MAO SINCE 1956) AND LIU SHAOSHI WAS VIEWED IN BOTH CANTON AND PEKING WITHIN PAST WEEK. POSTER WAS SAME IN BOTH CITIES, WAS PRINTED, AND WAS POSTED IN NUMBER OF PROMINENT LOCATIONS. (CONFIDENTIAL)

9. PEKING CELEBRATES SUN YAT-SEN CENTENARY

A. CENTENNIAL SUN YAT-SEN'S BIRTH CELEBRATED IN PEKING NOVEMBER 12 WITH RALLY IN GREAT HALL OF PEOPLE FOR 10,000

INCLUDING MOST OF TOP LEADERSHIP WITH EXCEPTION MAO AND LIN PIAO. IN RALLY SPEECHES, SUN TREATED GENEROUSLY AS REVERED REVOLUTIONARY, LEADER OF NECESSARY STAGE IN MARXIST EVOLUTIONARY CYCLE, THOUGH NOT OF SUFFICIENT STATURE TO ENTER MARX-LENIN-STALIN-MAO PANTHEON. MAJOR SPEECH OF RALLY MADE BY CHOU EN-LAI, WHO, WHILE JUSTIFYING ATTENTION PAID TO SUN, EMPHASIZED THAT "GREAT VICOTY OF CHINESE PEOPLE UNDER CHAIRMAN MAO HAS FAR EXCEEDED SUN'S IDEALS." CHOU DISCUSSED CURRENT SITUATION IN FAMILIAR TERMS, REFERRING TO "STRUGGLE BETWEEN TWO POLITICAL LINES" WHICH SUN HAD ALSO FACED, AND IN WHICH HE FOUGHT AGAINST "REFORMISTS" AND "UNCOMPROMISINGLY" OPPOSED IMPERIALISM. SAME POINT STRESSED IN SPEECH BY SOONG CHING-LING, SUN'S WIDOW, WHO EMPHASIZED HIS "FIRM STRUGGLE AGAINST REFORMISTS AMONG HIS CONTEMPORARIES."

B. LIU SHAOSHI, ALTHOUGH PRESENT, PLAYED NO APPARENT ROLE. ALTHOUGH NAMED CHAIRMAN OF PREPARATORY COMMITTEE IN 1965, HE WAS REPLACED BY TUNG PI-WU AS SPONSOR OF CELEBRATIONS.

C LARGE NUMBER MINORITY PARTY FIGURES AND PROMINENT MEMBERS OF CPPCC (CHINESE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CON-

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0251

FERNCE) PRESENT AT RALLY, INDICATING THAT EDIFICE OF UNITED FRONT STRUCTURE REMAINS STANDING DESPITE RED GUARD ULTIMATUM LATE AUGUST THAT MINORITY DEMOCRATIC PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO DISBAND.

D. WHILE TREATMENT OF ANNIVERSARY SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN PLANS REVEALED BY PREPARATORY STATEMENT MADE OCTOBER 1965, THERE SOME EVIDENCE THAT CELEBRATIONS FAR MORE ELABORATE THAN ORIGINALLY INTENDED AFTER CULTURAL REVOLUTION BEGAN. ANNOUNCEMENT THAT CELEBRATIONS WOULD BE HELD CAME ONLY TWO DAYS BEFORE ANNIVERSARY: HONGKONG PRO-COMMUNIST FIGURE, LISTED BY NCNA AS PRESENT, WAS REPORTEDLY NOT NOTIFIED TO GO TO PEKING UNTIL NOVEMBER 9. (HK 3422) (CONFIDENTIAL)

10. MORE CONCERN DEMONSTRATED OVER DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION ON ECONOMY

A. PASSAGES IN NOVEMBER 10 PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL, THOUGH FLANKED BY RINGING AFFIRMATIONS THAT THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IS A POWERFUL SPUR TO PRODUCTION, IMPLY THAT NEGATIVE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION MAY HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIAL AND ARE PROBABLY CONTINUING. KEY SENTENCE (OMITTED FROM NCNA ENGLISH VERSION) READS, " ANY ACTION WHICH AFFECTS PRODUCTION WILL BRING WITH IT SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES." EDITORIAL EMPHASIZES DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SCHOOLS, WHICH CAN CLOSE TEMPORARILY TO CARRY OUT CAMPAIGN, AND ECONOMIC UNITS WHICH CANNOT INTERRUPT WORK WITHOUT AFFECTING NATIONAL LIVELIHOOD. AS RESULT, CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN ALL ECONOMIC UNITS MUST BE CARRIED OUT IN SPARE TIME. NO ONE MAY LEAVE THEIR JOBS, AND "LABOR DISCIPLINE MUST BE SELF-CONSCIOUSLY RESPECTED," A COMMAND WHICH IMPLIES CONFIRMATION OF STRIKE REPORTS FROM FACTORIES IN MAINLAND AFFECTED BY RED GUARDS. REVOLUTIONARY STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS ARE EXPECTED TO UNITE WITH MASSES TO TAKE PART IN LABOR, AND PUBLICIZE MAO LINE, BUT ALL "IN PLANNED MANNER." ALSO INDICATIVE OF FURTHER ATTEMPT TO MINIMIZE DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGN IN FUTURE WAS PASSAGE IN EDITORIAL SUGGESTING CULTURAL REVOLUTION BE CARRIED OUT "ACTIVELY, CONSECUTIVELY, AND IN ONE GROUP OF PLACES AND UNITS AFTER ANOTHER." EDITORIAL

0252

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ALSO IMPLIED THAT ELEMENTS OF LEADERSHIP SPECIALIZING IN PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT WOULD BE SPARED DISTRACTIONS OF NEW INSTITUTIONS OF MASS DEMOCRACY.

B. ABOVE INDICATIONS OF ECONOMIC DISRUPTION BY CULTURAL REVOLUTION, PARTICULARLY IN INDUSTRIAL FIELD, REVEALED WITH JAPANESE REPORT (TOKYO MAINICHI NOVEMBER 5, FBIS 217) THAT IN LATE SEPTEMBER CENTRAL COMMITTEE AUTHORIZED INDUSTRIAL AND MINING UNITS TO DISBAND RED GUARD UNITS IF WORKERS AP-RPOVED. CENTRAL COMMITTEE INSTRUCTION REPORTEDLY STATED THAT RED GUARDS COMPETENT AT SCHOOLS BUT NOT ALWAYS SO AT INDUSTRIAL AND MINING WORK SITES. RED GUARDS PROBABLY SOON AGREE. RECENT VISITOR TO MAINLAND REPORTS SEEING POSTER IN SUBURBAN COMMUNE ON NOVEMBER 13 SAYING IN SUBSTANCE "MOVE WITH THOSE WHO USE PRODUCTION AS EXCUSE TO SUPPRESS REVOLU-TIONARY STUDENT MOVEMENT." (HK 3482, 3483) (CONFIDEN-TIAL)

11. LI FU-CHUN NAMED TO POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE

A. NOVEMBER 16 NCNA LIST OF THOSE WELCOMING CCP DELEGATION HOME FROM ALBANIA NAMED POLITBURO MEMBER AND CHAIRMAN STATE PLANNING COMMISSION LI FU-CHUN AS MEMBER POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE.

B. ADDITION LI TO MEMBERSHIP, WHILE POSSIBLY INDICATING CONTINUING RESHUFFLE LEADERSHIP RANKINGS, MORE LIKELY TO BE ONLY LATEST IN SERIES PUBLIC REVELATIONS OF PERSONNEL APPOINTMENTS MADE AT AUGUST CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM. BE-GINNING WITH KANG SHENG SEPTEMBER 13 NCNA HAS SINCE NAMED CHEN PO-TA AND TAO CHU AS NEW MEMBERS. LI'S MEMBERSHIP PRO-BABLY MEANS THOSE RANKED ABOVE HIM AT RECENT RALLIES ARE ALSO MEMBERS STANDING COMMITTEE. IF SO, THEN TO OUR EARLIER ESTIMATES OF STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBERS (MAO, LIN, CHOU EN-LAI, TAO, CHEN, TENG HSIAO-PING AND KANG SHENG) THIS WOULD ADD LIU SHAO-CHI AND CHU TEH, WHO, WHILE PREVIOUS STANDING MEMBERS, COMMITTEE AND VICE-CHAIRMEN CCP, HAVE NOT BEEN TITLED AS SUCH SINCE AUGUST MEETING.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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12. RED GUARDS AS PLA RESERVE

A. RECENT REGIME AND WESTERN COMMENT ON THE RED GUARDS HAS EMPHASIZED THEIR ROLE AS "FIGHTING TROOPS" A "RESERVE OF THE PLA." SUCH STATEMENTS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT ARE APT TO BE MISLEADING. THE RED GUARDS ARE AN ORGANIZATION CREATED PRIMARILY FOR THE RECTIFICATION OF THE CCP. THEIR ROLE AS

A PLA RESERVE IS CONCERNED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE SECOND (POLITICAL) ASPECT OF THE PLA'S TRIPLE MISSION: COMBAT, POLITICAL AGITATION, PRODUCTION.

B. MILITARILY THE RED GUARDS COULD SERVE AS A SOURCE OF POLITICALLY RELIABLE INDIVIDUAL RECRUITS FOR THE PLA AND AS AN ORGANIZED LOCAL FORCE FOR THE INTERNAL SECURITY OR MILITIA-TYPE EMPLOYMENT IN CASE OF INVASION. THEY LACK THE TRAINING, EXPERIENCE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL BACK-UP OF REGULAR COMBAT UNITS. IT SEEMS TO US UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD BE EMPLOYED AS AN ORGANIZATION IN ANY COMBAT ROLE OUTSIDE OF CHINA'S BORDERS -- EVEN IN GUERRILLA WARFARE. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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POUCH: (2) BANGKOK, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST CANBERRA, DARESSALAAM, DJAKARTA, KARACHI, KATHMANDU, KUALA LUMPUR, LONDON MANILA MOSCOW, MUNICH, NEW DELHI, PRAGUE, RANGOON, RAWALPINDI, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SOFIA, SINGAPORE, (4) TAIPEI, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, CINCPAC, COMNAVPHIL, TAIWANDEFCOM, 13AF MANILA

WEEKA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 44

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXTERNAL - 1. CHICOM GUIDED MISSILE-NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST; 2. PEKING ON MANILA CONFERENCE AND VIETNAM; 3. NEW DELHI "SUMMIT CONFERENCE" CONDEMNED; 4. CPR REPLY TO SOVIET

PAGE 2 RUMJDH 3194/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
PROTEST; 5. SUSPENSION CHICOM-GHANAIAN RELATIONS;
6. CHINESE STATEMENT ON BHUTAN BORDER INCIDENTS;
7. JAPAN: REPERCUSSIONS OF CCP-JCP RIFT MOUNT.
INTERNAL - 8. FURTHER, BROADER ATTACK ON PARTY OPPOSITION INDICATED; 9. RED GUARD ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENT MINISTERS CONTINUE; 10. NEW HERO FOILS SABOTAGE ATTEMPT;
11. LEADERSHIP NOTES; 12. K'ANG-TA EXHIBITIONS POPULARIZE EDUCATIONAL MODEL; 13. NOVEMBER-3 MASS RALLY.

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EXTERNAL

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/4/01

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1. CHICOM GUIDED MISSILE-NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST

A. NCNA ANNOUNCEMENT OF "GUIDED MISSILE NUCLEAR WEAPON" TEST ON OCTOBER 27 WAS LONG ON PRAISE OF MAO, SHORT ON TECHNICAL DETAILS. TERMINOLOGY OF "GUIDED MISSILE... WITH NUCLEAR WARHEAD" AGAIN UPGRADES PEKING'S PROJECTED IMAGE OF NUCLEAR PROGRESS IN KEEPING WITH MOVE FROM "ATOM BOMB" OF FIRST TWO TEST ANNOUNCEMENTS THROUGH "WITH THERMONUCLEAR MATERIAL" ATTRIBUTED TO THIRD EXPLOSION.

B. COMMUNIQUE DESCRIBING TEST PROVIDES APT REFLECTION OF CURRENT CHINESE POLITICAL SCENE AND OUTLOOK. IT

PAGE 3 RUMJDH 3194/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
GOES MUCH FURTHER THAN MAY 9, 1965 COMMUNIQUE ON THIRD TEST IN ASCRIBING ALLEGED SUCCESS OF LATEST TEST TO THOUGHT OF MAO AND, FOR FIRST TIME, LIN PIAO IS MENTIONED IN CONJUNCTION WITH NUCLEAR ACHIEVEMENT -- THOUGH CREDIT GIVEN HIM IS ONLY FOR HAVING URGED STUDY THAT THOUGHT. COMMUNIQUE ALSO REPRESENTS ESCALATION OF ANTI-SOVIET THEME RE NUCLEAR MATTERS, CHARGING MOSCOW WITH COLLUSION WITH U.S. IN "NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL" TACTICS. LATEST COMMUNIQUE, AS DID THIRD, DESCRIBES CHINESE NUCLEAR ACHIEVEMENTS AS "GREAT ENCOURAGEMENT -- TO REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLES OF WORLD," BUT FOR FIRST TIME "HEROIC VIETNAMESE PEOPLE" SINGLED OUT AS SPECIFIC BENEFICIARY OF THIS ENCOURAGEMENT. FINALLY, LATEST COMMUNIQUE REPEATS PLEDGE OF THREE PREVIOUS TEST ANNOUNCEMENTS "THAT AT NO TIME AND IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL CHINA BE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS." HOWEVER, IT OMITS PREVIOUS CALLS FOR UNIVERSAL SUMMIT CONFERENCE "TO DISCUSS COMPLETE PROHIBITION AND THOROUGH DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS."

C. EVENT IS BEING TREATED WITH CONSIDERABLE FANFARE

0257

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

PAGE 4 RUMJDH 3194/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WITHIN CHINA AND BEING EXPLOITED BY LEADERSHIP AS MEANS STRENGTHEN MAOIST POSITION AGAINST DOMESTIC OPPONENTS.

D. FOREIGN REACTION TO TEST OCCUPIED CONSIDERABLE PORTION REGIME'S EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF TEST. PCNA DESCRIBED U.S. AS ATTEMPTING "BELITTLE ACHIEVEMENTS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINA'S TEST" IN ORDER COVER ITS "GREAT SHOCK...SURPRISE...AND ANXIETY" OVER ACCOMPLISHMENT. SERIES OF DVN WARM AND EFFUSIVE EDITORIALS AND MESSAGES ON TEST WERE ESPECIALLY HIGHLIGHTED. IT MAY BE OF INTEREST, HOWEVER, THAT WHILE BOTH DVN AND ALBANIA OUTPUT TREATED TEST AS ACCOMPLISHMENT CHINESE PEOPLE UNDER "WISE," "CLEARSIGHTED," ETC., LEADERSHIP OF MAO AND PARTY THEY DID NOT TRAVEL SAME PATH AS PEKING IN DESCRIBING IT AS PRODUCT THOUGHT OF MAO. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. PEKING ON MANILA CONFERENCE AND VIETNAM

A. MOST AUTHORITATIVE CHICOM COMMENT ON MANILA CONFERENCE CAME IN PEOPLE'S DAILY "OBSERVER" ARTICLE OCTOBER 28 WHICH PORTRAYED SUMMIT MEETING AS YET ANOTHER U.S. EFFORT PROMOTE "PEACE TALKS HOAX." ARTICLE DEMANDED COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL U.S. WITHDRAWAL

PAGE 5 RUMJDH 3194/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
FROM VIETNAM AND TERMED OFFER OF WITHDRAWAL WITHIN SIX MONTHS "OUT-AND-OUT SWINDLE" SINCE CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL OUTLINED IN MANILA COMMUNIQUE TANTAMOUNT TO "ASKING 31 MILLION VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO SUBMIT IN TOTAL SURRENDER." OBSERVER ASSAILED NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROPOSALS EMBODIED MANILA COMMUNIQUE AS "BLACK DOUBLE-TALK" AND ASSERTED THAT COMMUNIQUE "BUT CREATION OF U.S. ALONE; REVISIONIST LEADERSHIP OF SOVIET UNION...AND FOLLOWERS WITHIN AND WITHOUT U.N., AND ACTIVITIES OF INDIAN REACTIONARIES AND TITO CLIQUE, ALL ARE COMPONENT PARTS IN THIS BIG CONSPIRACY."

B. PEOPLE'S DAILY ALSO CARRIED BRIEF COMMENTARY ON PRESIDENT'S "SURREPTITIOUS" VISIT TO CAM RANH BAY WHICH IT SAID SHOWED PAPER-TIGER NATURE OF U.S. AND ATTRI-

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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BUTABLE TO PRESIDENT'S ALLEGED WISH "TO GRAB FOR HIMSELF SOME DECEPTIVE POLITICAL CAPITAL." LATER IN WEEK, PEOPLE'S DAILY "COMMENTATOR" NOVEMBER 1 ROUTINELY PRAISED STATEMENT ISSUED PREVIOUS DAY BY NVN COMMITTEE FOR INVESTIGATION U.S. "WAR CRIMES."

C. COMMENT: OBSERVER'S DISCUSSION OF CONDITIONS FOR

PAGE 6 RUMJDH 3194/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
ENDING WAR OBVIOUSLY INTENDED MAKE CLEAR PEKING'S POSITION ON SIX-MONTH WITHDRAWAL PROPOSAL PRESENTED AT MANILA. HOWEVER, BOTH OBSERVER AND COMMENTATOR PIECES CONCLUDED BY PLACING FULL CONFIDENCE IN ABILITY OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DEFEAT U.S. BUT SAID NOTHING ABOUT CHICOM SUPPORT IN ANY FORM. (HONG KONG 3079) (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. NEW DELHI "SUMMIT CONFERENCE" CONDEMNED

A. THE OCTOBER "SUMMIT CONFERENCE" HELD IN NEW DELHI BY INDIRA GANDHI, NASSER AND TITO WAS ROUGHLY DENOUNCED IN OCTOBER 27 NCNA REPORT AS "COMPONENT PART OF U.S.-SOVIET SCHEMES FOR LARGE-SCALE GLOBAL COLLABORATION." NCNA ALLEGED THAT PURPOSE OF NEW DELHI MEETING WAS TO BOOST MANILA CONFERENCE, AND CLAIMED THAT "INDIRA GANDHI KEPT IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH U.S. PRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSON AND PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT MARCOS...."

B. COMMENT: DESPITE VEHEMENT CRITICISM OF MEETING AND TITO AND GANDHI, NCNA AVOIDED DIRECT ATTACK ON NASSER. HOWEVER, WE DOUBT UAR LEADER OVERLY PLEASED BY PEKING'S INFERENCE THAT HE PARTICIPATING IN "U.S.-SOVIET SCHEME FOR GLOBAL COLLABORATION." (LIMITED OFFICAL USE)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 3194 SECTION TWO OF FOUR

4. CPR REPLY TO SOVIET PROTEST

CHICOM FONMIN NOTE DATED NOVEMBER 1 IN REPLY SOVIET PROTEST NOTE OF OCTOBER 27 RE DEMONSTRATIONS BEFORE SOVIET EMBASSY ADOPTED TOUGH, SCORNFUL TONE. IT REITERATED CHARGES VOICED IN PEKING'S OCTOBER 22 PROTEST OVER EXPULSION CHINESE STUDENTS FROM USSR (WEEKA 43) THAT SOVIETS RESPONSIBLE FOR "WORSENING RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES." NOTE REJECTED SOVIET ALLEGATION THAT DEMONSTRATIONS WERE "ACTS OF HOOLIGANISM" ORGANIZED BY REGIME, CLAIMING THAT DEMONSTRATIONS BY "REVOLUTIONARY YOUTH (ACTING) ON THEIR OWN" AGAINST "UNREASONABLE" SOVIET ACTION WERE "ENTIRELY JUST" AND CHARACTERIZED BY "GREAT RESTRAINT...AND GOOD ORDER." NOTE ALSO INCORPORATED STOCK CHARGES THAT SOVIET "LEADING CLIQUE, ACTING IN COLLUSION WITH U.S. IMPERIALISM, HAS WHIPPED UP FRESH ANTI-CHINA WAVE" AND "ORGANIZED RING OF ENCIRCLEMENT AGAINST CHINA." (HK 3164) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. SUSPENSION CHICOM-GHANAIAN RELATIONS

A. IN OCTOBER 23 NOTE TO GHANAIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, CHICOMS ANNOUNCED THAT OWING GHANA'S "UNILATERAL SUSPENSION" RELATIONS AND WITHDRAWAL EMBASSY IN CHINA, CHINESE COMPELLED TAKE "CORRESPONDING MEASURE OF WITHDRAWING CHINESE EMBASSY IN GHANA." NOTE ALLEGED ANTI-CHINESE ACTION "FULLY REVEAL (GHANA'S) TRUE FEATURES AS A PAWN OF U.S. IMPERIALISM IN OPPOSING CHINA." COMMENTATOR CLAIMED THAT OWING IN PART TO RAPID DISSEMINATION MAO'S THOUGHT THROUGHOUT AFRICA, "AN EXCELLENT SITUATION FOR REVOLUTION PREVAILS ON THAT CONTINENT;" THEREFORE, IMPERIALISM ENGAGED IN FRENZIED ANTI-CHINESE ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA IN ORDER "SUPPRESS NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT." PEKING SAW IN GHANA'S DETENTION OF TRANSITING GUINEAN DELEGATION FURTHER PROOF THAT GHANAIAN AUTHORITIES WERE FAITHFUL "LACKEYS

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

OF U.S. IMPERIALISM" AND REGIME WELCOMED GUINEAN COUNTERMEASURES AND COMPLAINTS AGAINST U.S.

B. COMMENT: REGIME ITSELF MAY BE FACED WITH SIMILAR SITUATION OF DIPLOMATIC DETENTION. ACCORDING REPORTS FROM ACCRA, GHANAIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY IS PREPARING DETAIN CHICOM EMBASSY PERSONNEL UNTIL PEKING AFFIRMATIVELY RESPONDS TO REQUEST FOR EXIT PERMITS MADE TWO WEEKS AGO BY GHANAIAN DIPLOMATS IN PEKING. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. CHINESE STATEMENT ON BHUTAN BORDER INCIDENTS

A. NCNA "AUTHORIZED STATEMENT" OCTOBER 27 REJECTED INDIAN SEPTEMBER 30 CHARGES OF CHINESE INTRUSIONS INTO BHUTAN AND CLAIMED THAT PASTURELAND IN QUESTION BELONGED TO CHINA. STATEMENT EXPRESSED READINESS DISCUSS ANY DIFFERENCES REGARDING BORDER BILATERALLY WITH BHUTANESE GOVERNMENT, BUT ASSERTED THAT BOI HAD "NO RIGHT WHATSOEVER INTERVENE IN MATTER." IT WENT ON TO ACCUSE INDIA OF "ENCROACHING UPON INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF SIKKIM" AND ATTEMPTING "TIGHTEN ITS CONTROL OVER BHUTAN."

B. COMMENT: CHICOM REJECTION OF INDIA AS SPOKESMAN FOR BHUTAN UNDERSCORED BY USE OF NCNA INSTEAD OF DIPLOMATIC NOTE FOR REPLY. PEKING'S POLITICAL GOALS IN BHUTAN REFLECTED IN STATEMENT'S CLAIM THAT "KING OF BHUTAN HAS LONG SINCE SOLEMNLY DECLARED THAT BHUTAN AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE AND HAS RIGHT CONDUCT OWN FOREIGN AFFAIRS." FONMIN CHEN YI, SPEAKING AT BANQUET FOR VISITING PAK FONMIN, PROVIDED FURTHER INDICATION CHICOM VIEW WHEN HE CHARGED THAT INDIANS WERE "TIGHTENING CONTROL OVER BHUTAN WHICH IS STRIVING TO WIN INDEPENDENCE." (HK 3034) (CONFIDENTIAL)

7. JAPAN: REPERCUSSIONS OF SCP-JCP RIFT MOUNT CHICOM MEDIA REMAINED MUM ON JCP TENTH CONGRESS LAST WEEK BUT REPORTED SPLIT IN JAPAN-CHINA FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION (A JAPANESE ORGANIZATION) PRODUCED BY "SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS" BETWEEN "VAST MAJORITY OF LEADING MEMBERS...AND HANDFUL WHO WERE SABOTAGING JAPAN-CHINA FRIENDSHIP." OTHER ARTICLES APPEARED ON DISSOLUTION AND REPLACEMENT OF JAPAN-CHINA TRADE PROMOTION ASSOCIATION WHICH WAS "CONTROLLED BY ANTI-CHINA ELEMENTS" AND ON RESIGNATION OF CHAIRMAN OF JAPAN

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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CONGRESS JOURNALISTS IN PROTEST AGAINST "SABOTEURS OF JAPAN-CHINA FRIENDSHIP" WITHIN ORGANIZATION. PEOPLE'S DAILY "COMMENTATOR" NOVEMBER 2 HAILED "RIGHTEOUS ACTIONS" OF JAPANESE WHO CONTINUE UPHOLD PEKING LINE, BUT IN KEEPING WITH PREVIOUS STANCE "COMMENTATOR" REFRAINED FROM OPEN ATTACK ON JCP. (UNCLASSIFED)

INTERNAL

8. FURTHER, BROADER ATTACK ON PARTY OPPOSITION INDICATED

A. RALLY SPEECHES AND EDITORIALS COMMEMORATING THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF LU HSUN'S DEATH AND OCTOBER 31 RED FLAG EDITORIAL IMPLIED: A) THAT PARTY OPPOSITION TO CULTURAL REVOLUTION STILL STRONG AND PERHAPS INCREASING; B) THAT DISPUTE OCCURRING AT HIGHEST LEVELS BETWEEN SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS OF MAO-LIN LINE HAS BEEN COMPLICATED BY EFFORTS OF "MIDDLE-ROADERS" TO CONCILIATE BETWEEN THE TWO; C) THAT MAO AND LIN DETERMINED TO PUSH CULTURAL REVOLUTION WITHOUT COMPROMISE, WHATEVER COST; BUT D) THAT ANY OPPOSITON ELEMENT WHO SURRENDERS ON MAO'S TERMS STANDS CHANCE OF EVENTUAL REHABILITATION.

B. EVIDENCE OF OPPOSITION - AT OCTOBER 31 RALLY, STATEMENT BY LEADING CULTURAL CADRE YAO WEN-YUAN, THAT "STUBBORN RESISTANCE," "NEW PROBLEMS," "COMPLICATED STRUGGLES," "SETBACKS OF DIFFERENT FORMS" ALL INEVITABLE IN CULTURAL REVOLUTION SUGGESTED THAT OPPOSITION TO CAMPAIGN REMAINS STRONG. RED FLAG EDITORIAL ALSO ASSERTED THAT STRENGTH OF "NEW FORCES" GROWING STEP BY STEP AND COULD ULTIMATELY TRIUMPH OVER THOSE WHO RIDICULE EMERGING NEW THINGS, THUS FURTHER SUGGESTING THAT OPPOSITON TO RED GUARDS (NEW FORCES) IS STILL POTENT.

C. EVIDENCE OF CONCILIATION ATTEMPT - MOST EXPLICIT EVIDENCE TO DATE THAT CONCILIATORY APPROACH TOWARD OPPOSITION HAS BEEN ADVOCATED BY OTHERS WITHIN PARTY APPEARED IN RED FLAG EDITORIAL PASSAGE PRAISING LU HSUN'S HATRED FOR "PEACEMAKERS" WHO APPEAR IN EVERY STRUGGLE AT ITS HEIGHT. EDITORIAL WARNED THAT EFFORTS TO CONCILIATE STRUGGLE WERE TANTAMOUNT TO PROTECTION OF BOURGEOIS REACTIONARIES.

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CONFIDENTIAL HONG KONG 3194 SECTION THREE OF FOUR

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D. NO POLICY CHANGE - RALLY SPEECHES AND EDITORIALS ALSO INDICATIVE OF MAO'S UNCOMPROMISING ATTITUDE. SLOGAN FOR OCCASION WAS LU HSUN COUPLET "FIERCE-BROWED I COOLLY DEFY A THOUSAND POINTING FINGERS. HEAD BOWED LIKE A WILLING OX, I SERVE THE CHILDREN (HAISEE)." CHEN PO-TA IN RALLY SPEECH PRAISED THIS ATTITUDE BY DESCRIBING WITH GREAT RESPECT LU HSUN'S PLEDGE NEVER TO FORGIVE NENEMIES, EVEN ON DEATHBED.

E. EFFORT TO SPLIT OPPOSITION - ABOVE SINGS OF INTRANSIGEANCE TOWARDS OPPONENTS CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND BITTERNESS OF STRUGGLE WITHIN PARTY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY EVIDENCE OF ATTEMPT TO SPLIT AND SOFTEN OPPOSITION. ANOTHER EDITORIAL IN SAME OCTOBER 31 ISSUE OF RED FLAG URGED THAT CLEAR DISTINCTION BE MADE BETWEEN HANDFUL

PAGE 2 RUMJDH 3194/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
OF INCORRIGIBLES AND VAST MAJORITY THEIR CONFUSED OR UNWITTING FOLLOWERS. EDITORIAL WARNED THAT PERSISTENCE IN ERROR WOULD RESULT IN WRONGDOERS ULTIMATELY BECOMING ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE, BUT PROMISED REHABILITATION TO ALL WHO TRULY REPENTED. (CONFIDENTIAL)

9. RED GUARD ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENT MINISTERS CONTINUE

A. IN ADDITION TO WALL POSTER ATTACKS ON MINISTERS AND MINISTRIES REPORTED WEEKA 43, JAPANESE PRESS HAS REVEALED FOLLOWING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE ALSO COME UNDER CRITICISM BY RED GUARDS IN PEKING: VICE-PREMIERS TAN CHEN-LIN AND PO YI-PO; MINISTER OF EDUCATION HO WEI; AND VICE-MINISTERS OF FIRST MINSTRY OF LIGHT INDUSTRY, GEOLOGY, TEXTILE INDUSTRY, FOREIGN TRADE.

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B. MOST TARGETS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING 16-POINTS, AND DIRECTING CULTURAL REVOLUTION WORK TEAMS UNDER THEIR CONTROL TO SUPPRESS REVOLUTIONARY RED GUARD ACTIVITIES.

C. COMMENT: WE WONDER WHETHER EMERGENCE RECENT EVIDENCE THAT ATTEMPT HAS BEEN MADE TO CONCILIATE

PAGE 3 RUMJDH 3194/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
BETWEEN MAO AND OPPONENTS (ITEM 8) HAS CONNECTION WITH ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENT FIGURES. IN OUR OPINION PERSONALITY WITHIN LEADERSHIP BEST FITTING DESCRIPTION OF "PEACEMAKER" IS CHOU EN-LAI. IT CONCEIVABLE THAT CONCILIATION ATTEMPT ON HIS PART MAY HAVE BEEN BEHIND APPARENT INDECISON OF RECENT WEEKS, OF THAT HE AND OTHER LEADERS IN STATE BUREAUCRACY FINALLY BALKED AT DEVELOPMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION. THIS MAY IN TURN HAVE LED TO ATTACKS ON HIS MINISTERS AND MINISTRIES. ON OTHER HAND CHOU EN-LAI, CHEN YI AND OTHER MINISTERS CONTINUE TO APPEAR REGULARLY IN COURSE THEIR NORMAL DUTIES, WITH CHOU RANKING OFFICIAL PRESENT AT LU HSUN COMMEMORATION RALLY (ITEM 8). (CONFIDENTIAL)

10. NEW HERO FOILS SABOTAGE ATTEMPT

A. FULL-BLOWN HERO TREATMENT NOW UNDER WAY FOR PLA MEMBER TSAI YUNG-HSIANG WHO KILLED BY TRAIN IN SUCCESSFUL EFFORT THWART SABOTAGE EFFORT (IN FORM OF LOG ON TRACKS) BY "CLASS ENEMIES" AGAINST TRAINFUL OF RED GUARDS.

PAGE 4 RUMJDH 3194/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
B. COMMENT: BUILD-UP OF YET ANOTHER HERO AND PUBLICITY GIVEN TO SABOTAGE EFFORT APPEARS DESIGNED EMPHASIZE NEED FOR "REVOLUTIONARY VIGILANCE" AT TIME OF DEMONSTRATED OPPOSITION TO MAO-LIN LINE. THIS IS FIRST ADMISSION BY PEKING OF ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE IN SOME TIME, AND IT PRESUMABLY IS ACKNOWLEDGED ONLY IN ORDER TO POINT UP MORAL OF STORY. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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11. LEADERSHIP MOVES

A. TAO CHU, CHEN PO-TA CONFIRMED AS STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBERS - NCNA OCTOBER 28 LISTING THOSE SEEING OFF CCP DELEGATION TO ALBANIAN LABOR PARTY CONGRESS NAMED TAO CHU AS MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE CCP POLITBURO; NCNA REPORT ON LU HSUN RALLY OCTOBER 31 GAVE CHEN PO-TA SAME TITLE.

WE HAD ASSUMED TAO AND CHEN HAD JOINED STANDING COMMITTEE WHICH, IN ACCORD WITH LEADERSHIP LINEUPS REVEALED RECENT RALLIES, APPARENTLY INCLUDES KANG SHENG AND ALL RANKED ABOVE HIM, BUT THIS IS FIRST OFFICIAL IDENTIFICATION OF THEIR POSITIONS.

PAGE 5 RUMJDH 3194/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
B. CENTRAL COMMITTEE VACANCIES FILLED?
NCNA OCTOBER 28 IDENTIFIED FORMER CCP CC ALTERNATE LO KUEI-PO AS MEMBER OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE. PROMOTION LO TO FULL MEMBER STATUS INDICATES THAT 11TH PLENUM, IN ADDITION RECASTING POLITBURO AND STANDING COMMITTEE, MAY ALSO HAVE TAKEN STEPS FILL EIGHT VACANCIES IN CC DUE DEATHS RECENT YEARS.

C. LIU SHAO-CHI CONTINUES AS CPR CHAIRMAN
NCNA OCTOBER 31 REVEALED CPR NATIONAL DAY MESSAGE TO ALGERIA WAS SIGNED BY "CHAIRMAN LIU SHAO-CHI AND PREMIER CHOU ENLAI."

LAST CHICOM ANNOUNCEMENT OF CPR COMMEMORATION FOREIGN NATIONAL DAY (DESPITE NUMEROUS OCCASIONS OBSERVED LAST YEAR) WAS SEPTEMBER 01 MESSAGE TO HANOI, ALSO SIGNED BY LIU. ALGERIAN MESSAGE IS THIRD TIME SINCE THEN THAT OFFICIAL CHINESE SOURCES HAVE REFERRED TO LIU AS CHAIRMAN OF CPR. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

12. KANG-TA EXHIBITIONS POPULARIZE EDUCATIONAL MODEL

A. RECENT PRESS REPORTS IMPLY SELECTION OF FORMER CHINESE PEOPLE'S ANTI-JAPANESE MILITARY AND POLITICAL

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

COLLEGE (K'ANG-TA) AS MODEL FOR PROPOSED EDUCATIONAL REFORM. NOW OCTOBER 25 AND 31 ITEMS INDICATE EXHIBITIONS OF K'ANG-TA PHOTOS AND RELICS, FIRST ANNOUNCED JULY 31, CONTINUE TO BE PRESENTED THROUGHOUT COUNTRY IN APPARENT EFFORT TO DRUM UP POPULAR SUPPORT.

B. COMMENT: K'ANG-TA WAS TRAINING SCHOOL FOR MILITARY AND POLITICAL CADRES DURING LATE THIRTIES IN YENAN. UNDER GENERAL LEADERSHIP OF MAO AND DIRECT CONTROL OF LIN PIAO, SCHOOL UTILIZED SHORT 7-9 MONTH COURSE OF STUDY FEATURING POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION, MIXED WORK-STUDY CURRICULUM, AND MILITARY DRILL TO PRODUCE GRADUATES WITH MAXIMUM POLITICAL BACKGROUND AND MINIMUM PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE CONSISTENT WITH IMMEDIATE NEEDS. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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13. NOVEMBER 3 MASS RALLY

A. AS WE GO TO PRESS, PEKING RADIO ANNOUNCES MASS RALLY AT PEKING HELD TODAY ATTENDED BY MAO AND ADDRESSED BY LIN PIAO. NO OTHER DETAILS YET AVAILABLE.

B. COMMENT: PEKING THUS MAINTAINS STRIKING PERIODICITY OF BI-WEEKLY MASS RALLIES FOR RED GUARDS. WHILE WE UNABLE TO COMMENT FURTHER AT THIS TIME, INITIAL INDICATIONS THAT THIS RALLY FOLLOWED GENERAL FORMAT OF FIRST THREE FURTHER STRENGTHENS OUR IMPRESSION THAT SOMETHING WENT WRONG WITH FOURTH "RALLY". OCTOBER 18 AND FORCED CANCELLATION OF ORIGINAL PLANS (WEEKA 42). (CONFIDENTIAL)

GP-3
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POL 54-4

DATE: 04 27 66 MSG NO.: 2490 TYPE: TE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L HONGKONG 2789 SECTION ONE OF THREE

POUCHED BANGKOK BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST CANBERRA DARESALAAM DJAKARTA KARACHI KATHMANDU KUALALUMPUR LONDON MANILA MOSCOW MUNICH NEWDELHI PRAGUE RANGOON RAWALPINDI ROME SAIGON SEOUL SOFIA SINGAPORE TAIPEI TOKYO VIENTIANE CINCPAC COMNAVPHIL TAIWANDEFCOM 13AF MANILA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOING WEEKA NO 42

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXTERNAL -1. VIETNAM IN NEWS; 2. PEKING, HANOI DIFFER IN TREATMENT OF LAOS QUESTION; 3. PEKING RENEWS CHARGES OF SOVIET-AMERICAN COLLUSION; 4. OUTER MONGOLIA: TSEDENBAL AND GUS HALL CONDEMN CHICOMS.

INTERNAL - 5. COURSE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION REMAINS

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 2789/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNCLEAR. 6. MYSTERY AT TIENANMEN; ABORTIVE MASS RALLY? 7. CENTRAL-SOUTH OFFICIAL PURGED; 8. ATTACKS ON PEKING CITY COMMITTEE AND LI HSUEH-FENG.

EXTERNAL

1. VIETNAM IN NEWS.

A. IN PAST WEEK VIETNAM FIGURED MORE PROMINENTLY IN REGIME MEDIA THAN IT HAS FOR SOME TIME, BUT TREATMENT OF ISSUE WAS ESSENTIALLY REACTIVE AND ROUTINE. OCT 18 NCNA ARTICLE REPRESENTED REGIME'S FIRST EXTENSIVE TREATMENT OF

CONFIDENTIAL

HONG KONG 2789 10-20-66 (JW 42)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

MANILA CONFERENCE AND PRESIDENT'S TRIP. CONFERENCE WAS ATTACKED AS "DESIGNED TO PLAN INTENSIFIED WAR IN VIETNAM" WHILE RECENT US 3-POINT PEACE PROPOSAL WAS INTENDED "COVER US NATURE OF MANILA CONFERENCE." ARTICLE FURTHER ALLEGED ESSENCE OF US AND OTHER PEACE PROPOSALS WAS, IN PEKING'S STEREOTYPED PROSE " TO ENABLE US TO OBTAIN AT CONFERENCE TABLE WHAT IT FAILED GAIN ON BATTLEFIELD".

PAGE THREE RUMJDH 2789/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TREATED AS BOTH SIGN OF US WEAKNESS AND PRELUDE TO ESCALATION IN VIETNAM. ARTICLE ASSTERTED THAT "US WARMONGER JOHNSON" ON TRIP TO FAR EAST "WILL WAVE BANNER OF PEACE WHILE ACTUALLY TRYING EXPAND WAR OF AGRESSION IN VIETNAM".

B. PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTATOR TREATED US "SUDDEN DECLARATION STOP BOMBING EASTERN PART OF DMZ"AS PART OF "HOAX OF INDUCEMENT TO PEACE TALKS". COMMENTATOR IMPLIED US TRUE INTENTIONS IN VIETNAM REVEALED IN WESTERN PRESS REPORTS THAT "MACNAMARA WENT TO SAIGON WITH A MILITARY PLOT IN ORDER PLAN ATTACK ON DMZ BY US TROOPS AND MAKE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING ON DRV."

C. TWO OTHER ARTICLES COMPLETED REGIME'S COMMENTS ON VIETNAM.

LIBERATION ARMY DAILY COMMENTATOR ON OCTOBER 15TH MARKED SECOND ANNIVERSARY DEATH OF "VEITNAMESE HERO NGUYEN VAN THUO" BY RENEWING PLEDGES OF "RESOLUTE SUPPORT FOR VIETNAMESE PEOPLE...AND TO FIGHT BY THEIR SIDE TO WIPE

PAGE FOUR RUMJDH 2789/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

OUT US AGGRESSORS". HOWEVER,PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTATOR IN OCT 19 TRIBUTE TO DRV DESTRUCTION"1500 US AIRCRAFT" IMPLIED THAT THIS TYPE OF CHINESE ASSISTANCE WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED. THUS, COMMENTATOR USED THE DRV"VICTORY" OVER US AIRPOWER AS PROOF "THAT SO LONG AS THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE CARRY THEIR WAR THROUGH TO THE END WITH PERSISTENCE, THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE ABLE TO DEFEAT US AGGRESSORS COMPLETELY". (CONFIDENTIAL)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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2. PEKING, HANOI DIFFER IN TREATMENT OF LAOS QUESTION.

-.EXTENSIVE PLAY GIVEN BY PEKING AND HANOI TO NLXH CELEBRATION OF 21ST ANNIVERSARY LAOTIAN INDEPENDENCE (OCT 12), REVEAVLED SIGNIFICANT CONTRAST IN THEIR HANDLING OF 1954 AND 1962 GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND RELATED ISSUES. PEOPLES'S DAILY "COMMENTATOR" ARTICLE OCT 15

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 2789/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

IGNORED GENEVA ACCORDS AND RESULTANT TRI-PARTITE COALITION GOVERNMENT AND INSTEAD EMPHASIZED "STRUGGLE FOR FINAL VICTORY". NCNA SUMMARIES OF NLHX MESSAGE TO LAO PEOPLE AND ARTICLE BY NLHX SECGEN PHOUMI VONGVICHIT STUDIOUSLY OMITTED ALL THEIR REFERENCES TO GENEVA. HANOI, ON OTHER HAND, APPEALED FOR "SCRUPOLOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF 1962 GENEVA AGREEMENTS" IN OCT 12 NHAN DAN EDITORIAL AND PRINTED COMPLETE TEXTS OF PHOUMI ARTICLE AND NLHX MESSAGE. PHOUMI ARTICLE IN PARTICULAR MADE CLEAR THAT DESPITE FACT THAT US HAD "SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED...AND ALMOST NEGATED" 1962 ACCORDS, CORRECT SOLUTION TO LAOS QUESTION WAS STILL TO BE FOUND IN OCT 13, 1965 MANIFESTO OF LAOTIAN POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE WHICH CALLED INTER ALIA FOR RESPECTING 1962 ACCORDSSA AND HOLDING "SERIOUS"TRI-PARTITE NEGOTIATIONS. OF POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANCE ALSO WAS PEKING'S CONSISTENT IDENTIFICATION OF OCT 12 MESSAGE AS "APPEAL OF NLHX CENTRAL COMMITTEE," WHILE HANOI REFERRED TO IT AS "APPEAL BY PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG". (CONFIDENTIAL)

B.COMMENT: WHILE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN DRV AND CPR STANCE ON LAOS GENEVA ACCORDS COMES THROUGH CLEARLY IN RESPECTIVE TREATMENT OF OCCASION, CHINSE DID NOT GO TO EXTREME (AS HAD CHEN YI IN AUGUST--WEEKA 34) OF ASSERTING THAT US HAD "COMPLETELY WRECKED" GENEVA ACCORDS. IN FACT, AFTER EXCISING ALL REFERENCE TO GENEVA FROM INDEPENDENCE DAY MATERIAL, NCNA OCT 19 SUMMARIZED PHOUMI REMARKS MADE OCT 2 IN UNIDENTIFIED CONTEXT TO EFFECT THAT US SHOULD CEASE "AGGRESSION" IN LAOS AND ADHERE TO 1962 CEASE-FIRE AND GENEVA AGREEMENTS. HOWEVER, FACT THAT NLHX AND HANOI ESSENTIALLY IN TUNE WITH EACH OTHER AND AT ODDS WITH PEKING IN TREATMENT OF GENEVA AGREEMENTS STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT HANOI STILL THE MAJOR CONTROLLING FORCE OF PATHET LAO MOVEMENTS (CONFIDENTIAL).

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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C O N F I D E N T I A L HONGKONG 2789 SECTION TWO OF THREE

3. PEKING RENEWS CHARGES OF SOVIET AMERICAN COLLUSION.

1.LENGTHY PEOPLE'S DAILY "OBSERVER"ARTICLE OCT 16 FOUND EVIDENCE IN PRESIDENT'S OCT 7 SPEECH OF "GREAT CONSPIRACY OF NAKED COLLUSION BETWEEN US AND USSR" AND PORTRAYED SPEECH AS US BID FOR SOVIET SUPPORT OF VIETNAM "PEACE TALKS FRAUD"AS WELL AS FOR MOSCOW'S COOPERATION IN MAKING POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF US TROOPS FROM EUROPE TO VIETNAM. REACTING TO EUROPEAN FOCUS OF PRESIDENT'S SPEECH, OBSERVER STRESSED THEME THAT US-SOVEIT PLAN IN OFFING TO "BETRAY INTERESTS OF GDR AND PERMIT WEST GERMAN MILITARISTS ANNEX GDR AND TO "RESTORE CAPITALISM IN EAST EUROPE". AS FOR CHINA, OBSERVER CLAIMED THAT "ANTI-COMMUNIST, ANTI-PEOPLE, COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY AND ANTI-CHINA NEW HOLY ALLIANCE" BETWEEN US AND USSR WAS "ALREADY IN EXISTENCE" BUT THAT TWO COUNTRIES AT THIS TIME FOUND IT "SIMPLY INCONVENIENT MAKE PUBLIC THE RELATION OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THEM". IN HISTORICAL LONG

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 2789/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L

VIEW, HOWEVER, OBSERVER ASSURED READERS THAT BOTH POWERS WERE "COUPLE OF PAPER TIGERS"AND THAT "IMPERIALISM CANNOT SAVE REVISIONISM; NEITHER CAN REVISIONISM SAVE IMPERIALISM" UNCLASSIFIED

B. COMMENT: CHINESE CHAREGES OF US-SOVIET COLLUSION HAVE BECOME COMMON FEATURES OF PEKING'S COMMENTARY ON VIRTUALLY ALL FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS. BUT OBSERVER ARTICLE SEEMS TO SURPASS IN THOROUGHNESS AND FIERCENESS ALL SCATTERED ATTACKS OF PAST YEAR. (HONGKONG 2656) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

4. OUTER MONGOLIA: TSEDENBAL AND GUS HALL CONDEMN CHICOMS.

A. ULAN BATOR RADIO SUMMARY OF MONGOLIAN PREMIER TSEDENBAL'S SPEECH AT EARLY OCTOBER MEETING IN HONOR VISITING US COMMUNIST GUS HALL REPORTED TSEDENBAL'S SPECIFIC CONDEMNATION OF "CHINESE LEADERS" BOTH FOR "SPLITTISTS ACTIVITIES" AND FOR LAUNCHING "SO-CALLED GREAT PROLETARIAN

"CULTURAL REVOLUTION," ALL OF WHICH "PLAYED INTO HANDS OF WORLD REACTION". RADIO ALSO CARRIED RECORDED EXCERPTS OF HALL'S SPEECH CHARACTERIZING MAO THOUGHT AS "PETTY BOURGEOIS" AND "MIXTURE OF NARROW NATIONALISM AND GREAT POWER CHAUVINISM". (UNCLASSIFIED)

B. COMMENT: TSEDENBAL'S UNUSUALLY DIRECT CRITICISM OF CCP LEADERSHIP MAY WELL REFLECT SOVIET PRESSURE UPON MONGOLS TO JOIN OTHER FOREIGN PARTIES IN OPEN ATTACKS ON CHINESE.(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

INTERNAL

5. COURSE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION REMAINS UNCLEAR

A. EVENTS OF THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS HAVE ADDED TO UNCERTAINTY WHICH IN EVIDENCE SINCE OCT 1 OVER FUTURE DIRECTION OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION. THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED

DEARTH OF EDITORIAL COMMENT AND INSTRUCTION TO RED GUARDS SINCE NATIONAL DAY. MOREOVER, WE HAVE SEEN NO EVIDENCE OF GUARD ACTIVITY AGAINST PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN PROVINCES SINCE OCT 1. POSTER WARFARE IN PEKING CONTINUES WITH RENEWED ATTACKS ON SOME NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PARTY FIGURES SUCH AS PEKING CCP FIRST SECRETARY LI HSUEH-FENG (ITEM 8). (HOWEVER, BRITISH EMBASSY SOURCES SAY THAT THEY HAVE NOT SEEN ANY OF THE ALLEGED POSTER ATTACKS ON OTHER LEADERS SUCH AS MAO, LIN PIAO, LIU

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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SHAO-CHI, MADAME LIU, ETC, WHICH RECENTLY REPORTED BY EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PRESS). THE MAJOR EVENT" SINCE OCT 1 HAS BEEN LIN PAIOS'S CALL FOR A "NEW STAGE" IN MAO-THOUGHT, A CALL DEVOID OF NEW SUBSTANCE AND PERHAPS DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO BUILD UP LIN; AND EVEN THIS CAMPAIGN SEEMS TO HAVE LOST MOMENTUM IN LAST FEW LAYS.

B. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL INDIRECT INDICATIONS OF MODERATION IN RED GUARD ACTIVITIES. NCNA OCT 17 REPORTED

RED GUARDS TAKING STEPS TO "TAKE GOOD CARE OF" SCULPTURE OF LUNGMEN GROTTOES, (IMPORTANT HISTORICAL BUDDHIST SITE) WHICH "HAD SUFFERED SERIOUS DAMAGE DURING KMT REACTIONARY REGIME, BUT PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT HAD REPAIRED ALL OF THEM SINCE LIBERATION.". ARTICLE PRAISED RED GUARD EFFORT AT LUNGMENT TO PRESENT VISITORS WITH PROLETARIAN CLASS ANALYSIS OF SITE, AND ALLEGED PEOPLE OF AREA "WARMLY-- APPLAUDED RED GUARDS' EAGERNESS TO CHERISH CHINA'S CULTURAL HERITAGE AND PUT IT MORE EXCLUSIVELY TO SERVICE OF REVOLUTION". DESPITE EMPHASIS ON RED GUARD UTILIZATION OF LUNGMENT AS AID TO CLASS EDUCATION, ARTICLE IS DRASTIC DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS PORTRAYAL OF RED GUARDS AS PROPERLY DETERMINED TO ELIMINATE ALL VESTIGES OF FEUDALISM." WE SUSPECT THIS CHANGE IN PRESS COVERAGE REPRESENTS REGIME'S DEFENSIVE REACTION TO DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN DISAPPROBATION OF RED GUARD ACTIVITY.

C. HOWEVER, IN CONTRAST TO THESE SIGNS OF MODERATION AND THE RATHER CONCILIATORY TONE OF OCT 1 EDITORIALS TOWARD SEGMENT OF ENEMY (HK 2352), PEOPLE'S DAILY OCT 19 EDITORIAL MARKING ANNIVERSARY LU HSUN'S DEATH FORECAST HARSH TREATMENT FOR PARTY'S ENEMIES. EDITORIAL EXPLICITY STATED THAT "IN OUR GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION WE SHOULD DEVELOPE THIS SPIRIT OF LU HSUN'S OF

0274

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

'BEATING THE WILD DOG IN THE WATER TO DEATH' AND NEVER SHOW SOFTNESS OR MERCY TO THE ENEMY".

D.THE ZIG-ZAG COURSE OF RECENT REGIME COMMENT ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION WAS CAPPED BY THE MYSTERIOUS SPECTACLE OF MAO' S MOTORCADE THROUGH PEKING STREETS OCT 18(SEE ITEM 6) (CONFIDENTIAL)

6 MYSTERY AT TIENANMEN; ABORTIVE MASS RALLY?

A. NCNA OCT; 18 AND PEKING RADIO OCT 19 ANNOUNCED THAT MAO TSE-TUNG OCT 18 "RECEIVED AND REVIEWED " 1.5 MILLION

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RED GUARDS AND REVOLUTIONARY TEACHERS AND STUDENT S WHO WERE "IN PEKING TO EXCHANGE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCES" AND WHO WERE GATHERED AT TIENANMEN SQUARE AND ALONG THE STREETS LEADING TO THE SQUARE. REPORTAGE PROVIDED ORDER OF CAVALCADE, WITH MAO AND LIN AT THE HEAD AND 26 OTHER PARTY LEADERS IN ORDER FIRST REVEALED BY AUGUST 18 RALLY, E.G. LIU SHAO-CHI IN EIGHTH PLACE. (UNCLASSIFIED)

B. COMMENT: THERE WERE UNUSUAL OVERTONES TO "RALLY". WESTERN PEKING-BASED PRESS DESPATCHES OCT 17 REPORTED THAT RALLY PREPARATIONS, IN FORM OF PORTABLE LAVATORIES AND MOVIE CAMERA INSTALLATIONS, WERE BING MADE IN TIENANMEN SQUARE. ON OCT 18, SAME SOURCES RECOUNTED CROWD'S TEN-HOUR WAIT FOR MAO'S 20 MPH DRIVE THROUGH THE STREETS AND THEIR SUBSEQUENT WAIT OF AN HOUR BEFORE DEMONSTRATIONS DECLARED ENDED. CAVALCADE, APPARENTLY, NEVER HALTED. AS FAR AS WE KNOW, NO LEADERS APPEARED ON TIENANMEN ROSTRUM; NO ONE ADDRESSED THE HUGE CROWD. IN

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 2789/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L

ONE DAY'S DELAY OF BROADCAST AND RATHER BLATANT INDICATIONS THAT TAPE EDITED BY SUBSEQUENT ADDITIONS OF MUSIC AND RED GUARD STATEMENTS, WE SUSPECT THAT RALLY ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR TIENANMEN CALLED OFF AT LAST MINUTE AND SITUATION SALVAGED BY THIS STRANGE "REVIEW" OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION FIGHTERS.

C. WE FUTHER WONDER WHETHER IT POSSIBLE THAT SPECULATED CANCELLATION PRODUCT OF HIGH-LEVEL DISAGREEMENT ON FUTURE COURSE OF RED GUARDS. IN THIS CONTEXT, USEFUL RECALL THAT AT PREVIOUS RED GUARD RALLIES THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN EMPHASIS AND SUBSTANCE BETWEEN LIN PIAO'S AND CHOU EN-LAI'S TREATMENT OF THE MOVEMENT. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

7. CENTAL-SOUTH OFFICIAL PURGED

A. CANTON RADIO MONITORED HERE ON OCT 16 ANNOUNCED DISMISSAL OF WANG KUANG, PROPAGANDA DIRECTOR CENTRAL-SOUTH BUREAU FOR "USING HIS POSITION AS PROPAGANDA CHIEF TO SUPPRESS REVOLUTIONARY IDEAS AND PROMOTE A RIGHTIST LINE".

PAGE THREE RUMJDH 2789/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L

WANG ALLEGED TO HAVE "DECEIVED THE UPPER LEVELS AND HOOD WINKED THE LOWER LEVELS", WHILE LEADING "A SMALL HANDFUL OF BOURGEOIS RIGHTISTS IN THE PROPAGANDA, EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL FRONTS IN KWANGTUNG PROVINCE". (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: WANG, FIRST CENTRAL-SOUTH BUREAU OFFICIAL PUBLICLY DENOUNCED AND PURGED, IS ALSO FIRST PROPAGANDA FIGURE TO COME UNDER ATTACK SINCE MID-SEPTEMBER. HOWEVER, BROADCAST REVEALED THAT WANG WAS "EXPOSED" AT A MEETING OF BUREAU "AT START OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND HAS BEEN "SUSPENDED AND UNDER CTITICISM" SINCE MIDDLE TEN DAYS OF JUNE". THROUGH HIS POSITION AS BUREAU PROPAGANDA CHIEF, WANG PRESUMABLY HAD CLOSE TIES WITH THE CCP CC PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT WHICH HAS BEEN MAJOR PURGE TARGET OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

C. PARTICULARLY INTRIGUING ASPECT OF DISMISSAL IS WANG'S RELATIONSHIP WITH TAO CHU, FORMER FIRST SECRETARY OF

PAGE FOUR RUMJDH 2789/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L

CENTRAL-SOUTH BUREAU AND NOW CCP CC PROPAGANDA DIRECTOR. WANG SERVED UNDER TAO SINCE 1955, FIRST IN KWANGTUNG AND LATER IN REGIONAL BUREAU. HWEVER, STATEMENT THAT WANG "DECEIVED THE UPPER LEVELS" AND CHARACTERIZATION EVENT AS "IMPORTANT VICTORY FOR BUREAU" SEEMS EXPRESSLY DESIGNED ABSOLVE TAO AND BUREAU OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR WANG'S CRIMES. TAO'S BASICALLY SECURE POSITION FURTHER SUGGESTED BY DEALY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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IN PUBLICLY EXPOSING WANG WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN EFFORT KEEP TAO'S OLD STAMPING GROUND OUT OF LINE OF FIRE UNTIL HE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED AS MAJOR FIGURE IN PARTY CENTRAL (HK 2658) (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. ATTACKS ON PEKING CITY COMMITTEE AND LI HSUEH FENG.

A.WHILE PEKING CCP FIRST SECRETARY LI HSUEH-FENG CONTINUES TO APPEAR IN PUBLIC (LATESTS WAS IN OCT 18 PEKING MOTORCADE), REPORTS OF ATTACKS AGAINST HIM CONTINUE TO APPEAR. AFP OCT 16 REPORTED WALL POSTER IN PEKING BLAMING

LI FOR MONETARY LOSSES DUE TO HIS WRONGFUL HANDLING OF STRIKE WHICH ALLEGEDLY TOOK PLACE FROM MID-SEPTEMBER TO MID-OCTOBER AND AP TOKYO, QUOTING OCT 15 JAPANESE NEWSPAPERS, SAID LI HAD CONDUCTED A PUBLIC "SELF INSPECTION AT PEKING TEACHER'S UNIVERSITY.

B. COMMENT: THESE REPORTS COME AGAINST ABACKGROUND OF REPORTED CHOU EN-LAI AUG 22 AND SEPT 9 TALKS AT TSING HUA UNIVERSITY WHICH, ACCORDING TO JAPANESE PRESS AND OTHER SOURCES,RAISED POSSIBILITY THAT FURTHER RED GUARD ACTION WOULD BE REQUIRED AGAINST PEKING PARTY COMMITTEE OWING LI'S FAILURE CARRY OUT THOROUGH REFORM OF IT FOLLOWING PENG'S FALL. IN ANY EVENT, WHILE WE BASICALLY AT LOSS TO EXPLAIN LI'S SEESWAING STATUS, WE WONDER IF IT MAY NOT BE REFLECTION OF CONTINUING INTRA-PARTY DIFFERENCES AT HIGHEST LEVELS. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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POUCH: (2) BANGKOK, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, CANBERRA, DARESSALAAM, DJAKARTA, KARACHI, KATHMANDU, KUALA LUMPUR, LONDON, MANILA, MOSCOW, MUNICH, NEW DELHI, PRAGUE, RANGOON, RAWALPINDI, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SOFIA, SINGAPORE, (4) TAIPEI, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, CINCPAC, COMNAVPHIL, TAIWANDRFCOM, 13THAFMANILA

WEEKA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

RSR CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 41

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXTERNAL - 1. VIETNAM: PEKING ON NEGOTIATIONS, MCNAMARA TRIP, MANILA CONFERENCE; 2. ALBANIAN UNGA SPEECH REPORTED; 3. REPATRIATES FROM INDONESIA: "TWO CHINA PLOT" CASTIGATED; 4. PEKING SILENT ON DPRK PARTY MEETING; (5) SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS.

INTERNAL - 6. MAO'S 1927 ARTICLE USED TO JUSTIFY REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE; 7. LIN PIAO CALLS FOR "NEW STAGE" IN STUDY MAO'S THOUGHT; 8. RED GUARDS CONTINUE ACTIVE; 9. LEADERSHIP NOTES.

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EXTERNAL

1. VIETNAM: PEKING ON NEGOTIATIONS, MCNAMARA TRIP, AND MANILA CONFERENCE

NEGOTIATIONS

A. IN REGIME'S FIRST EXTENSIVE EDITORIAL TREATMENT OF VIETNAM IN RECENT WEEKS, PEOPLE'S DAILY OCTOBER 10 EDITORIAL STRONGLY REAFFIRMED PEKING'S OPPOSITION TO NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT VIETNAM CONFLICT. EDITORIAL LARGELY A STERILE

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

REITERATION FAMILIAR PEKING THESES: "ONLY WAY TO RESTORE PEACE IN VIETNAM IS TO IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW ALL US ARMED FORCES," AND "US AGGRESSION MUST BE ROUNDLY CONDEMNED." THESE POINTS TREATED AS PRINCIPLE ALLOWING NO COMPROMISE. THUS, NOT SURPRISING THAT EDITORIAL DEPICTED U THANT 3-POINT PEACE PROPOSAL AS "AN AMERICAN CONCOCTION."

B. EDITORIAL REFLECTED PEKING'S CONCERN OVER INTERNATIONAL OPINION FAVORING EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS AND INDEED APPEARED BE PRIMARILY INTENDED SWING THIRD COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY AFRO-ASIAN GROUP, TOWARDS REGIME'S STAND ON NEGOTIATIONS. IT ARGUED IN EFFECT THAT UNLESS US SUFFERED ABJECT DEFEAT IN VIETNAM, IT WOULD "POSE GREATER MENACE TO INDEPENDENCE PEOPLE OF ALL COUNTRIES AND WORLD PEACE."

C. POSSIBLY OWING DESIRE AVOID INCREASING PRESSURES FOR NEGOTIATIONS BY CONTRIBUTING TO FEARS THAT VIETNAM WILL LEAD TO SINO-US CONFRONTATION, EDITORIAL FAILED RELATE VIETNAM SITUATION TO US THREAT AGAINST CHINA OR TO REAFFIRM CHINA'S "RESOLUTE SUPPORT FOR VIETNAMESE PEOPLE." OCTOBER 8 CHICOM FONMIN STATEMENT SUPPORTING EARLIER CAMBODIAN PROTEST AGAINST ALLEGED US HELICOPTER ATTACK ON CAMBODIAN FRONTIER POST SIMILARLY FAILED INCLUDE ASSERTION THAT US WILL ULTIMATELY EXPAND WAR TO CHINA. THESE FAILURES TO PORTRAY CHINA AS THREATENED BY US ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM AREA MAY ALSO REFLECT LEADERSHIP'S DESIRE AVOID ADDING TO WORRIES OF CHINESE PEOPLE AT TIME OF MAJOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL UPHEAVAL AS WELL AS POSSIBLE DENY ARGUING POINTS TO DOMESTIC CRITICS OF HIGH-RISK POLICY ON VIETNAM. (HK TEL 2538).

MCNAMARA TRIP - MANILA CONFERENCE

D. REGIME'S PUBLIC MEDIA HAVE GIVEN ONLY PASSING ATTENTION TO MCNAMARA TRIP, FORTHCOMING MANILA CONFERENCE, AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S TRAVEL PLANS. THESE THREE DEVELOPMENTS WERE TOUCHED ON IN OCTOBER 9 NCNA "NEWS" STORY WHICH CONSISTED LARGELY OF EFFORT SHOW US "PEACE OFFENSIVE IS ONLY A SMOKESCREEN TO CAMOUFLAGE ITS WAR ESCALATION." STORY PICTURED MCNAMARA VISIT TO SOUTH VIETNAM AS PART OF US EFFORT "ESCALATE WAR UNDER COVER OF PEACE TALKS" AS DESPERATE RESPONSE TO "HEAVIER AND HEAVIER (US) DEFEATS ON SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLEFIELD." NCNA ALLEGED MCNAMARA FINDINGS WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO MANILA CONFERENCE, WHICH "PLOTTED BY US" WITH AIM OF GETTING PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES TO FOLLOW US IN ITS ADVENTURE OF FURTHER EXTENDING ITS WAR OF AGGRESSION". (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. ALBANIAN UNGA SPEECH REPORTED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

A. NCNA OCTOBER 6 CARRIED SUMMARY OF ALBANIAN FONMIN SPEECH WEEK EARLIER IN UNGA. ITEM DEVOTED TWO PARAGRAPHS TO ALBANIAN'S DEMAND THAT CPR'S "LEGITIMATE SEAT IN UN" BE RESTORED, AS WELL AS HIS ASSERTION THAT GRC OCCUPIED SEAT "ILLEGALLY."

B. COMMENT: BY CITING ALBANIANS ON CHIREP, PEKING HAS GIVEN TACIT OVERT APPROVAL OF RENEWED EFFORTS FOR ITS ADMISSION TO UN, EVIDENTLY ALONG SAME LINES AS LAST YEAR. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. REPATRIATES FROM INDONESIA: "TWO CHINA PLOT"

CASTIGATED

REPATRIATES

A. RETURN TO "MOTHERLAND" OF 1000 CHINESE FROM INDONESIA WAS CELEBRATED WITH OCTOBER 11 RALLY AT PORT OF DEBARKATION (CHANKIANG, KWANGTUNG). AT RALLY, VICE-MINISTER OF OVERSEAS CHINESE AFFAIRS LIN YI-HSIN PLEDGED TO "CONTINUE SEND SHIPS TO BRING BACK VICTIMIZED OVERSEAS CHINESE WHO WISH TO RETURN," AND PICTURED "INDONESIAN RIGHT-WING ANTI-CHINA AND ANTI-CHINESE MEASURES" AS EFFORT "CURRY FAVOR WITH US." LIN'S SPEECH WAS FOLLOWED BY REPATRIATE ACCOUNTS OF THEIR RESOLUTE STRUGGLE AGAINST INDONESIAN REPRESSION WHICH INSPIRED BY MAO'S THOUGHTS. EARLIER NCNA ACCOUNTS OF HOMEWARD VOYAGE PAINTED SHIPBOARD SCENE OF FERVENT MAO-STUDY AND REVOLUTIONARY SONGFESTS BY RETURNEES.

TWO CHINAS

B. PEKING ALSO CHARGED INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT WITH MOVING FURTHER ALONG ROAD OF COLLABORATION WITH US "TWO CHINA PLOT." OCTOBER 8 NCNA REPORT ALLEGED THAT GOI-GRC AGREEMENTS ON TEXTILE PURCHASES AND RAW COTTON PROCESSING REPRESENTED GOI "START OF ECONOMIC TIES (WITH GRC), WITH A PLOT TO ESTABLISH 'DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS' IN VIEW." ON OCTOBER 12 NCNA DEALT AT GREATER LENGTH WITH SUBJECT, PROVIDING ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF ALLEGED GOI DEALINGS WITH GRC WHICH "ALL DONE ON ORDERS OF US." NCNA TERMED THESE DEALINGS "A FLAGRANT ACT OF ANTAGONISM TOWARD CHINESE PEOPLE" AND "STERNLY WARNED" THAT GOI "WILL COME TO NO GOOD END BY FOLLOWING US EFFORTS MANUFACTURE 'TWO CHINAS'."

C. COMMENT: INDONESIA'S CASE PARALLELS THAT OF INDIA, WHERE DESPITE PRESENT MINIMAL LEVEL OF RELATIONS PEKING CONTINUES TO NOTE AND PROTEST ANY INDIAN CONTACTS INCLUD-

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ING NON-GOVERNMENTAL ONES, WITH TAIWAN. PEKING'S CONTINUING SENSITIVITY TOWARD POLITICAL STATUS OF TAIWAN WAS FURTHER DEMONSTRATED IN NCNA OCTOBER 5 STORY LABELING FIRST JAPANESE NAVAL VISIT TO TAIWAN SINCE WAR AS "FLAGRANT INTRUSION INTO CHINA'S TERRITORY AND TERRITORIAL WATERS." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. PEKING SILENT ON DPRK PARTY MEETING

A. KIM IL-SONG SPEECH OF OCTOBER 5 TO NORTH KOREAN WORKERS PARTY CONFERENCE, LIKE AUGUST 16 NODONG SHIMBUN "INDEPENDENCE" EDITORIAL, HAS NOT BEEN MENTIONED IN CHICOM PRESS. THOUGH KIM HAD HARSH WORDS FOR "GREAT-POWER CHAUVINIST" TENDENCIES OF BOTH MAJOR COMMUNIST STATES, HE CAME CLOSE TO OPEN ATTACK ON CHICOMS WHEN HE DEPLORED EFFORTS TO BRAND INDEPENDENT PARTIES AS "NEUTRALIST, ECLECTIC, OR OPPORTUNIST." THESE ARE EPITHETS CHICOMS HAVE USED (E.G., DURING MAY VISIT OF ALBANIAN PREMIER SHEHU) TO DESCRIBE PARTIES WHO REFUSED TO JOIN IN CCP DENUNCIATION OF SOVIET "REVISIONISTS." IN CONTRAST TO PEKING'S SILENCE, VNA OCTOBER 9 REPORTED KIM SPEECH BUT OMITTED REFERENCES TO BLOC POLEMICS AND HIS RENEWED OFFER OF "VOLUNTEERS" FOR VIETNAM; MOSCOW ALOS SUMMARIZED SPEECH AT SOME LENGTH IN OCTOBER 8 PRAVDA.

B. COMMENT: THOUGH SPEECH NOT REPORTED IN PEKING PUBLIC MEDIA, IT IS PRESUMABLY CIRCULATING AMONG HIGH-LEVEL CCP CADRES, WHOSE CONFIDENCE IN MAO'S LEADERSHIP NOT LIKELY TO BE BOLSTERED BY KIM'S WELL-FOUNDED CRITICISM. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

A. CHINESE STATE RELATIONS WITH USSR DETERIORATED ANOTHER NOTCH LAST WEEK AS SOVIETS ANNOUNCED EXPULSION REMAINING CHINESE STUDENTS IN USSR IN RETALIATION FOR PEKING REQUEST TO SOME FOREIGN EMBASSIES TO RECALL THEIR STUDENTS IN CPR SCHOOLS UNTIL CULTURAL REVOLUTION CONCLUDED. THOUGH SOVIETS STRESSED THAT ACTION WAS ON BASIS OF RECIPROCITY AND AFFIRMED READINESS CONSIDER EXCHANGE OF STUDENTS WITH CPR IN FUTURE, NCNA'S OCTOBER 9 REPORT OF RECEPTION GIVEN BY CHINESE STUDENTS IN MOSCOW ON CPR NATIONAL DAY SUGGESTS THAT THEIR PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES AMONG FOREIGN STUDENTS WERE ALREADY SOURCE OF IRRITATION TO HOST GOVERNMENT. NCNA STORY QUOTED RECEPTION GUESTS FROM A-A COUNTRIES AS SAYING THAT SOVIET PRESS CAMPAIGN MALIGNING CULTURAL REVOLUTION WAS "DELIBERATE DISTORTION OF FACTS," AND CLAIMED THAT GUESTS WERE HIGHLY APPRECIATIVE OF MAO BADGES AND MAO WORKS PRESENTED TO THEM BY CHINESE. NCNA STORY OF AFFAIR WAS FILED FROM MOSCOW AFTER SOVIETS PUBLISHED EXPULSION

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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ORDER; CHICOM MEDIA HAVE YET TO REPORT SOVIET MOVE.

B. AT SAME TIME, ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE EMERGED OF SHIFT IN CHICOM TACTICS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST FRONT MEETINGS, POINTING TO INCREASING SELF-ISOLATION OF CCP FROM "FRATERNAL" PARTIES. PEKING'S OCTOBER 2 REJECTION OF WIDF INVITATION (WEEKA 40) WAS FOLLOWED ON OCTOBER 7 BY PUBLIC REJECTION OF PARTICIPATION IN EAST BERLIN CONGRESS OF SOVIET-DOMINATED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF JOURNALISTS. (CONGENTEL 2445).

C. CHICOM PROPAGANDA BARRAGE CHARGING US-SOVIET COLLUSION OVER VIETNAM AND OTHER ISSUES CONTINUED AT HIGH LEVEL DURING WEEK AS NCNA REPORTED ON PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 7 SPEECH ON RELATIONS WITH USSR AND EAST EUROPE AND HIGHLIGHTED GROMYKO TALKS WITH PRESIDENT AND OTHER US LEADERS. WE UNDERSTAND FROM PEKING-BASED EASTERN CORRESPONDENTS ON VISIT HERE, HOWEVER, THAT SOVIETS IN CHICOM CAPITAL PROFESS TO BE LESS CONCERNED ABOUT CHARGES OF US-SOVIET COLLUSION THAN ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENT IN SINO-US RELATIONS. (SOVIETS HAVE TAKEN SAME LINE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGNERS IN OTHER CAPITALS). (CONFIDENTIAL)

INTERNAL

6. MAO'S 1927 ARTICLE USED TO JUSTIFY REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

A. OCTOBER 7 PEOPLE'S DAILY REPRINTED OCTOBER 6 LIBERATION ARMY DAILY'S "EDITORIAL NOTE" AND ARTICLE ON MAO'S 1927 REPORT ON AN INVESTIGATION OF AGRARIAN MOVEMENT IN HUNAN. LAD TERMED MAO'S REPORT OF "PROFOUND SIGNIFICANCE IN CURRENT GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND "MOST OUTSTANDING EXAMPLE FOR EVERY REVOLUTIONARY TO DEAL CORRECTLY WITH MASS MOVEMENT." (LAD ARTICLE WAS DESCRIBED AS STUDY MATERIAL FOR PLA UNITS.)

B. THERE ARE STRIKING SIMILARITIES EVENT DESCRIBED IN "REPORT" AND CURRENT CULTURAL REVOLUTION (E.G., MAO QUOTED AS SAYING HUNAN PEASANTS "AT THE SLIGHTEST PROVOCATION MAKE ARRESTS, CROWN THE ARRESTED WITH PAPER HATS AND PARADE THEM THROUGH THE VILLAGE. . .DOING WHATEVER THEY LIKE AND TURNING EVERYTHING UPSIDE DOWN). LAD EXPLICITLY LINKED HUNAN PEASANTS "MARVELOUS FEAT NEVER BEFORE ACHIEVED" WITH CURRENT "UPSURGE OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION." EMPHASIS ON MAO'S CHAPTER "THE QUESTION OF GOING TOO FAR" SEEMS SIGNIFICANT ATTEMPT REASSURE "REVOLUTIONARY" ELEMENTS ENGAGED IN PRESENT STRUGGLE THAT THOSE "FRIGHTENED" PEOPLE WHO ASSAULT THE MOVEMENT WITH SEEMINGLY PLAUSIBLE TALK OF "GOING TOO

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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FAR" ARE IMPEDING THE REVOLUTION AND MUST BE STOPPED. STRESS ON THIS ASPECT IN LINE WITH EARLIER STORIES THAT "STRUGGLE BY REASONING" LINE NEED NOT BE FOLLOWED ABSOLUTELY AND THAT PLA WAS STUDYING "REPORT" IN CONJUNCTION CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS EARLY AS AUGUST 28 (WEEKA NO. 38).

C. COMMENT: PLA HAS AGAIN TAKEN LEAD, DUTIFULLY FOLLOWED BY PEOPLE'S DAILY, IN STRESSING THAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION IS, IN FACT, REVOLUTION, AND THAT REVOLUTION, AS DESCRIBED BY MAO (AND REITERATED IN LAD ACCOUNT) IS NOT TEA PARTY OR BANQUET, BUT "ACT OF VIOLENCE.' THESE "STUDY MATERIALS" APPEAR TO CONSTITUTE WARNING THAT EVEN AFTER LONG EXHAUSTING STRUGGLE, MODERATION STILL NOT TO BE CONSIDERED A VIRTUE. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. LIN PIAO CALLS FOR "NEW STAGE" IN STUDY MAO'S THOUGHT

A. RECENT HSIAO HUA SPEECH TO AIR FORCE CADRES CARRRIED NCNA OCTOBER 9 AND REAFFIRMED IN LIBERATION ARMY DAILY OCTOBER 11 AND PEOPLE'S DAILY OCTOBER 12 EDITORIALS EULOGISTICALLY DISCUSSED LIN PIAO "RECENT CALL ON PLA" TO "CARRY FORWARD TO A NEW STAGE THE MASS DRIVE FOR THE CREATIVE STUDY OF CHAIRMAN MAO'S WORKS." (HD EDITORIAL WIDENED APPLICABILITY OF CALL "TO WHOLE PARTY AND WHOLE PEOPLE" AND DESCRIBED PLA AS "A BRILLIANT EXAMPLE FOR PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.") WHILE WE HAVE YET TO SEE TEXT OF LIN'S "RECENT CALL," AVAILABLE EVIDENCE DOES NOT INDICATE IT CONTAINED ANY SUBSTANTIVE INNOVATIONS, ALTHOUGH IT REACHED NEW LEVELS IN EXTOLLING MAO'S THOUGHT AS "MARXIST-LENINISM DEVELOPED TO HIGHEST LEVEL OF OUR TIME,. . .MARXIST-LENINISM CLOSEST TO PRESENT DAY REALITY." INSTEAD HSIAO HUA SPEECH AND EDITORIALS PRESENTED FAMILIAR RECITATION OF IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING AND GRASPING WORKS OF MAO IN ORDER "FULFILL THE MISSION HISTORY HAS GIVEN US." THERE WAS PERHAPS GREATER STRESS GIVEN TO NEED TO APPLY AS WELL AS MASTER MAO'S THOUGHT, BUT WE DOUBT WHETHER THIS TASK WAS MADE CLEARER BY THE DEFINITION OF APPLICATION AS "LINKING WITH REALITY ONE'S THINKING AND WORK."

B. COMMENT: DESPITE THE ALL TOO FAMILIAR NATURE OF MATERIAL AT HAND, TWO FAIRLY MAJOR POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS APPEAR TO BE MOTIVE FORCE BEHIND WHAT IS SHAPING UP AS YET "A HIGHER STAGE" IN ALREADY INTENSIVE STUDY-MAO CAMPAIGN. IN A SENSE, LIN'S CALL AND PUBLICITY GIVEN IT SERVES AS A DIRECTIVE INTENDED TO ESTABLISH EVEN GREATER POLITICAL ORTHODOXY WITHIN CHINA IN THE BELIEF, EXPRESSED RECENTLY

0284

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

BY LIN AND PROBABLY SHARED BY MAO (AND DERIVED FROM SUN YAT-SEN), THAT WITHOUT A UNIFIED IDEOLOGY THE CHINESE PEOPLE "WILL STILL BE LIKE LOOSE SAND."

C. SECOND CONSIDERATION APPARENT IN PRESENT CAMPAIGN INVOLVES THE CONTINUING BUILD-UP OF LIN PIAO (HK 2540). HSIAO HUA'S EMPHASIS ON CONTINUITY OF LIN'S IMPORTANT STAND AT THE SIDE OF MAO, "AT EVERY HISTORICAL, CRUCIAL TURN IN THE CHINESE REVOLUTION" IS SIMILAR TO SEVERAL RECENT ATTEMPTS UNDERLINE LIN'S CENTRAL ROLE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE HISTORY AND, IN FACT, CLEARLY IMPLIES THAT LIN GAVE IMPORTANT, PERHAPS DECISIVE SUPPORT TO MAO DURING RECENT PERIOD OF HIGH LEVEL DIFFERENCES AND SUGGESTS HE WOULD BE ONE WHO WOULD MOST FAITHFULLY CARRY OUT MAOIST POLICIES AFTER MAO GOES. BOTH LAD AND PD EDITORIALS QUOTE EXTENSIVELY FROM COMRADE LIN'S EXEGESIS OF "COMRADE MAO'S" WORKS IN OBVIOUS CONTINUING PORTRAYAL OF LIN AS MOST QUALIFIED AND LOYAL EXPONENT OF THOUGHT OF MAO. HOWEVER, IT OF INTEREST THAT, ARE REFLECTED IN HSIAO HUA'S AND LAD EDITORIAL'S DIRECT AND WARM PRAISE OF LIN, FOR MOST PART MILITARY SOURCES HAVE TAKEN LEAD IN THIS GLORIFICATION PROCESS. THIS LEADS US BELIEVE IT LARGELY LIN-INSPIRED, AND POSSIBLY RESULTS FROM HIS APPRECIATION OF IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING POPULAR REPUTATION AND SUPPORT AFTER HIS LONG YEARS AS PRIMARILY BEHIND-SCENES OPERATOR.

D. IF ANY FURTHER EVIDENCE REQUIRED UNDERLINE LIN'S RISE TO STATUS HEIR APPARENT, IT CONTAINED IN APPEARANCES WITHIN PAST TWO WEEKS OF EXAMPLES HIS CALLIGRAPHY ALONGSIDE MAO'S AND PREFACING OF RECENT PROVINCIAL RADIO NEWSCASTS WITH QUOTES FROM LIN'S OCTOBER ONE SPEECH. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. RED GUARDS CONTINUE ACTIVE

A. PEKING-BASED AFP CORRESPONDENT JEAN VINCENT CONFIRMED OCTOBER 10 TASS REPORT OF RECENT RED GUARD ATTACK ON NEW PEKING CCP CITY COMMITTEE WHICH FORMED LATE MAY TO REPLACE COMMITTEE HEADED BY PENG CHEN. VINCENT ON OCTOBER 8 SAW POSTER PLACED DIRECTLY ACROSS STREET FROM PEKING COMMITTEE HEADQUARTERS ATTACKING LI HSUEH-FENG, FIRST SECREATRY PEKING CCP COMMITTEE AND WU TEH, SECOND SECRETARY AND ACTING MAYOR OF PEKING, FOR "RESITING CULTURAL REVOLUTION".

B. COMMENT: BOTH LI AND WU PARTICIPATED IN NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS AND WERE HIGH UP ON LISTS OF PARTY LEADERS IN ATTENDANCE. POSTER MAY REPRESENT SPONTANEOUS RED GUARD ACTIVITY, THOUGH PROMINENCE OF ITS DISPLAY SUGGESTS ACTION AT LEAST CONDONED AND PERHAPS INSTIGATED BY AUTHORITIES WITHIN PARTY. WE INCLINED TO VIEW THIS ATTACK ON RE-

0285

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

CENTLY CHOSEN SUCCESSORS TO PURGED PEKING COMMITTEE AS REFLECTION OF CONTINUING MAO-LIN DISSATISFACTION WITH PERFORMANCE SUBORDINATE PARTY ORGANS AND OF SUBSTANTIAL RESISTANCE OR ANTIPATHY TO THEIR POLICIES WITHIN PARTY APPARATUS.

C. OTHER RED GUARD VIGNETTES INCLUDED NCNA ACCOUNT OF PRAISE OF ORGANIZATION BY "REPRESENTATIVES OF WORKERS, PEASANTS AND SOLDIERS, HEROES AND MODEL WORKERS IN ALL FIELDS" WHICH WE INTERPRET AS CONTINUING REGIME EFFORT COUNTER ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION TO LAST MONTH'S GUARD EXCESSES, AND CREATE BELIEF THEY HAVE ARDENT SUPPORT OF MASSES. NCNA OCTOBER 11 AND 12 FEATURE ARTICLES ON GUARDS [illegible] BE LARGELY INTENDED AS PRIMER FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES. OCTOBER 11 ARTICLE WAS MORE INTERESTING IN THAT IT REPEATED CLAIM, WHICH SOUNDS SOMEWHAT EX POST FACTO TO US, THAT RED GUARDS HAD ARISEN SPONTANEOUSLY AT TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY MIDDLE SCHOOL LAST MAY. ARTICLE ALSO PICTURED RED GUARDS AS FIRST DESIGNED ELIMINATE BOURGEOIS STRONGHOLD IN ACADEMIC CIRCLES, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY COMING TO REALIZATION THAT ANTI-SOCIALIST MANIFESTATIONS EXISTED THROUGHOUT SOCIETY, THUS NECESSITATING WIDESPREAD ATTACKS ON OLD IDEAS, CULTURE, CUSTOMS AND HABITS. OCTOBER 12 ARTICLE PICTURED DAY IN LIFE OF RED GUARD UNIT WHICH CENTERED AROUND MAO-STUDY, HOUR'S MILITARY TRAINING, AND THEN WORK IN FIELDS.

5. LEADERSHIP NOTES

A. HSIEH FU-CHIH LISTED AS POLITBURO ALTERNATE MEMBER: SEPT 29 HONGKONG WEN HUI PAO (LOCAL COMMUNIST DAILY) ARTICLE ON PEKING RECEPTION FOR NATIONAL MINORITY DELEGATIONS IDENTIFIED HSIEH FU-CHIH, A VICE-PREMIER AND MINISTER PUBLIC SECURITY, AS ALTERNATE MEMBER CCP POLITBURO. (UNCLASSIFIED)

B. COMMENT: NCNA ACCOUNT OF RECEPTION DID NOT GIVE PARTY POSITION THOSE ATTENDING, BUT IDENTIFICATION IN CHICOM-OWNED PAPER (AND, REPORTEDLY, IN RADIO PEKING BROADCAST) PRESUMABLY AUTHORITATIVE. THIS FURTHER BOLSTERS OUR BELIEF THAT AUGUST CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM ELECTED NEW POLITBURO AND THAT SUBSEQUENT LISTINGS OF "LEADERS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE" ATTENDING MASS RALLIES (ON SEVERAL OF WHICH LISTS HSIEH FU-CHIH HAS BEEN LAST NAME) LISTS THOSE POLITBURO MEMBERS IN ATTENDANCE IN THEIR NEW RANK-ORDER. STRIKINGLY, OF THE SIX NEW PERSONS APPARENTLY ADMITTED TO POLITBURO (HONGKONG TEL 1587) THREE ARE TOP MILITARY LEADERS (EX-MARSHALS HSU, NIEH, AND YEH) AND ONE, HSIEH, IS

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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C. NEW SECRETARY IN SOUTHWEST BURAU: NCNA ACCOUNT OF OCT 1 RALLY IN CHENGTU, SZECHWAN IDENTIFIED TSENG HSI-SHENG AS A SECRETARY IN PARTY'S SOUTHWEST BURAU. (UNCLASSIFIED)

D. COMMENT: TSENG, A FULL CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, HAD BEEN ANHWEI PROVINCE FIRST SECRETARY AND SECOND SECRETARY EAST CHINA BUREAU UNTIL LATE 1961, THEN DISAPPEARED ALMOST TOTALLY FROM VIEW. ACCORDING TO SOME REPORTS, HE WAS DISMISSED FROM THESE TWO POSTS BECAUSE HE WAS CRITICAL OF LEAP FORWARD EXCESSES AND HAD GONE TOO FAR IN ADOPTION PRAGMATIC POLICIES TO REDRESS THEM. IF SO, HIS REAPPEARANCE IN IMPORTANT REGIONAL BUREAU POSITION AT THIS TIME, WHEN OTHERS ARE BEING PURGED ON SIMILAR CHARGES, ADDS CONFUSING NOTE TO PICTURE. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L HONG KONG 1933 SECTION ONE OF FOUR

SEPTEMBER 15

(ALSO POUCHED TO:) BANGKOK BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST CANBERRA DARESSALAAM DJAKARTA KARACHI KATHMANDU KUALALUMPUR LONDON MANILA MOSCOW MUNICH NEWDELHI PRAGUE RANGOON RAWALPINDI ROME SAIGON SEOUL SOFIA SINGAPORE TAIPEI TOKYO VIENTIANE CINCPAC FOR POLAD COMNAVPHIL TAIWANDEFCOM 13AF MANILA

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 37

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXTERNAL - 1. CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND FOREIGN OPINION; 2. CHEN YI ON DPRK NATIONAL DAY; 3. VIETNAM: ELECTIONS CASTIGATED; NO COMMENT ON WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE; 4. ICC LAOS FINDINGS DENOUNCED; INTERNAL 5. RED GUARDS: OPPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION; 6. REGIME RECOGNIZES

DISRUPTIVE EFFECT OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION ON PRODUCTION; 7. NEW CULTURAL REVOLUTION COMMITTEES ESTABLISHED; 8. CHANGES IN TOP POSITIONS; 9. LOCAL NATIONALISM IN INNER MONGOLIA

EXTERNAL

1. CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND FOREIGN OPINION

A. OBVIOUSLY STUNG BY VIGOROUS DENUNCIATION OF CCP PLENUM COMMUNIQUE THROUGHOUT INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT WHICH TOUCHED OFF BY CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE STATEMENT FROM MOSCOW, AND CONCERNED ABOUT DAMAGED IMAGE ABROAD RESULTING FROM EXCESSES OF RED GUARDS, REGIME HAS ATTEMPTED TO MARSHAL VERBAL SUPPORT FROM DWINDLING RANKS OF PRO-PEKING

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HONG KONG 1933 9-15-66 (JW 37)

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COMMUNIST PARTIES AND FOREIGN "FRIENDS" FOR ITS INTERNAL POLICIES. NCNA OVER PAST WEEK PUBLISHED DOZEN OR MORE TRIBUTES TO CULTURAL REVOLUTION OR MAO THOUGHT FROM SUCH "WEIGHTY" GROUPS AS BRUSSELS FEDERATION OF BELGIAN CP, AUCKLAND DISTRICT COMMITTEE OF NEW ZEALAND CP, AND JAPANESE CP DISSIDENT ELEMENTS IN YAMAGUCHI PREFECTURE. SPECIFIC ENDORSEMENT OF RED GUARDS CAME FROM AFRICAN "FREEDOM FIGHTERS" IN DAR-ES-SALAAM, NEW ZEALAND COMMUNIST

PARTY SEC GEN WILCOX, AND A SWISS COMMUNIST PARTY JOURNAL. ESSENCE OF ASSORTED COMMENT TYPIFIED BY JAPANESE SPLINTER GROUP'S ASSERTION THAT CHINA "HAS BECOME YENAN OF WORLD REVOLUTION" AND THOSE WHO FAIL TO RECOGNIZE CORRECTNESS OF MAO LINE ARE "LUDICROUS IDIOTS".

B. COMMENT: COMPARED TO WIDESPREAD CRITICISM OF CURRENT CHICOM DEVELOPMENTS BOTH BY FOREIGN COMMUNISTS AND WESTERNERS (NONE OF WHICH HAS BEEN PUBLISHED IN CHINESE PRESS, FEEBLE EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT DREDGED UP BY PEKING WILL CREATE HARDLY A RIPPLE ABROAD. WE SUSPECT THINNESS OF SUPPORT OBVIOUS ALSO TO DISCERNING CHINESE ON MAINLAND, WHOSE APPREHENSION OVER PLUMMETING CHINESE PRESTIGE ABROAD LIKELY TO BE HEIGHTENED. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. CHEN YI ON DPRK NATIONAL DAY

A. RECENT COOLNESS IN SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS AFTER PYONGYANG'S AUGUST "DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE" WAS REFLECTED IN CHICOM DOWNGRADING OF DPRK 18TH ANNIVERSARY AS COMPARED WITH LAST YEAR'S ALL-OUT EFFORT. NEITHER CHOU EN-LAI NOR LIU SHAO-CHI ATTENDED EMBASSY RECEPTION, THOUGH BOTH HAD BEEN PRESENT LAST YEAR, AND LAST YEAR'S

RALLY WAS REPLACED THIS YEAR BY MEETING. PERHAPS MOST IRRITATING FROM NORTH KOREAN POINT OF VIEW, HOWEVER, WAS CHEN YI'S USE OF EMBASSY RECEPTION AS FORUM FOR CONDEMNATION "MODERN REVISIONISTS" AND REJECTION OF "UNITED ACTION" WITH

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THEM (WHEREAS NORTH KOREANS HAVE CALLED FOR JOINT OR UNIFIED ACTION TO AID VIETNAMESE BRETHREN). ANOTHER PROBABLE EMBARRASSMENT TO KOREAN HOSTS WAS CHEN'S EUPHORIC DESCRIPTION OF "GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION" IN CHINA -- SUBJECT ON WHICH PYONGYANG HAS MAINTAINED DISCREET SILENCE -- AND HIS CLAIM THAT MOVEMENT WOULD "SURELY EXERT INCALCULABLE FAR-REACHING INFLUENCE ON PRESENT AND FUTURE OF WORLD REVOLUTION".

B. CHEN ALSO GAVE VENT TO SOME PARTICULARLY STRIDENT, STEREOTYPED COMMENTS ON JAPAN (SATO GOVERNMENT WAS "MOST REACTIONARY SINCE WORLD WAR II") AND VIETNAM ("ONLY WAY LEFT TO VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IS TO FIGHT TO END AND THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF COMPROMISE"). REMARKS WERE IN STRIKING CONTRAST TO RELATIVELY MODERATE VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM BY JAPANESE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY VISITORS AFTER SEPTEMBER 6 INTERVIEW, AND WERE

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 1933/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
CARRIED IN SEPARATE ITEM BY NCNA IN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO UNDERSCORE REGIME'S DISAVOWAL OF CHANGE IN POLICY ON VIETNAM.

C. AS IN CASE OF ROMANIAN NATIONAL DAY AUGUST 23, NCNA PUBLISHED NO MESSAGES TO NORTH KOREAN PARTY AND STATE LEADERS, NOR ANY MESSAGES TO BULGARIANS ON THEIR HOLIDAY WHICH FALLS SAME DATE AS DPRK ANNIVERSARY. ONLY NATIONAL DAY MESSAGE SIGNED BY CHICOM LEADERS TO APPEAR IN CHINESE MEDIA SINCE JULY 26 WAS SEPTEMBER 1 GREETING TO DRV. (HONG KONG 1782)(CONFIDENTIAL)

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AGR 3. VIETNAM: ELECTIONS CASTIGATED; NO COMMENT ON
COM WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE
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IAB A. ELECTIONS - IN ADDITION SUBSTANTIAL NCNA COVERAGE
EBSY OF DRV AND NLF DENUNCIATIONS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE
ELECTIONS, PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTATOR ON SEPTEMBER 14
PROCLAIMED "BOGUS ELECTIONS STAGED BY U.S. PUPPETS...
A COMPLETE FLOP". COMMENTATOR DESCRIBED ELECTIONS AS
U.S. EFFORT CLOAK ITS PUPPETS IN GARB OF INDEPENDENCE
AND DEMOCRACY IN ORDER PROVIDE PHONY LEGAL GROUNDS FOR
WASHINGTON'S OCCUPATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM. HE PICTURED
SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AT ONE WITH "THEIR SOLE GENUINE
REPRESENTATIVE, THE NLF" IN RESOLUTELY OPPOSING "U.S.

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 1933/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
ELECTION FARCE". ALLEGING THAT EVEN BAYONETS HAD FAILED
BRING PEOPLE TO POLLS, COMMENTATOR VIEWED SOUTH VIETNAMESE
PEOPLE'S PERFORMANCE RE ELECTIONS AS HAVING "FIRMLY
SIGNIFIED THEIR DETERMINATION TO BATTLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
AND LIBERATION".

B. WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE - WHILE PEKING SIGNIFIED ITS
APPROVAL OF DRV REJECTION PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SEPTEMBER 5
PROPOSAL RE U.S. AND NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOP WITHDRAWAL
BY THOROUGH NCNA COVERAGE OF DRV SEPTEMBER 9 FONMIN
STATEMENT, THE REGIME TO DATE HAS NOT SEPARATELY
COMMENTED ON SUBJECT.

C. COMMENT: WE DO NOT ATTACH SUBSTANTIVE SIGNIFICANCE
TO PEKING'S FAILURE COMMENT ON PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL.
LIKELY THAT EITHER REGIME'S REACTION TIME TO EXTERNAL

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DEVELOPMENTS HAS BEEN SLOWED BY INTERNAL PREOCCUPATIONS (AND WE NOTE THAT FOR PAST WEEK NCNA BULLETIN HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY THINNER THAN USUAL) OR THAT PEKING FEELS HANOI'S RESPONSE SATISFYING ENOUGH TO STAND ALONE. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. ICC LAOS FINDINGS DENOUNCED

PAGE THREE RUMJDH 1933/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
A. PEKING REACTED BELATEDLY, BUT PREDICTABLY, TO AUGUST 22 BRITISH REPORT OF ICC FINDINGS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN LAOS. PEOPLE'S DAILY SEPTEMBER 12 COMMENTATOR ARTICLE VIEWED REPORT AS "ABSOLUTE LIE" AND "PRETEXT FOR TROOPS U.S. IMPERIALISM AND ITS LACKEYS TO MAKE MASSIVE INROADS UPON LAOS AND EXPAND WAR IN INDO-CHINA". TO COMMENTATOR, REPORT CONSTITUTED FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT "ICC IN LAOS DEGENERATED LONG AGO INTO TOOL TO PROTECT, AID AND ABET U.S. AGGRESSION AGAINST LAOS" AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY IT "HAS ALREADY LOST ALL RIGHT TO CARRY ON ANY LEGAL ACTIVITY".

B. COMMENT: POTBOILER NATURE OF COMMENTATOR'S PIECE WAS UNDERSCORED BY HIS FAILURE ADVANCE CUSTOMARY WARNINGS ABOUT DIRE CONSEQUENCES AWAITING U.S. IF IT EXPANDS WAR. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

INTERNAL

5. RED GUARDS: OPPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION

A. AGAINST BACKDROP MOUTNING EVIDENCE RECEIVED LAST WEEK THAT CLASHES HAD OCCURRED BETWEEN RED GUARDS AND ELEMENTS OF POPULATION, SEPTEMBER 11 PEOPLE'S DAILY

PAGE FOUR RUMJDH 1933/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
EDITORIAL PROVIDED CLEAREST OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION TO DATE THAT MUCH OPPOSITION TO YOUTH ACTIVITIES OF RECENT WEEKS HAS BEEN AND IS BEING ORGANIZED AND INSTIGATED

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FROM WITHIN PARTY RANKS. IN UNUSUALLY BLUNT TERMS EDITORIAL CHARGED THAT "RESPONSIBLE PERSONS" OF "SOME UNITS" IN "SOME PLACES" WERE SUPPRESSING MASS MOVEMENT IN OPEN DEFIANCE OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECISION, "EVEN INCITING A NUMBER OF PEASANTS AND WORKERS TO OPPOSE AND ANTAGONIZE REVOLUTIONARY STUDENTS". EVEN MORE INDICATIVE OF EXISTENCE OF EFFORT BY SOME PARTY OFFICIALS TO OPPOSE AND SUBVERT CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND PREVENT THEIR OWN PURGE AAS PLEDGE IN EDITORIAL NEVER TO LET ANYONE "MAKE USE OF PROFOUND CLASS FEELINGS TOWARD PARTY FROM WORKER AND PEASANT MASSES TO SOW DISSENSION OR CREATE ANTAGONISM BETWEEN OURSELVES AND REVOLUTIONARY STUDENTS SO AS TO CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THEIR OWN GAINS." (HK 1806)

B. AT SAME TIME REPORTS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN RED GUARDS AND PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL PARTY COMMITTEES HAVE PROVIDED FRESH EVIDENCE OF BOTH DISORDER IN PARTY RANKS AND

RED GUARDS ROLE AS WEAPON AGAINST OPPOSITION IN PARTY. JAPANESE REPORTS (SUMMARIZED IN TOKYO'S 1979) LIST FIGHTS, ARRESTS, AND CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN PARTY COMMITTEES AND GUARDS IN SHENSI, ANHWEI, HUNAN, HUPEH, KIANGSU, SHANTUNG, KWANGTUNG, AND KWEICHOW. MOST RECENT KWEICHOW BROADCAST (SEPTEMBER 14) DESCRIBES DEBATES IN SCHOOLS AND STREETS ON QUESTION OF "BOMBARDING PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL CCP COMMITTEES AND DESTROYING HEADQUARTERS BY SHELLING".

C. FURTHER EVIDENCE OF PEASANT AND WORK OPPOSITION TO ONSLAUGHT OF RED GUARDS WAS SERIES OF NCNA FEATURES WHICH APPEARED SUBSEQUENT ABOVE EDITORIAL AND EXTOLLED IN HIGHLY DEFENSIVE TERMS THE UNITY OF RED GUARDS AND MASSES BEHIND CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION THREE OF FOUR HONG KONG 1933

SEPTEMBER 15

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 37

D. CLOSER SUPERVISION BY PLA

PLA HAS RECENTLY BEGUN TO TAKE MORE DIRECT HAND IN SUPERVISION OF ORGANIZATION AND DISCIPLINE OF PROVINCIAL RED GUARD UNITS. RADIO BROADCASTS FROM KWEICHOW (SEPTEMBER 9) KUNMING (SEPTEMBER 11), CHENGTU (SEPTEMBER 12), AND WUHAN (SEPTEMBER 12) REPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RED GUARD "CORPS" WITH LEADING PLA OFFICERS AND POLITICAL COMMISSARS OF THE AREA'S MILITARY REGIONS AS "INSTRUCTORS". NOMENCLATURE USED TO DESCRIBE SOME OF UNITS ATTENDING; I.E., "REPRESENTATIVES OF JOINT COMMAND OF CHINESE RED GUARDS" AND "MEMBERS FROM UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT AND MIDDLE

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 1933/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
SCHOOLS DEPARTMENT OF JOINT COMMAND OF CHENGTU RED GUARDS", SUGGESTS THAT NATIONAL ORGANIZATION ESTABLISHED ALONG PLA LINES. HOWEVER, PROMINENT ROLE PLAYED BY LOCAL PARTY OFFICIALS AT RALLIES IN THESE PROVINCES CELEBRATING ESTABLISHMENT OF "CORPS" IS EVIDENCE THAT PARTY COMMITTEES (I.E., PRESUMABLY THOSE ELEMENTS IN COMMITTEES THAT SUPPORT CULTURAL REVOLUTION) MAY BE A PART OF "JOINT COMMAND" STRUCTURE. (HONG KONG 1856)

E. GUARDS CALM DOWN - MEANWHILE, REPORTS FROM PEKING, SHANGHAI AND CANTON THAT RED GUARDS IN THOSE CITIES HAD CEASED PUBLIC ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND THAT SOME SEMBLANCE OF NORMAL LIFE WAS GRADUALLY BEGINNING TO RETURN

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INDICATED THAT REPEATED EXHORTATIONS IN PARTY PRESS TO STRUGGLE WITH WORDS AND NOT FISTS WERE BEGINNING TO TAKE EFFECT. MUCH OF RED GUARDS YOUTHFUL ENERGY BEING CHANNELED INTO TRAVEL, AS "LITTLE GENERALS" FROM ALL OVER CHINA CONVERGE ON PEKING, AND PEKING UNITS CONTINUE TO MOVE OUT AND "LINK UP" WITH PROVINCIAL COUNTERPARTS. HOW LONG THIS PERIPATETIC ORGY WILL CONTINUE IS NOT CLEAR. POSTERS READ IN PEKING HAVE

PAGE THREE RUMJDH 1933/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
ASKED RED GUARDS FROM OTHER CITIES TO LEAVE CAPITAL BY SEPTEMBER 10 (PROBABLY TO FACILITATE PREPARATIONS FOR NATIONAL DAY), BUT WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION THAT THIS REQUEST HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH. (HONG KONG 1853) (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. REGIME RECOGNIZES DISRUPTIVE EFFECT OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION ON PRODUCTION

A. SEPTEMBER 7 PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL STIPULATED CONCRETE MEASURES DESIGNED APPARENTLY TO PREVENT THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION FROM DISRUPTING THE ECONOMY. AMONG THESE WERE: 1) DIVISION OF LEADERSHIP PERSONNEL IN ALL INDUSTRY, MINING ENTERPRISES, COMMUNES, CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION UNITS, AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH UNITS, INTO TWO SEPARATE GROUPS, ONE CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH PROGRESS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE OTHER CONCERNED WITH PRODUCTION, ALTHOUGH UNDER "UNIFIED LEADERSHIP"; 2) INJUNCTION AGAINST RED GUARD INTERFERENCE IN UNITS WHERE FOUR CLEARANCES MOVEMENT GOING WELL AND THEIR INTERVENTION BY OUTSIDERS IGNORANT OF LOCAL CONDITIONS WOULD AFFECT NORMAL PRODUCTION PRO-

PAGE FOUR RUMJDH 1933/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
CESS; (RED GUARDS FROM SCHOOLS AND REVOLUTIONARY STUDENTS AND TEACHERS SHOULD ORGANIZE THEMSELVES TO GO DOWN TO COUNTRYSIDE AND HELP WITH HARVEST, HOWEVER); 3) STIPULATION THAT "FOUR CLEARANCES" MAY BE SUSPENDED DURING BUSY FARMING SEASON; 4) REMOVAL OF

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RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION "FOUR CLEARANCES" FROM HANDS OF OUTSIDE WORK TEAMS. (HONG KONG 1727) TO DATE, HOWEVER, DESPITE HEAVY BUT VAGUE FOLLOW-UP EMPHASIS ON PRODUCTION, ONLY RADIO BROADCASTS FROM CANTON, KIANGSI AND HUNAN HAVE INDICATED THESE MEASURES CURRENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED. ALTHOUGH RED GUARDS HAVE BEEN REPORTED HELPING WITH THE HARVEST IN OUTSKIRTS OF PEKING, CHENGTU, AND CHUNGKING, NATIONWIDE MEDIA FAILS TO GIVE IMPRESSION THAT GUARDS FALLING OVER THEMSELVES IN RUSH TO HELP PEASANTRY SPUR PRODUCTION IN COUNTRYSIDE.

B. OUR HYPOTHESIS THAT REGIME DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER PROSPECTS FOR HARVEST, HOWEVER, RECONFIRMED IN SEPTEMBER 15 EDITORIAL, REPORTED AS WE GO TO PRESS, WHICH CALLS OFF CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN COUNTRYSIDE DURING BUSY

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 1933/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
SEASON, AND URGES RED GUARDS TO GO AND HELP WITH HARVEST. (CONFIDENTIAL)

7. NEW CULTURAL REVOLUTION COMMITTEES ESTABLISHED

A. FOCUS OF PAST SEVERAL WEEKS HAS BEEN ON DESTRUCTIVE ASPECTS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION. IT APPARENT, HOWEVER, THAT PROCESS OF REPLACING CULTURAL REVOLUTION COMMITTEES ORIGINALLY APPOINTED BY PARTY COMMITTEES WITH NEW "DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED" PROVISIONAL CULTURAL REVOLUTION COMMITTEES CALLED FOR IN 16-POINTS HAS BEGUN, AND THAT NEW ORGANS WILL HAVE FAR-REACHING POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. THE UNIVERSITIES, SCENE OF FIRST WAVE OF DESTRUCTION, HAVE ALSO BEEN TESTING GROUND IN ESTABLISHMENT NEW COMMITTEES. BEST DOCUMENTED "ELECTION" TO DATE DOK PLACE AT HUPEH UNIVERSITY, WHERE PROVISIONAL CULTURAL REVOLUTION COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED IN SECRET BALLOT "PARIS COMMUNE TYPE ELECTION" ON AUGUST 14. NEW COMMITTEE, 80 PER CENT OF WHICH ARE STUDENTS, WAS DESCRIBED BY HUPEH SECOND SECRETARY (NOW ACTING FIRST-SECRETARY) CHANG TI-SHUEH AT AUGUST 16 RALLY CELEBRATING ELECTION (RADIO HUPAH AUGUST 21) AS "THE ORGAN OF STATE POWER".

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AGR B. HUPEH UNIVERSITY NOT ONLY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION
COM TO ELECT COMMITTEE. AUGUST 25 CANTON YANG CHENG WAN PAO
HEW (SCMP 3775) INDICATES 23 OF 28 UNIVERSITIES AND
IAB COLLEGES UNDER KWANGTUNG PROVINCIAL JURISDICTION
TRSY HAVE FOLLOWED SUIT. PEKING UNIVERSITY ALSO HAS
SIMILAR ORGAN, HEADED BY NIEH YUAN-TZU, THE LEFTIST
PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTOR WHO BEGAN ATTACKS ON
UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT LU PING BACK IN MAY.

RSR C. EVIDENCE OF CREATION NEW COMMITTEES THROUGHOUT
REST OF SOCIETY HAS BEGUN TO EMERGE. SEPTEMBER 12
NCNA DISPATCH ON WORKERS' "SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY
STUDENTS" CITES OPINION OF CHEN FU "CHAIRMAN OF

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 1933/4 C O N F I D E N T I A L
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR CULTURAL REVOLUTIONARY
COMMITTEE OF SHANGHAI NO. 3 IRON AND STEEL PLANT".
IF HUPEH UNIVERSITY AND PEKING UNIVERSITY EXAMPLES
ANY INDICATION, NEW COMMITTEES WILL CONSIST OF AND BE
LED BY LEFTIST ACTIVISTS RESPONSIVE TO WILL OF NEWLY
ALIGNED REGIME LEADERSHIP. AS "ORGANS OF STATE POWER"
THEY ARE APPARENTLY INTENDED, TO BECOME SIGNIFICANT
ELEMENTS IN NETWORK THROUGH WHICH MAO AND LIN HOPE TO
EXERCISE CONTROL.

D. MEANWHILE, DESTRUCTION GOES ON, AND INCLUDED IN
WRECKAGE OF PARTY COMMITTEES WHERE MEMBERS ARE LUKE-
WARM OR OPPOSED TO MAOIST POLICIES IN GENERAL, HAVE
BEEN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUPS, SECTIONS, AND
COMMITTEES ORIGINALLY ESTABLISHED IN MUNICIPAL AND PRO-
VINCIAL PARTY COMMITTEES TO PROSECUTE THE REVOLUTION.

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SEVERAL OF THESE HAVE BEEN REPORTED UNDER ATTACK IN WALL POSTERS BY JAPANESE PRESS. (TOKYO'S 1979) (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. CHANGES IN TOP POSITIONS

A. NCNA SEPTEMBER 13 ITEM REPORTING ARRIVAL LEADER

OF PRO-CHICOM FRACTION AUSTRALIAN CP NAMES KANG SHENG AS MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE POLITBURO, APPARENTLY CONFIRMING CONJECTURE THAT KANG AND AT LEAST ALL RANKED ABOVE HIM AT RECENT PEKING RALLIES CONSTITUTE NEW POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE, E.E., MAO, LIN PIAO, CHOU EN-LAI, TAO CHU, CHEN PO-TA, TENG HSIAO-PING AND KANG.

B. ODDLY, SAME ITEM FAILED GIVE CHOU EN-LAI USUAL TITLE VICE-CHAIRMAN CCP, AN OMISSION WHICH DOES NOT, IN OUR OPINION, SIGNIFY WEAKENING CHOU'S POSITION BUT UNDERLINES PROMINENCE OF LIN PIAO, ONLY LEADER SINCE 11TH PLENUM TO BE PUBLICLY NAMED PARTY VICE-CHAIRMAN.

C. ALSO NOTEWORTHY IS CONTINUING FAILURE TENG HSIAO-PING PERFORM USUAL ROLE GREETING AND SAYING GOOD-BYE PROMINENT PARTY VISITORS, CONCEIVABLY INDICATING HE, WHILE STILL MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE, MAY NO LONGER BE SECRETARY GENERAL.

D. WUHAN REGIONAL RADIO (SEPTEMBER 10) IDENTIFIED WANG JEN-CHUNG, A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF TAO CHU, AS FIRST

SECRETARY CCP CENTRAL SOUTH BUREAU, SUCCEEDING TO POST FORMERLY HELD BY TAO. ALTHOUGH TAO NOW OCCUPIED WITH NATIONAL DUTIES HIS LINES OF INFLUENCE APPARENTLY STILL SECURE IN REGION. FURTHER, PROMOTION CHANG PING-HUA, FORMER HUNAN PROVINCE FIRST SECRETARY IN CENTRAL SOUTH TO DEPUTY DIRECTOR PARTY'S PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT HEADED BY TAO, SUGGESTS TAO HAS POWER TO NAME BOTH HIS SUCCESSORS AND PRINCIPAL ASSISTANTS. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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9. LOCAL NATIONALISM IN INNER MONGOLIA

DOMESTIC NCNA REPORTS OF RALLIES RECENTLY HELD IN INNER MONGOLIA TO DENOUNCE "BLACK GANG ELEMENTS" WITHIN LOCAL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE INDICATE CONTINUED PRESENCE THERE OF LOCAL NATIONALISM AND APPEAR CLEAREST INDICATION MINORITY UNREST SINCE SINKIANG RIOTS 1962 (AIRGRAM FOLLOWS). THOSE ATTACKED CHARGED WITH "NATIONAL SPLITTISM", LAUNCHING "EXTENSIVE ATTACK ON SO-CALLED GREAT HAN NATIONALISM" AND DISCONTINUING FOUR CLEARANCES ON GROUND MOVEMENT INAPPLICABLE INNER MONGOLIAN CONDITIONS. NATURE

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 1933/4 C O N F I D E N TI A L
OF ATTACK UNLIKE USUAL GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION (GCR) PURGES NOW CURRENT IN PROVINCES (AT LEAST 20 NEW VICTIMS IN 10 PROVINCES LAST TWO WEEKS) AND CULD PRESAGE ATTEMPT FIX ONUS ON HIGH PERSONAGE FOR THIS MOST SERIOUS CRIME OF "LOCAL NATIONALISM". IF SO, MOST LIKELY FIGURE IS INNER MONGOLIA FIRST SECRETARY ULANFU, WHOSE STATUS UNCERTAIN THROUGHOUT COURSE GCR. WITH EXCEPTION APPEARANCE AT PEKING RALLY AUGUST 31, HE OUT OF SIGHT SINCE MAY AND UNCONFIRMED TASS AND PRAVDA STORIES REPORTED HIM UNDER ATTACK FOR "SPLITTING NATIONALITIES AND TRYING TO SET UP INDEPENDENT KINGDOM", AND FOR POLICY OF "LIQUIDATION OF CLASS STRUGGLE AND RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM", WHICH ALSO INVOLVED "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WITH MONGOLIAN REVISIONISM".

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION ONE OF FOUR HONG KONG 1728

HONG KONG 1728 (JW 36)

9-8-66

SEPTEMBER 8

(ALSO POUCHED TO:) BANGKOK BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST CANBERRA DARESSALAAM DJAKARTA KARACHI KATHMANDU KUALALUMPUR LONDON MANILA MOSCOW MUNICH NEWDELHI PRAGUE RANGOON RAWALPINDI ROME SAIGON SEOUL SOFIA SINGAPORE TAIPEI TOKYO VIENTIANE CINCPAC FOR POLAD COMNAVPHIL, TAIWANDEFCOM, 13AF MANILA

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 36

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXTERNAL - 1. CHEN YI MEETING WITH JAPANESE PARLIAMENTARIANS: CONTRARY WIND FROM WARSAW; 2. VIETNAM: DRV NATIONAL DAY COMMEMORATED: DE GAULLE SPEECH IGNORED; 3. PROTEST AGAINST ALLEGED U.S. ATTACKS ON CPR SHIPS; 4. CHICOM SHIP TO EVACUATE OVERSEAS CHINESE FROM

PAGE TWO RUMJDH(1728/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
INDONESIA; 5. PEKING CONTINUES REFUSE ENTRY TO AMERICANS WITH VALIDATED PASSPORTS; 6. RECENT RED GUARD DEVELOPMENTS; 7. IMPLICATIONS OF AUGUST 31 RALLY FOR CHICOM LEADERSHIP; 8. CULTURAL REVOLUTION DISRUPTS STATE PROCESSES; 9. PROVINCIAL PURGES.

MILITARY - 10. REFUGEE ON CHINESE TROOP MOVEMENTS.

EXTERNAL

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1. CHEN YI MEETING WITH JAPANESE PARLIAMENTARIANS: CONTRARY WIND FROM WARSAW

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A. JAPANESE PRESS REPORTS OF CHEN YI SEPTEMBER 6 MEETING WITH JAPANESE LDP PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATIONS, IF ACCURATE, INDICATE CHEN ATTEMPTED PRESENT CHICOM POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM AND U.S. IN FAR MORE REASONABLE LIGHT THAN REGIME'S PUBLIC OUTPUT ON SUBJECT. ACCORDING ONE REPORT, CHEN DECLARED CHINA "IS NOT NECESSARILY DISMISSING THOUGHT OF TALKING WITH U.S." RE SOLUTION VIETNAM CONFLICT, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS APPRECIABLY MODIFIED BY REITERATION

PAGE THREE RUMJDH 1728/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
CHICOM VIEW CARRIED IN MOST ALL JAPANESE PRESS REPORTS THAT "PROBLEM IS NOT ONE FOR CHINA TO DECIDE BUT ONE FOR VIETNAMESE PEOPLE". CHEN REPORTEDLY PICTURED SOLUTION ALL INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS THROUGH TALKS AS "THE BASIC SPIRIT OF DIPLOMACY", BUT THEREAFTER ALLEGEDLY DECLARED THIS KIND OF SOLUTION NOW IMPOSSIBLE RE VIETNAM BECAUSE U.S. TRYING SOLVE ISSUE WITH "ARMED FORCE". CHEN ENDED DISCUSSION THIS POINT BY REITERATING CHINESE CONTENTION THERE COULD BE NO SOLUTION VIETNAM CONFLICT UNTIL ALL AMERICAN TROOPS PULL OUT.

B. ON ISSUE SINO-U.S. CONFLICT, CHEN ALLEGEDLY SAID "WE DON'T BELIEVE U.S. WILL ATTACK CHINA AT ONCE, WE DON'T BELIEVE U.S. AND CHINA CAN NOT ESCAPE FROM EVENTUAL MILITARY SHOWDOWN AND CHINA DOES NOT WANT WAR WITH U.R.; CHINA WILL NOT START A WAR, BUT IF U.S. ATTACKS, WE WILL WAGE ALL-OUT WAR."

C. IF REPORTED ACCURATELY, CHEN'S VIEWS ON "TALKS AND DIPLOMACY" DIFFERS IN SPIRIT FROM EXTREMIST POSITION OF JULY 24, 1966 PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL

PAGE FOUR RUMJDH 1728/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WHICH FLATLY DECLARED "CHINESE PEOPLE HAVE ALWAYS HELD THAT CONFERENCE TABLE CAN NEVER BRING OPPRESSED NATIONS A NEW WORLD OF INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM". AS FAR SUBJECT SINO-U.S. WAR IS CONCERNED, CHEN'S REMARKS APPEAR BE FIRST TIME IN AT LEAST SEVERAL YEARS THAT CHICOMS HAVE OPENLY PICTURED U.S. AS NOT SEEKING WAR WITH CHINA AND HAVE VIEWED WAR AS AVOIDABLE.

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D. COMMENT: CHEN YI HAS WELL KNOWN PROCLIVITY FOR OFF-CUFF REMARKS TO FOREIGN VISITORS THAT TEND TO SHADE PEKING'S OFFICIAL LINE ON GIVEN SUBJECT. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE INCLINED VIEW CHEN'S PERFORMANCE PRIMARILY AS TACTICAL MOVE DESIGNED INFLUENCE JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION IN FAVOR OF REGIME (BADLY NEEDED AT THIS TIME) RATHER THAN HARBINGER OF CHINESE SWITCH AWAY FROM HARD LINE POLICIES RE VIETNAM AND U.S. THIS ESTIMATE SIGNIFICANCE CHEN'S REMARKS STRENGTHENED BY AMBASSADOR WANG KUO-CHUAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE REVELATION OF CHINESE PRESENTATION AT SEPTEMBER 7 WARSAW TALKS. ASIDE FROM DEPICTING

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 1728/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
THIS EXTRAORDINARY BEHAVIOR AS MEANS GETTING EVEN FOR ALLEGED PREVIOUS U.S. VIOLATION OF SECRECY AGREEMENT ON TALKS, CHICOMS THEMSELVES HAVE EXPLAINED ACTION IN TERMS OF DEMONSTRATING TO WORLD THEIR CONTINUED DETERMINATION UPHOLD "BANNER OF OPPOSITION TO U.S. IMPERIALISM". (WE WONDER IF PERSISTENT SOV RUMBLINGS THAT CHINESE EVENTUALLY WILL ACHIEVE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH U.S. AT MOSCOW'S EXPENSE MAY NOT HAVE PROMPTED THIS CHINESE ACTION.) IN ANY EVENT, FAMILIAR SUBSTANCE OF WANG'S PRESS CONFERENCE PRESENTATION CLEARLY INDICATES THAT CHEN'S INTRIGUING COMMENTS NOT WITHSTANDING, PEKING'S PUBLIC HOSTILITY TOWARD U.S. WILL NOT ABATE. (HONG KONG TELS 1653 & 1681) CONFIDENTIAL

2. VIETNAM: DRV NATIONAL DAY COMMEMORATED; DE GAULLE SPEECH IGNORED

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SEPTEMBER 8

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 36

A. DRV NATIONAL DAY - CHICOM OBSERVANCE 21ST ANNIVERSARY FOUNDING OF DRV BROKE NO NEW SUBSTANTIVE GROUND IN REGIME'S POSITION RE VIETNAM. CHICOM MESSAGE TO DRV PARTY AND STATE LEADERS RELATED IMMENSE JOY OF CHINESE PEOPLE OVER "RESOUNDING VICTORIES" OF FRATERNAL VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, TREATED U.S. "PEACE TALKS SCHEME" IN USUAL FASHION AND REAFFIRMED CHINESE PEOPLE "PROVIDE POWERFUL BACKING...AND RELIABLE REAR AREA FOR VIETNAMESE PEOPLE...AND HAVE MADE EVERY PREPARATION TO DEAL WITH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, AT ANY TIME AND IN ANY PLACE, JOINT BLOWS AT U.S. AGGRESSORS UNTIL FINAL VICTORY". ONLY NEW ELEMENT

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 1728/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
THIS YEAR'S MESSAGE WAS REFERENCE TO CHINA SERVING AS RELIABLE REAR AREA, A FORMULATION FREQUENTLY REPEATED SINCE ITS UNVEILING IN JULY. (MESSAGE WAS SIGNED BY MAO, LIU SHAO-CHI IN CAPACITY CHAIRMAN CPR AND OTHERS, BUT LIU WAS ABSENT FROM DRV EMBASSY NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION WHICH HE ATTENDED LAST YEAR AND 1964, ANOTHER POSSIBLE SIGN HE MAY BE IN POLITICAL TROUBLE.)

B. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH CHICOM ATTENTION TO DRV ANNIVERSARY AAS OFF AS COMPARED TO LAST YEAR, WE ATTRIBUTE THIS LARGELY TO FACT THAT 1965 MARKED 20TH FOUNDING YEAR DRV. ALSO POSSIBLE THAT FRENZIED DOMESTIC POLITICAL ACTIVITY CUT INTO CHICOM ATTENTION TO EVENT.

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

IN ANY EVENT, OUR FEELING IS THAT CHICOM QUALMS ABOUT DRV PERSEVERANCE IN STRUGGLE HAVE BEEN APPRECIABLY REDUCED IN WAKE HO JULY 17 APPEAL, BUT APPARENTLY NOT COMPLETELY QUASHED AS EVIDENCED BY PEKING'S SILENCE AND HANOI'S FAVORABLE COMMENTS ON DE GAULLE SEPTEMBER 1 SPEECH.

C. DE GAULLE SPEECH - IN CONTRAST TO HANOI'S EXTEN-

SIVE, POSITIVE COVERAGE OF DE GAULLE SPEECH IN PHNOM PENH AND FRENCH-CAMBODIAN COMMUNIQUE, CHICOM MEDIA HAVE REMAINED COMPLETELY SILENT ABOUT FACT THAT DE GAULLE EVEN VISITED CAMBODIA, ALTHOUGH REGIME CROWED OVER HIS UNWELCOME RECEPTION IN FRENCH SOMALILAND. PEKING NO DOUBT FOUND DE GAULLE'S EMPHASIS ON GENEVA-TYPE SETTLEMENT FOR VIETNAM CONFLICT UNPALATABLE, BUT PROBABLY WISHED TO AVOID TAKING PUBLIC POSITION AT VARIANCE WITH THAT OF DRV. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. PROTEST AGAINST ALLEGED U.S. ATTACKS ON CPR SHIPS

A. CHICOM DEFENSE MINISTRY SEPTEMBER 5 STATEMENT CHARGED U.S. AIRCRAFT HAD ATTACKED TWO CHINESE CARGO VESSELS "IN WESTERN PART OF GULF OF TONKIN" SINKING ONE SHIP, DAMAGING OTHER AND RESULTING NINE DEAD, SEVEN WOUNDED. INCIDENT TERMED "ANOTHER BLOOD DEBT OWED BY IMPERIALISM TO CHINESE PEOPLE, A GRAVE EVENT, ANOTHER OPEN WAR-PROVOCATION". AT SAME TIME, NCNA REPORTED PROTEST OF "CHINESE DEPARTMENT CONCERNED" OVER THREE EARLIER ALLEGED INCIDENTS OF BUZZING AND

HARASSMENT OF CHICOM FISHING AND CARGO SHIPS ON JULY 30, AUGUST 6 AND AUGUST 12.

B. DEFMIN STATEMENT REINFORCED BY "COMMENTATOR" ARTICLES IN PEOPLE'S DAILY AND LIBERATION ARMY DAILY OF SEPTEMBER 6, BOTH OF WHICH LINKED INCIDENT TO VIETNAM CONFLICT MUCH MORE THAN DID DEFMIN SPOKESMAN. PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTATOR CITED INCIDENT AS EXAMPLE OF FALSENESS OF U.S. STATEMENTS THAT AMERICAN

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM WERE LIMITED AND THAT U.S. WOULD NOT TAKE OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST CHINA. ARTICLE WARNED IN WORDS OF ELEVENTH PLENUM COMMUNIQUE (ALSO USED BY DEFMIN SPOKESMAN) THAT IF U.S. "DARED TO IMPOSE WAR" ON CHINA, IT WOULD BE "WIPED OUT RESOLUTELY, THOROUGHLY, TOTALLY AND COMPLETELY".

C. COMMENT: PEKING'S TREATMENT OF ALLEGED INCIDENT RESEMBLES PROTEST OF ALLEGED FISHING BOAT STRAFING ISSUED MAY 29 AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO INTRODUCE ANY NEW PROSPECT OF CONCRETE RETALIATORY ACTION. COMMENTATOR'S CLOSE IDENTIFICATION OF ATTACKS ON CHINESE VESSELS WITH VIETNAM WAR MAY IN PART BE

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 1728/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
INTENDED TO REMIND HANOI OF CHICOM "SACRIFICES" FOR DRV CAUSE. (HONG KONG TEL 1645) CONFIDENTIAL

4. CHICOM SHIP TO EVACUATE OVERSEAS CHINESE FROM INDONESIA

A. CHICOM FONMIN SEPTEMBER 5 NOTE TO GOI EMBASSY INFORMED INDONESIANS THAT FIRST CHICOM REPATRIATION SHIP WOULD ARRIVE PORT BELAWAN (MEDAN) ABOUT SEPTEMBER 20 AND COULD CARRY 700 PERSONS. AMONG FIVE "DEMANDS" CONVEYED TO GOI BY PRESENT NOTE WERE STIPULATION THAT CHICOM CONSULAR OFFICERS SHOULD OVERSEE OPERATION AND THAT GOI MUST ENSURE SAFETY OF REPATRIATES AND THEIR PROPERTY AS WELL AS OF CHICOM SHIPS AND CREWS. NOTE ALSO DECLARED CHICOM INTENTION SEND SHIPS TO OTHER PORTS SUCH AS DJAKARTA, MAKASAR, AND SURABAJA AT LATER DATE.

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION THREE OF FOUR HONG KONG 1728

SEPTEMBER 8

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 36

B. NCNA ALSO CARRIED TEXT OF PEOPLE'S DAILY "OBSERVER" ARTICLE SEPTEMBER 6 ATTACKING FOREIGN POLICY INDONESIAN "RIGHT-WING MILITARY REGIME". ARTICLE ASSERTED THAT CESSATION MALAYSIA CONFRONTATION WAS "MONSTROUS CRIME" AND THAT GOI'S PROFESSED INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY WAS "SHEER HUMBUG". ACTUALLY, SAID ARTICLE, "REGIME HAS BECOME NEW LACKEY OF IMPERIALISM" AND WOULD COME TO "NO GOOD END". OBSERVER ALSO NOTED POINTEDLY THAT SOVIETS HAD "LOST NO TIME IN DECLARING (THEY) WILL ALSO GIVE AID TO INDONESIA".

C. FINALLY, NCNA RELEASED TEXT OF "URGENT APPEAL BY

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 1728/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF MALAYAN NATIONAL LIBERATION LEAGUE" WHICH PROTESTED DETENTION OF FOUR MNLL MISSION MEMBERS IN INDONESIA SINCE LAST NOVEMBER AND DENOUNCED "CONTEMPLATED MOVE TO HAND THEM OVER TO REACTIONARY ABDUL RAHMAN CLIQUE OF KUALA LUMPUR" INSTEAD OF PERMITTING THEM TO GO TO DESIRED DESTINATION IN NORTH VIETNAM. UNCLASSIFIED

5. PEKING CONTINUES REFUSE ENTRY TO AMERICANS WITH VALIDATED PASSPORTS

A. SINCE LATE MARCH, SOME 25 AMERICAN CITIZENS HAVE HAD PASSPORTS VALIDATED HERE FOR TRAVEL TO COMMUNIST CHINA OR HAVE APPLIED FOR VALIDATION, WHILE OTHERS HAVE COME TO HONG KONG WITH TRAVEL DOCUMENTS ALREADY VALIDATED TO APPLY FOR VISA. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE NONE

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

OF THESE HAS SUCCEEDED IN ENTERING COMMUNIST CHINA. MOST HAVE APPLIED FOR VISAS THROUGH LOCAL OFFICE CHINA TRAVEL SERVICE. RECEPTION USUALLY CORDIAL, ALTHOUGH MOST RECENTLY CTS HAS ADVISED APPLICANTS TO WRITE DIRECTLY TO PEKING. THERE HAS BEEN ONE CLAIMED NEAR-MISS: POLITICAL SCIENCE PROFESSOR FROM

PAGE THREE RUMJDH 1728/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
UNIVERSITY OF SANTA CLARA WITH VALIDATED PASSPORT STATED HE HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM CTS HE COULD SPEND FIVE DAYS CANTON AREA, AND THAT HE BOARDED KOWLOON TRAIN FOR BORDER SEPTEMBER 1 ONLY BE TOLD EN ROUTE BY CTS REPRESENTATIVE THAT HIS SAFETY COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED WHILE IN CHINA, SO HE GAVE UP.

B. COMMENT: AS FAR AS WE AWARE, ONLY AMERICANS TO ENTER MAINLAND FROM HONG KONG SINCE INTRODUCTION NEW CRITERIA FOR TRAVEL TO CHINA HAVE BEEN THREE DELEGATES (HAWKINS, SARENT, STEICHEN) WHO WALKED OUT OF ANTI-A-H BOMB CONFERENCE TOKYO AND WHO DID NOT HAVE VALIDATED PASSPORTS. (CONFIDENTIAL)

INTERNAL

6. RECENT RED GUARD DEVELOPMENTS

A. ANALYSIS RECENT CHICOM PRESS AND WESTERN DIPLOMATIC REPORTS ON RED GUARDS SHOW GROWTH OF MOVEMENT STILL FLUID, FAST-MOVING, AND OFTEN INCONSISTENT. NEVERTHELESS, FOLLOWING FOUR DEVELOPMENTS EMERGE:

(1) CONSIDERABLE AND CONTINUING POPULAR OPPOSITION

PAGE FOUR RUMJDH 1728/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
TO RED GUARDS' EXCESSES, AND PERHAPS, INCREASING OPPOSITION WITHIN SOME SEGMENTS PARTY APPARATUS; (2) CLEAR CONFIRMATION OF RED GUARDS' ROLE AS WEAPON IN PURGE OF PARTY; (3) NATIONWIDE ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY IN EFFORT TO COORDINATE DRIVE WITH PEKING AS MECCA AND HEADQUARTERS OF MOVEMENT; (4) EXTENSION OF ATTACKS TO TRADITIONAL BELIEFS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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B. EVIDENCE OF OPPOSITION - MOST ARRESTING INDICATION OF MOUNTING OPPOSITION WAS IN FOLLOWING STRIKINGLY DEFENSIVE PASSAGE IN SEPTEMBER 5 PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL ENTITLED "STRUGGLE BY REASONING NOT BY COERCIVE FORCE": "SHOULD ENEMY DARE RESORT TO FORCE THUS VIOLATING CRIMINAL LAW UNDER DICTATORSHIP OF PROLETARIAT, STERN PUNISHMENT WILL BE METED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW." INCLUSION SUCH WARNING IN NORMAL TIMES SO FATUOUSLY UNNECESSARY, ONLY FURTHERS BELIEF THAT TIMES HARDLY NORMAL, AND THAT "ENEMY" HAS ALREADY "DARED TO RESORT TO FORCE".

C. EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT LATTER CONCLUSION CONTINUES EMERGE. DIPLOMATIC CORPS REPORTS OF VIOLENT AND

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 1728/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
BLOODY REACTIONS AGAINST PEKING RED GUARDS ARE SUPPORTED IN PART BY RECENT STATEMENTS GUARDS THEMSELVES AND BY PROVINCIAL BROADCASTS REVEALING OPPOSITION RED GUARDS IN SEVERAL AREAS. WHILE PROBABLY MOST OF BLOOD-LETTING HAS STEMMED FROM INDIVIDUALS RESISTING RED GUARD ACTIVITIES, THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF LARGE SCALE CLASHES INVOLVING FACTORY WORKERS.

D. WEAPON IN PARTY PURGE - ARTICLE IN KWANGMING DAILY, AUGUST 26, REVEALED GUARDS' POWER PURGE ROLE AND OPPOSITION TO IT. IT ACCEPTED AS CORRECT ASSERTION OF SOME THAT RED GUARDS "WANT TO SEIZE POWER", AND DEFIANTLY RETORTED: "TODAY, WITH BACKING OF CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND CHAIRMAN MAO, WE WANT TO TAKE BACK THE POWER FROM YOUR HANDS. THIS IS CALLED A THING BEING RETURNED TO ITS ORIGINAL OWNER."

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SIL E. ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY - SINCE CHOU EN-LAI
AGR ANNOUNCEMENT AT AUGUST 31 RALLY THAT CENTRAL COMMITTEE
HEW INTENDED COORDINATE AND EXPAND MOVEMENT BY INTERCHANGE
LAB OF RED GUARDS BETWEEN PEKING AND OTHER AREAS, PEKING
TRSY RED GUARDS HAVE APPEARED IN NUMBER CENTRAL-SOUTH
CITIES AND REPORTEDLY THERE HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE "LINKING
UP" ACTIVITIES BETWEEN GUARD UNITS OF DIFFERENT
CITIES AND PROVINCES. ANOTHER ORGANIZATION DEVELOP-
RSR MENT WAS CONVENING OF FIRST CANTON RED GUARD CONGRESS
(FIRST CONGRESS OF ITS KIND ANYWHERE AS FAR WE KNOW).

7. IMPLICATIONS OF AUGUST 31 RALLY FOR CHICOM LEADERSHIP

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 1728/4 C O N F I D E N T I A L
A. CORRECTED VERSION LIST TOP LEADERSHIP AT AUGUST 31 PEKING MASS RALLY DESCRIBED PERSONALITIES AS "LEADERS CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE", AN EXPRESSION WE INTERPRET AS SIGNIFYING POLITBUREAU RANK.

B. OUR ESTIMATE RANK ORDER OF NEW POLITBUREAU AS FOLLOWS: FULL MEMBERS: MAO, LIN PIAO, CHOU EN-LAI, TAO CHU, CHEN PO-TA, TENG HSIAO-PING, KANG SHENG, LIU SHAO-CHI, CHU TEH, LI FU-CHUN, CHEN YUN, TUNG PI-WU, CHEN YI, HO LUNG, LI HSIEN-NIEN, LI CHING-CHUAN, TAN CHEN-LIN, NIEH JUNG-CHEN, HSU HSIANG-CHIEN, YEH CHIEN-YING; ALTERNATES: ULANFU, PO I-PO, LI HSUEH-FENG AND HSIEH FU-CHIH. FOLLOWING APPEAR BE NEW POLITBUREAU MEMBERS: TAO, CHEN, KANG, AND THREE EX-MARSHALS NIEH, HSU AND YEH -- STRONGLY BOLSTERING MILITARY VOICE AT TOP

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

LEADERSHIP LEVELS. NEW ALTERNATES WOULD BE LI HSUEH-FENG AND HSIEH FU-CHIH.

8. CULTURAL REVOLUTION DISRUPTS STATE PROCESSES

A. MEETINGS - GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION APPARENTLY HAS CAUSED DISRUPTION NORMAL GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITY.

PAGE THREE RUMJDH 1728/4 C O N F I D E N T I A L
USUAL MONTHLY SCHEDULED PLENARY SESSIONS STATE COUNCIL AS WELL AS MEETINGS STANDING COMMITTEE NPC HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED SINCE EARLY SPRING. MOREOVER, WITH EXCEPTION ONE EMERGENCY GATHERING TO EXPEDITE PUBLICATION MAO'S WORKS, THERE HAVE BEEN NO NATIONAL FUNCTIONAL CONVENTIONS SINCE JUNE.

B. PUBLICATIONS - SINCE START CULTURAL REVOLUTION, FOUR NEWSPAPERS (ALL IN PEKING) CLOSED AND EIGHT PERIODICALS HAVE ANNOUNCED SUSPENSION PUBLICATION. WITHOUT FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT, RECENT ISSUES OF 13 OTHER CHINESE LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS HAVE NOT APPEARED. INCLUDED AMONG THE CASUALTIES ARE CHINA YOUTH MAGAZINE, PEKING DAILY, PEKING EVENING NEWS, FRONT LINE AND LANGUAGE REFORM. ALL ENGLISH LANGUAGE PERIODICALS STILL OVERDUE (WEEKA 35).

C. COMMENT: STATE COUNCIL IS IMPORTANT AND ACTIVE BUREAUCRATIC EXECUTOR OF GOVERNMENT POLICY AND HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR DIRECTION AND COORDINATION OF MINISTRIES. POSSIBILITY THUS ARISES THAT ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION ON WORKINGS OF

PAGE FOUR RUMJDH 1728/4 C O N F I D E N T I A L
GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY ARE SUBSTANTIAL, UNLESS, OF COURSE, CONTRARY TO PREVIOUS PRACTICE COUNCIL HAS BEEN MEETING UNANNOUNCED. (FOR EXAMPLE, LAST WEEK IT WAS REVEALED THAT NEW POLICE UNIFORMS HAD BEEN DECREED RECENTLY BY STATE COUNCIL, BUT NO MEETING ANNOUNCED.) IT ALSO POSSIBLE THAT USUAL PUBLICITY SURROUNDING NPC STANDING COMMITTEE MEETINGS, AT WHICH APPOINTMENTS AND REMOVAL HIGH STATE OFFICIALS ANNOUNCED, MAY HAVE BEEN BARRED TO AVOID EMBARRASSING DISCLOSURES. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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9. PROVINCIAL PURGES

A. REGIONAL PURGES

A. REGIONAL RADIO BROADCASTS HAVE ATTACKED CHAO SHOU-YI, SECOND SECRETARY SHENSI CCP COMMITTEE AND FORMER DIRECTOR SHENSI PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT AND CHEN I-HSIN, VICE GOVERNOR HUPEH AND FORMER DIRECTOR HUPEH PUBLIC SECURITY. ATTACKS TERMED CHAO "LOYAL INHERITOR OF KAO KANG ANTI-PARTY CLIQUE" AND KHRUSHCHEV-TYPE PERSON".

B. COMMENT: TO DATE, CHAO IS HIGHEST PROVINCIAL FIGURE TO BE PUBLICLY ATTACKED. BOTH MEN APPARENTLY

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 1728/4 C O N F I D E N T I A L
QUALIFY AS ANTI-MAO "CAPITALIST" ELEMENTS WHO HAVE WORMED WAY INTO PARTY, A TYPE BRANDED BY LIN PIAO AS PRIMARY TARGET OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

MILITARY

10. REFUGEE ON CHINESE TROOP MOVEMENTS

A. MR. CHANG CHUNG, A REFUGEE FROM COMMUNE AT SHA TAO KOK ON HONG KONG BORDER WHOSE FLIGHT INTO HONG KONG LAST WEEK RESULTED EXAGGERATED PRESS REPORTS RED GUARD ACTIVITIES ON HONG KONG BORDER, TOLD LOCAL PRESS ON SEPTEMBER 6 THAT CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS HAD BEEN MOVING TOWARD AND INTO NORTH VIETNAM.

B. COMMENT: MR. CHANG'S INTERROGATION BY BRITISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IS ALMOST COMPLETED. IT INDICATES THAT HE HAS LITTLE MILITARY KNOWLEDGE OF EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO 1962-63, AND NO ACCESS TO TYPE OF INFORMATION OF TROOP MOVEMENTS WHICH HE GAVE PRESS IN APPARENTLY EAGER MOOD TO SUPPLY NEWSMEN WITH WHAT THEY WANTED ©AO HONG KONG MESSAGE 1728, SEPTEMBER 7, 1966). (CONFIDENTIAL)

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(ALSO POUCHED TO:) BANGKOK BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST CANBERRA DARESSALAAM DJAKARTA KARACHI KATHMANDU KUALALUMPUR LONDON MANILA MOSCOW MUNICH NEWDELHI PRAGUE RANGOON RAWALPINDI ROME SAIGON SEOUL SOFIA SINGAPORE TAIPEI TOKYO VIENTIANE CINCPAC FOR POLAD COMNAVPHIL TAIWANDEFCOM 13AF MANILA

SEPTEMBER 1

N O F O R N

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 35

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXTERNAL - 1. MORE ON PAPER TIGERS AND RELATED THEMES: 2. CHEN YI RATTLES SABRES AT JAPANESE VISITORS; 3. VIETNAM: AID AGREEMENT, NATIONAL DAY VISITORS, ANNIVERSARY OF MAO STATEMENT; 4. INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS OF RED GUARDS

INTERNAL - 5. RED GUARDS ENJOINED TO USE RESTRAINT;

6. PLA REPORTED IN CHARGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES BUREAU; 7. SUICIDES AMONG SHANGHAI SCIENTISTS REPORTED; 8. STATUS OF LIU SHAO-CHI IN DOUBT; 9. LEADERSHIP ATTENDS SECOND PEKING RALLY ON CULTURAL REVOLUTION

EXTERNAL

1. MORE ON PAPER TIGERS AND RELATED THEMES

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A. PAPER TIGERS CONTINUED TO ROAM CHICOM PRESS IN CONNECTION WITH 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF MAO'S ORIGINAL REMARKS ON SUBJECT. A SERIES OF NCNA ARTICLES RELATED EASE WITH WHICH INDIVIDUAL CHINESE VOLUNTEERS IN KOREA ARMED WITH MAO'S THOUGHTS WIPED OUT OR CAPTURED SCORES OF "AMERICAN AGGRESSORS". FAMILIAR THEMES AS "MAN OVER WEAPONS", "SPIRITUAL ATOM BOMB", ETC. WERE AGAIN TROTTED OUT TO REASSURE CHINESE PEOPLE OF THEIR INHERENT STRENGTH.

B. WHILE FOR MOST PART REGIME'S OUTPOURING ON PAPER TIGER THEME MOVED FURTHER INTO REALM OF FANTASY BY IGNORING MAO'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL APPROACH TO "U.S. IMPERIALISM",

PAGE THREE RUMJDH 1532/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
PEOPLE'S DAILY AUGUST 25 EDITORIAL INTRODUCED DEGREE OF REALISM INTO DISCUSSION OF SUBJECT. AFTER ASSERTING THAT EVENTS OF LAST 20 YEARS AND VIETNAM SITUATION "ELOQUENTLY PROVE U.S. IMPERIALISM IS A PAPER TIGER", EDITORIAL WARNED THAT "THIS DOES NOT MEAN ONE CAN TAKE THE ENEMY LIGHTLY AND CARELESSLY -- TACTICALLY, WITH REGARD TO EACH PART, REVOLUTIONARIES MUST TAKE ENEMY SERIOUSLY, TREAT HIM AS A REAL TIGER (UNDERLINING ADDED), BE PRUDENT". IT THEN ASSERTED THAT "HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE HAS TAUGHT US THAT IMPERIALISM CAN BE DEFEATED, BUT ONLY THROUGH A PROLONGED, ARDUOUS AND STUBBORN STRUGGLE".

C. COMMENT: THOUGH OBVIOUSLY OF RELEVANCE TO PRESENT VIETNAM SITUATION, REGIME'S DISCUSSION OF PAPER TIGERS SEEMS CONCERNED MAINLY WITH COMMEMORATING AND DEMONSTRATING MAO'S INFINITE WISDOM RATHER THAN FURTHER PREPARING POPULATION FOR POSSIBILITY OF WAR WITH U.S.

2. CHEN YI RATTLES SABRES AT JAPANESE VISITORS

A. ACCORDING TO LOCAL JAPANESE SOURCES, VISITING JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY DELEGATION WAS TOLD BY CHICOM FONMIN

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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PAGE FOUR RUMJDH 1532/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
CHEN YI ON AUGUST 11 THAT IF SINO-U.S. WAR BROKE OUT, AMERICANS COULD BE EXPECTED TO OCCUPY CHINESE SOUTHERN MARITIME PROVINCES AND BOMB PEKING AND SHANGHAI, BUT CHINA WOULD FIGHT ON. WITHOUT EXPLICITLY REFERRING TO JAPAN, CHEN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CHINA WOULD BE UNABLE TO BOMB U.S. IN RETALIATION, BUT WOULD CERTAINLY ATTACK ALL U.S. BASES "IN ASIA".

B. COMMENT: CHEN'S WARNING, THOUGH APPLICABLE TO COUNTRIES OTHER THAN JAPAN, BRINGS TO MIND MARCH 15 PEOPLE'S DAILY "COMMENTATOR" ARTICLE WHICH TOLD JAPANESE THAT U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA WOULD NOT PROTECT JAPAN BUT SIMPLY EXPOSE IT TO INVOLVEMENT "WHEN U.S. LAUNCHES WAR IN ASIA". INTENDED EFFECT OF CHEN STATEMENT IS PROBABLY TO PROVIDE AMMUNITION FOR OPPONENTS OF SATO'S GOVERNMENT'S DEFENSE POLICY IN CONNECTION WITH EXPECTED JAPANESE ELECTIONS.

3. VIETNAM: AID AGREEMENT, NATIONAL DAY VISITORS, ANNIVERSARY OF MAO STATEMENT

A. AID AGREEMENT. ECONOMIC DELEGATION HEADED BY DRV VICE PREMIER LE THANH NGHI (WEEKA 34) LEFT PEKING FOR

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 1532/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
PYONGYANG AUGUST 30 AFTER SIGNING "AGREEMENT ON CHINA'S ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM". CONTENTS OF AID PACKAGE WERE NOT MADE PUBLIC, BUT VNA USED TERM "NON-REFUND AID" WHICH SUGGESTS CHICOMS HAVE REVERTED TO GRANTS AFTER APPARENT SHIFT TO LOANS LAST DECEMBER. PRESENCE AT FAREWELL BANQUET OF LI TIEN-YU, DEPUTY CHIEF OF PLA GENERAL STAFF, WHO OFFERED TOAST ACCORDING TO VNA, INDICATED MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMPONENT MAY HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN AGREEMENT. NEW AID EVOKED VERY WARM NHAN DAN EDITORIAL OF AUGUST 30 WHICH REVIEWED PAST CHICOM SUPPORT FOR DRV AND THANKED PEKING FOR LATEST MANIFESTATION OF "CLOSE COMRADESHIP BETWEEN VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE PEOPLES WHO SHARE WEAL AND WOE". (CONGENTEL 1480)

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Info

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SEPTEMBER 1

N O F O R N

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 35

B. DRV NATIONAL DAY VISITORS. FIVE-MEMBER DRV FRIENDSHIP DELEGATION ARRIVED IN PEKING AUGUST 27 TO PARTICIPATE IN CELEBRATIONS OF HANOI'S NATIONAL DAY IN CHINA, WHICH ALREADY BEING GEARED UP BY FACTORY MEETINGS, FILM SHOWINGS, ETC. DELEGATION ATTENDED BANQUET IN ITS HONOR AUGUST 28 AND WAS ALSO PRESENT AT FAREWELL BANQUET FOR LE THANH NGHI ECONOMIC DELEGATION AUGUST 29. AS REPORTED BY NCNA, FEATURED CHICOM SPEAKER AT AUGUST 28 FUNCTION -- CHU TU-NAN, VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN CULTURAL RELATIONS COMMISSION -- CONDEMNED SOVIETS FOR "PLAYING ROLE OF CHIEF ACCOMPLICES OF U.S. IMPERIALISM IN ITS SCHEME TO FORCE PEACE TALKS THROUGH BOMBING".

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 1532/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
VIETNAMESE SPEAKER APPARENTLY IGNORED ANTI-SOVIET BARB IN HIS REPLY, AND VNA DID NOT MENTION IT IN REPORTING SPEECHES.

C. ANNIVERSARY OF MAO STATEMENT ON VIETNAM. LENGTHY ARTICLE BY NCNA "CORRESPONDENT" ON AUGUST 28 NOTED THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF MAO STATEMENT ON VIETNAM AND ATTEMPTED TO SHOW THAT EVENTS HAD BORNE OUT CORRECTNESS OF MAO'S THESIS THAT SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WOULD TRIUMPH AND ATTAIN LIBERATION THROUGH PERSEVERANCE IN "ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE". ARTICLE TRACED HEIGHTENED U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM, REITERATING CHICOM CONTENTION THAT U.S. HAS "COMPLETELY BROKEN BOUNDARIES OF WAR

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

AND THOROUGHLY SCRAPPED GENEVA AGREEMENTS". IN SPITE OF THIS, ARTICLE CLAIMED, U.S. HAD "SUNK DEEPER INTO QUAGMIRE" WHILE "PUPPET" SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WAS IN "GRAVE CRISIS". ACCORDING TO ARTICLE, FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WERE MERELY "A FARCE" DESIGNED TO CLOAK AGGRESSION IN SEMBLANCE OF LEGALITY.

4. INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS RED GUARDS

A. XENOPHOBIA AND "ANTI-REVISIONIST" ASPECTS OF RED

PAGE THREE RUMJDH 1532/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
GUARD BEHAVIOR HAVE INVOLVED REGIME IN SERIES OF PROTESTS BY NATIONS REPRESENTED IN PEKING. ON AUGUST 28, ACCORDING TASS, SOVS LODGED "EMPHATIC PROTEST" CHARGING "HOLLIGANISM" OUTSIDE ITS EMBASSY AND COMPLAINING OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING RESIDENT SOV DIPLOMATS. EAST GERMANS SEPTEMBER 1 PROTESTED MANHANDLING BY RED GUARDS OF THEIR MILITARY ATTACHE AND FAMILY AND ALSO COMPLAINED OF CHICOM REJECTION OF EARLIER PROTEST ON INCIDENT DELIVERED BY REGIME'S CHARGE AT PEKING.

B. UNDOUBTEDLY MOST DRAMATIC INCIDENT INVOLVING FOREIGNERS WAS REGIME'S CLOSURE SACRED HEART CONVENT WHICH HAS SERVED PRIMARILY AS SCHOOL FOR MORE THAN TWO HUNDRED CHILDREN OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS. CLOSURE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY PUBLIC HUMILIATION EIGHT ELDERLY NUNS WHO CONSTITUTED LAST REMAINING FOREIGN MISSIONARIES SERVING IN CHINA AND WHO WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DEPORTED FROM CHINA. ACCORDING NCNA, DEPORTATION WAS ORDERED BY PEKING MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ACTING IN COMPLIANCE WITH RED GUARD "DEMANDS". DEPORTATION ALLEGEDLY BASED ON COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES OF THE ELDERLY SISTERS

PAGE FOUR RUMJDH 1532/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WHICH INCLUDED USING THE SCHOOL AS A "COVER", SECRET COLLUSION WITH OTHER COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES IN CATHOLIC CHURCHES SCATTERED THROUGH NORTH CHINA, ESPIONAGE, INSTIGATING PLOTS FOR RIOTS AND SABOTAGE, ETC. TRAGIC DENOUEMENT OF INCIDENT, WAS DEATH OF ONE OF NUNS SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVAL IN HONG KONG

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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OWING EXHAUSTION INDUCED BY ORDEAL AT HANDS RED GUARDS, WHICH ACCORDING VICTIMS INCLUDED RUNNING GAUNTLET OF BAMBOO-WIELDING RED GUARDS AND SLEEPLESS, TERROR-STRICKEN NIGHTS.

C. IN ADDITION ATTACKS ON CATHOLICS WERE SERVICE REPORTS FROM PEKING REVEAL THAT AGED IMAM OF PEKING MOSQUE WAS BEATEN BY RED GUARDS ON AUGUST 26 TO FORCE HIM CONFESS TO CRIMES LISTED ON POSTER PUT UP ON MOSQUE. WE HAVE ALSO SEEN PHOTO OF BUDDHA IN HANGCHOW TEMPLE DEFACED WITH RED GUARDS' POSTER.

D. COMMENT: ASIDE FROM FURTHER STRAINING SINO-SOV RELATIONS, ACTS OF RED GUARDS AGAINST FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AND MAJOR RELIGIONS OF WORLD HAVE PROBABLY BROUGHT REGIME'S INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE TO LOWEST POINT EVER

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 1532/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
REACHED SINCE ESTABLISHMENT CPR. WHILE IT APPEARS THAT LEADERSHIP OBLIVIOUS OR UNCONCERNED ABOUT ADVERSE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THESE WANTON ACTS AS EVIDENCED BY ARROGANT AND BOASTFUL NCNA ACCOUNT OF NUNS' DEPORTATION, WE INTUITIVELY BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE MANY IN RESPONSIBLE POSITIONS IN CHINA WHO ARE CONSCIOUS OF AND LAMENT THE DAMAGE DONE TO CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION.

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SEPTEMBER 01

N O F O R N

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 35

INTERNAL

5. RED GUARDS ENJOINED TO USE RESTRAINT

A. AFTER WEEK OF FRENZIED AND OFTEN DESTRUCTIVE ACTIVITY BY RED GUARDS, "PARTY CENTER" HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED TO PLACE SOME RESTRAINTS ON THEIR OPERATIONS. EVIDENCE OF DECISION WAS AUGUST 28 PEOPLE'S DAILY (PD) EDITORIAL URGING THAT YOUNG PEOPLE LEARN FROM PLA'S EXAMPLE IN ADHERING TO MASS DISCIPLINE, DEFENDING PEOPLE'S INTERESTS, AND PROTECTING STATE PROPERTY. EDITORIAL, WHILE APPLAUDING RED GUARDS' REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES, STATED THEY SHOULD PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO STIPULATION IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S 16-POINT RESOLUTION (WEEKA 32) THAT STRUGGLE SHOULD BE "CONDUCTED BY REASONING NOT BY COERCION OR FORCE" EVEN WHEN DEALING WITH PRINCIPLE TARGETS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION, I. E., "THOSE IN AUTHORITY WHO TAKING CAPITALIST ROAD".

B. THAT YOUTHS GOT MESSAGE WAS IMPLIED IN NCNA DISPATCH OF AUGUST 29 DESCRIBING RED GUARDS STUDYING PD EDITORIAL, 16-POINTS, AND PLEDGING TO APPLY RULES OF PLA DISCIPLINE. WESTERN PRESS REPORTS THAT CURRENT DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF SOVIET EMBASSY IS ORDERLY AND WELL ORGANIZED (IN CONTRAST TO RECENT RED GUARD ACTIVITIES) CONFIRM NOT ONLY THAT LATITUDE GIVEN GUARDS HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY NARROWED, BUT THAT AT LEAST IN PEKING THEY NOW RESPONSIVE TO

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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SUPERIOR AUTHORITY. SIMILARLY, ACCORDING LOCAL HONG KONG PRESS AUGUST 30, ARRIVALS FROM CANTON STATE RED GUARDS THERE NOW RESTRAINING THEIR ACTIVITIES AND NO LONGER HARRASSING VISITORS FROM HONG KONG. SECOND MASS RALLY IN PEKING (SEE ITEM 9), ATTENDED BY SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND RED GUARDS APPEARED DESIGNED IN PART TO IMPRESS ON THEM NEED FOR GREATER RESTRAINT AND DISCIPLINE. JAPANESE PRESS REPORTS THAT 8-POINT RULES OF CONDUCT FOR RED GUARDS BEING CIRCULATED THROUGHOUT PEKING. IT BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT POPULAR RESISTANCE AND RESENTMENT STRONG ENOUGH TO CAUSE BLOODSHED HAVE BEEN KEY FACTORS IN DECISION TO MUZZLE GUARDS. BRITISH EMBASSY IN PEKING REPORTS THAT TEN RED GUARDS IN CAPITAL KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN KILLED OR INJURED. ALSO BRITISH HAD LEARNED FROM WALL POSTERS IN PEKING OF INCIDENT BETWEEN POLICE AND "REVOLUTIONARY STUDENTS" IN CHANGSHA. AUGUST 29 FOOCHOW DOMESTIC SERVICE BROADCAST DESCRIBES MASS TRIAL AND EXECUTION AUGUST 28 OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY WHO DAY BEFORE HAD WOUNDED THIRTEEN REVOLUTIONARY STUDENTS, TEACHERS, AND CADRES (LARGE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES IMPLIES HE MAY HAVE HAD SOME HELP) AT MIDDLE SCHOOL STRUGGLE MEETING AT WHICH HE WAS TARGET. WE ALSO INTRIGUED BY AUGUST 31 REUTER'S REPORT FROM PEKING OF DIRECTIVE SIGNED BY "CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF RED GUARDS" WHICH INCLUDED ADMONITION THAT RED GUARDS MUST NOT STOP MILITARY OR FOREIGN VEHICLES. IF REPORT ACCURATE, IT RAISES POSSIBILITY THAT FRICTIONS OR EVEN INCIDENTS HAVE ARISEN BETWEEN RED GUARD AND PLA ELEMENTS, DESPITE REGIME'S EFFORTS HIGHLIGHT INTIMATE AND IDEOLOGICAL TIES BETWEEN TWO ORGANIZATIONS. HIGH LEVEL MANIPULATORS OF GUARDS MAY, THEREFORE, HAVE DECIDED THAT DESTRUCTIVE FRENZY PAST SEVERAL DAYS HAS SERVED INTENDED PURPOSE OF PROVING POWER AND MILITANCE OF NEW ORGANIZATION AND DECIDED TO TONE DOWN THE BEHAVIOR OF YOUTHS ALONG LINES LESS REPUGNANT TO CHINESE AND WORLD OPINION. DESIRE TO PREVENT UNINTENDED AND UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF PHYSICAL DAMAGE MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN FACTOR IN DECISION.

C. POLITICAL CONNOTATIONS OF APPARENT SWITCH ARE CLOUDY. IT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS SETBACK FOR MILITANT PARTY ELEMENTS (PROBABLY CONTROLLED BY MAO AND LIN PIAO) RESPONSIBLE FOR UNLEASHING GUARDS IN FIRST PLACE. AT VERY LEAST, IT SHOWS THAT YOUTHS

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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WERE, TEMPORARILY, NOT UNDER TIGHT ENOUGH PARTY CONTROL.

D. DESPITE CHANGE IN TONE, HOWEVER, NEITHER BASIC PURPOSES NOR REGIME APPROVAL OF GUARDS HAVE CHANGED. LATEST PD EDITORIAL ON SUBJECT (AUGUST 29) UNEQUIVOCALLY SALUTED RED GUARDS AS SHOCK FORCE OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION. WHILE PLA DAILY HAS CARRIED NO EDITORIAL ON SUBJECT SINCE ITS AUGUST 25 TRIBUTE "THEY HAVE DONE RIGHT AND WELL!" NCNA DISPATCHES DESCRIBE PLA OFFICERS AND MEN AS GIVING WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT TO REVOLUTIONARY "YOUNG CAVALIERS".

E. WHERE DO RED GUARDS AND CULTURAL REVOLUTION GO FROM HERE? AUGUST 29 PD EDITORIAL WARNED THAT "CULTURAL REVOLUTIONALWAYS HERALDS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REVOLUTION", AND STATED THAT ULTIMATE POLITICAL GOAL OF REVOLUTION WAS "IMPROVEMENT", "CONSOLIDATION" OF DICTATORSHIP PROLETARIAT. INFERENCE WE DRAW IS THAT GUARDS MAY BECOME INCREASINGLY INVOLVED IN POLITICAL TASK OF ROUTING OUT OPPOSITION WITHIN PARTY TO MAO AND LIN, A SURMISE SUPPORTED BY AUGUST 29 RED GUARDS' RALLY IN HARBIN TO "BURN DOWN CCP COMMITTEE AND SHELL COMMAND POST". SPEAKERS AT RALLY, WHICH WAS LENT STATURE AND LEGITIMACY BY PRESENCE NORTHEAST BUREAU THIRD SECRETARY MA MING-FANG PROMISED TO "DRAG OUT COMPLETELY" THOSE AUTHORITIES ENTRENCHED IN LEADING GROUP OF PROVINCIAL CCP WHO HAD TRIED TO "STRIKE DOWN REVOLUTIONARY STUDENTS, SUPPRESS MASS MOVEMENT AND UNDER MINE CULTURAL REVOLUTION". HARBIN IS FIRST EXAMPLE THIS KIND OF ROLE FOR RED GUARDS AND COULD BE ISOLATED EXAMPLE. WE INCLINED TO DOUBT THIS, HOWEVER, AND WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO SEE SIMILAR STRUGGLES APPEARING IN OTHER PROVINCES. PERIOD OF INCREASED UPHEAVAL APPEARS IN STORE FOR CHINA.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION FOUR OF FIVE HONG KONG 1532

SEPTEMBER 1

N O F O R N

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 35

6. PLA REPORTEDLY IN CHARGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES BUREAU

A. ENGLISH LANGUAGE PERIODICALS OF THE FOREIGN LANGUAGES BUREAU ARE ALL AT LEAST A MONTH OVERDUE. LAST ISSUE OF CHINA PICTORIAL WAS IN JUNE, AND CHINA RECONSTRUCTS, CHINA LITERATURE, AND CHINA SPORTS HAVE NOT BEEN RECEIVED IN HONG KONG SINCE JULY. BACKGROUND FOR THIS APPARENT PARALYSIS OF MOST OF PEKING'S ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROPAGANDA APPARATUS WAS PROVIDED THIS WEEK BY YOUNG BRITISH LANGUAGE TEACHER PASSING THROUGH HONG KONG ON WAY HOME AFTER TWO YEARS IN MAINLAND (HIS TEACHING CONTRACT LIKE HIS EIGHT OTHER BRITISH COLLEAGUES, WAS ABRUPTLY TERMINATED AS RESULT OF

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 1532/4 C O N F I D E N TI A L
CULTURAL REVOLUTION). ACCORDING TO TEACHER, FOREIGN LANGUAGES BUREAU HAS BEEN SCENE OF MANY STRUGGLE MEETINGS, AND STAFF IS COMPLETELY DISTRACTED. AS OF ABOUT SIX WEEKS AGO, FOREIGN LANGUAGES BUREAU HAS BEEN UNDER DIRECTION OF YOUNG PLA SOLDIERS. THE SOLDIERS ARE APPARENTLY SAME AS THOSE DESCRIBED BY CLARENCE ADAMS IN HIS DEBRIEFING (CONGEN A-61, JULY 29, 1966) -- YOUNG, PROGRESSIVE, BUT FOR MOST PART TECHNICALLY INCOMPETENT GRADUATES OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE COURSE AT HSIANG SHAN, WHO ASSIGNED AS APPRENTICE PROOFREADERS AND TYPISTS THROUGHOUT ORGANIZATION AT END OF 1965. ACCORDING TO BRITISH TEACHER, WHAT ENGLISH LANGUAGE

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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TRANSLATIONS ARE BEING DONE (PEKING REVIEW AND NCNA ENGLISH ARE UP TO DATE) ARE BEING TURNED OUT FOR TIME BEING BY PARTY'S BUREAU FOR TRANSLATION AND COMPILATION OF WORKS OF MAO (IN WHICH RANKING FOREIGNER IS ISRAEL EPSTEIN).

B. WE REMEMBER ADAMS COMMENTING AT TIME HIS DEBRIEFING THAT NO ONE AT FOREIGN LANGUAGES BUREAU COULD FIGURE OUT PRECISE PURPOSE YOUNG SOLDIERS' PRESENCE THERE, OTHER

THAN AS IDEOLOGICAL MODELS. IF ACCOUNT BY BRITISH TEACHER ACCURATE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT ASSIGNMENT OF PLA LANGUAGE STUDENTS FROM HSIANG SHAN (SCHOOL APPARENTLY NOW CLOSED) HAD ULTERIOR AND ULTIMATE MOTIVE OF INSURING CONTROL OVER FOREIGN LANGUAGES BUREAU DURING KEY PERIOD BY RELIABLE PLA ELEMENTS.

7. SUICIDES AMONG SHANGHAI SCIENTISTS REPORTED

A. AN ENGINEER WHO WAS IN SHANGHAI UP UNTIL MID-AUGUST THIS YEAR REPORTED (FSC 6692 CONF/NOFORN) THAT, AS OF THE TIME HE LEFT, ALL WESTERN TRAINED AND "BOURGEOIS" INDIVIDUALS AT ALL LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN SHANGHAI'S SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS WERE BEING SUBJECTED TO "CONTINUOUS INTENSE PRESSURE" BY CULTURAL REVOLUTION WHICH HAD ALREADY RESULTED IN A NUMBER OF SUICIDES AND ATTEMPTED SUICIDES. THE SHANGHAI CHEMICAL INDUSTRY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WHERE THIS ENGINEER WORKED, HAD BEEN INACTIVE FOR ALMOST A YEAR OWING TO THE CAMPAIGNS, AND THE ENGINEER THOUGHT THAT LONG-TERM RESEARCH PROJECTS BEGUN THERE OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS AND NOT COMPLETED BY EARLY LAST FALL WOULD PROBABLY HAVE

TO BE ABANDONED BECAUSE OF THE PERSONNEL LOSSES CAUSED BY THE PURGE.

B. COMMENT: REPORT, WHICH APPEARS RELIABLE, HELPS EXPLAIN STRONG CLAUSE IN 16- POINTS SHIELDING SCIENTISTS AND TECHNICIANS FROM FURTHER ATTACK DURING CULTURAL

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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REVOLUTION. HOWEVER, ASSERTION THAT INTENSE PRESSURE CONTINUED INTO MID-AUGUST, I.E., AFTER AUGUST 8 PROMULGATION OF 16-POINTS, SUGGESTS THAT ACTIVIST ELEMENTS WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIVE TO DIRECTIVE - A FURTHER INDICATION OF FLUIDITY AND UNCERTAINTY THAT CHARACTERIZES CURRENT INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE.

8. STATUS OF LIU CHAO-CHI IN DOUBT

A. FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE HAS POINTED TO POSSIBLE DE FACTO REMOVAL LIU SHAO-CHI AS CHAIRMAN, CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC:

A) LIU'S FAILURE TO APPEAR IN CAPACITY CPR CHAIRMAN SINCE AUGUST 5.

B) PEKING'S FAILURE SINCE PLENUM TO PUBLICIZE AND IN SOME CASES SEND NATIONAL DAY GREETINGS TO COUNTRIES TO WHICH LIU LAST YEAR SENT MESSAGES. ROMANIAN CASE

PARTICULARLY PUZZLING. NCNA DID NOT REPORT A MESSAGE TO BUCHAREST, BUT ROMANIAN EMBASSY PEKING TOLD BRITISH A TELEGRAM WAS SENT WITHOUT LIU'S SIGNATURE. EMBASSY BUCHAREST, HOWEVER, REPORTED THAT MESSAGE SIGNED BY FOUR LEADERS INCLUDING LIU WAS PRINTED BUCHAREST NEWSPAPERS.

C) BRITISH REPORTS OF POSTERS IN PEKING UNIVERSITY CRITICIZING LIU FOR MALADMINISTRATION (AND HIS WIFE FOR BOURGEOIS HABITS) AS WELL AS RUMORS IN CAPITAL THAT LIU WAS CRITICIZED AT 11TH PLENUM.

B. LIU ATTENDED AUGUST 31 MASS RALLY, FOR FIRST KNOWN PUBLIC APPEARANCE SINCE AUGUST 18 RALLY; HE LISTED IN APPROXIMATELY SAME ORDER OF PRECEDENCE (IN NCNA LIST OF PARTY AND STATE LEADERS) AS ON THAT OCCASION.

C. COMMENT: IF LIU NO LONGER ACTIVE HEAD OF STATE, IT RAISES QUESTIONS WHETHER LIN'S DESIGNATION BY MAO AS HEIR APPARENT MOTIVATED BY CHAIRMAN'S ACTIVE DISPLEASURE WITH LIU IN ADDITION TO ANY FEEL[illegible]MAO MAY HAVE HAD THAT LIN BETTER EQUIPPED THAN LIU TO LEAD.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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THIS, IF TRUE, SUGGESTS THAT THERE WERE POLICY DISPUTES

PAGE SIX RUMJDH 1532/4 C O N F I D E N T I A L
OVER "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND OTHER MATTERS ON WHICH
LIU TOOK ISSUE WITH MAO. UNCERTAINTY OVER LIU'S
POSITION MAY ALSO REFLECT REGIME'S FAILURE TO GAIN CLEAR-
CUT VICTORY IN STRUGGLE WITH [redacted] THAT ARE DEEMED
TO BE ANTI-MAOIST.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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N O F O R N

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 35

9. LEADERSHIP ATTENDS SECOND PEKING RALLY ON CULTURAL REVOLUTION

A. ON AUGUST 31 PEKING'S TIENANMEN SQUARE (WHOSE NAME HAS APPARENTLY NOT BEEN CHANGED) WAS SCENE OF SECOND MASS RALLY ON CULTURAL REVOLUTION, THIS ONE ATTENDED BY HALF MILLION REVOLUTIONARY STUDENTS AND TEACHERS FROM EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OTHER THAN THOSE IN PEKING. ACCORDING TO REPORTS TRICKLING IN AS WE GO TO PRESS, FORMAT ALMOST IDENTICAL TO FIRST, WITH MAO WEARING MILITARY UNIFORM AGAIN AND LIN PIAO (ONLY ONE DESCRIBED AS "CLOSE COMRADE-IN-ARMS") AND CHOU EN-LAI GIVING KEY NOTE SPEECHES. FESTIVITIES DECLARED OPEN

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 1532/5 C O N F I D E N T I A L
BY CHIANG CHING (MRS. MAO) WHO LISTED FOR FIRST TIME AS FIRST DEPUTY HEAD OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP UNDER PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE. (HEAD OF GROUP CHEN PO-TA NOT THERE).

B. ANALYSIS LIN AND CHOU SPEECHES INDICATES THAT WHILE RED GUARDS ARE TO BE PLACED UNDER TIGHTER CONTROL, MOVEMENT TO BE INTEGRATED AND CONVERTED INTO MORE EFFECTIVE POLITICAL FORCE IN CULTURAL REVOLUTION. STRONG STRESS IN BOTH SPEECHES ON THEME OF TOTAL ADHERENCE TO PLA DISCIPLINE AND 16-POINTS AS WELL AS ABSTENTION FROM USE OF FORCE (LIN SAID FLATLY - DON'T HIT PEOPLE") ECHOED AUGUST 28 PEOPLE'S DAILY

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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EDITORIAL AND HAMMERED HOME TOP LEADERSHIP'S DESIRE TO HALT EXCESSES AND CONFUSION OF RECENT WEEKS (SEE ABOVE). ALTHOUGH YOUTHS HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN MORE ORDERLY AND DISCIPLINED IN PEKING AND CANTON SINCE AUGUST 28, FELT NEED OF LEADERS TO REITERATE IN PERSON SAME STRICTURES WHICH HAVE BEEN PRIMARY SUBJECT OF REGIME PROPAGANDA SINCE APPEARANCE OF EDITORIAL MAY BE EVIDENCE OF DIFFICULTY ENCOUNTERED IN BRINGING GUARDS TO HEEL ELSEWHERE.

PAGE THREE RUMJDH 1532/5 C O N F I D E N T I A L
C. LIN PIAO'S STATEMENT THAT CAPITALIST POWER HOLDERS WITHIN PARTY RANKS ARE FOCUS OF ATTACK (A POINT NOTICEABLY ABSENT IN CHOU SPEECH) SUGGESTED, AS DID HARBIN RALLY MENTIONED ABOVE, THAT A FUTURE MAJOR TARGET OF NEWLY INTEGRATED AND DISCIPLINED GUARDS MAY BE ERRANT ORGANS OF PARTY ITSELF.

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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AUGUST 25

WEEKA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD
POUCH: (2) BANGKOK, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, CANBERRA, DARESALAAM, DJAKARTA, KARACHI, KATMANDU, KUALALUMPUR, LONDON, MANILA, MOSCOW, MUNICH, NEWDELHI, PRAGUE, RANGOON, RAWALPINDI, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SOFIA, SINGAPORE, (4) TAIPEI, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, CINCPAC COMNAVPHIL, TAIWANDEFCOM, 13AF MANILA

WEEKA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 34

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXTERNAL - 1. DRV ECONOMIC DELEGATION IN PEKING; 2. IT'S ONLY A PAPER TIGER; 3. ROMANIAN NATIONAL DAY IN PEKING; 4. CCP-JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY RIFT;

5. LAOS: CHEN YI REPLIES TO NLHX SECGEN;

INTERNAL - 6. HOPE ON AUGUST 18 RALLY; 7. STRUGGLE AT PEKING UNIVERSITY; 8. BIOGRAPHIC NOTES; 9. RED GUARDS ON MARCH.

EXTERNAL

1. DRV ECONOMIC DELEGATION IN PEKING

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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A. DRV ECONOMIC DELEGATION HEADED BY DRV VICE PREMIER LE THANH NGHI ARRIVED PEKING AUGUST 19, PROBABLY TO DISCUSS FURTHER AID TO DRV. THIS IS SECOND TIME WITHIN SEVEN MONTHS THAT NGHI HAS HEADED ECONOMIC DELEGATION TO CHINA AND IT MAY BE INDICATION THAT DRV REQUIREMENTS FOR CHINESE HELP GROWING FASTER THAN ANTICIPATED.

B. SPEECHES AT AUGUST 20 BANQUET HOSTED BY CHICOM VICE PREMIER LE HSIEN-NIEN REVEALED CONTINUING DRV AND CHICOM DIVERGENCE OVER SOV ROLE IN VIETNAM AND HINTED AT OTHER AREAS OF FRICTION BETWEEN TWO REGIMES. IN NCNA ACCOUNT, LE HSIEN-NIEN CRITICIZED SOVES BY (A) CLAIMING HO JULY 17 APPEAL DEALT HEAVY BLOW TO PEACE TALKS "SCHEMES" OF

PAGE THREE RUMJDH 1332/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
"IMPERIALISTS, REVISIONISTS AND REACTIONARIES," AND (B) PREDICTING USA PROPOSAL ON VIETNAM "WOULD END IN IGNOMONIOUS FAILURE LIKE EARLIER PEACE TALK ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND MOSCOW." VNA ACCOUNT OF LI'S REMARKS EXCISED THESE REFERENCES TO "REVISIONISTS" AND " MOSCOW." ON OTHER SIDE OF FENCE, VNA ACOUNT OF HGHI'S SPEECH INCLUDED EXPRESSED CONVICTION THAT TALKS DURING VISIT WOULD "RECORD SPLENDID SUCCESSES....." NCNA ACCOUNT OF VISITOR'S REMARKS DOES NOT HAVE THIS PASSAGE, PERHAPS INDICATING CHICOM RESERVATION ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR "SPLENDID SUCCESS" OF VISIT.

C. FINALLY, WE NOTE THAT ALTHOUGH NGHI PRAISED ACHIEVEMENTS OF CCP AND MAO TSE-TUNG (IN THAT ORDER), HE MADE NO MENTION AT ALL OF "GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION" NOW OCCUPYING CENTER OF CHINESE POLITICAL SCENE. WE WONDER IF THIS MAY NOT INDICATE DRV LESS THAN ENTHUSIASTIC OVER CURRENT CHICOM INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. (CONFIDENTIAL, CONGENTEL 1270).

PAGE FOUR RUMJDH 1332/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. IT'S ONLY A PAPER TIGER

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

-3- Hong Kong 1332, August 25 (Section 1 of 4)

A. PEKING MARKED 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF MAO'S THESIS THAT IMPERIALISTS, INCLUDING U.S., ARE PAPER TIGERS WITH SERIES OF ARTICLES PURPORTING DEMONSTRATE THAT INERVENING YEARS HAVE PROVED VALIDITY CHAIRMAN'S VIEWS AS WITNESSED BY "RESOUNDING VICTORIES" OF PEOPLE OF CHINA, VIETNAM, KOREA, LAOS, CUBA, ALGERIA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, CONGO(K) -OTHER COUNTRIES." REGIME'S TREATMENT OF SUBJECT WAS STANDARD. IT INCLUDED ASSERTION THAT U.S. GOAL OF WORLD DOMINATION WAS FACED WITH INSOLUBLE CONTRADICTION CONSISTING OF INSUFFICIENT ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RESOURCES FOR JOB AND OPPOSTION OF REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLES OF WORLD WHO AWAKENING UNDER IMPETUS OF U.S. OPPRESSIVE POLICIES. PREDICTABLY, VIETNAM SITUATION FIGURED PROMINIENTLY IN REGINE'S EFFORTS PROVE "PAPER TIGER" NATURE OF U.S. NCNA AUGUST 20 ARTICLE ALLEGED THAT DESPITE ESCALATION OF WAR AND PESENCE 300,000 TROOPS "ARMED WITH ALL SORTS OF WEAPONS EXCEPT NUCLEAR WEAPONS,"

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 1332/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
U.S. HAS BEEN INCURRING EVER MORE SHAMEFUL DEFEAT."
ANOTHER NCNA ARTICLE ON SAME DAY PRESENTED ACCOUNT OF ALLEGED COWARDICE AND FRIGHT OF U.S. TROOPS IN VIETNAM AND CONCLUDED U.S. COULD NOT "EXCAPE FATE OF BEING WIPED OUT BY HEROICE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE."

B. COMMENT: ASIDE FROM REAFFIRMATION OF FAITH IN ABILITY SOUTH VIETNAMESE COPE BY THEMSELVES WITH "U.S. AGGRESSORS," ONLY OTHER POINT OF INTEREST IN REGIME'S OUTPUT WAS FAILURE TREAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CONTEXT "PAPER TIGER" ANALYSIS, DESPITE FACT THAT MAO TWENTY YEARS AGO SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO THIS SUBJECT IN CELEBRATED INTERVIEW WITH ANNA LOUISE STRONG. WE SUSPECT THAT BY NOW EVEN PEKING MUST FEEL THAT CREDIBILITY IS STRAINED BY REFERENCES TO WEAPONS CAPABLE OF DESTROYING MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AS PAPER TIGES. BESIDES, NOW THAT PEKING CAN POINT TO ITS OWN NUCLEAR PROGRAM, REGIME MAY NOT BE AS ANXIOUS DOWNGRADE SIGNIFICANCE OF AN ACHIEVEMENT WHICH HAS BEEN SO COSTLY TO IT IN TERMS OF HUMAN AND NATURAL RESOURECES. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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1966 AUG 25 PM 9 NE
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CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 34

3. ROMANIAN NATIONAL DAY IN PEKING

A. CHICOM TREATMENT OF ROMANIAN NATIONAL DAY LEFT IMPRESSION THAT PEKING STILL NETTLED OVER OUTCOME OF CHOU EN-LAI VISIT TO ROMANIA LAST JUNE. IN CONTRAST TO LAST YEAR, WHEN MAO, LIU, CHOU AND CHU TEH SENT GREETINGS TO BUCHAREST LEADERSHIP, NO MESSAGES WERE PUBLISHED THIS YEAR. WHILE LAST YEAR'S SPEECHES WERE FILLED WITH WARM REFERENCES TO EXCHANGE OF VISITS BY STATE AND PARTY LEADERS, NO MENTION WAS MADE THIS YEAR OF RECENT CHOU VISIT. FEWER TOP-RANKING CHICOM LEADERS ATTENDED EMBASSY RECEPTION THIS YEAR THAN IN 1965. MOREOVER, THOUGH BOTH SIDES PAID TRIBUTE TO ROMANIA'S POLICY OF

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 1332/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
"INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY," BULK OF REPORTED REMARKS AT RECEPTION WERE ON VIETNAM, WITH ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR HEWING CLOSELY TO DRV "FOUR POINTS" AND CHICOM SPEAKER CHEN YI CONCENTRATING ON DENUNCIATION OF "PEACE TALKS SCHEMES" PUT FORTH BY U.S. AND ALLEGEDLY BACKED BY ITS (SOVIET) "ACCOMPLISHES."

B. COMMENT: WE WOULD INTERPRET CHICOM EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR ROMANIAN INDEPENDENT STANCE AS REPRESENTING MINIMUM COMMON GROUND SHARED BY CCP AND RCP, AND NOT AS SIGN THAT CHICOMS HAVE SOFTENED DEMANDS FOR "LINE OF DEMARCATION" BETWEEN TRUE MARXIST-LENINISTS AND SOVIET "REVISIONISTS." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

4. CCP-JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY RIFT

A. SIGNS OF DEEPENING RIFT BETWEEN CHINESE AND JAPANSESE COMMUNIST PARTIES CONTINUED TO APPEAR DURING PAST WEEK. NCNA REPORTED IN ITEM DATE-LINED TOKYO AUGUST 17 THAT FORTHCOMING SECOND JAPAN-CHINA YOUTH FESTIVAL HAD ENCOUNTERED OPPOSITION FROM DEMOCRATICE YOUTH LEAGUE OF JAPAN,

PAGE THREE RUMJDH(1332/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WHICH (ACCORDING JAPANESE CONGEN) IS JCP AFFILIATE. SPOKESMAN FOR THIS GROUP KOYAMA, ANNOUNCED AT RECEPTION FOR VISITING CHICOM YOUTH DELEGATION THAT HIS ORGANIZATION WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN FESTIVAL, AND AT SAME TIME ADVOCATED "UNITY OF ALL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES" INCLUDING USSR---WHICH NCNA, IN QUOTING HIM, DESCRIBED AS A "DISCORDANT NOTE."

B. FURTHER INDICATION OF CCP-JCP ESTRANGEMENT IS COMPLETE ABSENCE DURING PAST FEW MONTHS IN CHICOM MEDIA OF REPRINTS OR QUOTES FROM JCP PAPER AKAHATA. UNTIL ABOUT MAY, SUCH ITEMS APPEARED REGULARLY IN PEOPLE'S DAILY SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK. NEW PEKING-APPROVED MOUTHPIECE FOR JAPANESE OPINION MAY BE PROVINCIAL PAPER CHOSHU SHIMBUN OF SHIMONOSIKE, YAMAGUCHI PREFECTURE. NCNA AUGUST 23 SUMMARIZED EDITORIAL FROM THIS PAPER WHICH CALLED ON JAPANESE PEOPLE TO STRENGTHEN SOLIDARITY WITH CHICOMS AND "SMASH ALL INTRIGUES TO UNITS WITH SOVIET UNION TO OPPOSE CHINA." ON BASIS JAPANESE PRESS REPORTS, APPEARS THAT YAMAGUCHI BRANCH OF JCP HAS BEEN

PAGE FOUR RUMJDH 1332/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
CENSURED BY PARTY LEADERSHIP FOR ITS FAILURE OBEY PARTY LINE ON RELATIONS WITH CCP. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. LAOS: CHEN YI REPLIES TO NLHX SECGEN

NCNA AUGUST 20 PUBLISHED TEXT OF LETTER DATED SAME DAY FROM CHEN YI TO NLHX SECGEN PHOUMI VONGVICHIT IN REPLY TO PHOUMI LETTER OF JULY 23 WHICH TRANS-MITTED NLHX CC STATEMENT ON ANNIVERSARY OF 1962

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

GENEVA ACCORDS. CHEN NOTED THAT NLHX HAD ACCUSED U.S. OF VIOLATING 1962 AGREEMENTS AND EXPANDING "AGGRESSION AND INTERVENTION IN LAOS". HE VOICED CHICOM SUPPORT FOR NLHX STANCE, AND APPEARED TO GO BEYOND IT IN OUTLINING CPR VIEW THAT U.S. HAD "FINALLY AND COMPLETELY TORN UP" 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND "COMPLETELY WRECKED" 1962 AGREEMENTS. HE ALLEGED THAT U.S. HAD LONG AGO SUBVERTED TRIPARTITE GOVERNMENT AND WAS NOW BOMBING PATHET LAO AREAS AND PREPARING TO SEND GROUND FORCES FOR "DIRECT AGGRESSION". HE ASSERTED IN SIMILAR VEIN TO PEOPLE'S DAILY "COMMENTATOR" ARTICLE OF

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 1332/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
JULY 30 THAT U.S. ACTIONS "PROVED" THAT U.S. HAS "NEVER SHOWN ANY RESPECT WHATSOEVER FOR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS." (UNCLASSIFIED)

INTERNAL

6. MORE ON AUGUST 18 RALLY

A. ASIDE FROM ATTESTING TO DRAMATIC ELEVATION LIN PIAO, TAO CHU, CHEN PO-TA, KANG SHENG AND DEMOTION LIU SHAO-CHI, LIST OF 200 PERSONS ATTENDING AUGUST 18 RALLY AT TIEN AN MEN SQUARE REVEALED NO DRASTIC PERSONNEL CHANGES. PRESENCE HSIAO HUA SHOWED HE NOT IN DISGRACE DESPITE PREVIOUS CIRCUMSTANTIAL INDICATIONS TO CONTRARY.

B. OF ENTIRE BODY OF LUMINARIES ON ROSTRUM GREAT MAJORITY IDENTIFIABLE AS GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRATS AND MILITARY MEN. LIST SHOWED LARGE TURNOUT OF MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES IN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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AUGUST 25

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 34

C. PAUCITY OF REGIONAL AND PROVINCIAL LEADERS OF HIGH PARTY RANK ON ROSTRUM PRESUMABLY DUE TO THEIR RETURN, FOLLOWING ATTENDANCE AT CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM, TO HOME GROUNDS FOR MASS RALLIES HELD AUGUST 19 TO CELEBRATE MAO'S MEETING WITH MASSES IN PEKING THE DAY BEFORE: LI PAO-HUA WAS IN HOFEI, LI CHING-CHUAN IN CHENGTU, WEI WEN-PO IN SHANGHAI, AND LIU LAN-TAO IN SIAN.

7. STRUGGLE AT PEKING UNIVERSITY

A. NCNA AUGUST 23 REPORTED CELEBRATION BY ALL PEKING UNIVERSITY (PEITA) "REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS" OF BIRTH OF NEW SCHOOL MAGAZINE "NEW PEKING

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 1332/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
UNIVERSITY", WITH TITLE CHARACTERS OF PUBLICATION PENNED BY MAO'S OWN HAND. DESPATCH SAID HIS DYNAMIC CALLIGRAPHY WOULD INSPIRE REVOLUTIONARY TEACHERS AND STUDENTS TO TRANSFORM INSTITUTION WHICH HAD BEEN TOOL OF BLACK GANG OF LU PING AND PENG PEI-YUN INTO PROPAGATOR AND PROTECTOR OF THOUGHT OF MAO. WITH YENAN'S ANTI-JAPANESE UNIVERSITY AS MODEL, PEITA WOULD NOW TAKE UP PROPER FUNCTION IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, SUPPORTING 16 POINTS AND SPIRIT OF 11TH PLENUM, DESPATCH CONCLUDED.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0336

B. PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL AUTUST 24 WELCOMED BIRTH OF NEW PUBLICATION AND PREDICTED THAT NEW CORRECTLY SOCIALIST PEKING UNIVERSITY WOULD QUICKLY EMERGE.

C. COMMENT: EMPHASIS ON "NEW" PEITA CLEARLY INDICATES MAO'S DISAPPROVAL OF IDEOLOGICAL CLIMATE AT PRE-CULTURAL REVOLUTION PEKING UNIVERSITY. IN ANY EVENT DESPATCH AND EDITORIAL BOTH HINT THAT STRUGGLE AT PEITA MAY BE ENDING WITH "NEW" (I.E., RECTIFIED) PEKING UNIVERSITY BEGINNING TO EMERGE FROM UPHEAVAL. IF SO, SOME MAY ALSO BE

TRUE OF OTHER MAINLAND UNIVERSITIES, CONSTITUTING FURTHER EVIDENCE OF SHIFT IN CULTURAL REVOLUTION AWAY FROM EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND AGAINST BOURGEOIS SYMBOLS AND HABITS IN SOCIETY AS WHOLE.

3. BIOGRAPHIC NOTES

KANG SHENG - FULL POLITBUREAU MEMBER

A. NCNA AUGUST 23 IN REPORTING BANQUET GIVEN BY KANG SHENG FOR DELEGATION OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST MOVEMENT (MARXIST-LENINIST) IDENTIFIED KANG AS "MEMBER OF POLITICAL BUREAU". UNTIL THIS REPORT KANG HAS BEEN TERMED AN ALTERNATE MEMBER. KANG'S RECENT, SUDDEN IMPROVEMENT IN HIS PARTY STANDING WAS SUGGESTED EARLIER WHEN HE WAS LISTED SEVENTH (AFTER TENG HSIAO-PING AND BEFORE LIU SHAO-CHI) IN NCNA ACCOUNTS OF PEKING RALLY AND IS FURTHER INDICATION THAT LISTING REFLECTS ALTERATIONS MADE BY CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM.

LIU NING-YI IN SECRETARIAT

B. LIU NING-YI WAS LISTED IN NCNA AS PARTY SECRETARIAT MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WHEN

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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PAGE FOUR RUMJDH 1332/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WELCOMING JACQUES GRIPPA TO PEKING AUGUST 17.
IT APPEARS THAT JUST AS TAO CHU AND YEH CHIEN-YING
HAVE TAKEN PARTY AND MILITARY FUNCTIONAL POSITIONS
OF LU TING-YI AND LO JUI-CHING, RESPECTIVELY,
LIU NING-YI HAS TAKEN OVER LEGISLATURE FUNCTION
ON SECRETARIAT AS REPLACEMENT FOR PENG CHEN.
FACT THAT LIU REPLACED PENG AS SECRETARY GENERAL
OF NPC IN JANUARY 1965 HEIGHTENS EARLIER IMPRESSION
THAT SECRETARIAT APPOINTMENTS ARE ALONG FUNCTIONAL
LINES.

MORE MILITARY MEN IN CULTURAL JOBS

C. RECENT APPOINTMENTS OF TANG PING-CHU AND HU CHIH,
BOTH DEPUTY CHIEF EDITORS OF LIBERATION ARMY DAILY,
TO BE VICE CHAIRMEN OF ALL-CHINA JOURNALISTS ASSO-
CIATION ADDS TO LIST OF MILITARY MEN NOW IN KEY POSI-
TIONS OF MAJOR CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS, MOST IMPORTANT
OF WHOM ARE ACTING MINISTER OF CULTURE HSIAO WANG-
TUNG AND HIS VICE MINISTER YEN CHIN-CHENG.

9. RED GUARDS ON MARCH

A. DURING PAST SEVERAL DAYS NCNA HAS CARRIED

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 1332/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
ACCOUNTS OF "RED GUARDS" UNITS ROVING PEKING
CHANGING THE NAMES OF STREETS AND STORES,
AND CRITICIZING BOURGEOIS HABITS OF POPULA-
TION. IN ADDITION TO THESE ACTIVITIES, WHICH
BRITISH EMBASSY PEKING DESCRIBES AS "DISORDERLY
AND SOMETIMES VIOLENT", FRENCH, BRITISH AND JAPANESE
CORRESPONDENTS REPORT THAT "RED GUARDS" HAVE GIVEN
MINORITY DEMOCRATIC PARTIES SEVENTY-TWO HOURS TO
DISBAND, HAVE OCCUPIED FEW REMAINING CHRISTIAN
CHURCHES IN PEKING, DEMANDED CESSATION OF INTERESTS
PAYMENTS TO FORMER CAPITALISTS, CRITICIZED FACT THAT
RED LIGHTS MEAN "STOP" RATHER THAN "GO", AND, WILDEST
OF ALL DEMANDED THAT NAME OF CAPITAL CITY BE CHANGED
FROM PEKING TO TUNG FAN HUNG ("EAST IS RED").

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WEEKA
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CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 34

B. ALTHOUGH "RED GUARDS" FIRST IDENTIFIED AND PUBLICIZED IN CHINESE PRESS ON AUGUST 18 RALLY (WEEKA 33) EVIDENCE AVAILABLE INDICATES ORGANIZATION MAY HAVE BEEN IN EXISTENCE SINCE LATE JUNE. FURTHERMORE, DESPITE ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY MOVEMENT AS SPONTANEOUS, IT REASONABLY CLEAR THAT "RED GUARD" ACTIVITIES CENTRALLY PLANNED AND GUIDED.

C. COMMENT: EMERGENCE OF "RED GUARDS" COMPRISES MAJOR NEW DEVELOPMENT IN CULTURAL REVOLUTION. OUR PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT IS THAT "RED GUARD" PHENOMENON APPEARS TO HAVE THREEFOLD PURPOSE: TO HEIGHTEN IDEOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF POPULATION AND MAINTAIN MOMENTUM OF CAMPAIGN; TO GIVE ELEMENTS OF YOUNGER GENERATION REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE THEY HAVE LACKED, AND TO FURNISH SHOCK TROOPS IN STRUGGLE TO CONSOLIDATE LIN PIAO'S POWER.

D. WE CONSIDER IT SIGNIFICANT THAT SPATE OF PUBLICITY ON "RED GUARDS" HAS NOT ONCE MENTIONED YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE (YCL), THE ORGAN OF PARTY THAT ONE WOULD EXPECT TO TAKE LEAD IN MOVEMENT ACTIVATED BY YOUTH. IMPRESSION GIVEN IS THAT YCL, LIKE SOME OTHER ELEMENTS OF STANDARD PARTY STRUCTURE, HAS NOT FULLY RESPONDED TO CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THAT MAOIST ELEMENTS OF TOP LEADERSHIP HAVE DECIDED TO CREATE NEW ORGANIZATION TO CARRY OUT THEIR POLICIES.

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CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 31

8-4-66

MILITARY

1. ARMY DAY 1966

MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS CELEBRATION AUGUST 1 ARMY DAY WERE: 1) SURFACING OF ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF, 2) EMERGENCE OF FIRST EXPLICIT ADMISSION OF RECENT POLICY DISPUTE WITHIN PLA, 3) PUBLICATION OF MAOIST BLUEPRINT FOR SOCIETY CALLING FOR DEGREE OF MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN CIVILIAN

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 808/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
AFFAIRS WHICH FAR EXCEEDS PAST LEVELS.

LO JUI-CHINA IMPLICATED IN RECENT DISPUTE

A. JULY 31 APPEARANCE YANG CHENG-WU AS ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF AT PEKING ARMY DAY BANQUET IS SUREST INDICATION SO FAR OF LO JUI-CHING'S POLITICAL ECLIPSE. APPEARANCE SAME DAY OF LIBERATION ARMY JOURNAL EDITORIAL REVEALING RECENT DISPUTE WITHIN MILITARY IS NO COINCIDENCE, AND WE FEEL, DESIGNED TO IMPLY THAT FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF WAS INVOLVED IN STRUGGLE. APPOINTMENT OF YANG, LONG TIME MILITARY COMMANDER, IN ITSELF THROWS LITTLE LIGHT ON REASONS BEHIND LO'S FALL. NOR DOES

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LIBERATION ARMY JOURNAL EDITORIAL WHICH IMPLIES THAT FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF WAS PART OF ANTI-PARTY CLIQUE OPPOSED TO MAOIST POLICIES IN "GREAT STRUGGLE" WHICH TOOK PLACE "NOT VERY LONG AGO" IN MILITARY CIRCLES. CLIQUE, WHICH ALLEGEDLY WAS A SEGMENT OF LARGER ANTI-PARTY GROUP RECENTLY EXPOSED DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, WAS ACCUSED OF FAILING TO PUT POLITICS FIRST AND INSTEAD STRESSING MILITARY AFFAIRS, TECHNOLOGY AND "PROFESSIONALISM". EDITORIAL ALSO HELD THEM OPPONENTS OF ABSOLUTE PARTY LEADERSHIP, POLITICAL WORK, AND MASS LINE WITHIN MILITARY.

B. IMPLIED CHARGES THAT LO JUI-CHING, FOR YEARS AN APPARENT FAITHFUL MAO FOLLOWER WITH STRONG BACKGROUND IN POLITICAL AND PUBLIC SECURITY WORK, OPPOSED MAO AND HIS POLITICAL POLICIES IN PLA MAKE LITTLE OBVIOUS SENSE. IT POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT LO BEING MADE SCAPEGOAT FOR FAILURE TO QUELL PERSISTENT MILITARY OPPOSITION TO MAOIST POLICIES SINCE 1960. IF THIS IS TRUE, DIRECTOR OF PLA GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT HSIAO HUA, WHO FAILED TO ATTEND SEVERAL RECENT VEY FUNCTIONS INCLUDING THOSE FOR ARMY DAY, MAY ALSO BE IN TROUBLE.

MAO CALLS FOR PLA AND SOCIETY TO BECOME "GREAT SCHOOL" FOR HIS THOUGHT

A. ALTHOUGH OVERT OPPOSITION TO MAOIST MILITARY POLICY MAY HAVE BEEN SILENCED FOR MOMENT, LIKELIHOOD OF ITS CONTINUED EXISTENCE BELOW SURFACE AND ULTIMATE RE-EMERGENCE WAS ENHANCED BY AUGUST 1 PROMULGATION) ↳NEW BLUEPRINT FOR EXPANDED PLA ROLE IN CIVILIAN LIFE. "RECENT INSTRUCTIONS" ALLEGEDLY DRAFTED BY MAO SINCE CULTURAL REVOLUTION BEGAN, AND WHICH APPEARED IN AUGUST 1 PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL, DIRECTED PLA TO BECOME "GREAT SCHOOL" IN WHICH MILITARY MEN SHOULD LEARN POLITICS AND

CULTURE AS WELL AS MILITARY AFFAIRS. IN ADDITION THEY SHOULD RUN FACTORIES, PARTICIPATE IN AGRICULTURE, ENGAGE IN SOCIALIST EDUCATION, CRITICIZE BOURGEOISE IN INTELLECTUAL RECTIFICATION CAMPAIGNS (ALL XSSI* NOT ALL OF THESE ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE ENGAGED IN SIMULTANEOUSLY). IN ALL PERFORMING THESE MYRIAD TASKS, DIRWWLT* BECOME OUXEL* OF VERECILITY FOR OTHER SECTORS OF SOCIETY: PEASANTS, WORKERS AND STUDENTS, WHICH IN TURN SHOULD STUDY MILITARY

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AFFAIRS AS WELL AS EACH OTHERS WORK. GOAL IS FUNCTIONALLY HOMOGENOUS REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY "WHERE PEOPLE TAKE PART IN BOTH INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE, IN MILITARY AS WELL AS CIVILIAN AFFAIRS".

B. THIS "BRILLIANT NEW CONCEPT" FOR MILITARY AND SOCIETY APPEARS ATTEMPT TO IMPLEMENT AS NATIONAL POLICY A NOSTALGIA FOR YENAN DAYS WHEN LIFE WAS SIMPLER AND EVERYONE A JACK OF ALL TRADES, AND REPRESENTS MARKED EXAGGERATION OF PRECISELY THOSE ASPECTS MAOIST POLICY AROUND WHICH STRONGEST OPPOSITION HAS CRYSTALLIZED IN PAST. IN CIVILIAN SOCIETY, CONCEPT IF THOROUGHLY IMPLEMENTED WOULD PROBABLY SET TIMETABLE FOR MODERNIZATION OF CHINA BACK MANY YEARS, CONTRADICTING TREND TOWARDS

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 808/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
INCREASED SPECIALIZATION WHICH IS CHARACTERISTIC OF ADVANCING ECONOMIES. BIG QUESTION MARK, OF COURSE, REMAINS EXTENT LX WHICH THIS SWEEPING CONCEPT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED. WHILE PLA HAS SPARE TIME AND DISCIPLINE TO EXPAND ITS TRADITIONAL SPHERES OF PARTICIPATION IN CIVILIAN SOCIETY, NATIONWIDE FAMILIARIZATION OF WORKERS, PEASANTS, AND STUDENTS WITH MILITARY AFFAIRS AND EACH OTHER'S WORK SEEMS UTOPIAN GOAL (REF HW 743), (CONF).

INTERNAL

2. TOP LEVEL PERSONNEL SHIFTS IN CHICOM CULTURE AND PROPAGANDA

A. NCNA JULY 30 ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HSIAO WANG-TUNG,

CAPACITY OF ACTING MINISTER OF CULTURE, DELIVERED REPORT ON CULTURAL REVOLUTION TO PEKING PHYSICS COLLOQUIUM SUGGESTS BIGGER PLA ROLE IN CULTURE, AND REPRESENTS FINAL NAIL IN POLITICAL COFFIN OF FORMER CULTURE MINISTER AND PARTY PROPAGANDA DIRECTOR LU TING-YI. NEW ACTING MINISTER WANG WAS LONG-TIME POLITICAL COMMISSAR AND COMMANDED NANKING ARMED FORCES BEFORE APPOINTMENT AS VICE MINISTER CULTURE IN APRIL 1965. HIS EXPERIENCE WITH CULTURAL MATTERS APPARENTLY LIMITED TO PERIOD HIS VICE MINISTERSHIP.

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CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 31

B. ANOTHER IMPORTANT PERSONNEL SHIFT INVOLVING FORMER POLITICAL COMMISSAR AND PROVINCIAL PARTY FIGURE WAS REVEALED IN JULY 29 NCNA REPORT OF PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT MEETING DENOUNCING CHOU YANG, WHICH FOR FIRST TIME CITED CHANG PING-HUA AS CCP PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT VICE DIRECTOR. CHANG IS AN ALTERNATE MEMBER OF CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, HAS BEEN FIRST PARTY SECRETARY OF HUNAN SINCE 1959, AND, SINCE 1961, A CLOSELY-CONNECTED SUBORDINATE OF CENTRAL SOUTH PARTY BOSS TAO CHU, THE NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE PROPAGANDA DIRECTOR.

C. COMMENT: APPARANCE OF CHANG AS TAO'S DEPUTY IN PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT SUGGESTS TAO HAS AUTHORITY TO NAME

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 808/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
OWN SUBORDINATES. OBVIOUS THAT PARTY BRINGING IN RELATIVE OUTSIDERS TO REVAMP ITS CULTURAL AND PROPAGANDA APPARATUS. WHILE IN SEVERAL CASES, SUCH AS THAT OF HSIAO, THIS CAN BE INTERPRETED AS SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN PLA INFLUENCE OVER CIVLIAN LIFE, DISTINCTION SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN INFLUENCE AND CONTROL. INCREASED UTILIZATION OF FORMER PLA POLITICAL OFFICERS IN KEY CIVILIAN POSTS BY NO MEANS AUTOMATICALLY PRESUPPOSES ENHANCED DIRECT PLA CONTROL OVER CIVILIAN LIFE. ARMY POLITICAL COMMISSARS AND COMMANDERS ARE SENIOR PARTY FIGURES AND HAVE LONG PLAYED MAJOR ROLE IN CHICOM POLITICS WITHOUT VIOLATING BASIC TENET OF ABSOLUTE PARTY CONTROL. (REF. HK 710) (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. MORE ON CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN INDUSTRY

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CONFIRMING SIGNS THAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION EXTENDS BEYOND CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL AND PROPAGANDA FIELDS TO INDUSTRIAL SECTOR (WEEKA 289, A KNOWLEDGEABLE JAPANESE VISITOR WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM MONTH-LONG MAINLAND TOUR REPORTED NUMEROUS WALL POSTER ATTACKS ON SENIOR PLANT CADRES IN WUHAN, LOYANG, SHANGHAI AND TIENTSIN.

PAGE THREE RUMJDH 808/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
THE POSTERS, WRITTEN BY WORKERS, CONTAINED SPECIFIC CHARGES REGARDING INVIDUAL CADRES' MISDEEDS, WRONG ATTITUDES, ETC. LOWER LEVEL CADRES SUCH AS WORK SHOP FOREMEN APPARENTLY NOT TARGETS. THE OBSERVER KNEW NOTHING ABOUT FATE OF CADRES UNDER ATTACK, AND COULD NOT APPRAISE CAMPAIGN'S EFFECT ON QUALITY OF ENGINEERING AND RESEARCH WORK. HE THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT OVERSTAFFING IN FACTORIES, ESPECIALLY AT ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS, MIGHT PREVENT CULTURAL REVOLUTION FROM AFFECTING OUTPUT VERY MUCH. (SEE WER 31 FOR MORE DETAIL)(CONFIDENTIAL)

EXTERNAL

4. VIETNAM

A. CHICOM ARMY DAY RECEPTION IN HANOI AND DRV CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE RECEIVED TOP BILLING IN CHICOM MEDIA, MATCHED ONLY BY REPORTS OF OCCASION IN ALBANIA. NCNA'S COVERAGE OF GIAP'S SPEECH AT CHICOM EMBASSY RECEPTION WAS MORE EXTENSIVE THAN VNA ITEM. BOTH SOURCES CITED GIAP'S PRAISE OF CHICOM AID AND "EFFORTS TO ASSURE ADEQUATE AND TIMELY TRANSPORTATION OF AID FROM OTHER FRATERNAL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES", BUT ONLY NCNA REPORTED THAT GIAP HAD ACKNOWLEDGED "POWERFUL SUPPORT"

PAGE FOUR RUMJDH 303/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
MANIFESTED IN JULY 3 LIU SHAO-CHI STATEMENT AND WAVE OF MASS RALLIES WHICH ENSUED IN CHINA.

B. MOSCOW VISIT OF U THANT WAS REPORTED BY NCNA IN SIMILAR VEIN TO COVERAGE OF GANDHI AND WILSON VISITS. AS SEEN FROM PEKING, U THANT'S STATEMENT THAT VIETNAM CONFLICT PRESENTED DANGER "OF BIGGER WAR WHICH WILL SPILL OVER FRONTIER" SHOWED THAT HE "PARROTED WASHINGTON'S TUNE AND THREATENED HEROIC

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VIETNAMESE PEOPLE". DURING HIS VISIT, ACCORDING NCNA, SOVIET LEADERS HAD PROVIDED HIM VARIOUS OPPORTUNITIES "TO PEDDLE U.S. SCHEME OF FORCING PEACE TALKS THROUGH BOMBING". (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. CHICOMS "INSULTED" BY JAPANESE REFUSAL OF VISA TO LIU NING YI

A. PEKING'S INITIAL REACTION TO JAPANESE REFUSAL TO PERMIT ENTRY OF LIU NING-YI AS HEAD OF CHICOM DELEGATION TO ANTI-BOMB CONFERENCE (WEEKA 30) CAME IN JULY 28 PEOPLE'S DAILY AND TA KUNG PAO "COMMENTATOR" ARTICLES AND STATEMENT BY SUN PING-HUA, HEAD OF CHICOM LIAO-TAKASAKI TRADE OFFICE IN TOKYO. SUN CHARACTERIZED GOJ ACTION AS "NEW OBSTACLE IN WAY OF DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDSHIP OF TWO PEOPLE", AND DECLARED THAT JAPANESE AUTHORITIES WOULD BEAR "FULL RESPONSIBILITY

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 808/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
FOR ALL ITS SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES". TA KUNG PAO COMMENTATOR TERMED DECISION "GROSS INSULT TO CHINESE PEOPLE" AND PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTATOR ASSERTED THAT VISA REFUSAL WAS "NO FORTUITOUS HAPPENING" IN VIEW OF "GRAND JOINT ANTI-CHINA PERFORMANCE" OF SATO GOVERNMENT DURING RECENT VISITS OF SECRETARY RUSK AND SOVIET FONMIN GROMYKO.

B. ALL OF FOREGOING COMMENT LEFT "SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES" OF GOJ ACTION PURPOSELY VAGUE, AND PEOPLE'S DAILY "OBSERVER" ARTICLE OF JULY 31 ON ALLEGED "U.S.-JAPANESE-SOVIET HOLY ALLIANCE" AGAINST CHINA ADDED NOTHING NEW TO STANDARD VERBAL ATTACKS ON SATO GOVERNMENT. OF INTEREST IN OBSERVER PIECE, HOWEVER, WAS IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF CURRENT JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY LINE ON VIETNAM AND INTRA-BLOC RELATIONS. ACCORDING ORSERVER, "'JOINT ACTION' PROPOSED BY CERTAIN PERSONS AT PRESENT IS NOTHING BUT REFURBISHED VERSION OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY SLOGAN OF 'UNITED ACTION' (WHICH WOULD LEAD TO) WALLOWING IN SAME MIRE...AS SOVIET REVISIONIST LEADING CLIQUE". PHRASE "JOINT ACTION" HAS APPEARED FREQUENTLY IN JCP ORGAN AKAHATA OVER PAST FEW MONTHS, AND WAS ALSO EMBODIED IN JCP-KOREAN WORKERS' PARTY COMMUNIQUE OF LAST MARCH. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 31

6. SINO-DUTCH RELATIONS STILL AT IMPASSE

A. IN RETALIATION FOR DUTCH EXPULSION OF CHICOM CHARGE AT THE HAGUE (WEEKA 29), CPR ON JULY 22 DECLARED DUTCH CHARGE IN PEKING PERSONA NON GRATA BUT PROHIBITED HIS DEPARTURE UNTIL CHINESE WANTED FOR QUESTIONING BY DUTCH POLICE REGARDING DEATH OF FELLOW DELEGATE TO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WERE PERMITTED TO LEAVE NETHERLANDS. TO DATE, DUTCH AUTHORITIES HAVE STOOD FIRM, WITH RESULT THAT CHINESE DELEGATES REMAIN SEQUESTERED IN CHICOM MISSION AT THE HAGUE AND DUTCH CHARGE IN PEKING IS VIRTUAL PRISONER IN HIS OWN HOUSE. ACCORDING TO WESTERN DIPLOMAT RECENTLY ARRIVED FROM PEKING, CHICOMS HAVE STATIONED TWO CARS OUTSIDE DUTCH MISSION; THEORY

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 808/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
PREVALENT IN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLE IS THAT CARS WOULD WHISK CHARGE TO PRISON SHOULD HE ATTEMPT TO LEAVE DIPLOMATIC PROPERTY. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. PAKISTAN MINISTER VISITS PEKING

A. PAKISTANI COMMERCE MINISTER FARUQUE CONCLUDED FOUR-DAY VISIT TO PEKING ON JULY 30. THOUGH ONE APPARENT PURPOSE OF FARUQUE'S TRIP WAS DISCUSSION OF CHICOM OFFER TO PROVIDE 100,000 TONS OF RICE TO PAKISTAN ON BARTER BASIS (WER 30 AND 31), REPORTAGE OF VISIT HAS FAILED TO MENTION SUBJECT. HOWEVER, NCNA DID REPORT THAT HE MET CHOU EN-LAI TWICE AND EXCHANGED SPEECHES WITH CHEN YI AT TWO BANQUETS. IN JULY 28 SPEECH, CHEN REFERRED TO ALLEGED EFFORTS BY U.S., INDIA AND USSR TO "UNDERMINE SINO-PAKISTAN FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION",

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AND CHARGED THAT U.S. AND SOVIETS WERE PLOTTING "JOINT INDIAN-PAKISTAN OPPOSITION TO CHINA (WHICH) IS DETRIMENTAL TO CHINA AND HARMFUL TO PAKISTAN AS WELL". HE VOICED CONFIDENCE THAT THIS SCHEME WOULD NOT SUCCEED, AND PRAISED PAK GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE "UNDER LEADERSHIP OF PRESIDENT AYUB KHAN" FOR UPHOLDING SOVEREIGNTY AND OPPOSING "FOREIGN AGGRESSION". FARUQUE RESPONDED BY AGREEING THAT NO ONE COULD "DRIVE WEDGE" BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND CHINA: HE ASSURED YLSTS THAT PAKISTAN WAS READY TO DEAL WITH "ANY AGGRESSION LAUNCHED AGAINST OUR COUNTRY" AND WOULD REMAIN "STEADFAST ON CHOSEN COURSE, NO MATTER HOW HARD OTHERS MAY TRY TO COMPROMISE OUR NATIONAL HONOR AND DIGNITY".

B. COMMENT: CHEN'S REMARKS ARE MOST FORTHCOMING INDICATIONS THAT 1) CHICOMS CONCERNED OVER WESTWARD DRIFT OF PAK FOREIGN POLICY SINCE TASHKENT, AND 2) THAT THEY WOULD REGARD ANY HEALING OF INDIAN-PAK ANTAGONISMS AS EVIDENCE OF INDIAN-PAK PLOT AGAINST CHINA. TREATMENT OF FARUQUE VISIT, HOWEVER, ALONG WITH ACTUAL AND PROFFERED CHINESE ASSISTANCE APPEAR TO INDICATE THAT PEKING CONTINUING ITS POLICY OF STRINGING ALONG WITH PAKS UNDER AYUB IN EXPECTATION THIS WILL PAY OFF IN LONG RUN. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

8. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: TIT-FOR-TAT

A. PEOPLE'S DAILY "COMMENTATOR" ARTICLE AUGUST 3 RESPONDED TO JULY 28 PRAVDA FEATURE ON SINO-U.S. WARSAW TALKS BY ATTACKING PRAVDA'S ULTERIOR MOTIVES AND "RENEGADE LOGIC", SIMPLY STATING IN DEFENSE THAT UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES NEGOTIATIONS WERE ACCEPTABLE PART OF TIT-FOR-TAT ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE WHILE UNDER OTHERS THEY WERE NOT. COMMENTATOR WENT ON TO CLAIM THAT CHICOMS HAD ALWAYS TAKEN "FIRM MARXIST-LENINIST STAND" AT WARSAW, AND THAT U.S. HAD "FAILED TO GAIN ANYTHING FROM TALKS". IN EFFORT TO REGAIN OFFENSIVE, COMMENTATOR REITERATED THEME THAT SOVIETS HAD PROMOTED VIETNAM PEACE TALKS IN MEETINGS WITH VARIOUS FOREIGN STATESMEN IN MOSCOW AND ABROAD, AND THEN QUOTED RECENT COMMENT OF DRV ARMY PAPER THAT PROPOSING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH U.S. "AMOUNTS TO ENCOURAGEMENT OF U.S. AGGRESSORS TO GO AHEAD".

B. COMMENT: SOVIETS EVIDENTLY TOUCHED SENSITIVE CHINESE NERVE WITH PRAVDA ARTICLE, BUT WE NOTE THAT CHICOMS REFRAINED FROM DISPARAGING USEFULNESS OR DESIRABILITY OF CONTINUED WARSAW MEETINGS IN DEFENDING SELVES. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)
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CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 29

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXTERNAL

1. VIETNAM

2. CHICOM CHARGE EXPELLED FROM NETHERLANDS

3. PEKING SEES NEW NEGRO MILITANCE IN U.S.

INTERNAL

4. RADICAL FORM OF EDUCATION PROPOSED FOR ENGINEERING AND AGRICULTURE

5. PRIMARY FOCUS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION TO BE ON URBAN AREAS

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6. SIGNS OF NORMALCY?

7. REDUCTION OF PRIVATE PLOTS REPORTED AS RESULT OF "FOUR CLEARANCES" IN ONE AREA

EXTERNAL

1. VIETNAM

A. REACTION TO HO SPEECH. PEKING HAS SHOWN ITS SATISFACTION OVER TOUGH DRV STANCE ENUNCIATED IN HO JULY 17 SPEECH BY CARRYING HEAVY VOLUME OF VIETNAM REPORTAGE IN MAINLAND MEDIA, INCLUDING TEXTS OF PARTIAL MOBILIZATION ORDER AND NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE, ACCOUNTS OF PUBLIC MEETINGS IN DRV ENDORSING HO'S APPEAL TO "FIGHT TILL COMPLETE VICTORY", AND EDITORIALS IN PEOPLE'S DAILY, PLA DAILY, AND OTHER PAPERS. INITIAL CHICOM RESPONSE WAS CHOU EN-LAI'S CAREFULLY WORDED STATEMENT TO DRV AMBASSADOR UPON BEING PRESENTED COPY OF HO SPEECH THAT CHINA WOULD "IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERESTS AND DEMANDS OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, CONTINUE TO BE READY AT ANY TIME TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY

PAGE THREE RUMJDH 433/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF GREAT STRUGGLE OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE." FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL MONTHS, CHOU SPOKE OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE "UNDER LEADERSHIP OF HO CHI MINH", AND DESPITE WARNING THAT "IMPERIALISTS, REACTIONARIES AND MODERN REVISIONISTS HAVE RESORTED TO VARIOUS TRICKS TO MALIGN AND POISON RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO PEOPLES", HE DECLARED THAT HISTORY HAD MADE IT INEVITABLE THAT "TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD UNITE, FIGHT AND WIN TOGETHER".

B. PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL OF JULY 18 VOICED "STAUNCHEST SUPPORT" FOR DRV AND RECAPITULATED MAJOR CHICOM STATEMENTS ON VIETNAM SINCE BEGINNING OF AIR RAIDS ON HANOI-HAIPHONG INSTALLATIONS. IN ADDITION, IT SAID "VAST EXPANSE OF OUR COUNTRY IS REAR AREA FOR VIETNAMESE PEOPLE". THIS PHRASE WAS ALSO USED IN JULY 19 EDITORIALS OF LIBERATION ARMY DAILY AND CHINA YOUTH NEWS.

C. COMMENT: CHICOM REFERENCE TO HISTORICAL "INEVITABILITY" OF SINO-VIETNAMESE UNITY SUGGESTS THAT NOT ALL PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF PRESENT DAY BETWEEN PEKING AND HANOI YET RESOLVED.

0352

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

HOWEVER, CHINESE ATTITUDE TOWARDS DRV HAS BECOME PERCEPTIBLY WARMER WITH STIFFENING OF HANOI'S PUBLIC STANCE ON PEACEFUL

PAGE FOUR RUMJDH 433/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
SETTLEMENT OF WAR. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT RECALL PREVIOUS USE BY CHINESE OF TERM "REAR AREA" TO DESCRIBE CHINESE ROLE, IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO SIGNIFY ANY NEW OR INCREASED COMMITMENT ON PEKING'S PART. IN FACT, PHRASE COULD EVEN BE CONSTRUED AS LIMITING CHINESE ROLE, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT THINK THAT WAS THE INTENT. (CONGENTIEL 355)

B. PEOPLE'S DAILY VS. TASS. CHEN YI'S CHARGE IN JULY 10 SPEECH THAT USSR HAD BEEN INFORMED IN ADVANCE OF U.S. OIL STORAGE RAIDS IN NORTH VIETNAM INITIATED SPATE OF CHARGES AND COUNTER-CHARGES IN MOSCOW AND PEKING WHICH CULMINATED IN TASS "AUTHORIZED STATEMENT" PORTRAYING CHEN AS "SERVANT OF IMPERIALISM" FOR SPREADING SUCH FALSE RUMOR AND REPLY BY PEOPLE'S DAILY "COMMENTATOR" ON JULY 19 INSISTING THAT "ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR" OF TASS MERELY CONFIRMED THAT CHEN HAD HIT SOVIET LEADERS ON ACHILLES HEEL. THEME OF ALL CHICOM ATTACKS WAS THAT SOVIETS WERE ACTING AS "ACCOMPLICES IN U.S. PLOT TO FORCE PEACE TALKS THROUGH BOMBING." (CONFIDENTIAL)

C. NO COMMENT ON U.S. PRISONERS. PEKING TO DATE HAS MAINTAINED COMPLETE SILENCE ON ISSUE OF U.S. PRISONERS HELD BY DRV. SHOULD DRV DECIDE ON TRIAL, WE HAVE NO DOUBT PEKING WOULD

PAGE FIVE RUMJDH 433/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WELCOME AND SUPPORT THE DECISION. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS REGIME DOES NOT WISH COMMIT ITSELF ON SUBJECT IN ADVANCE DRV DECISION. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. CHICOM CHARGE EXPELLED FROM NETHERLANDS

A. LI EN-CHIU, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF CHICOM MISSION IN THE HAGUE FOR PAST THREE YEARS, WAS GIVEN 24 HOURS TO LEAVE COUNTRY AS RESULT INCIDENT INVOLVING INJURED CHICOM DELEGATE TO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. INJURED MAN, WHO CONCEIVABLY SOUGHT TO DEFECT, DIED AFTER BEING SNATCHED BY CHICOM OFFICIALS FROM DUTCH MEDICAL FACILITY WHERE DOCTOR HAD INDICATED THAT HE REQUIRED HOSPITALIZATION. NCNA JULY 20 REPORTED LI'S ARRIVAL IN PEKING WHERE HE GREETED BY THREE VICE-MINISTERS AND GIRLS BEARING BOUQUETS. NCNA ALSO

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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REPORTED THAT CHICOM FONMIN OFFICIAL HAD PROTESTED PREVIOUS DAY TO DUTCH CHARGE OVER "OUTRAGEOUS, UNJUSTIFIABLE" ACTION OF HIS GOVERNMENT. CHICOM OFFICIAL ALLEGED INCIDENT WAS "DELIBERATELY MANUFACTURED BY NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT TO UNDERMINE RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND NETHERLANDS IN ACTIVE PURSUANCE OF U.S. IMPERIALISTS' ANTI-CHINA ACTIVITIES" AND PLACED "FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES" ON DUTCH GOVERNMENT.

B. COMMENT: NO INDICATION YET WHETHER CHINESE WILL RETALIATE FOR EXPULSION THEIR CHARGE. SINO-DUTCH RELATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN CORDIAL (AND AT PEKING'S INSISTENCE, RELATIONS HAVE BEEN RESTRICTED TO CHARGE LEVEL), BUT PEKING, WITH FRESH MEMORIES OF AFRICAN NATIONS OUSTING THEIR EMBASSIES, MAY BE LOATH TO PUSH INCIDENT TO POINT WHERE RELATIONS JEOPARDIZED. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. PEKING SEES NEW NEGRO MILITANCE IN U.S.

A. NCNA CARRIED REPORTS CULLED FROM WESTERN PRESS NEARLY EVERY DAY LAST WEEK ON RACIAL TENSIONS IN U.S. CITIES. JULY 16 ARTICLE BY NCNA "CORRESPONDENT" INTRODUCED WIDE-RANGING SURVEY OF RACIAL INCIDENTS WITH ASSERTION THAT "AMERICAN NEGROES' STRUGGLE AGAINST RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, OPPRESSION AND EXPLOITATION IS BREAKING THROUGH DOCTRINE OF NON-VIOLENCE

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 433/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
IMPOSED BY THEIR RIGHT-WING LEADERS"... ARTICLE WENT ON TO DESCRIBE "WIDE RESPONSE OF NEGRO MASSES" TO SLOGAN OF "BLACK POWER", AND PREDICTED THAT "NEGROES' ARMED STRUGGLE...WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME CONFLAGRATION RAGING IN WHOLE COUNTRY".

B. COMMENT: CHICOMS REACTED IN SIMILAR FASHION TO THE RACIAL INCIDENTS OF SUMMER, 1965. (UNCLASSIFIED)

INTERNAL

4. RADICAL FORM OF EDUCATION PROPOSED FOR ENGINEERING AND AGRICULTURE

A. LETTERS PUBLISHED IN NATIONAL MEDIA JULY 15 FROM STUDENTS OF PEKING AGRICULTURE UNIVERSITY AND ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING DEPT OF TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY ASSERTED THAT PROPOSALS MADE BY CHINA PEOPLE'S UNIVERSITY STUDENTS (WEEKA 28)

0354

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

FOR REFORM LIBERAL ARTS CURRICULUM WERE EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO AGRICULTURE AND ENGINEERING. IN ADDITION TO ECHOING ALL PROPOSALS MADE BY LIVERAL ARTS STUDENTS, LETTERS FROM AGRICULTURE AND ENGINEERING STUDENTS PRESENTED EVEN MORE RADICAL SUGGESTIONS OF THEIR OWN, INCLUDING TOTAL RE-ORGANIZATION POST GRADUATE STUDY SYSTEM, ABOLITION ALL FACULTY TITLES, AND DRASTIC REVAMPING OF CURRICULUM IN FAVOR PRACTICAL SUBJECTS.

B. COMMENT: WITH WIDE PUBLICITY NEW LETTERS, REGIME APPARENTLY SERVING NOTICE THAT SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL SPHERE WILL NOT, AS HAS BARN THE CASE UP UNTIL NOW, BE

EXEMPTED FROM MAOIST EDUCATIONAL EXPERIMENTATION.

C. WHILE REQUEST FOR SHORTER MORE PRACTICAL CURRICULUM COULD RESULT IN BENEFICIAL INCREASE OF SUPPLY OF TRAINED PERSONNEL TO BASIC LEVEL (IF REDUCTION IN QUALITY OF GRADUATES NOT TOO GREAT), OTHER PROPOSALS IF IMPLEMENTED LIKELY TO HAVE DISASTROUS EFFECT ON CHINA'S LONG-RUN SCIENTIFIC CAPABILITIES. OVER SHORT-RUN FACULTY MORALE AND STUDENT PERFORMANCE LIKELY TO DETERIORATE MARKEDLY.

D. ALTHOUGH NONE OF ABOVE PROPOSALS AS YET IMPLEMENTED, LETTER WRITING CAMPAIGN TYPICAL OF PAST CHICOM EFFORTS TO GENERATE IMPRESSION OF SPONTANEOUS AGITATION FOR REFORM FROM MASSES. IF PATTERN RUNS TRUE TO FORM, REGIME LIKELY TO ISSUE ANNOUNCEMENT IN NEAR FUTURE THAT AT LEAST SOME OF REFORMS HAVE BEEN ADOPTED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH "POPULAR DEMAND". (CONFIDENTIAL HK NO. 376)

5. PRIMARY FOCUS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION TO BE ON URBAN AREAS

A. ON JULY 14, ANHWEI FIRST SECRETARY LI PAO-HUA (WHO ALSO EAST CHINA BUREAU THIRD SECRETARY), IN LENGTHY AND FOR MOST PART STANDARD EXPLANATION OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION (RADIO HOFEI, JULY 13), TOLD ACTIVISTS MEETING IN ANHWEI THAT "KEY POINTS

OF CAMPAIGN" SHOULD BE "HABITUAL PLACES OF BOURGEOIS INTELLECTUALS", I.E. THE LARGER TOWNS "WHERE PROVINCIAL,

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

SPECIAL DISTRICT, AND MUNICIPAL CCP COMMITTEE ORGANS ARE LOCATED". ALL CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL, JOURNALISTIC, PUBLISHING, AND ACADEMIC UNITS IN THESE CITIES ARE TO UNDERGO THOROUGH RECTIFICATION, LI CONTINUED. INSTITUTES OF HIGHER LEARNING AND SENIOR MIDDLE SCHOOLS ARE TO CANCEL SUMMER VACATION BECAUSE OF CAMPAIGN, AND EVEN PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS ARE TO "UNDERGO COLLECTIVE TRAINING" DURING HOLIDAYS. ALREADY, WORK TEAMS CONSISTING OF LARGE NUMBERS OF CADRES FROM VARIOUS PARTY COMMITTEES AND PLA HAVE BEEN SENT TO RECTIFY PROBLEM CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL UNITS, HE SAID.

B. LI WENT ON TO INTIMATE, HOWEVER, THAT LESS INTENSE AND IMMEDIATE TREATMENT WAS IN STORE FOR UNITS IN RURAL AREAS AND SMALLER TOWNS FROM COUNTY SEATS ON DOWN. IN THESE AREAS CULTURAL REVOLUTION TO BE COMBINED WITH SOCIALIST EDUCATION CAMPAIGN (I.E. "FOUR CLEARANCES") AND CARRIED OUT "A BIT AT A TIME", HE SAID.

C. DURING DISCUSSION CAMPAIGN TECHNIQUES LI INFERRED THAT

CONFUSION, OPPOSITION, AND VIOLENCE HAD ATTENDED CAMPAIGN SO FAR, AND THAT SOME STRUGGLE MEETINGS IN ANHWEI HAD BACKFIRED WITH PARTICIPANTS RALLYING TO SIDE OF THOSE CRITICIZED BECAUSE CRITICS' CASE WAS ILL PREPARED (AS HAS APPARENTLY HAPPENED IN A NUMBER OF OTHER UNIVERSITIES).

D. COMMENT: ANHWEI INSTRUCTIONS HAVE RING OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE GENERAL DIRECTIVE AND CONFIRM PREVIOUS INDICATIONS THAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION PRIMARILY AN URBAN CAMPAIGN. IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH "FOUR CLEARANCES" IN RURAL AREAS AND SMALL TOWNS. IN ADDITION TO ORIGINAL ANTI-CORRUPTION ROLE, FOUR CLEARANCES HAS DURING PAST YEAR BECOME OMNIBUS VEHICLE FOR ALL RURAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY FROM MAO STUDY TO MEDICAL TEAMS. COORDINATION OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION WITH "FOUR CLEARANCES" IS EVIDENCE THAT REGIME STILL CONSIDERS LATTER KEY BASIC-LEVEL CAMPAIGN IN COUNTRYSIDE, AND RECOGNIZES CULTURAL REVOLUTION FAR LESS APPLICABLE TO ESSENTIALLY UNCULTURED PEASANTRY. (CONFIDENTIAL.)

0356

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

-7- HONGKONG 433, JULY 21

6. SIGNS OF NORMALCY?

A. DESPITE RADICAL AND JARRING NOTES SOUNDED ABOVE, PAST WEEK BORE SOME RESEMBLANCES TO CHICOM INTERNAL SCENE PRIOR TO CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

B. MAO BACK IN SWIM. JULY 17 NCNA DESPATCH AND PHOTOGRAPH OF MAO RECEIVING AFRO-ASIAN WRITERS RECALLED DAYS BEFORE HIS LONG ABSENCE WHEN EVERY VISITING DELEGATION OF ANY IMPORTANCE COULD EXPECT BRIEF AUDIENCE WITH CHAIRMAN. FURTHER REPORTS (PASSED BY JAPANESE CONSULATE HERE) FROM JAPANESE DELEGATES THAT ON JULY 18 MAO HAD PARTICIPATED PART WAY IN MASS SWIM ACROSS YANGTZE RIVER AT WUHAN (RECEPTION OF AFRO-ASIAN WRITERS ALSO TOOK PLACE IN WUHAN AS DID LAST

PAGE TWO RUMJDH 433/3 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WEEK'S AUDIENCE WITH NEPALI CROWN PRINCE) WERE EVIDENCE OF CHAIRMAN'S RELATIVE GOOD HEALTH AND RETURN TO MORE NORMAL PUBLIC ACTIVITIES.

C. NEW PLA HERO. ANOTHER FAMILIAR NOTE WAS CANONIZATION BEGINNING JULY 13 OF NEW PLA HERO IN NATIONWIDE PUBLICITY AND EMULATION DIRECTIVES FROM GOVERNMENT, PARTY, AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES. STORY OF ARTILLERY MAN LIU YING-CHUN WHOSE MAO-INSPIRED SELF-SACRIFICE IN HORSECART ACCIDENT SAVED SEVERAL CHILDREN ON MARCH 15TH IN SHENYANG, FOLLOWED STANDARD PATTERN. ONLY NOTE OF INTEREST IN CAMPAIGN WAS PUBLICATION OF QUOTE BY LIU SHAO-CHI ON FRONT PAGE OF JULY 14 LIBERATION ARMY JOURNAL URGING ALL PARTY MEMBERS TO STUDY, PROPAGATE AND APPLY MAO TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT. APPEARANCE OF LIU QUOTE IN LIBERATION ARMY JOURNAL WAS TREATED AS SEPARATE NEWS ITEM IN SHENSI, YUNNAN, AND KANSU PROVINCIAL BROADCASTS, POSSIBLY INDICATING THAT THIS SIGN OF HARMONY BETWEEN PLA AND LIU SHAO-CHI WAS CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT WITHIN CHINA. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. REDUCTION OF PRIVATE PLOTS REPORTED AS RESULT OF "FOUR CLEARANCES IN ONE AREA

A. KWANGTUNG COMMUNE BRIGADE CADRE (SEE WEEKA 27) REPORTS

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

THAT ONE RESULT "FOUR CLEARANCES" CAMPAIGN IN TANSHUI COMMUNE WAS CONFISCATION PRIVATELY RECLAIMED LAND AND PLANNED REDUCTION IN SIZE OF PRIVATE PLOTS FROM .10 MOU TO .02 PER FAMILY MEMBER BY END 1966. (FULLER ACCOUNT IN WER 29)

B. COMMENT: REPORT CONFIRMS AND REFINES TESTIMONY FROM EARLIER TANSHUI COMMUNE REFUGEE WHICH STATED ALL PRIVATE LAND CONFISCATED SINCE BEGINNING 1965 (WEEKA 43, 1965). AT THAT TIME WE CONJECTURED THAT CONFISCATION MIGHT BE PUNITIVE MEASURE RESTRICTED TO PARTICULARLY "ROTTEN"COMMUNE. HOWEVER, RECENT LETTER FROM SWATOW (FIB 10129) REPORTING THAT ALL PRIVATE LAND WILL HAVE TO BE RETURNED TO COLLECTIVE AS SOON AS SOCIALIST EDUCATION CAMPAIGN BEGINS AS WELL AS EARLIER REPORT OF ABOLITION PRIVATE PLOTS IN SHANTUNG (WEEKA 20) SUGGESTS THAT PHENOMENON MAY BE MORE WIDESPREAD. (CONFIDENTIAL)

GP-3.

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SECRET

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HONG KONG 257 (JUL 28)

POUCHED ALSO TO BANGKOK BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST CANBERRA DAR-ESSALAAM DJAKARTA KARACHI KATHMANDU KUALALUMPUR LONDON MANILA MOSCOW MUNICH NEWDELHI PRAGUE RANGOON ROME SAIGON SEOUL SOFIA SINGAPORE TAIPEI TOKYO VIENTIANE CINCPAC FOR POLAD, COMNAVPHIL, TAIWANDEFCOM, 13AF MANILA

JULY 14:

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 28

INTERNAL

1. THE LEADERSHIP.

CHANGES IDENTIFIED

A. NCNA ACCOUNT OF RECENT PARTY AND GOVERNMENT TURNOUT IN WHICH SEVERAL MAJOR FIGURES IDENTIFIED IN NEW POSITIONS CONSTITUTED FIRST POSITIVE EVIDENCE THAT PROPAGANDA CHIEF LU TING-YI AND POSSIBLY ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF LO JUI-CHING INVOLVED IN PURGE, AND INDICATED RISE OF TAO CHU IN THE CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS. REPORT OF JULY 9 AFRO-ASIAN WRITERS RECEPTION ATTENDED BY ENTIRE TOP LEADERSHIP WITH EXCEPTIONS OF MAO AND LIN PIAO (AND REGIONAL LEADERS LI CHING-CHUAN AND ULANFU) LISTED CENTRAL SOUTH REGIONAL BUREAU FIRST SECRETARY TAO CHU AS CENTRAL COMMITTEE PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR, POST HELD BY LU TING-YI SINCE 1945 (EXCEPT FOR BRIEF PERIOD 1953-54). TAO ALSO IDENTIFIED AS MEMBER PARTY SECRETARIAT IN WHICH BODY HE PROBABLY ALSO REPLACES LU. LU THUS BECAME SECOND MAJOR CULTURAL REVOLUTION PURGE TARGET AFTER FORMER PEKING FIRST SECRETARY PENG CHEN (SEE BELOW).

B. EVIDENCE ON LO JUI-CHING'S DOWNFALL LESS CONCLUSIVE. OTHER MAJOR PROMOTION ALLUDED TO IN COVERAGE OF RECEPTION

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

WAS CITATION OF MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE MEMBER AND FORMER MARSHAL YEH CHIEN-YING AS MEMBER PARTY SECRETARIAT, A POSSIBLE INDICATION THAT HE HAS TAKEN SECRETARIAT POSITION AND PERHAPS EVEN MILITARY FUNCTION OF LONG ABSENT PLA CHIEF OF STAFF LO JUI-CHING.

C. IN ADDITION, CHEN PO-TA, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF RED FLAG AND LONG KNOWN AS MAJOR IDEOLOGICAL AIDE TO MAO, WAS IDENTIFIED AS LEADER OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE GROUP IN CHARGE OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION (NO OTHER PERSONS NAMED), EVIDENCE THAT CHEN EVEN CLOSER TO CENTER OF POWER THAN HIS STATUS AS ALTERNATE MEMBER OF POLITBURO SUGGESTS.

D. COMMENT: LU TING-YI'S REMOVAL NOT SURPRISING IN VIEW HIS ABSENCE FROM PUBLIC VIEW DURING THE ENTIRE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. PARTY PROPAGANDA APPARATUS HAS BEEN FOCUS OF PURGE AND EVEN THOUGH CHOU YANG FINGERED AS RINGLEADER, LU PRESUMABLY HAD TO BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR SHORTCOMINGS IN HIS BAILIWICK. HIS REPLACEMENT, TAO CHU, IS ADMIRABLY SUITED FOR TOP PROPAGANDA JOB, HAVING LONG SET PROPAGANDA TONE FOR KEY CENTRAL-SOUTH REGION AND OFTEN REST OF NATION. WHETHER CHOU WILL RELINQUISH HIS CENTRAL SOUTH POST IS UNCLEAR. TIME AND DISTANCE WILL MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO HOLD DOWN CENTRAL PARTY POST AND REGIONAL BUREAU POSITION CONCURRENTLY, EXCEPT IN PURELY TITULAR SENSE. (HK 169, CONFIDENTIAL)

MAO APPEARS AGAIN

A. APPEARING IN PUBLIC FOR ONLY SECOND TIME SINCE LATE NOVEMBER, MAO, ACCORDING NCNA, MET AND HAD "FRIENDLY CHAT" WITH NEPALI CROWN PRINCE BIRENDA AND MEMBERS HIS ENTOURAGE. ALSO PRESENT WERE PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI AND VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HAN NIEN-LUNG. FOLLOWING USUAL PRACTICE, NCNA JULY 12 REPORT OF MEETING NEGLECTED MENTION PLACE OR DATE. JUDGING FROM CHOU EN-LAI'S MOVEMENTS, AUDIENCE COULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE ON JULY 11 IN SHANGHAI OR HANGCHOW, OR, POSSIBLY, ON JULY 6, 7, OR 8 AT LUSHAN. MEETING, OF WHICH NO FURTHER DETAILS GIVEN, APPARENTLY LASTED 45 MINUTES.

B. COMMENT: WHILE LOCATION OF MEETING A MYSTERY IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT MAO STILL OUT OF PEKING. WHATEVER CHAIRMAN'S CURRENT ROLE AND INFLUENCE, THEY STILL BEING EXERCIZED AT LONG DISTANCE FROM CAPITAL. (HK 211, SECRET)

PENG CHEN CRITICIZED AT BASIC LEVEL

A. KWANGTUNG COMMUNE BRIGADE LEADER WHO SKIPPED ACROSS BORDER IN JUNE WHILE ATTENDING CADRE CONFERENCE IN SHUMCHUN REPORTED THAT SPEAKER AT CONFERENCE HAD CRITICIZED PENG CHEN BY NAME WHILE EXPLAINING CULTURAL REVOLUTION. SPEAKER MAINTAINED CULTURAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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REVOLUTION HAD BEEN NECESSARY AS SMALL GROUP OF HIGH RANKING CADRES, INCLUDING PENG CHEN, HAD BEEN EXPLOITING COMMUNIST PARTY FOR MANY YEARS TO ACHIEVE HIGH POSITIONS. FORGETTING THEIR CLASS ORIGIN, THEY HAD TURNED AGAINST PARTY BY SELFISHLY PURSUING STILL HIGHER POSITIONS (EMPHASIS ADDED) AND THUS HAD ADVANCED ON ROAD TO CAPITALISM, CONFERENCE SPEAKER MAINTAINED. (OIR 5184/66)

B. COMMENT: WHILE THIS CRYPTIC DESCRIPTION PENG'S CRIME MAY BE ATTEMPT TO STRENGTHEN RATIONALIZATION FOR HIS REMOVAL, REFERENCE TO PURSUIT OF HIGHER OFFICE IS INTRIGUING. CONTENTS OF EXPLANATION ASIDE, CAMPAIGN AGAINST PENG CHEN NOW APPARENTLY ENTERING FINAL STAGE; I.E., CONFIDENTIAL CRITICISM BY NAME PRESENTED TO SELECTED IN-GROUP AUDIENCES. SAME THING HAPPENED TO PENG TE-HUAI IN 1959, BUT AS FAR AS WE KNOW, DID NOT PENETRATE TO COMMUNE LEVEL. (SECRET)

2. MORE EVIDENCE OF RADICALISM IN CHICOM EDUCATIONAL POLICY

A. LETTER FROM UNIVERSITY STUDENTS PROPOSING TWO YEAR CUT IN LIBERAL ARTS CURRICULUM WHICH APPEARED ON FRONT PAGE JULY 12 PEOPLE'S DAILY AND RECENT KWANGTUNG PROVINCE DIRECTIVE (BROADCAST LOCALLY JULY 7) STIPULATING REFORM OF SENIOR MIDDLE SCHOOL ENTRANCE REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED FURTHER EVIDENCE OF CURRENT RADICAL THINKING IN CHICOM EDUCATIONAL POLICY.

B. IN BRIEF, UNIVERSITY STUDENTS SUGGESTED THAT: 1) ALL LIBERAL ARTS STUDENTS BE GRADUATED TWO YEARS AHEAD OF SCHEDULE AND ASSIGNED "INDEFINITELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY" TO WORK AMONG PEASANTS, WORKERS AND SOLDIERS; 2) LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGES IN FUTURE SHOULD PROVIDE FLEXIBLE RANGE OF 1, 2 AND 3 YEAR COURSES WHICH WOULD INCLUDE PRODUCTIVE LABOR AND POLITICAL AND MILITARY TRAINING; 3) GRADUATION FROM MIDDLE SCHOOL BE DROPPED AS PREREQUISITE FOR COLLEGE ENTRY; 4) "DEMOCRATIC" TEACHING METHODS BE ADOPTED; 5) CLASS STRUGGLE BE MADE PRINCIPAL SUBJECT IN LIBERAL ARTS COURSE WITH MAO'S WORKS AS TEXT.

C. WHILE THERE NO INDICATIONS SUCH FAR-OUT SUGGESTIONS HAVE BEEN APPROVED OR IMPLEMENTED AT NATIONAL LEVEL, A KWANGTUNG BROADCAST IS EVIDENCE THAT AT LEAST ONE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IS BEGINNING TO TINKER WITH NEW IDEAS ALONG THESE LINES. RADIO CANTON REPORTS (JULY 7, 2245 GMT) THAT KWANGTUNG PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND PARTY COMMITTEE HAVE APPROVED PROVINCIAL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT PROPOSAL FOR REFORM OF SENIOR MIDDLE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT CRITERIA ALONG LINES SUGGESTED IN JUNE 13 ANNOUNCEMENT OF UNIVERSITY ENROLLMENT FREEZE. PROPOSAL STIPULATED THAT APPLICANTS WHO HAD NOT GRADUATED DIRECTLY FROM JUNIOR MIDDLE SCHOOL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR SENIOR MIDDLE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT. AMONG THOSE ELIGIBLE WILL BE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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EDUCATED YOUTHS WHO HAVE GONE TO WORK IN COUNTRYSIDE, WHICH SUGGESTS THAT PROSPECT OF GETTING BACK TO SCHOOL WILL BE USED AS INDUCEMENT TO WILLING DEPARTURE AND ZEALOUS PERFORMANCE IN COMMUNES FOR URBAN YOUTHS ASKED TO LEAVE CITY.

D. WHETHER IMPLEMENTED OR NOT, ABOVE PROPOSALS ARE SURE SIGN THAT REGIME THINKING ALONG RADICAL, IDENTIFIABLY MAOIST LINES IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY. CURRENT ACCELERATING LEFTWARD TREND IN CHICOM EDUCATION CALLS TO MIND EARLIER CAS REPORT OF MAO TELLING FOREIGN VISITORS OF HIS DESIRE TO EFFECT EDUCATIONAL REFORM, WHILE BEMOANING FACT THAT "MY MINISTERS WON'T LET ME". SINCE SOME OF RECALCITRANT OFFICIALS TO WHOM MAO REFERRED MAY HAVE BEEN REMOVED, OR THEIR AUTHORITY WEAKENED, WAY APPEARS CLEAR FOR "REVOLUTIONARY" EXPERIMENTS IN CHICOM EDUCATION. (HK 229, CONFIDENTIAL)

3. CULTURAL REVOLUTION HITS INDUSTRY

A. ON JULY 9 RADIO CANTON ANNOUNCED THAT "GREAT PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION HAS UNFOLDED TO GREAT DEPTH" IN FACTORIES OF MAOMING CITY, CLAIMING THAT, IN ALL, OVER 93 PER CENT OF MAOMING WORKERS TAKING PART IN CAMPAIGN. BROADCAST STATED THAT, IN FIRST 26 DAYS OF JUNE, 42,000 LARGE CHARACTER POSTERS HAD APPEARED CRITICIZING "BOURGEOIS TECHNICAL AUTHORITIES" AND "ANTI-PARTY, ANTI-SOCIALIST ELEMENTS" AMONG LOCAL FACTORY MANAGEMENT.

B. COMMENT: UP UNTIL NOW FOCUS OF MOST DENUNCIATION AT PEASANT AND WORKER'S MEETINGS THROUGHOUT PROVINCES HAS BEEN ON FIGURES FROM PROPAGANDA, CULTURAL, AND EDUCATIONAL FIELDS. WHILE BRITISH SOURCES HAVE REPORTED CRITICISM CAMPAIGNS AGAINST BOURGEOIS FACTORY MANAGERS IN SHANGHAI (RESULTING IN SOME SUICIDES), CANTON BROADCAST IS FIRST PUBLIC INDICATION THAT PURGE MAY NOW EXTEND TO TECHNICAL AND INDUSTRIAL SECTOR. SUCH EXTENSION WOULD NOT BE SURPRISE IN VIEW OF ATTACKS IN EARLY CULTURAL REVOLUTION EDITORIALS ON SPECIALISTS AND CADRES WHO PLACED TECHNICAL MATTERS AHEAD OF POLITICS AND ON POLITICAL DEGENERATES WHO HAD WORMED WAY INTO POSITIONS OF POWER AND INFLUENCE IN ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL, AS WELL AS CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL SPHERES.

4. CURTAILMENT OF FOREIGN TRAVEL TO CHINA MAY BE DUE TO CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

A. IN RESPONSE TO QUERIES OVER WHEN HONG KONG NEWSPAPERMEN WOULD NEXT BE PERMITTED TO VISIT MAINLAND, LOCAL NCNA OFFICIAL RESPONDED THAT "BECAUSE OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION" PRESS WOULD NOT BE INVITED TO CHINA UNTIL NOVEMBER CELEBRATION SUN HOT-SEN'S 100TH BIRTHDAY. IN ADDITION TO RESTRICTING NEWSMEN, REPORTS FROM TRAVEL AGENCIES INDICATE CHICOM INTENTION TO KEEP NUMBER OF FOREIGN TOURISTS TO MINIMUM DURING NEXT FEW MONTHS, ALTHOUGH SMALL NUMBERS STILL CONTINUE TO GO.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

-5- HONG KONG 257, JULY 14

B. COMMENT: STATEMENT OF NCNA OFFICIAL IS, TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, FIRST ADMISSION BY CHICOM OFFICIAL THAT "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" HAS MADE IT NECESSARY REDUCE FOREIGN TRAVEL. IT SEEMS REASONABLE ASSUME CHICOMS DON'T WANT BE BOTHERED WITH INQUIRING FOREIGNERS, ESPECIALLY NEWSMEN, WHILE PERVASIVE PURGE BEING CARRIED OUT, PARTICULARLY IF PERSONS NORMALLY IN CONTACT WITH FOREIGN VISITORS ARE IMPLICATED. HOWEVER, PLANS TO INVITE FOREIGN PRESS IN NOVEMBER, PRESUMABLY IN MANNER SIMILAR TO LAST SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER MASS INVITATION ATTEND LU-TSUNG-JEN PRESS CONFERENCE, SUGGESTS THAT CHICOMS MAY EXPECT CONFUSION ATTENDANT CULTURAL REVOLUTION TO BE OVER BY THEN. (HK 129 AND 201, CONFIDENTIAL)

EXTERNAL

5. VIETNAM CONTINUES DRAW HEAVY REGIME COMMENT

A. VIETNAM SITUATION WAS MAJOR TOPIC OF SEVERAL SPEECHES BY CHICOM LEADERS, WITH COMMENT REMAINING WITHIN BOUNDS SET BY JULY 3 CPR GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON HANOI-HAIPHONG OIL DEPOT RAIDS. "MASS RALLIES" ON VIETNAM WERE HELD IN NUMBER OF CITIES THROUGHOUT CHINA, BUT TO DATE HAVE NOT BEGUN TO MATCH SIZE OR LEVEL OF INTENSITY GENERATED DURING MASS CAMPAIGNS IN SUPPORT OF VIETNAM IN 1964 AND EARLY 1965.

B. BESIDES EXPRESSING CHICOM DETERMINATION TO SUPPORT VIETNAMESE PEOPLE "WHATEVER THE RISK, WHATEVER THE COST" (CHOU EN-LAI AT AFRO-ASIAN WRITERS BANQUET, JULY 9) AND DECLARING THAT SINCE U.S. HAD "BROKEN BOUNDS IN ITS WAR OF AGGRESSION...IT CANNOT EXPECT ALLCOUNTRIES AND PEOPLES THAT OPPOSE AGGRESSION TO BE RESTRICTED IN ANY WAY ANY LONGER IN THEIR ACTIONS" (CHEN YI AT JULY 10 RALLY), SPEAKERS AND PRESS COMMENT WERE QUICK TO ATTACK PROPOSALS FOR RECONVENING GENEVA CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM. NCNA'S CORRESPONDENT REVIEWED PROPOSALS IN JULY 11 ARTICLE AND CONCLUDED THAT GENEVA AGREEMENTS "HAVE LONG BEEN TORN TO SHREDS BY WAR ACTIONS OF JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION; THEY NO LONGER EXIST". CHOU ON JULY 9 AND CHEN YI AT A NORTH KOREAN BANQUET JULY 12 WERE SLIGHTLY LESS CATEGORICAL, BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT RECONVENING GENEVA CONFERENCE WAS "OUT OF THE QUESTION" UNLESS U.S. TROOPS FIRST WITHDRAWN FROM VIETNAM. LOCAL HONG KONG COMMUNIST PAPER WEN WEI PO JULY 14 EDITORIALIZED ALONG SAME LINES, CALLING CONFERENCE PROPOSAL "A NEW MUNICH PLOT".

C. VIRTUALLY ALL PEKING COMMENT ON VIETNAM SINCE OIL DEPOT BOMBING HAS INCLUDED STRONG ATTACKS ON SOVIET "REVISIONISTS" FOR ALLEGEDLY ACTING AS U.S. "ACCOMPLICES" IN SCHEME TO "FORCE PEACE TALKS THROUGH BOMBING". HOWEVER, TO DATE REGIME HAS IGNORED WARSAW PACT NATIONS' OFFER OF "VOLUNTEERS" FOR VIETNAM. AT PEKING RALLY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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CHEN YI ACCUSED SOVIET "LEADING CLIQUE" OF DEPLOYING TROOPS ALONG CHINESE BORDER "IN COORDINATION WITH U.S. IMPERIALIST ENCIRCLEMENT OF CHINA". EARLIER IN WEEK, CHICOMS REVIVED ISSUE OF SOVIET MILITARY AID SHIPMENTS TO VIETNAM THROUGH CHINESE TERRITORY. PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTATOR ARTICLE ON SUBJECT, WHILE PROVIDING NO NEW INFORMATION, CHARGED THAT SOVIETS WERE CIRCULATING ANTI-CHINESE RUMORS IN ORDER TO "SOW DISSENSION BETWEEN CHINESE AND VIETNAMESE PARTIES, COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES".

D. OUR IMPRESSION THAT CHINESE PUBLIC REACTION TO DATE TO BOMBING RAIDS DOES NOT INDICATE DRAMATIC CHICOM POLICY CHANGE IN OFFING WAS BUTTRESSED BY JULY 10 PEOPLE'S DAILY ARTICLE SIGNED BY "HSIANG TUNG-HUI" WHICH REAFFIRMED CHICOM POSITION THAT ESSENCE OF PEOPLE'S WAR IS SELF-RELIANCE. IT PREDICTED THAT VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, THOUGH "STILL FACED WITH ARDUOUS STRUGGLE, BY CONTINUED FIRM RELIANCE ON OWN STRENGTH, WILL BE ABLE WITH HELP OF OTHER PEOPLES TO DEFEAT U.S. AGGRESSOR". THE CHINESE EMPHASIS ON SELF-RELIANCE AND PROFESSED CONFIDENCE IN ULTIMATE COMMUNIST VICTORY IN VIETNAM MAY HAVE BEEN PROMPTED BY FELT-NEED TO DEFEND PEKING'S FAILURE TO ASSUME MORE ACTIVE PUBLIC ROLE IN AID OF DRV. PERHAPS IT ALSO REPRESENTS THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR DOWNGRADING IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET AID AS WELL AS BOLSTERING DRV MORALE BY CITING HISTORICAL SUCCESSES OF CHICOMS. (CONGENTELS 123, 189, 200) (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. KOREAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY ANNIVERSARY

A. CHICOMS TREATED FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF SINO-KOREAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AS MAJOR EVENT, BUT DID NOT EXPLOIT OBVIOUS OPPORTUNITY TO EVOKE MEMORY OF CHINESE "VOLUNTEERS" IN KOREA. INSTEAD, OCCASION PROVIDED SPRINGBOARD FOR ANOTHER ATTACK ON SOVIETS, AS TYPIFIED BY ASSERTION OF LIN FENG, VICE-CHAIRMAN OF NPC, IN SPEECH TO PEKING ANNIVERSARY RALLY THAT SOVIET LEADERS WERE "ACCOMPLICES OF U.S. IMPERIALISM" AND "SABOTEURS OF PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION IN ASIAN COUNTRIES". BILATERAL ASPECTS OF TREATY COMMEMORATION SUGGESTED CONSIDERABLE COOLNESS IN PEKING'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS PYONGYANG REGIME. NORTH KOREANS EMPLOYED STOCK PHRASE "CHINESE PEOPLE UNDER LEADERSHIP OF CCP HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG" IN THEIR MESSAGES TO CHINESE LEADERS AND SPEECHES AT RECEPTIONS AND MEETINGS, BUT CHICOMS FAILED TO RECIPROCATE WITH NOD TO "KOREAN WORKERS PARTY HEADED BY KIM IL SUNG" IN MESSAGES OR PEKING SPEECHES AS THEY HAD ON EARLIER ANNIVERSARIES. CHICOM AMBASSADOR TO DPRK DID MENTION KWP AND KIM IN JULY 11 SPEECH TO MEETING OF PYONGYANG WORKING PEOPLE; HOWEVER, HE ALSO DELIVERED A THINLY VEILED GIBE AT KOREAN SENTIMENTS FAVORING BLOC UNITY BY DECLARING THAT "VICTORY OVER U.S. IMPERIALISM IS POSSIBLE ONLY WHEN RESOLUTE FIGHT CARRIED OUT AGAINST MODERN REVISIONISM". (CONGENTEL 198) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 27

EXTERNAL

1. CHICOM REACTION HANOI-HAIPHONG RAIDS

A. CHICOMS REACTED BELATEDLY AND GENERALLY ALONG FAMILIAR LINES TO US RAIDS IN VICINITY HANOI AND HAIPHONG. INITIAL COMMENT WAS LOW LEVEL JULY 1 PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTATOR ARTICLE WHICH PICTURED RAIDS AS INDICATION "HOPELESS AND DESPERATE BOGGED DOWN STATE" OF US IN VIETNAM AND REITERATED CHICOM WILLINGNESS SUPPORT VIETNAMESE REGARDLESS PRICE ENTAILED. POSSIBLY IN PART PROMPTED BY AWARENESS THEIR REACTION TO RAIDS LAGGED BEHIND THAT FORTHCOMING FROM SOVS, NORTH KOREANS, ROMANIANS AND OTHERS, AS WEEK WORE ON CHICOMS NOTICEABLY STEPPED UP THEIR OUTPUT ON SUBJECT. A JULY 3 GOVERNMENT STATEMENT WAS FOLLOWED BY LENGTHY JULY 5 PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL AND BY NCNA REPORTS OF LOCAL EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR THE JULY 3 STATEMENT FROM ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES THROUGHOUT CHINA. THIS POPULAR BUILD-UP HAS NOT YET REACHED THE STAGE OF LARGE SCALE MASS RALLIES.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

B. KEY TO CHICOM TREATMENT OF RAIDS WAS JULY 3 STATEMENT WHICH APPEARED BE CAREFULLY WORDED EFFORT ENHANCE PEKING'S DETERRENT VALUE IN VEITNAM WITHOUT PUBLICLY EXTENDING REGIME'S COMMITMENT. STATEMENT DECLARED THAT "NEW AND STILL GRAVER STAGE OF US AGGRESSION" FREED REGIME FROM

ANY BONDS OR RESTRICTIONS IN RENDERING "POLITICAL, MORAL, AND OTHER SUPPORT AND AID TO VIETNAMESE PEOPLE". HOWEVER, AS HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN CASE IN PAST, ACTIVE RENDERING OF SUCH AID WAS MADE DEPENDENT "ON INTERESTS AND DEMANDS OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE". PEOPLE'S DAILY JULY 5 EDITORIAL FOR MOST PART FOLLOWED CLOSELY ALONG LINES OF STATEMENT, ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT GREATER NOTE OF URGENCY IS DETECTABLE IN ITS ASSERTION THAT "(CHINESE PEOPLE) ARE READY AT ANY MOMENT TO TAKE ANY NECESSARY ACTION TO SUPPORT THE FRATERNAL VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR INTERESTS AND DEMANDS." EDITORIAL ALSO DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE SPACE TO DENUNCIATION SOVS. IT ALLEGED "CURRENT BOMBING RAIDS--ON HANOI AND HAIPHONG ARE PRODUCT OF FILTHY POLITICAL DEAL BETWEEN US AND SOV UNION" WHICH AIMED AT "FORCING PEACE TALKS THROUGH BOMBING".

C. COMMENT: CHICOM REACTION TO RAIDS SUGGEST REGIME DOES NOT INTEND DRAMATIC RESPONSE TO THIS DEVELOPMENT. IN ITS PUBLIC POSTURE, PEKING CONTINUES HOLD OUT THREAT OF INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM, BUT IT DOES SO BY INFERENCE RATHER THAT IN DIRECT TERMS. THUS, WHILE TREATING RAIDS AS NEW STAGE

OF ESCALATION, PEKING HAS NOT REITERATED IN SPECIFIC TERMS ITS EARLIER PLEDGE TO SEND CHINESE "PERSONNEL" IF REQUIRED. TO US IT APPEARS THAT BASIC CONSIDERATION SHAPING REGIME'S TREATMENT OF RAIDS IS PEKING'S RELUCTANCE PUBLICLY THROW DOWN GAUNTLET ON ISSUE "US AIR ESCALATION."

D. WHILE WE DO NOT FORESEE OVERT CHICOM RESPONSE TO RAIDS, FACT NEVERTHLESS REMAINS THAT REGIME HAS AGAIN PUBLICLY RENEWED COMMITMENT COME TO AID OF DRV IF SO REQUESTED. THIS COMMITMENT COMES AGAINST BACKGROUND OF SUBSTANTIAL AND CONTINUING CHICOM DEVOTION TO DRV'S SUCCESS WHICH EVIDENCED IN PEKING'S STUBBORNLY FANATICAL OPPOSTION TO

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0366

NEGOTIATED COMPROMISE. WE WOULD EXPECT REGIME'S POSITION TO BE TRANSLATED INTO WILLINGNESS INCREASE PRESENT LEVELS OF MATERIEL AND COVERT MANPOWER ASSISTANCE IN MANNER CALCULATED LEAST LIKELY BRING ABOUT US RESPONSE. INDEED, CHICOMS MAY ALREADY ENGAGED IN SUCH EFFORT. JULY 2 DRV-CPR AGREEMENT FOR CHINESE AID IN SETTING UP STATE FARMS FOR VIETNAM COULD BE COVER FOR INTRODUCTION CHINESE RUALL LABOR TO RELIEVE DRV MANPOWER PINCH. TO END ON NOTE OF ADDED CAUTION, CURRENT "LEFTISTS" ATMOSPHERE IN PEKING AND REGIME'S PROCLAIMED DEVOTION TO "PRINCIPLED" BEHAVIOUR

CONCEIVABLY COULD PRODUCE CHICOM DECISIONS RESULTING IN NEW AND UNWELCOME PROBLEMS FOR US IN VIETNAM. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. COMMUNIST TREATMENT OF CCP ANNIVERSARY

ONLY FOREIGN COMMENT CARRIED BY NCNA ON ANNIVERSARY OF PARTY (JULY 1) WAS EFFUSIVE ALBANIAN EDITORIAL AND RESUME OF PRESS COMMENT FROM DRV AND VIET CONG PRAISING SINP-VIETNAMESE FRIENDSHIP AND PATTING CHICOMS ON BACK FOR DELIVERING SOVIET AID "ON SCHEDULE". ON COMPARABLE OCCASION FIVE YEARS AGO, MULTITUDE OF GREETINGS FROM RULING AND NON-RULING CP'S FILLED PEKING PAPERS. THIS TIME, GREETINGS SENT BY SOVIETS, BULGARIANS AND PROBABLY OTHERS HAVE BEEN POINTEDLY IGNORED BY CHICOM PUBLIC MEDIA. (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. CHOU VISIT TO PAKISTAN.

A. REGIME'S SPARSE PRESS COVERAGE OF CHOU VISIT TO PAKISTAN AND ABSENCE OF SUBSEQUENT EDITORIAL COMMENT ON EITHER VISIT OR SINP-PAK RELATIONS STRENGTHENS SPECULATION THAT CHICOMS NOT AT ALL PLEASED WITH RECENT PAK FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS. FIRST CHICOM MENTION OF VISIT WAS BRIEF NCNA JUNE 28 ITEM DATELINED RAWALPINDI REPORTING CHOU'S ARRIVAL ALONG WITH BRIEF SUMMARY PAK EDITORIAL COMMENT PRAISING REGIME. AYUB CHOU TALK RATED EXTREMELY BRIEF AND FACTUAL NCNA REPORT WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY DEVOID OF FAVORABLE ADJECTIVES CUSTOMARILY USED WHEN CHICOMS PLEASED WITH OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS. ONLY OTHER CHICOM PRESS ITEMS ON VISIT WERE EXCERPTS FROM PAK FONMIN SPOKESMAN'S FAVORABLE DESCRIPTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES AND BRIEF COVERAGE CHOU AND AYUB REMARKS AT BANQUET HOSTED BY AYUB.

B. AS REPORTED BY NCNA, BOTH BANQUET SPEECHES CONSISTED OF

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0367

GENERALITIES ABOUT FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES, ALTHOUGH CHOU REITERATED REGIME'S "RESOLUTE SUPPORT OF KASHMIRI PEOPLE'S JUST STRUGGLE FOR RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION" AND AYUB SPOKE OF PAKISTAN'S INABILITY FORGET "INVALUABLE SUPPORT OF PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF CHINA IN ITS HOUR OF NEED.". NCNA ALSO REPORTED AYUB'S REMARK THAT "FIRM PRINCIPLE," OF PAK FOREIGN POLICY IS "TO PROMOTE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL ESPECIALLY OUR NEIGHBORS." (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. INDONESIA

NEW SALVO OF CHICOM PROTESTS TO INDONESIA WAS SET IN MOTION BEGINNING WITH JUNE 29 FONMIN NOTE WHICH DEMANDED THAT BY SECOND WEEK OF JULY GOI NAME NEGOTIATORS TO WORK OUT "CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS" FOR REPATRIATION OF OVERSEAS CHINESE. FONMIN NOTED GOI FAILURE TO PROVIDE SHIPS AS DEMANDED BY CHICOMS IN APRIL, AND SAID CPR NOW READY TO CARRY OUT OWN MAY 18 OFFER TO SUPPLY SHIPS "IN NEAREST FUTURE". NOTE SUMMARILY REJECTED INDONESIAN CLAIM THAT NO CHINESE HAD ASKED FOR REPATRIATION AS A " DOWNRIGHT LIE" BUT REFUSED TO SUPPLY NAME LIST REQUESTED BY GOI ON

GROUNDS THAT CHINESE ON LIST WOULD THEN BE SUBJECT TO "FURTHER PERSECUTION." IN COURSE OF DENUNCIATION OF GOI, NOTE DECLARED THAT "NO OTHER GOVERNMENT IN WORLD SO PERFIDIOUS AS YOU ARE." PEOPLE'S DAILY EDIT FOLLOWING DAY ECHOED LANGUAGE OF NOTE AND ADDED CHARGE THAT GOI WAS OPENLY ENCOURAGING GRC "AGENTS" IN FOMENTING "ANTI-CHINA ACTIVITIES AND TRYING FORCE OVERSEAS CHINESE TO GO TO TAIWAN." MEANWHILE, CHICOM EMBASSY DJAKARTA LODGED NO LESS THAT FOUR PROTESTS DURING WEEK OVER VARIOUS INCIDENTS, INCLUDING ALLEGED GOI INSTIGATION OF "FORCIBLE OCCUPATION" OF NCNA OFFICE IN DJAKARTA WHICH HAS BEEN CLOSED FOR THREE MONTHS. PROTEST NOTE DATED JULY 3 REITERATED STOCK PHRASE THAT GOI WAS "GOING FURTHER ALONG ROAD OF BREAKING RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

INTERNAL

5. REGIME EXPLAINS PURGE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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A. REGIME FOUND PARTY 45TH ANNIVERSARY APPROPRIATE TIME TO OFFER PUBLIC ITS FIRST EXPLANATION OF EVENTS OF PAST FEW MONTHS. JULY 1 PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL "LONG LIVE THOUGHT OF MAO" DESCRIBED RECENT CONTROVERSY UNDERLYING GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS POLITICAL CRISIS COMPARABLE IN GRAVITY TO 1953 KAO-JO INCIDENT AND 1959 DISPUTE WITH RIGHT OPPORTUNISTS" AT LUSHAN. EDITORIAL ALSO SIGNIFIED THAT STRUGGLE AT LEADERSHIP LEVEL WAS OVER, AND PRESENTED WHAT APPEARED TO BE LIST OF LEADING SURVIVORS.

B. AS PROTRAYED IN EDITORIAL, RECENT STRUGGLE FITTED DEFINITION NEITHER OF ATTEMPTED COUP D'ETAT NOR POLICY DISPUTE. INSTEAD, IT PROTRAYED AS LONG-RANGE EVOLUTIONARY ATTEMPT TO SUBVERT MAOIST POLICIES WITH VIEW TOWARDS ULTIMATELY "GRABBING POWER" ON PART OF SUBTLE BAND OF CONSPIRATORS IN PARTY, ARMY, AND GOVERNMENT, WHO CAMOFLAGED INTENTIONS WITH SUPPORT FOR PARTY AND ORTHDOX LINE. THEIR ALLEGED AVENUE TO POWER WAS CONTROL OVER PROPAGANDA, EDUCATION AND CULTURE: IN WORDS OF EDITORIAL, "AN EFFORT TO SIEZE PEN" WITH "SOLE PURPOSE OF PREPARING PUBLIC OPINION FOR RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM". AS RELATED IN EDITORIAL, GROUP WAS "EXPOSED AND SMASHED" LONG BEFORE ANY CONCRETE EFFORT TO SEIZE POWER MADE. MAJOR CHARGE AGAINST THEM SIMPLY THAT "ONCE CONDITIONS RIPENED" THEY WOULD HAVE MADE "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY COUP LIKE ONE STAGED BY KHRUSCHEV."

C. VAGUE DESCRIPTION OF OFFENSES, FUZZY TIMETABLE OF ALLEGED ACTS HERESY, AND HYPOTHETICAL NATURE OF CHARGES PRESENTED IN TIMETABLE IMBUED THIS "THIRD STRUGGLE," ESPECIALLY ITS CONSPIRATORIAL ASPECTS, WITH DECIDELY PHONEY AIR, LEADING US TO QUESTION STRONGLY ALLEGATION THAT ANY ORGANIZED BAND OF GENUINE CONSPIRATORS EXISTED AT ALL. ENTIRE ACCOUNT SOUNDS MORE LIKE ATTEMPT TO CREATE BLANKET JUSTIFICATION FOR GENERAL PURGE OF ALLEGED POLITICAL DEVIANTS, BEGINNING WITH PROPAGANDA, EDUCATION AND CULTURAL SECTORS, ON PART OF LEADERSHIP OBSESSED WITH FAILURE OF PAST EFFORTS TO REMOLD CHINESE SOCIETY IN MAOIST IMAGE. SUCH AN OBSESSION OVER PAST FAILURE AND FEAR FOR FUTURE OF REVOLUTION COULD CAUSE LEADERSHIP TO REPUDIATE SUCH APPARENTLY FAITHFUL FOLLOWERS AND UNLIKELY"REVISIONISTS" SUCH AS PENG CHOU AND MORE RECENTLY CHOU YANG (SEE ITEM 7) ESPECIALLY IF POWER RIVAL WERE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF MAO'S PARANOID APPREHENSIONS TO TURN HIM AGAINST THEM.

D. POINTED QUOTATIONS IN EDITORIAL PRAISING MAO'S THOUGH BY LIU SHAO-CHI, CHOU EN-LAI, LIN PIAO AND TENG HSIAO-PING

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

(IN THAT ORDER) PROBABLY MEANT TO ESTABLISH IDENTITY OF LEADING FAITHFUL AND TOP LEVEL POWER GROUP IN MAINLAND TODAY. FACT THAT QUOTATIONS LISTED IN ORDER CURRENT PARTY RANK NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF ACTUAL PEKING ORDER, HOWEVER. CONTENT OF QUOTATIONS COULD CONCEIVABLY BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT LIN PIAO IS BEING PRESENTED AS MOST IMPORTANT OF QUARTET, WITH CHOU EN-LAI AND TENG HSIAO-PING ALSO IN POSITIONS OF POWER. LIU SHAO-CHI APPEARS TO BE SAFE, THOUGH HIS FAILURE TO TAKE PUBLIC POSITION ON RECENT EVENTS MAY BE EVIDENCE OF HOLLOWNESS HIS POSITION.

E. WHATEVER THE OTHER CONNOTATIONS, APPEARANCE OF EDITORIAL AND EXPLANTION OF STRUGGLE TOGETHER WITH STATEMENT OF VICTORY, IS EVIDENCE THAT CRISIS IS CONSIDERED OVER. THIS CONCLUSION BUTTRESSED BYHIKRST GROUP PUBLIC APPEARANCE SINCE EARLY MAY OF MUCH OF LEADERSHIP ON OCCASION CHOU JULY 1 RETURN FROM ALBANIA. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. PEKING PARTY COMMITTEE FORMALLY INDICTED.

A. WHILE ANNIVERSARY EDITORIAL THREW LITTLE LIGHT ON KEY QUESTION OF DEGREE MAO'S INVOLVEMENT IN RECENT STRUGGLE, JULY 1 RED FLAG ARTICLE LISTING CRIMES OF CERTAIN MEMBERS" OF PEKING MUNICIPAL PARTY COMMITTEE CITED CHAIRMAN'S PERSONAL CRITICISM OF COMMITTEE, SUGGESTING HE ACTIVELY BY GUIDING CAMPAIGN. HOWEVER, CHARGES LODGED BY ARTICLE, IF TRUE, INDICATE DECLINE IN PARTY DISCIPLINE AND EVIDENCE THAT, IF CHAIRMAN'S HAND ON WHEEL, HIS GRIP MUST HAVE SLIPPED AT LEAST AT ONE POINT. FURTHERMORE, CHARGES SHOW THAT MAO'S PRESTIGE AMONG AT LEAST SOME SECTORS OF PARTY HAS BEEN SURPRISINGLY LOW.

B. MOST STRIKING EVIDENCE OF INDISCIPLINE APPEARED IN ELABORATION OF COMMITTEE'S MAJOR OFFENSE: RESISTANCE TO

GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION. ARTICLE DESCRIBED MEMBERS OF PEKING CCP COMMITTEE USING ALL MEANS AT COMMAND TO CHECKMATE SHANGHAI COMMITTEE ATTACKS ON PEKING VICE MAYOR WU HAN, CONTINUING OPPOSITION AND EVEN "COLLECTING INFORMATION ABOUT PROLETARIAN REVOLUTIONARIES IN PREPARATION FOR COUNTER-OFFENSEIVE" AFTER (EMPHASIS ADDED) MAO HAD CRITICIZED PEKING

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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OF 30'S AND HIS ANNOTATIONS IN 1958 EDITION OF COMPLETE WORKS OF LU HSUN (GREAT AUTHOR OF 30'S). RELEVANCE OF CHARGES IMMATERIAL IN THESE ARCANE MASTERPIECES VINDICTIVE EX-POST-FACTO RE-INTERPRETATION WHICH CHICOMS, ESPECIALLY CHOU YANG HIMSELF, HAVE SO LONG EMPLOYED TO OBLITERATE PARTY FAITHFUL WHO HAVE INTO DISFAVOR. MESSAGE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT CHOU YANG IS OUT. SO ALSO IS PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT VICE DIRECTOR LIN MO-HAN WHO WAS MENTIONED IN PASSING IN ATTACKS ON CHOU.

B. COMMENT: CHOU YANG LAST APPEARED IN PUBLIC AT JANUARY 3 PROVINCIAL WRITERS MEETING IN CANTON. WITH BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT FIRST SIGN HE IN TROUBLE EMERGED WITH APRIL 18 LIBERATION ARMY JOURNAL EDITORIAL CRITICIZING "NATIONAL DEFENSE LIBERATURE" OF 30'S. LONG DELAY IN DENUNCIATION COULD CONCEIVABLY BE EVIDENCE THAT ISSUE IN DOUBT FOR SOME TIME.

C. SO FAR, BEST TENTATIVE EXPLANATION FOR PURGE THIS LEAST PLAUSIBLE OF DEVIANTS IS THAT HE BEING MADE SENIOR SCAPEGOAT FOR FAILURE OF PARTY PAROPAGANDA APPARATUS TO REMOLD MAINLAND CHINESE INTELLECTUALS. CHOU'S FORMAL QUALIFICATIONS AS SCAPEGOAT, I.E., HIS POSITION IN APPARATUS, MAY HAVE BEEN REINFORCED BY PERSONAL ENMITY HIS ACTIVITIES HAVE ENGENDERED OVER THE YEARS.

D. CHOU'S DENUNCIATIONS AS "RING LEADER OF BLACK LINE IN LITERATURE AND ART" FURTHER CLOUDS POSITION OF LONG ABSENT PARTY PROPAGANDA CHIEF LU TING-YI. LU WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BEAR SOME MEASURE RESPONSIBILTIY FOR FAILINGS PARTY PROPA-DANDA ARM.

8. CHARTER PARTY MEMBER ADDED TO PROVINCIAL PURGE LIST

A. ONE SIGNIFICANT ADDITION TO PROVINCIAL PURGE LIST ON EVE OF PARTY 45TH ANNIVERSARY WAS LI TA, PRESIDENT OF WUHAN UNIVERSITY. LI IS 76 YEAR OLD SCHOLAR WHO WAS ONE OF TWO SHANGHAI DELEGATES TO THE FOUNDING CONGRESS OF CCP IN 1921, AND PARTY'S FIRST PROPAGANDA DIRECTOR. ALTHOUGH HE LEFT PARTY BEFORE 1927, SUBSEQUENT SERVICE IN GOVERNMENT POSTS (HE WAS MEMBER SOUTH CENTRAL MILITARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

COMMITTEE. FURTHERMORE, DISORDERLY PICTURE OF COMMUNIST CHINS'S TWO MAJOR MUNICIPAL PARTY COMMITTEES AT LOGGERHEADS DESPITE ORDERS OF CHAIRMAN WAS SHARPENED BY ACCUSATION IN ARTICLE THAT PEKING PARTY COMMITTEE WAS RUN AS "INDEPENDENT DUCHY" BASED ON POLITICAL PATRONAGE RATHER THAN PRINCIPLE.

C. DISENCHANTMENT WITH MAO AND HIS WORKS STRIKINGLY PROTRAYED IN PASSAGE DESCRIBING COMMITTEE MEMBERS "INTENSE HATRED FOR MAO'S THOUGHT" AT VERY MENTION OF WHICH THEY "SWORE AND FLEW INTO RAGE". A REACTION TO MAO ALSO DESCRIBED IN ANNIVERSARY EDITORIAL.

D. OTHER OFFENSES LISTED DEPICTED COMMITTEE MEMBERS OPPOSED TO ENTIRE RANGE OF MAOIST POLICIES, FROM SOCIALIST

EDUCATION TO EDUCATIONAL REFORM, AND GUILTY OF STANDARD ARRAY OF IDEOLOGICAL CRIMES (NEGATING GLASS STRUGGLE, ETC.)

E. IN SUM, LIST OF CHARGES AND DISCUSSION OF THEM STRENGTHENS IMPRESSION THAT ANNIVERSARY EDITORIAL CHARGES OF ORGANIZED CONSPIRACY WITH ULTIMATE AIM TO "GRAB POWER" ARE FALSE. POWER STRUGGLE ASPECTS OF CRISIS ARE EASIER TO UNDERSTAND IN TERMS OF GROUP ACCUSED OF OPPOSING MAOIST ORTHODOXY FIGHTING BACK TO PROTECT POSITIONS ONCE IT CLEAR THEY IN DANGER. WHAT INITIATIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS MAY HAVE TAKEN, IF ANY, TO MAKE THEM VULNERABLE TO SUCH CHARGES STILL UNCLEAR. ON THIS POINT ARTICLE ONLY OFFERS CRYPTIC BUT INTRIGUING STATEMENT THAT "EVEN POISONOUS SNAKE COMES OUT OF HOLE IN CERTAIN WEATHER CONDITIONS"

7 CHOU YANG DENOUNCED

A. REMAINDER OF JULY 1 RED FLAG DEVOTED TO REPRINTING MAO'S TALKS AT YENAN FORUMON LITERATURE AND ART IN 1942 AND DENUNCIATION OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT VICE DIRECTOR CHOU YANG, WHO UP UNTIL NOW HAS BEEN REGIME'S LEADING INTELLECTUAL HATCHET MAN AND EXPONENT OF MAO'S ORTHODOXY IN CULTURAL FIELD. WITH AN IRONY THAT MUST HAVE DELIGHTED MANY CHINESE INTELLECTUALS WHO SUFFERED AT HIS HAND, CHOU WAS ATTACKED AS "A FATHER OF REVISIONIST CULTURE" AND "BIG RED UMBRELLA COVERING MONSTERS IN FIERCE CLASS STRUGGLE," WHO HAD BEEN SECRET OPPONENT OF MAO'S THOUGHT EVER SINCE 1930'S. AUTHORS OF ARTICLES, INCLUDING KWANGMING DAILY EDITOR MU HSIN, DOCUMENTED CHOU'S HIDDEN HERESY BY CITING HIS ADVOCACY OF "NATIONAL DEFENSE LITERATURE"

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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COUNCIL AFTER 1949, CURRENTLY NPC DELEGATE AND VICE-HEAD CENTRAL SOUTH BRANCH CHINESE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES) SUGGESTED HE HAD BEEN REINSTATED.

B. JUNE 30 HUPEH DAILY QUOTED BY RADIO WUHAN (1200 GMT) ACCUSED LI OF BEING PART OF REVISIONIST GROUP AT WUHAN UNIVERSITY.

C. OTHER MAJOR FIGURES UNDER ATTACK IN PROVINCIAL MEDIA DURING WEEK WERE TIEN WEI, KWANGTUNG PROVINCIAL RADIO

STATION DIRECTOR WHO WAS CHARGED WITH HESITATING THREE HOURS IN BROADCAST OF REORGANIZATION PEKING PARTY COMMITTEE ANNOUNCEMENT JUNE 3; WU HSIAO-CHUANG (PHONETIC) PARTY SECRETARY OF WUHAN EDUCATION CADRES SCHOOL; KO LIN, PRESIDENT OF CHUNG SHAN MEDICAL COLLEGE IN CANTON; KUO HSIAO-TANG, VICE-PRESIDENT CHENCHOW UNIVERSITY AND VICE-CHIEF HUNAN PROVINCIAL PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT; LI YA-CHUN VICE CHIEF SZECHUAN PROVINCIAL PARTY PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT; ANHWEI PROPAGANDA CHIEF LI FAN-FU, AND KWANGSI PROPAGANDA HEAD LU TI.

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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HONG KONG 2358 (JUN 26)

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

POUCH: BANGKOK, BLEGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, CANBERRA, CINCPAC, DARESSALAAM, DJAKARTA, KARACHI, KATMANDU, K-LUMPUR, LOND, MANILA, MSOCW, MUNICH, N-DELHI, PRAGUE, RANGOON, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SOFIA, S-PORE, TAIPEI, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, COMNAVPHIL, COMUSTDC, 13AF MANILA

CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 26

INTERNAL

1. CLEAR APPROACH TO CULTURAL REVOLUTION

A. JUNE 24 PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL "SUNLIGHT OF PARTY ILLUMINATES ROAD OF GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION" REPRESENTED FIRST PUBLIC EVIDENCE OF LEADERSHIP CONCERN OVER EFFECTS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION PURGES ON PARTY MORALE.

B. EDITORIAL BEGAN WITH EXAGGERATED AND DFENSIVE PRAISE OF PARTY'S KEY ROLE IN ALL ASPECTS NATIONAL AFFAIRS INCLUDING CULTURAL REVOLUTION. HAVING ESTABLISHED THAT ALL IS WELL WITH PARTY EDITORIAL WENT ON TO ASSURE READERS THAT PURGE INVOLVED ONLY "A SMALL HANDFUL" OF POLITICAL DEGENERATES AND BOURGEOIS ELEMENTS IN PARTY AND THAT DISCOVERY, DENUNCIATION, AND REMOVAL OF SUCH ROTTEN MEMBERS WAS NORAML RECURRING PHENONOM AMID THE CONTINUING CLASS STRUGGLE. ARTICLE ALSO EXPRESSED SOOTHING CONFIDENCE THAT PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND MEMBERS WHO HAD ERRED WOULD BE ABLE TO RECTIFY THEMSELVES. FURTHERFMORE, IN STRIKING CONTRAST TO JUNE 20 EDITORIAL STRIDENTLY DEMANDING MASSES PREPARE MORE DENUNCIATORY WALL POSTERS, EDITORIAL URGED LEADING PARTY FUNCTIONARY AT ALL LEVELS TO EXAMINE THEIR MISTAKES COURAGEOUSLY AND NOT "BECOME DISSATISFIED AND DROOP JUST BECAUSE MASSES POSTED A FEW BING CHARACTER-POSTERS AND VOICE SOME OPINIONS."

C. EDITORIAL ALSO POINTED OUT THAT "EVERY PARTY ORGANIZATION AND EVERY COMMUNIST WILL BE TESTED IN THE GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION," AND "THE TOUCHSTONE FOR EVERY MEMBER OF SOCIETY WILL BE HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GREAT CULTURAL REVOUTION."

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

THUS, ALONG WITH SOOTHING NOTES, EDITORIAL ALSO PRESENTED EVIDENCE THAT NEITHER PARTY NOR GENERAL PUBLIC COULD EXPECT ANY GENUINE SLACKENING OF THE CAMPAIGN.

D. COMMENT: WE REGARD REGIME'S FELT NEED TO STRIKE SUCH NOTES OF CALM AT THIS STAGE OF THE CAMPAIGN AS AN INDICATION OF EXTENT TO WHICH PURGES HAVE DISRUPTED PARTY MORALE. MOREOVER, REASSURING LINE TAKEN IN THE EDITORIAL BUTTRESSES CAS REPORTS OF FEAR AND ANXIETY ("DROOPINESS," " DISSATISFACTION") AMONG CADRES WHOSE ORGANIZATIONS HAVE COME TO A STANDSTILL AND BEEN TURNED TOPSY-TURVY IN SEARCH FOR POLITICAL DEVIATES AND STRUGGLE TARGETS. SUCH AN EFFORT TO SHORE UP SAGGING MORALE DURING A PARTICULARLY ROUGH CAMPAIGN IS NOTHING PARTICULARLY NEW AND HAS BEEN EMPLOYED BY CHICOMS IN THE PAST. (CONFIDENTIAL - CONGENTEL 2335)

2. CAMPAIGN EXCESSES AND CONFUSION REPORTED

A. FURTHER LIGHT WAS THROWN ON POSSIBLE REASONS BEHIND SWITCH IN THE TONE OF CAMPAIGN DURING THE WEEK BY EMERGENCE OF COVERT AND OVERT REPORTS DETAILING SOME OF EXCESSES AND DISORDERS RESULTING FROM CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN VARIOUS TARGET AREAS. AT PEKING INIVERSITY AND IN SHANGHAI SUICIDES HAVE BEEN REPORTED AS A RESULT OF HUMILIATIONS SUFFERED DURING THE CAMPAIGN. SOME TARGETS OF CRITICISMS AT PEKING UNIVERSITY (BOTH PROFESSORS AND PUPILS) HAVE HAD FACES BLACKED BY ACTIVISTS STUDENTS AND BEEN LED AROUND CAMPUS WEARING WHITE HATS OF SHAME. OTHERS HAVE BEEN STOOD AGAINST WALL WHILE STUDENTS FILED PAST SPITTING IN THEIR FACES. CONTRADICTING IMPRESSION GAINED FROM THESE REPORTS THAT STUDENTS IN FULL AND ACTIVE SUPPORT OF CAMPAIGN, ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED BRAWLING AT PEKING UNIVERSITY CAMPUS BY RIVAL SUTDENT FACTIONS.

B. RADIO CHENGTU JUNE 23 DESCRIBED HIGHLY CONFUSED SITUATION AT CHENGTU UNIVERSITY IN WHICH CADRE LEADING CULTURAL REVOLUTION ACCUSED OF OPPOSING CAMPAIGN BY 1) ALLEGING BIG CHARACTER POSTERS WERE REALLY SARCASTIC ATTACKS ON LEADERSHIP, 2) COUNTER-ACCUSING ACTIVISTS ATTACKING UNIVERSITY PARTY COMMITTEE AS "FREAKS, MONSTERS, ANTI-PARTY GANGS, ETC": AND 3) DEMANDING THAT 100 PER CENT OF FACULTY BE CRITICIZED. AS RESULT OF CONFUSION "EVERYONE FELT MENACED AND ONE WRONGFULLY ACCUSED CADRE ALMOST BEATEN TO DEATH. AT CHUNGKING UNIVERSITY PARTY COMMITTEE SECRETARY RESPONSIBLE FOR CAMPAIGN FIRED FOR SUPPRESSING REVOLUTION BY ADVOCATING STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH AND CONFUSING STUDENTS WITH PLETHORA OF CONFESSIONS. IN COURSE OF CONTROVERSY LARGE NUMBERS OF WALL POSTERS SUPPORTING HIM HAD APPEARED ON CAMPUS (RADIO CHENGTU JUNE 21, 2310 GMT).

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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-3-2358, June 30, from: Hong Kong

C. IN URUMCHI AN ALLEGED COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY NAMED HUANG CHI-SHENG (PHONETIC) WAS EXECUTED ON JUNE 17 IMMEDIATELY AFTER A MASS CIRCUS TRIAL FOR THE ATTEMPTED MURDER OF A SOCIALIST EDUCATION WORK TEAM CADRE ON JUNE 2. WHILE PERHAPS MORE A CASUALTY OF THE FOUR CLEARANCES CAMPAIGN THAN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, WE REGARD HIS SUMMARY TRIAL AND EXECUTION AS AN OBJECT LESSON TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC DURING TENSE TIMES. (RADIO URUNCHI JUNE 17 1405, GMT, FBIS 118).

D. PEKING SOURCES ALSO REPORTED DISMISSAL OF PROVINCIAL TSING HAI DAILY EDITOR FOR PUBLICATIONS ON JUNE 3 OF EDITORIAL IN WHICH EXCESSIVE USE OF SUPERLATIVES WAS INTERPRETED AS SATIRICAL ATTACK ON REGIME. READERS OF ARTICLE AGREED THAT PREPOSTEROUS ADJECTIVES USED COULD EASILY BE CONSTRUED AS MOCKERY OF PARTY LINE.

E. COMMENT: WHILE COVERT REPORTS ARE SECOND HAND, COMBINED WITH OVERT EVIDENCE THEY FORM USEFUL INDICATOR AS TO PREVAILING ATMOSPHERE IN TARGET AREAS MAJOR CITIES AND HELP FILL IN BARE BONES OF PICTURE PROVIDED BY PRESS ANALYSIS. PICTURE PRESENTED IS ONE OF FEAR, CONFUSION, APPREHENSION, RESENTMENT, ALL REMINISCENT OF ANTI-RIGHTIST CAMPAIGN OF 1957. IMPRESSION STRENGTHENED THAT CAMPAIGN DEVELOPING INTO INDISCRIMINATE WITCH HUNT AS WELL AS VEHICLE OF EVENING OLD PERSONAL SCORES. (SECRET).

3. CHOU EN-LAI AND CHEN YI DISCUSS CULTURAL REVOLUTION

A. PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY LEADING REGIME SPOKESMEN ON CULTURAL REVOLUTION DURING WEEK FURTHER UNDERLINED REGIME'S DESIRE TO EXPLAIN POSITION AND CALM SPECULATION AND APPREHENSION AT HOME AND ABROAD OVER PURGE BY EMPHASIZING CAMPAIGN'S ROLE IN BROAD CONTEXT OF OVER-ALL ANTI-REVISIONIST POLICY. FOREIGN MINISTER CHEN YI ADDRESSING AFRO-ASIAN WRITERS EMERGENCY MEETING IN PEKING ON JUNE 27 IN STRIKINGLY DEFENSIVE WAY CALLED IMPERIALISTS WHO READ CAMPAIGN AS EVIDENCE OF REGIME INSTABILITY AND HOPE TO GAIN THEREBY "MORE STUPID THAN PIGS." FACT THAT PARTY HAD MOBILIZED CAMPAIGN PROOF THAT NATION POWERFUL, STATE POWER CONSOLIDATED, PEOPLE UNITED, HE MAINTAINED. CHEN DENOUNCED FOREGING CHARGES THAT CAMPAIGN DIRECTED AT ALL INTELLECTUALS AS "SHEER NONSENSE," POINTING OUT THAT DRIVE INVOLVED "HANDFUL" OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS.

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

-4-2358, June 30, from: Hong Kong

B. PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI (SIGNIFICANTLY ONCE AGAIN DUBBED BY NCNA AS ONE OF MAO'S "CLOSE COMRADES IN ARMS") IN SWEEPING AUTHORITATIVE JUNE 27 SPEECH TO TIRANA MASS RALLY PRESENTED CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS PART OF MASTER ATTEMPT TO CONQUER REVISIONISM AND INSURE REALIZATION OF COMMUNISM IN CHINA. ADDING LITTLE NEW ON CAMPAIGN, HIS DISCUSSIONS OF IT AS CAMPAIGN OF FOUR CLEARANCES, CADRE LABOR, EDUCATIONAL REFORM, INDUSTRIAL EMULATION, AND CHINA'S NEW ECONOMIC LEAP (WHICH CHEN YI ALSO MENTIONED AS HAVNG BEGUN) WAS CLEARLY AIMED AT TONING DOWN SENSATIONAL NATURE OF CAMPAIGN. CHOU ALSO REITERATED LINE THAT ONLY HANDFUL OF DEVIANTS INVOLVED (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

EXTERNAL

4. VIETNAM

U.S. RAIDS IN VICINITY HANOI AND HAIPHONG

A. FIRST CHICOM REACTION TO U.S. AIR ATTACKS IN VICINITY HANOI AND HAIPHONG WAS BRIEF JUNE 29 REPORT WHICH NOTED "IN DISREGARD SERIOUS WARNINGS OF PEOPLE....OF VIETNAM AND WORLD." U.S. PLANES ON JUNE 29 ATTACKED "SUBURBS" OF HANOI AND HAIPHONG. NCNA ALLEGED U.S. PLANES WERE "SEVERLY HIT" BY DEFENDERS, WITH SEVEN DESTROYED AND SEVERAL PILOTS CAPTURED.

B. COMMENT: WE EXPECT HEAR GREAT DEAL MORE FROM PEKING ON THIS DEVELOPMENT, BUT ARE INCLINED VENTURE GUESS THAT PEKING WILL TREAT RAIDS AS ANOTHER "BRILLIANT VICTORY" IN VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S WAR AGAINST U.S. IMPERIALISM. SUCH TREATMENT WOULD CARRY ATTENDANT IMPLICATION THAT VIETNAMESE CAPABLE OF STANDING ALONE IN DEFEATING U.S. "AGGRESSORS."

CHOU EXPOUNDS PEKING'S VIETNAM POLICY

A. AT JUNE 27 MASS RALLY AT TIRANA CHOU EN-LAI PRESENTED BASICALLY STANDARD RECITAL CHICOM POSITION ON VIETNAM. CHOU ATTACKED IDEA OF RECONVENING GENEVA CONFERENCE, CLAIMING THAT QUESTION IS ONE OF U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING GENEVA AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD INVOLVE U.S. ACCEPTANCE DRV 4 POINTS AND NLF 5-POINT STATEMENT. HE RULED AS "OUT OF QUESTION....TALK ABOUT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF VEITNAM" IN ABSENCE WITHDRAWAL U.S. TROOPS AND IMMEDIATE HALT "U.S. AGGRESSION" AGAINST ALL OF VIETNAM. CHOU ALSO REPREATED CHICOM PLEDGE TO PROVIDE "ALL-OUT SUPPORT" TO VIETNAMESE PEOPLE "WHATEVER

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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COST WE MAY HAVE TO PAY." HIS EXPOSITION ON VIETNAM EMBODIES A PREDICTABLE ATTACK ON "MODERN REVISIONISTS" FOR SEEKING BETRAY VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND A JUSTIFICATION FOR PEKING'S OPPOSITION TO "UNITED ACTION" WITH SOVS ON VIETNAM. IN CHOU'S WORDS, "IT IS ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE REVOLUTION TOGETHER WITH THE RENEGADES OF THE REVOLUTION." B. COMMENT: ONE COULD HARDLY EXPECT ANY MODIFICATION OF CHICOM HARD-LINE ON VIETNAM AT TIME LEFTIST SWING UNDERWAY ON MAINLAND AS EVIDENCED BY CULTURAL REVOLUTION CAMPAIGN.

PORTENT FOR SINO-DRV RELATIONS

A. HANOI'S PROBLEMS IN ATTEMPTING SIMULTANEOUSLY MAINTAIN DECENT RELATIONS WITH PEKING AND MOSCOW WERE CLEARLY OUTLINED IN CHICOM-ALBANIAN STATEMENTS ON "MODERN REVISIONISM" EMANATING DURING COURSE RECENT CHOU VISIT TO ALBANIA. IN COURSE JUNE 27 SPEECH, CHOU REITERATED CHICOM POSITION THAT "STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM STRUGGLE AGAINST REVISIONISM." WHILE HE PROFESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR SOME "PERSONS WHO UNABLE PERCIEVE THIS," AS WELL AS OPTIMISM THAT "ALL GENUINE COMMUNISTS WILL ULTIMATELY COME ROUND TO THEME THAT "IT IS AS MUCH A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE TO OPPOSE KHRUSHCHEV REVISIONISM AS IT IS TO OPPOSE U.S. IMPERIALISM. IT IS NOT PERMISSIBLE TO BE EQUIVOCAL TOWARDS A PRINCIPLED QUESTION." CHAIRMAN ALBANIAN COUNSUL OF MINISTERS SHEHU AT JUNE 26 MASS RALLY PUT MATTER MORE BALDLY BY ASSERTING "CERTAIN PEOPLE PASS FOR "NUETRLS' IN THIS LIFE AND DEATH STRUGGLE BETWEEN MARXISM AND LENINISM AND MODERN REVISIONISM. 'NEUTRALITY' IN THIS STRUGGLE IS ONLY FAVORABLE TO MODERN REVISIONISM."

B. COMMENT: WHILE PEKING MAY STILL SHOW DEGREE TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY TOWARD DRV, WE CAN ONLY SEE CONTINUING FRICTION IN PEKING'S RELATIONS WITH DRV (AND INDEED OTHER COMMUNIST STATES AND PARTIES) IN ABSENCE HANOI (OR OTHERS) COMPLETE CAPITULATION ON THIS "PRINCIPLED" QUESTION OF TREATMENT OF "MODERN REVISIONISTS." (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. OUTER MONGOLIA

A. CHICOM FOREIGN MINISTRY NOTE TO MPR EMBASSY DATED JUNE 20 PROTESTEED ALLEGED INTRUSION OF MPR BORDER GUARDS INTO CHINESE TERRITORY ON APRIL 1 NORTH OF HUHEHOT, INNER MONGOLIA, AND CHARGED THAT THEY HAD KIDNAPPED

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

-6-2358, June 30, from: Hong Kong

HERDSMAN MISTREATED AND INTERROGATED HIM FOR 27 DAYS "IN PRESENCE OF SOVIET PERSONNEL," AND FORCED HIM TO SIGN STATEMENTS APPARENTLY ADMITTING BORDER VIOLATION. CONTENTS OF NOTE WERE BRAODCAST IN MONGOLIAN LANGUAGE BY PEKING RADIO, BUT HAVE NOT APPEARED IN NCNA ENGLISH OR CHINESE. NOTE REFERRED TO PREVIOUS CHICOM NOTE OF DECEMBER 25, 1965, OUTLINGING "MEASURES" TAKEN BY CHICOMS REGARDING "INSTRUSIONS OF MPR SOLDIERS" INTO CHINESE TERRITORY. FONMIN CHARGED THAT INCIDENTS WERE "PLANNED PROVOCATIONS WHICH SERIOUSLY DAMAGE RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES" AND DEMANDED THAT MPR GUARANTEE AGAINST RECURRENCE SUCH EVENTS.

B. COMMENT: THIS IS FIRST EVIDENCE OF BORDER FRICTION BETWEEN CHICOMS AND MONGOLS SINCE CONCLUSION OF BOUNDARY TREATY IN 1962 AND DEMARCATION OF BOUNDARY WHICH COMPLETED IN MID-1964. LANGUAGE OF NOTE IS VERY TOUGH, AND ATTACKS SOVIETS AS WELL AS MONGOLIANS. IT APPEARS THAT SITUATION ON SINO-MONGOLIAN FRONTIER NOT MUCH BETTER THAN ON SINO-SOVIET BORDER, WHERE MORE THATN 5000 INCIDENTS OCCURED BETWEEN JULY 1960 AND DECEMBER 1965, ACCORDING TO CHEN YI IN MAY INTERVIEW WITH SCANDINAVIAN JOURNALISTS. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. ROMANIA

CHOU EN-LAI LEFT BUCHAREST FOR TIRANA ON JUNE 24, PROBABLY RELIEVED TO BE IN COMPANY OF ALBANIAN COMRADES AFTER FAILURE TO FIND ADEQUATE COMMON GROUND WITH ROMANIANS FOR JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED. ACUTE DIFFERENCES DURING TALKS WITH CEAUCESCU APPARENTLY CENTERED AROUNG VIETNAM AND CORRECT STANCE TOWARDS SOVIETS. AMONG SIGNS THAT CHOU GOT SHORT END OF TALKS WAS CONTRAST IN AIRPORT DEPARTURE SPEECHES, IN WHICH MAURER CHARACTERIZED ATMOSHERE OF TALKS AS "WARM AND FRIENDLY" WHILE CHOU FOUND DISCUSSIONS MERELY "FRANK" AND "USEFUL." (CONGENTELS 2326, 2347) (CONFIDENTIAL)

7. AFRO-ASIAN WRITERS

CONFERENCE OF A-A WRITERS, DESCRIBED BY NCNA AS BIGGEST MEETING OF ARO-ASIAN ORGANIZATION EVER HELD, OPENED JUNE 27 IN PEKING. WE ESTIMATE BETWEEN THIRD AND HALF OF DELEGATES ARE CHICOMS OR FOREIGN RESIDENTS OF PEKING. EVENTS LEADING UP TO MEETING, WHICH BILLED AS "EMERGENCY MEETING IN SUPPORT OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE" STORMY, OWING TO CLAIMS BY CAIRO-BASED PRO-SOVIET FACTION OF ORGANIZATION THAT PEKING MEETING ILLEGAL AND ITS

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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-7-2358, June 30, from: Hong Kong

SUBSEQUENT DECISION TO HOLD RIVAL MEETING IN BAKU, USSR, IN AUGUST. CHICOM OBSESSION FOR ATTACKING SOVIET "REVISIONISTS" WAS MANIFEST IN PRE-MEETING STATEMENTS, CHEN YI SPEECH TO OPEING SESSION, AND LENGTHY REPORT DELIVERED BY CEYLONESE REPRESENTATIVE OF INEXPLICABLY ABSENT A-A WRITERS BUREAU SECGEN SENANANYAKE. ALMOST SEEMS THAT REAL PURPOSE OF MEETING IS ANTI-SOVIET RATHER THAN SUPPORT FOR VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. (CONGENTEL 2319) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

8. KOREAN WAR ANNIVERSARY.

CHICOMS OBSERVED 16TH ANNIVERSARY OF OUTBREAK OF KOREAN WAR WITH MASS RALLY AND EDITORIALS, BUT UNLIKE LAST YEAR AVOIDED ANY SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO CHICOM "VOLUNTEERS" WHO SERVED IN KOREA AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO TO VIETNAM. INSTEAD, LOW-LEVEL RALLY SPEAKER AFFIRMED PEKING'S READINESS TO "FIGHT WAR AT ANY TIME...AGAINST AGGRESSION AND IN DDFENCE OF MOTHERLAND AND OF PEACE." IN ADDITION TO USUAL ATTACKS ON U.S. AND JAPAN, CHICOMS ATTACKED "MODERN RIVISIONISTS CENTERED AROUND CPSU LEADERSHIP" WHILE DPRK AMBASSADOR LISTENED ON ROSTRUM. FINALLY, THROUGHOUT ENTIRE OCCASION THERE WAS NO MENTION OF KOREAN WORKERS PARTY OR KIM IL SUNG. (CONGENTEL 2336) (CONFIDENTIAL)

9. NEPAL.

A. CROWN PRINCE OF NEPAL ARRIVED PEKING JUNE 26 IN VISIT "AT INVITATION OF CHOU EN-LAI" AND WAS GIVEN BANQUET BY CHEN YI ON BEHALF OF JUNKETING CHOU. PRINCE IN SPEECH STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF 1964 TRADE AGREEMENT AND RECENTLY REVEWED TIBET TRADE PACT, AND SPOKE OF "INCREASED POSSIBILITIES OF TRADE" IN WHICH "SINGLE GREATEST FACTOR WHICH HAS BROADENED TRADIONAL TRADE ROUTES" WAS NEWLY OPENED KATMANDU-KODARI HIGHWAY. NCNA HAD REPORTED PREVIOUS DAY KING MAHENDRA'S COMMENTS TO NATIONAL PANCHAYAT ON RECORD-INCREASE OF TRADE WITH CHINA THIS YEAR AND EXPECATIONS THAT NEW HIGHWAY WOULD RESULT IN STILL GREATER TRADE.

B. COMMENT: IT APPEARS THAT NEPALESE MAY BE PRESSING CHICOMS FOR STEPPED UP TIBET TRADE, AND UNUSUAL NCNA REPORT OF REMARKS ON SUBJECT BY KING IN KATHMANDU INDICATES PEKING MAY BE RESPONSIVE TO NEPALESE WISHED. IF MORE NEPALESE TRADERS ACTUALLY PERMITTED IN TIBER, THIS WOULD BE SIGN FO GROWING REGIME CONFIDENCE IN ITS CONTROL OVER AREA. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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AID POUCH: (2) BANGKOK, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, CANBERRA,
IC CINCPAC, DARESALAAM, DJAKARTA, KARACHI, KATHMANDU, KUALA
SIL LUMPUR, LONDON, MANILA, MOSCOW, MUNICH, NEW DELHI, PRAGUE,
AGR RANGOON, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SOFIA, SINGAPORE, (4) TAIPEI,
COM TOKYO, VIENTIANE, COMNAVPHIL, TAIWANDEFCOM, 13AFMANILA
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CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 25

RSR INTERNAL

1. CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

A. IN MAJOR EFFORT TRANSFORM MAO'S VISIONARY CONCEPT OF REVOLUTIONARY CHINA INTO REALITY, REGIME IN JUNE 13 CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND STATE COUNCIL NOTICE DECREED POSTPONEMENT COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMS FOR SIX MONTHS IN ORDER "THROUGHLY CARRY THROUGH CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND. . . REFORM EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM." PEOPLE'S DAILY JUNE 18 EDITORIAL ON SUBJECT INDICATED REGIME INTENDS DEVISE HIGHER EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE MAO'S THOUGH, WILL GIVE FIRST PLACE TO POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION, ELIMINATE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS (LARGELY THROUGH EXTENSION PART-WORK, PART-STUDY SYSTEM) AND ASSURE THAT CLASS BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL RELIABILITY ARE THE KEY CRITERIA GOVERNING ENTRANCE INTO HIGHER INSTITUTIONS.

B. DESIGNATION OF SIX MONTH PERIOD FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" IN SCHOOLS AND EDITORIALS, REFERENCE TO EXISTENCE IN EDUCATIONAL FIELD OF "MANY STUBBORN BOURGEOIS STRONGHOLDS WHICH HAVE NOT YET BEEN BREACHED" APPEARS FORESHADOW CONTINUING AND WIDESPREAD PURGES OF INTELLECTUALS AND EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATORS. NEED FOR SUCH PURGES PROBABLY CONFIRMED IN REGIME'S EYES BY EVIDENCE OF STRONG OPPOSITION WITHIN UNIVERSITIES TO CURRENT LEVEL "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" ACTIVITIES ON CAMPUS. NCNA JUNE FIVE REPORT

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HONG KONG 2317 (JUN 25) 6-23-66

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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REVEALED THAT FOLLOWING DISMISSAL PEKING UNIVERSITY PARTY COMMITTEE, "SOME STUDENTS WHO DID NOT KNOW THE TRUTH. . . MOMENTARILY PLUNGED UNIVERSITY INTO CHAOS." EXTENT OF THIS RESISTANCE INDICATED BY NCNA'S DISCLOSURE THAT "6000 TEACHERS, STUDENTS AND WORKERS" HAD BEEN RECALLED FROM COUNTRYSIDE TO "INCREASE STRENGTH OF UNIVERSITY'S PROLETARIAN REVOLUTIONARIES." REGIONAL BROADCASTS ALSO REVEAL PATTERN OF AS YET UNDISCLOSED DEGREE OF FACULTY AND STUDENT RESISTANCE TO PURGES AT WUHAN, NANKING AND SIAN COMMUNICATIONS UNIVERSITIES.

C. COMMENT: REGIME'S DECISION ZERO IN ON EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM INDICATIVE OF DISTRUST WITH WHICH IT VIES INTELLECTUALS AND UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. IT INCREASINGLY EVIDENT SUCH DISTRUST WELL PLACED OWING APPARENT UNWILLINGNESS OF EDUCATED CHINESE TO ABANDON COMMON SENSE AND ACQUIRED KNOWLEDGE IN FAVOR OF A REVOLUTIONARY MYSTIQUE -- AND ONE WHICH HAS ALREADY FAILED. WHILE REGIME MAY HAVE APPEARANCE OF SUCCESS IN IMPLEMENTING MAOIST LINE ON EDUCATION, WE WONDER HOW MUCH PERMANENCE MIGHT BE EXPECTED IN NEW ORDER WHICH, IN EFFECT, WILL DEAL HEAVY BLOW TO NATION'S INTELLECTUAL RESOURCES AND HENCE INVITE INCALCULABLE BUT PERHAPS DIRE CONSEQUENCES FOR CHINA'S FURTHER DEVELOPMENT. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. DEIFICATION OF MAO

A. CONTINUING CAMPAIGN TO DEIFY MAO HAS REACHED STAGE BORDERING ON HYSTERIA WITH SUBSTANTIAL PERCENTAGE NCNA OUTPUT FOR WEEK DEVOTED TO MAKING CASE THAT "RADIANCE OF MAO'S THOUGHT ILLUMINATES WHOLE WORLD." AS NCNA WOULD HAVE IT FOR BENEFIT OF DOMESTIC AUDIENCE, MAO STUDY IS SWEEPING THE WORLD AND PERSON OF MAO OCCUPYING UPPERMOST THOUGHTS VIRTUALLY ALL FOREIGNERS.

B. COMMENT: MAGNITUDE OF EFFORT TO INFLATE MAO'S PRESTIGE AT HOME BY REFERENCES TO HIS GLOBAL INFLUENCE NATUALLY RAISES QUESTION WHETHER REGIME IS ACTING IN BELIEF RECENT EVENTS HAVE LOWERED MAO'S STANDING AMONG IMPORTANT SEGMENTS CHINESE POPULATION. ALSO POSSIBLE THAT CAMPAIGN INTENDED TO MAKE THOUGHT OF MAO A MORE EFFICIENT BLUDGEON TO BE USED AGAINST DOMESTIC OPPONENTS REGIME'S POLICIES. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. LIN PIAO PROMINENTLY FEATURED

A. ALTHOUGH NOWHERE APPROACHING EXTENT OF MAO CAMPAIGN (SEE PRECEDING), IT APPARENT THAT CONTINUING EFFORT IS UNDERWAY BUILD UP LIN PIAO (WEEKA 24). PEOPLE'S DAILY AND ALL OTHER

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

PEKING PAPERS ON JUNE 19 FRONTPAGED LIN MARCH 11 LETTER PRAISING INDUSTRIAL AND COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENTS (PRESUMABLY OF CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE) FOR PLACING POLITICS IN COMMAND. ASIDE FROM SIGNIFICANCE OF RESUSCITATING THREE MONTH OLD LETTER AS MEANS SPLASHING LIN ON FRONT PAGES, WE DETECT IN LIN LETTER A CONSCIOUS EFFORT INTIMATE WRITING STYLE OF MAO. IT IS, OF COURSE, AN ACCEPTED CHINESE BUREAUCRATIC PRACTICE FOR THE HEIR APPARENT TO COPY THE STYLE OF HIS MASTER IN SPEECH AND WRITING. WE ALSO BELIEVE THIS IS FIRST TIME IN RECENT YEARS THAT LIN HAS TOUCHED ON SUBJECT NOT IN SOME WAY RELATED TO THE OVER-ALL REVOLUTIONARY PICTURE OR MILITARY AFFAIRS. ON JUNE 22, NCNA FURTHER CARRIED EDITORIAL OF LIBERATION ARMY JOURNAL OF SAME DATE EXTOLLING LIN PIAO'S MARCH 11 LETTER. ANOTHER INDICATION LIN RIDING HIGH APPEARED JUNE 20 EDITION LOCAL CHICOM PAPER WEN WEI PAO WHICH HEADLINED PRAISE BY FAR-OUT AMERICAN MARXIST GROUP OF LIN'S SEPTEMBER 3 ARTICLE "LONG LIVE VICTORY OF PEOPLE'S WAR."

B. COMMENT: THE FACT OF LIN'S RISE TO PROMINENCE SEEMS TO BE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE STILL UNANSWERED KEY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING HIS EMERGENCE. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. MORE INTELLECTUALS ON MAINLAND INVOLVED IN PURGE

A. MAINLAND REGIONAL BROADCASTS REPORTED FURTHER DENUNCIATIONS OF INTELLECTUALS AS ANTI-PARTY AND ANTI-SOCIALIST ELEMENTS. RADIO NANKING ON JUNE 14 BROADCAST NEW CHINA DAILY EDITORIAL CONCERNING T'AO PAI, DUPUTY DIRECTOR PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT CCP KIANGSU PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE, FOR FORCING PRESS TO PUBLISH HIS REACTIONARY ARTICLES 1959 THROUGH 1964 VILLIFYING PARTY AND MAO. RADIO NANCHANG JUNE 18 REPORTED RALLIES AT KIANGSI UNIVERSITY AND KIANGSI NORMAL COLLEGE TO DENOUNCE PROFESSOR KU CHI-KUANG FOR SLANDERING EDUCATIONAL REVOLUTION AND MILITIA, AND BEING SUPPORTER OF TEN T'O. RADIO SIAN JUNE 18 REPORTED DISMISSAL OF PENG KANG, SECRETARY OF CCP SIAN COMMUNICATIONS UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE. PENG REPORTEDLY ATTEMPTED JUNE 6 TO OUST WORK TEAM SENT TO UNIVERSITY TO PROMOTE REVOLUTION. RADIO NANNING JUNE 18 BROADCAST ARTICLE DENOUNCING LU TI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR PROGAGANDA DEPARTENT, CCP KWANGSI REGIONAL COMMITTEE, AUTHOR OF NOVEL OLD FRIENDS.

B. COMMENT: CADRES INVOLVED ARE FAIRLY HIGH ON PROVINCIAL LEVEL, AND ROUGHLY SAME RANK AS DENOUNCED EARLIER. APPEARS THAT AT LEAST FOR PRESENT PURGES WILL DEVELOP LATITUDINALLY AND SPREAD TO OTHER AREAS SO FAR NOT YET AFFECTED.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

C. PENG KANG MOST NOTABLE OF THESE NEW VICTIMS. HE WAS DIRECTOR PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT, CCP CENTRAL CHINA BUREAU, OF SINO-JAPANESE WAR PERIOD WHICH HEADED BY LIU SHAO-CHI. ABOUT 1949, WAS DIRECTOR PROGAGANDA DEPARTMENT OF SHANTUNG SUB-BUREAU. IN 1964, HEADED SINO-ALBANIA FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION DELEGATION TO ALBANIA'S 20TH LIBERATION CELEBRATIONS. T'AO PAI, KIANGSU COMMITTEE VICE-CHIEF, HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED FOR MANY YEARS AS DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION DEPARTMENT KIANGSU COMMITTEE.

EXTERNAL

5. VIETNAM

A. ONLY MAJOR CHICOM PRONOUNCEMENTS ON VIETNAM DURING PAST WEEK WERE PEOPLE'S DAILY "COMMENTATOR" ARTICLE IN SUPPORT OF NLF AND DRV STATEMENTS ON INCREASE IN U.S. TROOP STRENGTH, AND CHICOM MINISTRY WATER CONSERVANCY AND ELECTRIC POWER STATEMENT ENDORSING DRV COUNTERPART MINISTRY'S STATEMENT ON U.S. DESTRUCTION OF IRRIGATION AND DYKE SYSTEMS IN NORTH VIETNAM. BOTH CHICOM ITEMS APPEARED ON JUNE 20, AND BOTH WERE MARKED BY VIGOROUS CONDEMNATIONS OF AMERICAN "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY DUAL TACTICS" WHICH COMBINED WAR EXPANSION WITH "PEACE TALK PLOTS." VIETNAMESE STATEMENTS WHICH PROMPTED CHICOM COMMENT HAD DEALT ONLY MINIMALLY WITH QUESTION OF PEACE TALKS.
B. OF POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANCE FOR HANOI-PEKING RELATIONSHIP IS ABSENCE ANY NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMENT TO DATE ON REGIME'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION." NCNA JUNE 19 QUOTED APPARENTLY SOLICITED TESTIMONIALS OF PATHET LAO OFFICIALS IN KHANG KHAY WHO PRAISED PURGE OF "POISONOUS WEEDS" IN CHINA, BUT NO OTHER BLOC REACTIONS EXCEPT ALBANIA HAVE APPEARED. WE SUSPECT HANOI IS MORE THAN SOMEWHAT APPALLED BY PUBLIC EVIDENCE OF DISCORD WITHIN HIGHEST LEVEL OF CCP. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. CHOU TO ROMANIA

A. CHICOM PREMIER CHOU EN-LAO ARRIVED BUCHAREST JUNE 16 AS HEAD OF FOUR MAN PARTY GOVERNMENT DELEGATION. VISIT TO DATE HAS PRODUCED LITTLE EXCITEMENT SAVE THAT GENERATED BY CHOU'S FRONTAL ATTACK ON SOVIET "REVISIONISTS" AT JUNE 17 LUNCHEON. CHOU HAS ALSO ALLUDED POINTEDLY TO ROMANIAN-SOVIET DIFFERENCES, BUT HOSTS HAVE REFRAINED FROM PUBLIC CONTROVERSY, PREFERRING TO EMPHASIZE "FRIENDSHIP" ASPECT OF VIST. BESIDES INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, ONE TOPIC APPARENTLY GENERATING INTEREST IN TALKS IS CURRENT "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" IN CHINA, WHICH CHOU SOUGHT TO EXPLAIN AWAY AS CAMPAIGN AGAINST "SMALL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

HANDFUL" OF INTELLECTUALS AND "ANTI-PARTY VILLAINS." CHOU WILL VISIT ALBANIA AFTER ROMANIA, WITH SUBSEQUENT STOPS REPORTED BY WESTERN PRESS TO BE IN WORKS FOR UAR AND PAKISTAN B. COMMENT: PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY CHOU AND HOSTS INDICATE CONSIDERABLE AREAS OF DISARGEEMENT ON SUCH ISSUES AS VIETNAM AND INTRA-BLOC RELATIONS. HOWEVER, VERY FACT OF VISIT INDICATES EXTENT TO WHICH PEKING WILLING TO SUBMERGE HALLOWED PRINCIPLES FOR SAKE OF STRENGTHENING LINK WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRY WHICH HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW. (CONFIDENTIAL)

7. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DISARMAMENT.
A. PEOPLE'S DAILY "OBSERVER" JUNE 20 REJECTED ANY EFFORTS TO INVOLVE CHICOMS IN PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY, NON-PROLIFERATION ARRANGEMENTS, OR WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. OBVIOUSLY DISCOMFITED BY NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE ON U.S. BROACHING OF NUCLEAR ISSUE AT WARSAW TALKS, CHICOMS REITERATED STANDARD ARGUMENTS AGAINST ALLEGED U.S.-SOVIET "NUCLEAR MONOPOLY" AND STRESSED CHINESE REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO "COUNTER U.S. NUCLEAR THREAT AND BREAK (THIS) MONOPOLY." APART FROM PROPAGANDA CONTENT OF ARTICLE, OBSERVER'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST SUBSTANCE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAENT PROPOSALS LEFT IMPRESSION THAT CHICOMS FIND ALL SUCH PROPOSALS UNATTRACTIVE IN LIGHT THEIR FELT NEED FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, AS PROTECTION BOTH AGAINST U.S. AND USSR. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. SEOUL CONFERENCE

A. PEKING CONDEMNED SEOUL CONFERENCE IN PEOPLE'S DAILY "OBSERVER" ARTICLE JUNE 18 AND FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT JUNE 21, AS WELL AS NCNA COVERAGE AND EXTRACTS FROM ADVERSE COMMENT BY JAPANESE COMMUNIST, NORTH KOREA, NORTH VIETNAMESE AND PATHET LAO SPOKESMEN. CHICOMS SAW CONFERENCE AS U.S. ATTEMPT "ORGANIZE NEW AGGRESSIVE ALLIANCE" IN ASIA BY ASSEMBLING ALL ITS "ACCOMPLICES, PUPPETS AND VASSALS." NEW GROUPING ALLEGEDLY FURTHERED U.S. AIM OF "TIGHTENING MILITARY ENCIRCLEMENT OF CPR, PREPARING FOR ARMED ATTACKS ON CPR AND DPRK, AND FURTHER EXPANSION OF. . .VIETNAM WAR." FONMIN STATEMENT SINGLED OUT JAPAN AS "CHIEF ACCOMPLICE" OF U.S. IT ALSO CHARGED THAT SOVIET REACTION TO CONFERENCE HAD BEEN "DOUBLE-DEALING TRICK" AND THAT CPSU LEADING GROUP HAD BECOME "SABOTEUR OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS OF PEOPLE OF ASIA AND WHOLE WORLD." IN FACE OF SUCH FORMIDABLE ARRAY OF "PAPER TIGERS," FONMIN STATEMENT STOUTLY DECLARED READINESS OF CHINESE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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PEOPLE TO SUPPORT PEOPLES OF VIETNAM, KOREA, LAOS, JAPAN, THAILAND, CAMBODIA "AND OTHERS" AND TO RESIST U.S. "TO THE END" IF IT SHOULD "IMPOSE WAR ON CHINESE PEOPLE."

B. COMMENT: ONLY CHICOM IDEOLOGICAL GYMNASTS COULD FIND GROUNDS FOR NEW VERBAL ATTACK ON SOVIET "REVISIONISTS" IN ASPAC ASSEMBLAGE AT SEOUL. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE).

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ORIGIN/ACTION

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ARA	EUR	FE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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A-816 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

INFO : (See last page for distribution.)

FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG DATE: June 8, 1966

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 22

REF :

1966 JUN 8 PM 4 30

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

Action Assigned

Action Taken

Date of Action

Action Office Symbol

Initials of Officer

Direction to RM/R

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Liberation Army Journal Steps Up Attacks on Intellectual "Authorities"
2. Back to Mao Study - The Whole World and the Southwest Bureau
3. Chinese Academy of Sciences Political Work Conference Announced
4. 100 Million Red Scarves

External

5. Alleged U.S. Attacks on Chicom Fishing Boats Protested
6. Vietnam: Le Duc Tho Transits Peking Unheralded
7. Afghan National Day
8. Guyana Independence

Military

9. Is Ideological Revolution in the PLA Lagging?

NOTE TO READERS: In accordance with instructions from the Department, the Chinese Communist Joint WEEKA will hereafter be transmitted telegraphically to the Department, and by pouch in telegram format to info addressees.

1966 JUN 8 PM 3 31

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Drafted by: DAMALO:Col Treadwell
POL:NPlank,CKamman,YSNg:nom,drb,6/2/66

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. Liberation Army Journal Steps Up Attacks on Intellectual "Authorities"

Editorial notes and a short commentary appearing in the Liberation Army Journal last week made a series of threatening statements which suggested that the campaign against intellectual questioners of current militant orthodoxy was entering a new stage. On May 28, the short commentary entitled, "Long Live the Great Leap Forward" appeared along side Liberation Army Journal features praising the regime's recent economic and scientific achievements and concluded with the statement: "Let those imperialists, revisionists, and all freaks and monsters tremble before our Great Leap Forward!" An editorial note appearing on the same day in conjunction with an item on placing politics in the fore ended with the ominous rejoinder: "Let those honorable old capitalist 'authorities' who oppose our placing politics in the fore and who oppose the living study and application of Mao's thought dance with thundering rage." The day before, another Liberation Army Journal editorial note widely published in other Peking papers also promised to "fight and reject to the very end" all capitalist authorities who had "shamelessly slandered" the study and application of Mao's thought.

Comment: The Liberation Army Journal appears to be preparing the mass level ground work for more explicit denounciations of those "authorities" and "scholars" and "specialists" in the cultural, economic, and scientific fields, who, we have conjectured, may have supported a more pragmatic approach in a recent debate over the future course of ChiCom policy (WEEKAS 16 and 19). As we go to press the People's Daily has extended the hue and cry with its first significant internal editorial in weeks, entitled: "Sweep Away all Monsters."

The "authorities," "specialists," and "scholars" categories previously defined as targets presumably are to be found primarily at the ministry level and below. However, the ideological implications of opposing Mao's thought are sufficiently grave to be used to build up a case against losers out in the power

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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struggle evidently now going on, even though there may not necessarily be any connection between those who questioned policy and those involved in a power struggle. (We have difficulty, for instance, envisaging hard-liners like Peng Chen espousing revisionist policies.)

The appearance in the Liberation Army Journal of fulsome praise of the Great Leap Forward and threatening scorn for those who opposed it gives national prominence to a recent secondary propaganda theme which has up to now appeared mainly in provincial media attacks on Teng T'o and his "black gang." The suggestion is that the time has arrived for a final settling of old scores against Party intellectuals who criticized the Great Leap. However, the present tense context of the Liberation Army Journal commentary, plus the more important fact that the regime has mounted an enormous effort in past months to whitewash the failure of the Great Leap, could also mean that the leadership is planning to launch some sort of new economic "upsurge" (WER 22, Item 1). (ConGenTel 2171) (Confidential)

2. Back to Mao Study - The Whole World and the South West Bureau

Stress on the study of Mao Tse-tung's thought, a theme which flooded Mainland media during February, March and April but ebbed somewhat during May with the onset of the "great socialist cultural revolution" and the attacks on Teng T'o, has returned in saturation doses to the Mainland press. One novel feature of the recent treatment has been the obsequious lengths traveled to portray Mao as an object of international adoration and emulation. A Canton Evening News editorial of May 29 which was reprinted in the Peking papers termed the Chairman "the most outstanding leader of the contemporary international Communist movement" and its "greatest standard bearer." The June 1 People's Daily devoted its entire fourth page to reports on the study and application of Mao's thought by people throughout the world. "Chairman Mao, China's great leader is the sun in the hearts of the 650 million people, and the sun in the hearts of all the revolutionary people in the world," brayed an ecstatically sycophantic editor's note accompanying the effusions.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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An organizationally important event of recent months in the Mao study campaign was the Southwest Bureau conference of Mao study activist cadres, held in Chengtu "recently," according to a May 27 Chengtu Radio broadcast. A communique issued by the conference made the usual points, emphasizing the role of leadership cadres at the county level and above, invoking the "spirit of rectification," demanding that Party committees at all levels arrange a fixed time for leadership cadres to engage in study, requiring that the first secretaries of Party committees should take the lead in studying and applying Mao's works, and remolding their thought, and improving their work. The tone of this stereotyped announcement was relatively mild.

Comment: The Southwest bureau was the only regional bureau which had not held a conference to discuss implementation of the original Mao-study directives. Now that the regional pattern is complete, it remains to be seen whether the momentum of the campaign can be maintained at the lower levels.

The build up of Mao as an international object of reverence appears to be aimed at inflating Mao's prestige within China. Why this should be necessary at the present is not entirely clear in view of all the enormous efforts spent in the past several years to pump up his image. If Teng T'o derisive jibes at Mao in 1962 (as recently published in the attacks against the black gang) are any indication, Mao's reputation was considerably lower than we imagined, requiring a much more extensive rebuilding job then was originally supposed. Whatever the reasons, the current state of Mao emulation on the Mainland has reached new heights of defensiveness and hysteria, not to mention an eerie divorcement from the world of reality. (Limited Official Use)

3. Chinese Academy of Sciences Political Work Conference Announced

NCNA May 31 announced that an enlarged conference of the Chinese Communist Party Chinese Academy of Sciences Committee (not the Chinese Academy of Sciences Party Committee) and a political work conference had been concluded early in April.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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The conference probably was held at the Institute of Chemical Physics in Lushun-Dairen, which was the scene of an "on-the-spot meeting" just prior to the gathering.

The conference predated the current stage of the "socialist cultural revolution," with the result that there was little in the communique to suggest that scientists and technicians would soon be joining their liberal arts colleagues in the stocks. The only element that could be related to the current intellectual purge was an exhortation to "break down the superstitious belief in the bourgeois authorities, and intensify efforts to foster the younger generation." For the rest, the communique concentrated in standard fashion on problems of placing politics to the fore in science, relating the class struggle to the scientific field, and transforming science into a red and expert tool of proletarian politics.

The communique also demanded that the Academy of Sciences must "thoroughly overthrow the 'Chia-kuei ideology' (we have no idea to what or to whom this refers) and overthrow all crawling ideas in the development of science." China's scientists must arm themselves with Mao Tse-tung's thought and "starting with practical conditions" work hard to catch up and surpass the advanced, the communique stated. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: The most significant aspect of the conference is the revelation of the existence of the CCP Chinese Academy of Sciences Committee. This is an organ on which we have no record to date. Pending more definite identification, the word order and nomenclature suggests that it is an organ of the CCP Central Committee which has charge over the Chinese Academy of Sciences. It might be on the same level, though not so large as, the CCP Political Department for Higher Education, which was first mentioned on February 24, 1966. The existence of a CCP Central Committee organ overseeing the Chinese Academy of Sciences is logical in view of the current emphasis on politics, and would parallel efforts over the past two years to reorganize the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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the Central Committee work departments in industry, communication, trade, finance, and agriculture. (See WER 22, Item 6).

4. 100 Million Red Scarves

NCNA May 31 announced that the membership of the Young Pioneers, the youth organization with jurisdiction over youngsters from ages 7-15, had reached 100 million. A People's Daily editorial celebrating International Youth Day on June 1 further revealed that the Pioneers had grown from 50 million to the current figure all in the space of one year.

Comment: The enormous growth of the Young Pioneers dates from the Second Plenum of the Ninth YCL Central Committee in April 1965, at which instructions for the reorganization and expansion of the Pioneers were issued (WEEKAS 18, 23, 33, 1965). We strongly doubt that the stated goal of organizing all children between the ages of 7 and 15 has yet been achieved, however. Furthermore it is doubtful that an organization so large, with no entry requirements and no standards for maintaining membership has any real meaning. Now that every child is entitled to wear it, the red scarf of the Pioneers has become just another article of clothing. (Unclassified)

Whether effective or not, this dramatic organizational gesture serves to underline the regime's continuing, and perhaps increasing, concern over the purity of the younger generation. Another sign of the same phenomenon during the past week has been the constant defensive claims in the press to the effect that the "third and fourth generations" will not repeat not succumb to the blandishments of "peaceful evolution," as hoped for by the "imperialists and modern revisionists." (Unclassified)

External

5. Alleged U.S. Attacks on ChiCom Fishing Boats Protested

A ChiCom Defense Ministry spokesman statement of May 29 and a People's Daily Commentator article of May 30 protested alleged

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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American bombing and strafing of ChiCom fishing vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin which the Chinese claimed had killed three and wounded eighteen in two separate incidents May 28. The spokesman and the article both viewed the incidents as "provocations" which had added to the "blood debt" owed by the U.S. to the Chinese people. Although the spokesman avowed that "we shall definitely settle the blood debts incurred by U.S. imperialism," he gave no indication when this would happen; the People's Daily Commentator followed his lead in treating the incidents as a "blood debt. . .which the Chinese people will surely settle." Commentator went on to point out that the attacks were further evidence of U.S. "hostility" towards the Chinese people and which "served to remind the Chinese people that they must be alert to danger in time of peace and must raise their vigilance a hundred fold and be prepared at all times." For some reason, NCNA's summary of the Commentator article was later corrected to omit the phrase "alert to danger in time of peace" -- a phrase also absent from the People's Daily text of the article.

Comment: Peking's reaction to alleged U.S. air attacks on its fishing boats is the sharpest since last December (WEEKA 50, 1965), but the regime continues to regard the matter as a "provocation" rather than aggression and avoids specifying how and when retribution will be exacted. The People's Daily had already spoken of "blood debts" in conjunction with alleged boat strafing last December and even then the phrase had lost much of its traditional Chinese forcefulness through repetition. Of possibly greater significance in the present instance is the issuance of an official ChiCom reaction in the form of a statement by a spokesman of the Defense Ministry, not the Foreign Ministry or "department concerned," which resembles the handling of plane downings but has not, to our knowledge, been applied to fishing boat losses before. This technique may have been used by Peking to add a greater note of gravity to the alleged incidents, perhaps in an attempt to inhibit U.S. air missions over the Guld of Tonkin which disrupt sea-borne infiltration of military supplies to the Viet Cong. At the same time, of course, the protests over the alleged incidents involving "peaceful Chinese fishermen" help to support

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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ChiCom charges before Chinese and world opinion that the U.S. is implacably hostile to China and that U.S. gestures of friendship toward China are a fraud. (ConGenTels 2175, 2180) (Confidential)

6. Vietnam: Le Duc Tho Transits Peking Unheralded

A. Peking-Hanoi Relations

According to Hanoi's VNA, Lao Dong Politburo member Le Duc Tho, a frequent traveler to Eastern Europe in recent years, headed a DRV delegation to the Czech Communist Party's 13th Congress. On his way to Prague, Tho arrived in Peking on May 26 and Moscow on May 28. Hanoi reported that he had been greeted and later seen off at Peking airport by Chinese Politburo member Li Hsien-nien and Chao Yi-min, an alternate member of the CCP Central Committee who ranks high in its International Department. Although Tho remained in Peking for over 24 hours, NCNA said nothing about his visit, nor have ChiCom media mentioned the existence of a Czech Party Congress. Peking's attitude stands out in sharp relief to Hanoi's treatment of the Congress, which included a congratulatory message from Ho Chi Minh and a Nhan Dan editorial which praised the socialist accomplishments of the Czech people under the leadership of their Party, and expressed gratitude for Prague's sympathy and support for the Vietnamese "struggle against the U.S. aggressors."

Comment: The Czechs and Vietnamese by no means see eye to eye on all questions, but Hanoi's relatively high-level participation in the Czech Congress is not surprising in the context of its policy of seeking aid from all quarters. Nevertheless, Le Duc Tho undoubtedly found his reception in Peking chilly, since his mission represents yet another instance of what Teng Hsiao-ping on May 6 called "opportunism" in the international Communist movement. (Limited Official Use)

B. Other Coverage

Vietnam continued to take second place to internal matters in ChiCom last week. Except for some warmed-over NFL and North

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Vietnamese comment on dry season "victories" over U.S. forces, NCNA managed only a summary of Walter Lippman's May 25 column which called the war in Vietnam "impossible," and a biting synopsis of what was termed Secretary Rusk's "gangster logic" in his speech to the Council on Foreign Relations. According to NCNA, the Secretary reaffirmed U.S. "persistence in its war of aggression in Vietnam" and emphasized the primary goal of American foreign policy was attainment of "a world in which the oppressed people are forbidden to rise in revolution and the old order is maintained. " (Unclassified)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

7. Afghan National Day

An Afghanistan National Day reception in Peking on May 27 drew Chou En-lai, Vice Premier Hsieh Fu-chih and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, who was the Chicom speaker. Chen, who can usually be counted upon to come out with some fiery remarks attacking American "imperialists" or Soviet "revisionists," uttered a few platitudes about Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism, but otherwise confined himself to repetitive tributes to the "friendly relations and cooperation between China and Afghanistan" which had been cemented by Liu Shao-chi's April visit (WEEKA 15) and would be further enhanced by the forthcoming visit of the Afghan Prime Minister next autumn. As reported by NCNA, the Afghan Ambassador's speech in reply was even more non-committal than Chen's. He stressed Kabul's neutrality in foreign policy and also took pleasure in the reciprocal visits touched off by the Afghan King's 1964 visit.

Comment: The exchange of speeches reflects the relatively moderate, tolerant tone which characterized Liu's trip, and provides soothing relief from the shrillness and militance which have generally characterized Chicom dealings with Afro-Asian countries in the past year. While there appear to be no serious difficulties in Sino-Afghan bilateral relations, neither do the two countries' views on world issues seem to have much in common. For example, not even Afghan support for Chicom representation in the U.N. was mentioned in the NCNA report of the reception, though it had figured in coverage of the Afghan Abmassador's national day speech last year. (Limited Official Use)

8. Guyana Independence

On the eve of British Guiana's becoming independent, Premier Chou En-lai sent a congratulatory telegram to Forbes Burnham, Prime Minister of the country which was renamed Guyana. A People's Daily editorial on May 26 rejoiced at the event, but warned that the Guyana people nonetheless still faced the "serious task" of frustrating the "sinister designs of the British colonialists and American neo-colonialists." Unlike such newly independent countries as Malta (September 1964), Guyana did not receive notification of Chicom recognition along with congratulations on independence. Among the reasons for Peking's coolness are the pro-West leanings of Burnham's government and its invitation of a high-level GRC representative to the independence celebrations. (Unclassified)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Military

9. Is Ideological Revolution in the PLA Lagging?

An NCNA May 4 release commented on a General Political Department directive which reiterated the need to put politics to the fore, revolutionize thinking and apply the strategy of the people's war. The directive urged Party Committees to pay particular attention to the lagging efforts of leading cadres at or above regimental level in the study of Mao.

Probably related to the directive was a meeting of a "certain CCAF unit" (NCNA, May 17) which "is attracting universal attention in the Army." The meeting ran through the normal course of discussion on the correctness of Mao's thought but made several specific charges which are interesting in view of the "attention" which was allegedly focused on the meeting and in view of the current speculation about a personal power struggle in Peking, the whereabouts of Lo Jui-ching, and the involvement of the PLA.

The meeting mentioned "some" who complain that the chief weak link in the work of the Army is not in political or ideological construction but is in military technique and training. The rebuttal claims that this view is not compatible with the actual situation, but admits that technical work will be "slightly affected while the fundamental construction is being grasped." Again, "some" are criticized for not being able to handle the relationship between personal and collective interests, are ingrained with individualist ideas and have not adopted sufficiently tough styles of work.

For the Deputy Principal Officer:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED

(2) BANGKOK CANBERRA KARACHI MOSCOW RANGOON SOFIA V'NTIANE
BELGRADE CPACPLAD KATHMANDU MUNICH ROME S'PORE COMNAVPHL
BUCHAREST DARESALAAM KLUMPUR NDELHI SAIGON (4)TAIPEI TAIWANDEFCOM
BUDAPEST DJAKARTA LONDON PRAGUE SEOUL TOKYO 13AFMANILA
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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POL 54 (11)

DATE: 27 May '60 MSG NO.: A-799 TYPE: airgram

FROM: Hong Kong TO: State

SUBJECT: Weeka 21

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ✓ OTHER: _____

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Pol 2-1 CHICOM

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A-786 NO. | SECRET | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

1966 MAY 25 PM 3 50

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG

DATE: May 20, 1966

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 20

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Peking Alleges U.S. Downed Chicom Plane over China
2. Sino-Albanian Joint Statement
3. Romania: Party-Government Delegation Stops in Peking
4. World Reaction to Nuclear Test as Reported by Peking
5. Sino-Soviet Relations
6. Peking to Provide Ships for Repatriation of Chinese from Indonesia

Internal

7. Attacks on Teng To Sweep Mainland
8. Kuo Mo-jo Explains Self-Criticism
9. Private Plots Abolished in Shantung Brigade

Military
Negative

Mongolia
Negative

1966 MAY 25 PM 4 32

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1966 MAY 25 PM 2 DEPT OF STATE

Action Assigned to: REE/OD

Action Taken: Noted

Date of Action: 6/1/66

Action Office Symbol: REE/DC

Name of Officer:

Direction to RM/R:

SECRET

SECRET

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FORM DS-323

Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,CKamman,SYNg:nom,drb

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

External

1. Peking Alleges U.S. Downed ChiCom Plane over China

A May 12 NCNA release charged that five "intruding" U.S. fighter planes using guided missiles shot down a Chinese plane on a "training flight over the area northeast of Makwan, Yunnan." (Makwan is about ten miles north of the Sino-DRV border.) The NCNA charge was followed up the same day by a brief but pungent statement by a "spokesman of the Ministry of National Defense" which termed the affair an "extremely grave incident, a deliberate, systematic act of war provocation" and noted the "extreme indignation" of the Chinese people and PLA. The statement warned that the Chinese people "were not to be trifled with" and reiterated Chou En-lai's four point statement on the regime's policy toward the U.S., stressing Chou's affirmation that "should U.S. imperialism insist on extending the war and imposing war on the Chinese people. . .we will certainly go on with it to the end."

The statement also made an effort to demonstrate that the incident was not an isolated act but occurred against a background of alleged increasingly threatening U.S. actions and statements aimed at China.

The incident also prompted a May 13 Liberation Army Daily editorial which though couched in more strident language, did not go beyond the basics of the Ministry of National Defense statement. As in the case of the latter, the editorial called the incident a "war provocation" and also referred to war with the U.S. as a future contingency, although it placed greater stress on the incorrigibility of U.S. imperialism and therefore on the need to "put all our activity on the footing of a possible war." Chou's four points were again cited, but this time singled out for emphasis was the Premier's warning: "If you (the U.S.) can come from the sky, we can fight it out on the ground. Once war breaks out it will have no boundaries." The choice of this particular point appeared to be an effort to enhance the deterrent value of the regime's reaction to the

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

incident by means of exploiting a subject which Peking is fully aware is of great concern to U.S. public and governmental opinion -- the prospect of a Sino-U.S. land confrontation.

As the week progressed it became apparent that Peking was not preparing for a major propaganda campaign centering around the incident. Although a number of articles from foreign sources condemning this latest manifestation of alleged U.S. aggressiveness were reported and an effort was made to prove the veracity of the Chinese claim that the incident took place over Chinese territory by publishing on May 17 photographs of missile fragments and auxiliary fuel tanks allegedly emanating from the intruding U.S. planes, the regime's public media continued to be overwhelmingly concerned with the unfolding anti-rightist campaign.

Comment: The language and substance of Peking's treatment of the incident closely parallels that contained in previous protests against alleged U.S.-ChiCom aerial clashes, even though in the present case a Chinese plane and not one of ours was downed. In all cases, including this one, the key element appears to be the description of the incident as an "act of war provocation" rather than "aggression," which to us carries the attendant implication that Peking does not view the event in itself as requiring a further Chinese response as would have been the case had the accusation of aggression been involved. We also view the Chinese effort to prove that the incident took place over China as an indication of the regime's basically cautious approach to the issue in that Peking apparently does not wish to imply that it has embarked on a policy of active air assistance to the DRV and instead is concentrating on making a case of bellicose American behavior.

Our feeling is, however, that while Peking has probably learned to live with isolated air incidents, there are in China psychological and political considerations which could impel the regime to a vigorous reaction in the event it feels that U.S. air activity in the vicinity of its borders is increasing in frequency. (Secret) (ConGenTel 2066)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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2. Sino-Albanian Joint Statement

A long Sino-Albanian joint statement dated May 11 and published by NCNA on May 14 did not depart from themes already belabored in the flood of speeches occasioned by the two-week visit of Premier Shehu (WEEKAS 18 and 19). In summing up the foreign policy views of the two regimes, the joint statement and a subsequent People's Daily editorial of May 15 acknowledged that the world was in the process of "great upheaval, great division and great reorganization" but insisted that any "adverse currents" in the world situation were "temporary phenomena." Against this background, the People's Daily acclaimed the visit for having "struck fear into the hearts of the enemy but tremendously encouraged /our/ friends."

Both the statement and the editorial affirmed specifically the theme stressed throughout the visit -- that of equating the anti-revisionist with the anti-imperialist struggle. Thus, in the context of an appeal for the broadest possible "international united front against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys" the editorial declared that the fight against "modern revisionism with the CPSU leading group as its center" and the fight against the U.S. were "two inseparable tasks." Perhaps as an outgrowth of this preoccupation with the struggle against modern revisionism, the statement devoted considerably more space to attacking the Soviets than the U.S. Teng Hsiao-ping's May 6 attack on "centrists" in the crucial struggle between Marxist-Leninists and revisionists was incorporated in the statement's warning that "an opportunist and pragmatic attitude is bound to cause serious damage to the revolutionary cause."

Comment: In effect, Peking and Tirana have stepped up verbal pressure on other parties to repudiate the Soviets once and for all, presumably in full awareness that this could only embarrass fence-straddling Hanoi. Despite the stridency of the joint statement and editorial, which appears to be an effort to convey an impression of strength and confidence, we detect an underlying note of uncertainty and defensiveness. Aside from reiteration of the "great upheaval" line, the statement carries

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

the surprisingly frank admission that after exchanging experiences, neither the ChiComs nor the Albanians as yet have the final word on how to prevent the internal emergence of revisionism and restoration of capitalism. We also feel that nowhere is ChiCom isolation better reflected than in the spectacle of the world's most populous nation grasping at the straw of tiny Albania to assure the world and its domestic audience that the regime's policies are perfectly correct. Peking, at least in this respect, seems to have lost touch with reality -- we can hardly see the regime's enemies fearful and its friends encouraged by the link with Albania. (ConGenTel 2079) (Confidential)

3. Romania: Party-Government Delegation Stops in Peking

A Romanian Party and government delegation headed by Emil Bodnaras stopped in Peking on May 11 en route back to Romania from a week's visit to North Vietnam. During its two-day stay, the delegation had talks with Chou En-lai, Chen Yi and Li Hsien-nien and attended two evening banquets at which Chou and others were present. No indication was given of the topics discussed or even of the "atmosphere" of the discussions. We also note that the Romanians managed to get out of town without uttering a word for publication on the ChiCom nuclear test, which had been announced just two days before their arrival.

Comment: Though the delegation's visit to Peking coincided with the sudden visit to Bucharest of Leonid Brezhnev, our guess is that neither Brezhnev's visit nor the projected Chou visit to Romania occupied first place on the agenda of talks. It seems more likely Vietnam was foremost in the minds of the Romanians and ChiComs alike, but that their viewpoints diverged in important respects. (ConGenTel 2059) (Confidential)

4. World Reaction to Nuclear Test as Reported by Peking

Diverse messages of congratulations to the Chinese on their third nuclear explosion continued to receive prominence in ChiCom propaganda media more than a week after the announcement

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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of the explosion itself (WEEKA 19). Among the more important figures sending messages were Prince Sihanouk and the Party and government chiefs of Albania, North Korea and North Vietnam. Then there was Kwame Nkrumah, who was no longer identified as "President" Nkrumah. Of the host of lesser figures and organizations, those of the DRV and NLF figured most heavily. In its roundup of press reactions abroad, NCNA pictured Washington and London as worried, and Paris as impressed, with the rapidity of the ChiCom nuclear program. Moscow's reaction was one of "opposition," said NCNA, citing a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman's comment to a Yugoslav reporter that the USSR was "against nuclear tests." Themes stressed in ChiCom coverage of foreign opinion centered around Peking's pledge not to use nuclear weapons first and the contribution to world peace represented by this new evidence that China had broken the nuclear "monopoly" of the West (which in the Chinese lexicon includes USSR). The regime has understandably avoided mentioning that its ambiguous description of the blast as "containing thermo-nuclear material" has been interpreted in the West to mean that the device was essentially fission type, though containing some fusion elements. (Unclassified)

5. Sino-Soviet Relations

A. Sholokhov Attacked. Soviet writer Mikhail Sholokhov, winner of the 1965 Nobel Prize for literature, has become the object of coordinated attacks in the ChiCom literary journal Wen Yi Pao and the People's Daily. As excerpted by NCNA on May 14 and 15, articles pointed to Sholokhov as the epitomy of all that is wrong with Soviet literature nowadays, which can be boiled down to "bourgeois pacifism" and "revisionist capitulationism." Sholokhov's short novel "Fate of a Man" (1956) was singled out for detailed analysis from the ChiCom militant revolutionary point of view, and was found wanting in every respect. Attacks of this nature are not new in the Sino-Soviet polemic, but there may be added significance to their appearance at a time when the campaign being waged against Chinese "reactionary" intellectuals has reached a new pitch (Item 7). (Unclassified)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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B. Komsomol Invitation Rejected. The Chinese Communist Youth League sent its Soviet counterpart a mercifully brief letter dated May 10 which rejected the Komsomol invitation to its Fifteenth Congress in Moscow. Of interest was the date of the invitation -- according to the ChiComs, it came in a letter of March 30, which was a week after Peking published its decision to boycott the 23rd CPSU Congress. Despite that slap, the Soviets evidently maintained a posture of correctness towards the Chinese comrades by tendering an invitation which was sure to be rejected, thus shifting the onus for "splittism" once again onto Peking's shoulders. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese News Agency reported on May 16 that a delegation from the Viet Cong youth organization had left for Moscow to attend the Congress. (Unclassified)

C. Travel Freeze. Reuters reported from Peking on May 15 that the Soviet Ambassador to Communist China, Sergei Lapin, had refused to go on the annual spring diplomatic tour organized by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, apparently the first time the Soviets have boycotted the safari. The Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires likewise stayed home, thus joining his Soviet colleague in protest against the statements attacking Soviet leaders and President Tito in the Sino-Albanian joint statement. (Unclassified)

6. Peking to Provide Ships for Repatriation of Chinese From Indonesia

In a May 18 note to the Indonesian Embassy, Peking made known its decision to provide ships "in the nearest future" for "thousands upon thousands" of Chinese nationals who desire repatriation from Indonesia. The note proposed that the two Governments immediately hold "concrete talks" in order to work out proper arrangements to facilitate the safe and speedy repatriation of these individuals along with their property and wealth.

Despite the regime's willingness to provide ships, the note rejected the Indonesian May 5 disclaimer of responsibility for such arrangements and again called on Djakarta to assume the shipping burden. As a backdrop to the note, NCNA on May 18 carried a long article giving the bloody details of alleged Indonesian violence against the Chinese. Both the note and

DECLASSIFIED
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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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the article continued the recent ChiCom practice of attributing direct responsibility to the Indonesian Government for the planning and implementation of anti-Chinese acts. (See WEEKA 15) (ConGenTel 2091) (Limited Official Use)

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Internal

7. Attacks on Teng To Sweep Mainland

The campaign against Peking Party Committee secretary and former People's Daily editor Teng To has gone farther faster than any anti-intellectual attacks on record. The May 9 assaults by the Liberation Army Journal and the Peking Kwangming Jih Pao have been broadcast throughout the country and echoed at mass forums at such length that news on other subjects from the provincial radio has been noticeably driven into the background. In fact, grass roots criticism meetings by peasants, workers and soldiers have almost totally eclipsed provincial coverage of such key events as the third nuclear explosion and the alleged intrusion of U.S. aircraft into Chicom air space. (See items 1,4 .) In the national press, May 11 People's Daily reprints of a Shanghai Wen Hui Pao and Liberation Daily attacking Teng shared the front page with reportage of the Mao-Shehu meeting and took up two full additional pages of the paper. Other Peking papers also reprinted the May 11 and later articles, and some were forced by the length of the attacks to add supplementary pages.

The total saturation of national and provincial media with anti-Teng material and the mobilization of country-wide basic level criticism meetings was accomplished in the short span of two days. The process in the case of other target intellectuals, ranging from Yang Hsien-chen in 1964 to Wu Han in 1965-66, took a much longer period of time, with arcane attacks simmering on the cultural pages of the newspapers for months before gradually being broadened out to involve the man in the street.

Substantively, the attacks have concentrated on Teng To's position as a leading "poisonous weed" of the "second hundred flowers" period in 1961 and 1962. Articles now considered heretical, which criticized Party policy by means of historical allegory, began to appear in the Peking Party Committee periodical Front Line and the newspapers Peking Daily and Peking Evening News in early 1961 and ended in September 1962 just before the Tenth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee. It is therefore easy to regard the Teng To as simply the latest target in the "great cultural revolution" now going on in the Mainland. The attacks on him, in our opinion, represent a significant intensification of regime efforts to perpetuate revolutionary ideology by eradicating the doubters of the past and cowing possible future ones.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

However, although he fits the standard "poisonous weed" role perfectly, materials published so far give few clues to the reasons behind the timing, the speed, and the near-hysterical intensity of the attacks, which convey the impression of more complex implications.

Our gropings for an explanation, in addition to considering the ideological factors outlined above, keep returning to P'eng Chen, who as First Secretary of the Peking Municipal Party Committee bears ultimate responsibility for heresy committed in his bailiwick by a man whose relationship with him can be traced back to 1937. Regardless of his role in the proceedings, Peng's position almost certainly must suffer from the campaign. Furthermore, it seems unlikely; 1) that the campaign instigators would be unaware of the implications to Peng and 2) that a campaign so damaging to a Politburo member could be launched without the approval of a Politburo majority and Mao. The inference is therefore that Peng is the target of a Politburo power play and the groundwork is being laid nationwide for his eventual downgrading. (ConGenTel 2092, Confidential)

8. Kuo Mo-jo Explains Self-Criticism

On May 15 President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Kuo Mo-jo told visiting Japanese LDP figure Kenzo Matsumura that his self-criticism did not, as the foreign press had so distortedly reported, signify his stepping from the stage. "On the contrary, I shall be more active in the future." He termed his speech a spontaneous act of support for regime cultural policies, and joked with Matsumura that the speech took him only 10 minutes to make, but an hour to explain. Kuo also told Matsumura that he had recently moved to a bigger house, from which fact the Mainichi reporter (whose paper carried the interview on May 16 reprinted the next day in the Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao) wryly gathered that Kuo's position was still secure. (Unclassified)

Comment: So do we (WEEKA 18), especially when the regime for the past week has gone out of its way to provide an almost day-by-day account of his meetings and talks with various visiting Japanese delegations. (Unclassified)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

9. Private Plots Abolished in Shantung Brigade

A Saigon Newsweek reporter, Francois Sully, in the course of a recent 20-day tour of the Mainland visited a model production brigade in a Shantung commune in which all private plots had been abolished. The commune chief of the Tung Kuo commune (8 kilometers northeast of Chefoo) told Sully that the private plots were no longer useful and gave the impression that plots had been removed in the rest of the commune as well. The commune's 1200 families were organized into 9 brigades and further subdivided into 32 production teams. According to the secretary, the brigade was the basic accounting and planning unit within the commune (an organizational feature which Sully found in most of the communes that he visited in other parts of the country).

Sully did not ask when the plots had been abolished. He remarked, however, on the vast regional differences that he found with regard to private acreage in the course of his trip. In the Canton area he was told that 7 percent of the arable land was privately farmed, while in the Peking area the figure was 4 percent.

Private subsidiary production (especially pigs and poultry) was still being encouraged in the Tung Kuo commune (as well as other places he visited). Each household was limited to four pigs at any given time, and most families that Sully saw were raising at least two. He got the impression of strict regimentation in the Shantung commune when he saw peasants marching to and from the fields in orderly ranks behind red banners, a sight that greeted him nowhere else in the Mainland.

Comment: While we have had refugee reports of the abolition of private plots in Hainan and Kwangtung (WEEKA 43, 1965, WER 2), this is the first news of its trend from the north, and to our knowledge, the first such report from a foreigner. However, the news that private plots may have been removed in selected brigades in selected parts of the country is not surprising when viewed against the background of the current massive emphasis on political rather than material incentives for production (see WEEKA 12). The plots have been an anathema to the regime's ideologues ever since they were first established to offset food shortages following the Great Leap disaster. We would expect the abolition process to be

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gradual, with high yield areas and brigades in which the plots make less difference being hit first, and pressure being applied to other areas to conform over a period of years.

For the Deputy Principal Officer:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED:

(2) BANGKOK CANBERRA KARACHI MOSCOW RANGOON SOFIA VNTIANE
BELGRADE CPACPLAD KATHMANDU MUNICH ROME S'PORE COMNAVPHL
BUCHAREST DARESALAAM KLUMPUR NDELHI SAIGON (4)TAIPEI 13AFMANILA
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MANILA

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ORIGIN ACTION

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1966 MAY 19 PM 4 41

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AIRGRAM

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A-764 (NO.) CONFIDENTIAL AIR POUCH (HANDLING INDICATOR)

1966 MAY 13 PM 1 29

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

INFO : See last page for distribution

RM/R DISTRIBUTION

HOCKMAN

FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG

DATE: May 13, 1966

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 19

REF :

1966 MAY 23 PM 12 32 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Mao Reappears
2. Liberation Army Journal Hints at Purge of Anti-Rightist Intellectuals
3. Peking Party Committee Press Organs Attacked -- Criticism of Teng T'o Intensified
4. Minority Educators in Sinkiang Higher Education

External

5. Third Nuclear Explosion
6. Albanian Delegation Ends Visit
7. Reticence on Vietnam Developments
8. Philippines: Visitors Warmly Welcomed
9. Sino-Soviet Relations: International Front Group Acrimony
10. India Reappears in Regime's Press

5/23/66 EA/A

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,CKamman,YSNg,drb,nom

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal
1. Mao Reappears

NCNA May 10 announced that Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Mehmet Shehu and all the other members of the Albanian Party and Government delegation (at an undisclosed place and time). Others present on the occasion were Premier Chou En-lai, Defense Minister Lin Piao (his first appearance in a year), Party Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-ping, Central Committee Member Wu Hsiu-chuan (a specialist on Eastern European Communist Party affairs), Vice Foreign Minister Wang Ping-nan, and Hsu Chien-kuo, the Chinese Ambassador to Albania. Mao gave a banquet in honor of the Albanian guests after "extremely intimate and friendly" talks. (Unclassified)

Comment: The photographs accompanying the Hong Kong press treatment of the meeting were no more indicative of the Chairman's true state of health than photographs published in the past. The Chairman looks about the same as he did prior to his November 26 disappearance.

Although the NCNA release on the meeting was datelined Peking in an apparent attempt to give the impression that Mao was in the capital, our guess after analyzing Shehu's itinerary, and a list of Chinese officials accompanying the delegation, is that the meeting probably took place in Shanghai on May 6, or possibly at Hanchow the next day. Had the meeting taken place in Peking we would have expected Liu Shao-chi (who attended the farewell banquet given by the Albanians in Peking on May 10) to be present.

Mao's apparent continued absence from Peking plus the above mysterious elements in the reportage of his reappearance strengthens speculation that he was indeed ill, and that he may still be recuperating from whatever health problem may have removed him from the public scene last November.

The presence of Lin Piao at the meeting is striking and may have a deeper significance than the simple desire to honor Shehu with the presence of the nation's leading, but rarely seen, military leader. The appearance together with Mao of the ranking PLA, Party, and state officials in Communist China may also have been designed to impress domestic and foreign audiences alike with the unity of the regime's three major components behind the long absent Chairman. (ConGenTel 2055) (Confidential)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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2. Liberation Army Journal Hints at Purge of Anti-Rightist Intellectuals

On May 4 the Liberation Army Journal published an editorial entitled "Never Forget Class Struggle" which gave indications of a significant intensification of the regime's continuing campaign against intellectuals. While the self-declared focus of the article was on the "life and death struggle" within the cultural sphere, the discussion clearly had much wider implications. The editorial termed the eradication of bourgeois and revisionist influence from academic work, education, journalism, art, literature, and other cultural spheres a "crucial question", and "an issue of prime importance related to life and the future of the Party, the State, and the world revolution." More pointedly the article quoted Mao as saying, "any given culture is a reflection of the politics and economics of society and the former in turn has a tremendous influence and effect upon the latter." The logical extension of this emphasis on the political significance of culture, which was meant to justify the current heavy attacks on the intelligentsia, is that doubting intellectuals have used their media as well as their reputations to oppose Party policy, not only in the cultural sphere, but in the political and economic spheres as well.

The targets of attack in the editorial were ranking intellectuals, "authorities" with "reputations," "scholars," "specialists," and "professors" who "oppose the Party and socialism." That many of them are in the Party was indicated by pointed references to persons who were "waving red flags to oppose the red flag, and donning the cloak of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's thinking to oppose Marxism-Leninism and Mao's thinking." The editorial linked the intellectual anti-Party elements with the imperialists, the reactionaries, revisionists, and "rightist opportunists within the Party." By thus tarring the anti-Party intellectual as traitors, the editorial appeared to be establishing justification for a purge. Care was taken, however, in the article to create a special category of intellectuals who have written bad works in the past, but who have remained faithful to the Party and socialism. Many, like Kuo Mo-jo (who has returned from Chengtu and is appearing regularly in Peking) will probably find safety under this rubric.(ConGenTel 2022) (Confidential)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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3. Peking Party Committee Press Organs Attacked -- Criticism of Teng T'o Intensified

In the process of expanding the campaign against Peking Vice Mayor Wu Han, and Municipal Party Committee members Teng T'o (the former People's Daily editor) and Liao Mo-sha (see WEEKA 17), the PLA Journal and the Kwangming Jih Pao on May launched attacks against the Peking Party Committee press organs that originally published heretical articles by these intellectuals. Both the PLA Journal and the Kwangming rejected the self-criticisms printed by the Peking Daily and the theoretical journal Frontline (Chienhsien) on April 16 and accused them of being willing advocates of a capitalist restoration. In addition to publishing Teng T'o, Liao Mo-sha, and Wu Han's joint column, Night Chats at Yen Shan, in 1961 and 1962 the Peking Party papers were accused of withholding articles criticizing the column which were subsequently sent to the editors. The Peking Daily, the Peking Evening News, and Frontline were all anti-Party tools controlled by Teng T'o and his henchmen, the Liberation Army Journal charged, adding ominously, "singling out from within our internal ranks a handful of anti-Party and anti-socialist elements is...a great good thing...a great victory for the thought of Mao Tse-tung." It assured anti-Party elements that they would not be left alone, as the cultural revolution must be carried to its final end.

Meanwhile the charges against Teng T'o have become increasingly serious. The Kwangming Jih Pao accused him of 1) malicious attacks on the Party, 2) opposition to the general line, the great leap, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, 3) defending the rightist opportunists for moral integrity in opposing the Party and encouraging them to make a comeback, 4) clamoring for the Party to step down and take a "rest." These allegations have been broadcast throughout the country and echoed by mass forums in the provinces with such intensity that little news on other subjects has emerged from provincial radio. (Confidential)

Comment: The heresies of Teng T'o and Liao Mo-sha date from the "second Hundred Flowers" in 1961 and 1962. The charges fit the pattern of other attacks against intellectuals since mid-1964. However, the fact that Teng and Liao are Peking Municipal Committee figures, and the newspapers under attack are all organs of the committee could have a significance beyond the context of the current anti-rightist intellectual campaign; i.e., that high-level

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

opponents are using the campaign as a means of weakening the position of Peking's First Secretary and Mayor, Politburo member P'eng Chen. It may also be significant that the major vehicle for attack has been the PLA Journal and not the Party organ, the People's Daily. We feel, however, that this circumstantial evidence, while intriguing, is too scanty to make a judgment on the existence of a power play. (Confidential)

4. Minority Educators in Sinkiang Higher Education

An NCNA report of May 8 provided some insight into the question of Han Chinese versus national minority representation in Sinkiang's higher educational institutions. With evident pride, the Chinese revealed that one fifth of the teachers in Sinkiang's six colleges and universities were of a minority nationality. At the agricultural institute, all are from families of "working people" and eighty percent are CCP or CYL members. The total number of minority teachers in the Autonomous Region is 340, of whom 165 or about one half are employed at the University of Sinkiang. In some cases, according to NCNA, they are able to give courses in Uighur or Kazakh, using textbooks translated from Chinese. (Unclassified)

Comment: While Han teachers still outnumber their minority colleagues by four to one, the regime is apparently making some headway in developing a new "red" intelligentsia among Sinkiang's minorities. The article makes it clear that the prime characteristics of this new elite are a reliable class background and advanced training in China proper. There may be a few "rehabilitated" members of the old intelligentsia still teaching, but NCNA's data would tend to corroborate refugee reports that the regime relies for the most part on young cadres trained since "liberation." (Confidential)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

External
5. Third Nuclear Explosion

NCNA announced that on May 9 the regime had "successfully conducted over its western areas a nuclear explosion which contained thermo-nuclear material." (The Chinese language version of the announcement indicated more clearly that the explosion had taken place in the air --- shang kung, 0006/4500 --- above the western area.) While the NCNA announcement implied that the explosion was a hydrogen one, and western press reports treated it as such, the imprecise language used to describe the event means clarification of this important point awaits scientific analysis. Moreover, it was impossible to discern from the regime's public treatment of the test whether a device or an operational weapon was involved.

NCNA's announcement of the explosion affirmed, as did the announcements of the previous two test explosions, that China is developing nuclear weapons solely for defensive purposes and "at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons." Once again the Chinese "people and Government" were pictured as striving for the "noble aim of completely prohibiting and thoroughly destroying nuclear weapons." America's policy of "nuclear blackmail" and U.S.-Soviet efforts to maintain a nuclear monopoly were again stressed as factors impelling the regime to develop a nuclear capability.

To date NCNA coverage of the international reaction to the latest test has consisted of the publication of messages of congratulations from North Korea, North Vietnam and Albania and from such groups as "representatives of African nationalists in Peking" and the Afro-Asian Solidarity chapter of Japan: the latter messages were probably highlighted in order to strengthen the regime's contention that its development of nuclear weapons constitutes "great encouragement to the peoples who are fighting heroically for their own liberation." (Limited Official Use)

Comment: Treatment of the latest explosion is virtually identical with that of the earlier ones and the continued defensive justification of China's nuclear program suggests a regime awareness of the adverse impact its atmospheric testing is likely to have on international opinion.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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We doubt that Peking's apparent advance in nuclear technology will cause it to change its current policy of refraining from obvious efforts at nuclear blackmail, although the regime undoubtedly calculates that neighboring countries will take appropriate notice of the fact of China's nuclear achievements, and hopes that nuclear stature will increase pressures for China's entry into international councils. (Confidential)

6. Albanian Delegation Ends Visit

The Albanian Party-Government delegation headed by Premier Mehmet Shehu continued its tour of the provinces last week, receiving tumultous welcomes in Harbin, Shanghai and Hangchow and, at an undisclosed location, the ultimate honor of being received by long-missing Chairman Mao (see item 1). After returning to Peking and signing a joint communique (not available at this writing), Shehu and comrades left for home on May 11.

Like the first week of their visit (WEEKA 18), the second week was filled with speech-making in which both sides aimed their most blistering attacks at the Soviet "revisionist leaders." The "anti-imperialist struggle of the Vietnamese people" was praised, but neither side dealt in detail with the war, except to browbeat the Soviets for their "sham" support of Hanoi's cause. In the context of rejecting Soviet appeals for "united action" (i.e., on aid to Vietnam), Teng Hsiao-ping in a Shanghai speech of May 6 voiced the clearest criticism to date of those who follow a "centrist" line in the struggle between "Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism." Teng equated the "pragmatic or eclectic attitude" of the "centrists" with opportunism, and declared that there could be no "vacillation" in the anti-revisionist struggle. His remarks on this question were echoed three days later by Albanian Politburo member Hysni Kapo in a speech to the CCP Higher Party School in Peking. Neither the Chinese nor the Albanians identified the "centrists" at whom their criticism was directed, but taken in the context of unity on aid to Vietnam, the label seemed tailor-made for Hanoi. (ConGenTel 2050) (Confidential)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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7. Reticence on Vietnam Developments

People's Daily on May 8 carried separate brief commentaries on the alleged U.S. artillery bombardment across the Cambodian border on April 30 and May 3 and on Thailand's decision to participate directly in the Vietnam conflict. The artillery bombardment was called "another move to expand the (U.S.) aggressive war in Indo-China" and the personification of the "arrogance and insolence" of the U.S. in refusing to respect Cambodian sovereignty. The U.S. was advised to take warning from the ability of the Cambodian troops to strike retaliatory blows against aggressors and from the "Cambodian declaration that the U.S. imperialists will not intrude anywhere throughout Indo-China today with impunity."

The commentary on Thailand's decision was equally bland. It ridiculed the significance of Thai naval and air support for Vietnam by noting the "inability of 250 thousand U.S. troops to prop up the collapsing American show in South Vietnam." Thai support of U.S. policy in Vietnam was pictured as furthering the "Thai people's patriotic struggle" and Prime Minister Thanom was advised that he was "following in the footsteps of Diem and Rhee." (Limited Official Use)

Comment: Peking's noticeably restrained reaction to these developments is in keeping with its reticence in recent weeks on such major Vietnam events as B-52 raids on the DRV, aerial clashes over North Vietnam and the Department's reiteration of the U.S. position on the sanctuary issue. As we have reported earlier, this reticence may be a regime effort to restore a degree of credibility to its international pronouncements and thus we would tend to attach importance to any subsequent warnings voiced against the present background of silence. Nevertheless, it is tempting, and perhaps valid, to link Peking's reticence to what we have taken as signs of the regime's displeasure with the state of the Hanoi-Moscow relationship (Item 6) (ConGenTel 2047). (Confidential)

8. Philippines: Visitors Warmly Welcomed

Following in the footsteps of Senator Maria Katigbak, who led the pioneer Philippine group of visitors to Communist

0418

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

China last March (WEEKA 12), two more Philippine delegations arrived in Peking on May 4 and 6. They were, respectively, a press group headed by Columnist Jose V. Cruz of the Manila Times under the sponsorship of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, and a trade exploration mission headed by Generoso Marcial which was received by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade. Each delegation was feted at a banquet given by its host, and each was received on May 9 by Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi. At the banquet for the press delegation, the ChiCom speaker -- Hu Yu-chih, Vice President of the People's Institute of Foreign Affairs -- emphasized the "long tradition of friendly relations" between the Chinese and Philippine peoples, but also dragged in some hard sell references to the common struggle against "U.S. imperialism" and praised "patriotic" Philippine journalists for opposing the sending of Philippine troops to Vietnam. (Unclassified)

Comment: Peking's red carpet treatment of the two delegations continues efforts launched with Mrs. Katigbak to sow the seeds for a Philippine movement away from the U.S. (Unclassified)

9. Sino-Soviet Relations: International Front Group Acrimony

An NCNA item dated May 6 recapped a meeting in Geneva of the Communist-front World Federation of Scientific Workers executive Bureau on April 16 and 17. The ChiCom post-mortem followed the standard format for such reports in assailing Soviet positions on Vietnam, disarmament, etc., while at the same time "exposing" Soviet tactics of "manipulating" the meeting. Although the ChiComs were forced to conclude that the executive bureau of the WFSW "is now in reality completely manipulated and controlled by the Soviet revisionist group," the leader of the Chinese delegation told NCNA that it is "necessary to constantly expose the modern revisionists, with the Soviet leadership which serves as an imperialist pawn as their core." (Unclassified)

Comment: This is the first ChiCom report of Sino-Soviet confrontation at an international front group meeting for quite

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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some time, and is interesting since it post-dates the 23rd CPSU Congress. Despite its refusal to attend the Congress, Peking evidently intends to continue speaking out against the "revisionists" in multilateral bodies dominated by Moscow, even when Soviet "manipulators" do their utmost to muzzle the "principled stand" of the ChiComs. (Unclassified)

10. India Reappears in Regime's Press

Following about a month long absence, India suddenly reappeared in the regime's press as the subject of a ChiCom May 4 note. The note termed "groundless" Indian charges that Chinese troops had intruded into the Chinese side of the 20 kilometer demilitarized zone along the present de facto boundary between the two nations. However, the contents of the note implied that Chinese troop movements into the demilitarized zone had indeed taken place. Thus, the note declared that China's 1962 act in unilaterally establishing a demilitarized zone on her side of the de facto boundary "in no way meant relinquishment of sovereignty over her territory or of the right to take self-defense measures against Indian intrusions and provocations." The charge was thereupon voiced that such Indian intrusions had taken place and therefore "it was only natural for the Chinese Government "to exercise the right of self-defense." In short, according to the Chinese they had not intruded, but acted in accordance with their rights.

The note also reiterated the Chinese claim to "large tracts of Chinese territory" in the eastern sector of the boundary. Apparently in response to an Indian demarche on the subject, it cast aspersions on India's "unequal relationship" with Sikkim, but fell short of specifically denouncing it.

Aside from publishing the text of the note, NCNA on May 9 and May 10 castigated Prime Minister Gandhi for attributing India's food crisis to Chinese and Pakistan aggression instead of recognizing that "the present famine in India is the natural consequence of the reactionary policies pursued by the Indian Government." (Unclassified)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: We see little more in the latest note than Peking's felt-need to respond to outstanding Indian notes. One factor which may account for the timing is that now with the approaching spring along the Sino-Indian border, Peking may wish to discourage the Indians from thoughts of military activities in the disputed areas. (Confidential).

For the Acting Principal Officer,

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED:

(2) BANGKOK
BELGRADE
BUCHAREST
BUDAPEST
CANBERRA
CPACPLAD
DARESALAAM
DJAKARTA
KARACHI
KATHMANDU
KLUMPUR
MANILA
LONDON
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ROME
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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POC 54 (12)

DATE: 6 May 66 MSG NO.: A-750 TYPE: airgram

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SUBJECT: Weeka 18

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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A-731 (NO.) | CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN | AIR POUCH (HANDLING INDICATOR)

TO : Department of State WASHINGTON, D.C.

INFO: (See last page for info addressees)

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: April 29, 1966

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 17

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Regime Restates Line on Culture, Politics
2. Former People's Daily Editor, and Ranking Peking Municipal Party Official Attacked as Partners of Vice Mayor Wu Han
3. Regime Releases Captured GRC Naval Personnel

External

4. Peking's Reticence on Vietnam Air Clashes: Another Peace Hoax Discovered
5. Bloc Relations
6. Cambodia: Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien Visits Phnom Penh
7. Afro-Asian Journalists
8. Peking Protests Seizure of Diplomatic Properties in Indonesia
9. Memories of Bandung

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Drafted by: BLevin, NPlatt, SYNg:drb:nm 4/28/66 CKamman

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:BLevin

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. Regime Restates Line on Culture, Politics

The stereotyped monotony of Peking's output during the past several months has often reduced political analysis to the compilation of three dreary but swelling catalogues; one labeled New Maoist Heros, another called New Intellectual Rectification Targets, and the third headed Sterile Restatements of the Party Line. Last week the latter two catalogues grew significantly, (see also item 2).

The People's Daily on April 22 took several thousand well-chosen characters to tell us once again that Maoist thought was the apex of contemporary Marxism-Leninism. For wishful and perhaps over-sensitive readers, the eulogistic tone of the article had a faint obituarial ring, but aside from this intriguing intuitive impulse, the piece contained nothing new.

Earlier on April 19 the People's Daily disappointed novelty hunters by reprinting from the April 18 Liberation Army Journal a long reiteration of Maoist cultural policy as originally laid down in the Talks at the Yenan Literary Forum in 1942.

What was interesting about this militant general call for continued proletarianization of literature and art was its appearance in the army organ and the inference that the military establishment was to extend its role as the model of society to include the cultural as well as the political-ideological sphere. While such a demand would be farfetched in other societies, it should be remembered that some of the most accomplished modern singers and dancers in Communist China are members of PLA troupes. The highly touted novel "Song of Ou-yang Hai" (a well known Chinese Communist twist on Truman Capote's new literary art form known as "documentary fiction") was also supposedly written by a soldier.

The editorial hit out at the "black anti-socialist thread of anti-Party literature" that has run through Chinese Communist cultural life since 1949. It described this evil influence as a compound of bourgeois and revisionist literary ideas, and the

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

leftist literature of the '30's (the latter being works by the now roughly handled Mao Tun, Tien Han, and Wu Han).

One sign that Chinese literature is entering what one British diplomat called a "new dark age" was contained in the portion of the editorial that warned revolutionary writers against overstressing the horrors of war. Descriptions of trials and hardships must be tempered by "revolutionary optimism" lest readers become infected by "bourgeois pacifistx" attitudes. In other words, war should look like fun and the good guys should always win.

Another stultifying sign of the times was the editorial's demand that literary criticism be extended beyond the grasp of a few intellectual critics and into the hands of the workers, peasants and soldiers. That this piece of advice hit home was evidenced the next day when a Canton bus driver unburdened himself of a particularly blistering attack on Wu Han at a criticism meeting in the southern city (Radio Canton, April 21, 0440 GMT). (Limited Official Use)

2. Former People's Daily Editor, and Ranking Peking Municipal Party Official Attacked as Partners of Vice Mayor Wu Han

The Peking Daily (organ of the CCP Peking Municipal Committee) on April 16 devoted three full pages to reproducing historical articles written jointly from 1959-62 by Vice Mayor Wu Han, Peking Municipal Party Committee United Front Work Department head Liao Mo-sha, and former People's Daily editor Teng To. An accompanying editor's note calling for solemn criticism of the articles accused Teng To of the following crimes: 1) distorting the 100 flowers policy and advocating that bourgeois ideology be dissiminated freely; 2) beautifying the feudal social system; 3) propagating the decadent philosophy of the exploiting classes; and 4) using old stories to ridicule present events.

Liao Mo-sha was also attacked as the most enthusiastic admirer of two "poisonous" plays, "The Dismissal of Hai Jui" and "Li Hui-niang" (a ghost drama), and as the author of two currently unacceptable works called "History and Plays" and "Ghosts are Harmless." Liao was accused of deliberately having

0485
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

become a "leading member of the contingent of anti-socialism and anti-Mao Tse-tung ideology."

The People's Daily and other organs of the national press which have been busy during the past weeks hammering Wu Han for such increasingly serious offenses as being a supporter of the KMT, have not attacked Teng To or Liao Mo-sha as yet. (Unclassified)

Comment: We were struck by the inclusion in the April 14 editorial ("Politics Should Command All Work" - see WEEKA No. 16) of journalism as one of the spheres in which "political degenerates" and bourgeois elements had gained influence. Despite the fact that Teng To apparently has not been active in ChiCom journalism for several years (he was replaced by Wu Leng-hsi as Chief Editor of the People's Daily some time in 1958 and relinquished the chairmanship of the All China Journalists Association in 1960) the attacks on a person of his journalistic reputation seem designed as a specific warning to other members of the profession. Intellectuals from other fields that have as yet gone unrepresented by a live scapegoat can take their example from the campaign against Wu Han which has now reached a level of intensity and accusation similar to the attacks on Hu Feng in 1955. (Limited Official Use)

3. Regime Releases Captured GRC Naval Personnel

NCNA Canton on April 25 announced that all 33 GRC naval officers and men captured when the "Chienmen" and "Changchiang" were sunk by the PLA navy on August 6, 1965 have now been released. Among those released were Commander Wang Yun-shan, captain of the "Chienmen," Commander Huang Chih-chun, Lt. Commander Ko Teh-hui, Lt. Li Teh-kang, and 29 sailors. Eleven of these, including Li Teh-kang, who have families in Taiwan and desired to return, were given permission to rejoin their relatives.

While detained, the prisoners were given "education in patriotism by the PLA," and taken on trips to factories and rural people's communes. Those not returning to Taiwan were put in touch with relatives on the Mainland, given travel money and provided with a chance to make a living.

0426

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: The dispatch was not clear on whether the 11 who wished to return to Taiwan had actually left the Mainland. As in the case of GRC prisoners released last January (ConGenTel 1350), the regime is again apparently trying to embarrass Taipei by demonstrating its magnanimity and recalling GRC defeats. By releasing the prisoners after only seven months (most of the previously released agents were held and "re-educated" for years) the regime may also be trying to demonstrate the shallowness of their captives' loyalty to the GRC. In any event, Chinese history offers many cases of similar treatment of captives (ConGenTel 1946). (Limited Official Use)

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0427

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

External

4. Peking's Reticence on Vietnam Air Clashes: Another Peace Hoax Discovered

A. Peking's reticence on such Vietnam developments as the April 12 B-52 raid on North Vietnam and U.S. air strikes in the vicinity of Hanoi was carried over to the recent series of air clashes over North Vietnam. To date the regime's entire comment on these incidents consists of a NCNA reproduction of an April 26 Vietnamese News Agency item claiming that on the same day the "DRV airforce...in close coordination with the armed forces and people...shot down two U.S. jets and damaged seven others" over Hac Bac province.

Comment: As yet we do not see anything ominous in Peking's silence on these significant Vietnamese developments. However, the thought occurs to us that any subsequent warnings issued by the regime against this unaccustomed background of reticence might reflect a truer picture of its intentions than have the sterile pronouncements of past months. (Confidential)

B. Among the outpouring of thoroughly predictable reports of alleged U.S. military and political defeats in South Vietnam, the only regime comment of more than routine interest on the Vietnam situation during the week was an NCNA April 20 report on Senator Mansfield's proposal for Vietnam peace negotiations to be held in Japan or Burma. NCNA described the proposal as another resort by the "Johnson Administration and Congress notables... to the peace hoax...(which is) nothing but a cover for widening the Vietnam war." The proposal's deceptive nature was alleged to be "thoroughly exposed" by the "Johnson Administration's insistence it will never withdraw its aggressive forces from South Vietnam and will never recognize the NLF as the sole legitimate representative of the South Vietnamese people." (Unclassified)

Comment: The implication of the NCNA report is the regime will continue to regard as a "peace hoax" any U.S. proposals for negotiations which do not convey a willingness to accept the DRV 4-point stand. (Confidential) (ConGenTel 1917)

0428
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

5. Bloc Relations

A. Albania - NCNA reported the arrival on April 26 in Kunming of an Albanian party and government delegation headed by Mehmet Shehu, titular head of the Albanian Government and member of the Party Politburo. He was accompanied by Politburo member Hysni Kapo, CC member and Albania-China Friendship Association Chairman Abdyl Kellezi, and Albania's newly appointed Foreign Minister, former Ambassador to Peking Nesti Nase. The new Albanian Ambassador, Vasil Nathanaili, was also named as a member of the delegation and met his compatriots upon their arrival in Kunming. Surprisingly, although the arrival of this high-level Albanian entourage was marked by great fanfare as reported by NCNA, only provincial Chinese officials and Vice-Foreign Minister Chang Han-fu were on hand to accord welcoming honors.

Editorials from two Tirana papers on the departure of the delegation were reprinted by NCNA; they avowed Albania's great love and gratitude towards China and expressed confidence that the delegation's visit would "further strengthen fraternal friendship and militant unity" between the two peoples. In banquet speeches at Kunming, the same theme of cementing Sino-Albanian friendship was stressed by both sides. In addition, the Chicom speaker--Party chief of Yunnan province--sounded the first blast in what may become a fusilade of denunication of the "modern revisionist traitors and accomplices" whose collaboration with U.S. "imperialism" was "fully exposed at the 23rd CPSU Congress." (Unclassified)

Comment: We are reasonably confident that the present Albanian visit is something more than a routine friendship exercise--the Chinese have conspicuously avoided linking it with forthcoming May Day celebrations, though the Albanians are likely to attend the festivities. We suspect that the recent broad internal changes in the Albanian party and government impelled the Albanians to seek a huddle with their protector and benefactor. If there are strains in the Peking-Tirana relationship, as implied by reports emanating from Eastern Europe, the Albanian pilgrimage so far would seem to squelch speculation [redacted] that any serious rift is brewing. (Limited Official Use)

B. Romania - A Western correspondent stationed in Peking told us that officials of the Romanian Embassy in Peking had mentioned recently that Chou En-lai's long-predicted visit to Romania would take place in "May or June -- perhaps in mid-summer."

0429

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

When asked the purpose of the visit, they gave the distinct impression that it would be largely ceremonial, offering the explanation that Romanian Premier Maurer had been in China and reciprocity was to be expected. (Confidential)

C. Navigation of Bordering Rivers - The People's Daily of April 20 published regulations issued by the CPR Ministry of Communications governing foreign ships on bordering rivers. An expressed aim of the regulations is to "safeguard China's sovereign rights," as well as to assure safe navigation, etc. The regulations also apply to foreign vessels entering Chinese ports via a river which flows across the Chinese frontier from a foreign country. NCNA notes that the regulations would not apply in situations already covered by commercial navigation agreements between China and the country of a ship's registry. Since the only countries which have important river borders with China are North Korea and the USSR, and a Sino-Korean Yalu and Tumen Rivers Navigation Cooperation Committee had its last regular meeting as recently as December 1965, the Soviets are obviously the intended target of the new regulations. Most of the provisions cover ships entering, leaving and tying up in Chinese river ports, but some appear to offer considerable potential for harassing Soviet shipping moving along the Amur/Ussuri border, should the Chinese desire to impede this traffic. (See WER 17) (Limited Official Use)

6. Cambodia: Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien Visits Phnom Penh

On April 24 NCNA reported the arrival in Cambodia of Vice Premier and Finance Minister Li Hsien-nien, accompanied by Wang Tao-han, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, which is the Chicom aid agency. Li's activities in Phnom Penh included calls on Prince Kantol, Premier and Foreign Minister, and Son Sann, Vice Premier for Economics, Finance and Planning. At a banquet given by Kantol, Li praised Cambodian self-reliance and rejection of American aid, and also lauded his hosts for "standing in the forefront of the struggle against U.S. imperialism. You have energetically repulsed the aggressors and won one victory after another." Finally, with little apparent urgency, he pledged that "the Chinese people stand resolutely on the side of the Cambodian people and will resolutely support your just struggle."

Comment: Li is an infrequent foreign traveler; this is apparently his first visit to a non-Communist country. The

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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composition of his delegation and his appointment schedule in Phnom Penh indicate that the primary purpose of the visit is probably economic. While some sort of prop for the sagging RKG budget may be offered by the Chicoms, we note coincidentally that on the very day of Li's arrival, Sihanouk was presenting 200 bags of dried fish to the Viet Cong. From covert sources we have reports that Peking may be footing the bill (in hard currency) for Cambodian rice supplied to the Viet Cong. Thus, Li's mission may be to iron out details of a triangular, rather than bilateral aid scheme. (ConGenTels 1930, 1941) (Confidential/Noforn)

7. Afro-Asian Journalists

The 4th Plenary Meeting (enlarged) of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association Secretariat was held in Peking from April 20 through 24. It produced reams of anti-imperialist resolutions and speeches which swelled NCNA's output for a week, all of them in perfect harmony with current Chicom propaganda themes. Only 19 of 53 member organizations managed to be represented at the meeting, and in some cases the delegates were of the variety already residing permanently in Peking. Resolutions along familiar lines on Vietnam and Indonesia were among the more important agenda items. The session also endorsed the Secretariat's hasty retreat from Djakarta and its selection of Peking as "temporary" headquarters site until the next full meeting of the AAJA, which was set for Algiers within a year.

The speech of the Chinese delegate was reported at length by NCNA on April 22, and constituted a sweeping indictment of the forces of "imperialism," which were being swept away by surging torrents of people's struggle around the world, despite occasional "adverse currents." The Chinese made an especially scathing attack on the Soviet "revisionists," re-hashing all the charges that have flown furiously since last November regarding alleged Soviet "collaboration" with imperialism, the traitorous Soviet role in Vietnam and moves to "paralyse" the revolutionary will of African and Asian peoples. Under such circumstances, declared the Chinese, neither China nor the AAJA could think of uniting with Soviets or other "lackeys, accomplices and collaborators of U.S. imperialism." A People's Daily editorial of April 26 congratulated the meeting for expressing the alleged will of Africans and Asians to "draw a clear line of demaraction" between themselves and pseudo-revolutionaries (i.e., Soviets), and lauded the "democratic"

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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procedures of the meeting which "contrasted sharply with meetings of some international organizations controlled by a certain big power."

Comment: Peking appears to have maintained its firm grip on this somewhat withered Afro-Asian front organization. (Unclassified)

8. Peking Protests Seizure of Diplomatic Properties in Indonesia

In notes dated April 21, 23 and 25 Peking strongly protested to the Indonesian Government a series of seizures of a number of Chicom diplomatic and consular properties in Djakarta, including the Consulate General, several residences of diplomatic officials and the offices of the Military Attache and Commercial Counsellor. The notes flatly accused the Indonesian Government of having planned and carried out these various seizures as evidenced by the role played in them by the Indonesian armed forces. The April 21 and 23 notes regarded the incidents as "extremely serious steps taken by the Indonesian Government to rupture relations between the two countries," but for some reason seizure of the regime's Military Attache Office which occasioned the April 25 note was not related to these alleged Indonesian efforts to "rupture relations." All the notes raised demands for the return of the seized properties, compensation for losses and for measures to "truly ensure the safety of the Chinese missions." In their recital of the details of the seizure incidents, the notes implied that all the concerned properties were vacant with the exception of care-taker staffs.

Other Peking comment on Indonesia revealed the extent to which the regime now regards that nation as a lost cause and its corresponding lack of caution in dealing with the situation. A People's Daily April 21 commentary made use of Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik's expression of "good-will toward China" to taunt the Indonesians as cowards lacking the bravery to bear responsibility for their actions. The regime's press was also replete with attacks on the present Indonesian Government as a creation and tool of "U.S. imperialists" and for good measure the "Japanese militarists" were also frequently cited as collaborating with the "Indonesian reactionaries." (Limited Official Use)

Comment: By not going beyond the language used in previous protests, this latest series of Chicom notes implies that Peking has decided against a dramatic reaction to these incidents and to hang on in Indonesia for the sake of the local Chinese. While it remains to be seen how Peking will react to an Indonesian failure

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

to return the seized properties, our guess is the regime has probably already written off its chances of regaining them. (Confidential) (ConGenTels 1916, 1928, 1932)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

9. Memories of Bandung

A People's Daily April 21 editorial hailing Liu Shao-chi's recent visits to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Burma as "a major victory for China's foreign policy of peace" provides further evidence of the regime's concern over its deteriorating international position. The editorial reads as if it were produced on the eve of the Bandung Conference and sets out to demonstrate the regime's devotion to peace, non-interference in the internal affairs of others and its foreign policy successes which are evidenced by the "fact. . .that China has friends all over the world."

As an example of the editorial's tone, it asserts that "since the very day of its birth the CPR has steadfastly pursued the socialist foreign policy of peace." "Vilification" of "China's foreign policy of peace" (the word peace must appear at least twenty times in the editorial) as "bellicose" is attributed to "U.S. imperialism and their followers" whose only ground for such a charge is that "the Chinese people resolutely support the just struggles of various people" and will continue to do so. In keeping with the emphasis on China's devotion to peace and friendship, the editorial steers completely clear of the regime's ideological position on "revolutionary violence" and all references to struggle are in the context of principled ChiCom support of the victims of aggression and "imperialist" crimes.

The Liu trip itself is handled as an example of China's solid standing in the Afro-Asian world and his "warm welcome" abroad is treated as proof that China's foreign policy is fully correct." (The latter usage suggests that the editorial may in part be intended to answer domestic critics of the leadership's foreign policy course.) (Confidential)

Comment: The practical implications of the increasingly apparent ChiCom verbal shift to a Bandung-era line are not easy to predict. Should Peking continue to show sensitivity toward

0434
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

its "international image" the possibility arises that over the long run this would have a moderating influence on the regime's policy. For the present, however, we do not see the regime's present concern over its standing abroad as playing a part in its policy calculations toward the U.S. or Vietnam. (ConGenTel 1925.) (Confidential)

For the Acting Principal Officer,

Burton Levin
Deputy Chief, Political Section

POUCHED

(2)	Bangkok	Daresal'M	Manila	Rome	Tokyo
	Belgrade	Djakarta	Moscow	Saigon	V'ntiane
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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0435

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 27, 1966

SUBJECT: Discussion with Soviet Embassy Official Concerning Communist China

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Igor Rogachev, First Secretary, Russian Embassy
Mr. Harald W. Jacobson, Director, Asian Communist Affairs
Mr. David Dean, Deputy Director, Asian Communist Affairs

COPIES TO: FE (1 cc) 1
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Consulate General, Hong Kong (1 cc)

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1966 MAY 6 AM 10 19 Pol 9 S-H Rogachev

1. Mr. Rogachev called by appointment to meet Mr. Jacobson and Mr. Dean. (At an earlier meeting on April 19 - Mr. Rogachev had expressed to Mr. Dean an interest in further discussions of Chinese affairs. A meeting was subsequently arranged for April 27.)

2. During some introductory conversation Rogachev confirmed that he had spent five and one-half years in Peking (and was more at ease speaking Chinese than English). He knew many of the Russian Embassy officials that Mr. Jacobson had known in Chungking during 1944-45.

3. When the conversation touched on more substantive issues (Peking's foreign policy and its ideological views) Rogachev was extremely cautious. He said the ideological dispute was a question between the two parties (i.e. not for outsiders to discuss). He refrained from any criticism of the Chinese Communists. He said the Chinese Communists should be in the UN. He spoke disparagingly of Taiwan. He said very little about Vietnam. Communist China's economic situation was discussed at some length. Rogachev agreed that China's growing population was a major problem.

4. Rogachev volunteered nothing of particular interest. His main purpose seems to have been to become acquainted with officers in FE. On his departure he said with evident pleasure that this was the first time a member of his embassy had contact in the State Department with the Far Eastern Bureau.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Deaprtment of State, WASHINGTON, D. C.

INFO: (See last page for info addressees)

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM: AmConsul HONG KONG DATE: April 20, 1966

SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 16

REF:

POLITICAL

Internal

1. People's Daily Discusses Political Effects of Preoccupation with Technology
2. Liu Ning-yi has a Fright
3. Latest Mao Rumor: Chairman has Throat Cancer

External

4. VIETNAM: Slight Response to Bombings, Political Strife
5. INDONESIA: To the Verge of a Split
6. Liu and Chen Continue Travels
7. The Regime's Views on Africa
8. ChiCom Continue Reject U.S. Moves Toward Improved Relations

Military - Negative

RFE/OD noted

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GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,JThomas,SYNg:drb/nm 4/20/66

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

POL:GDana (in draft)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. People's Daily Discusses Political Effects of Preoccupation With Technology

The April 14 People's Daily editorial "Politics Should Command All Work," the second installment of the ideological restatement begun last week -- see WEEKA 15, was as significant and timely as its predecessor was dull and routine.

In bare outline, the editorial bemoaned the fact that Party personnel had become immersed in the technical details of production thereby neglecting proletarian ideology and political indoctrination. Thus "mired in routinism" some Party cadres had lost their revolutionary sense of direction, and by relying on bourgeois "scholars and specialists" who are better educated and able to cope with production problems than the cadres themselves, had provided an opening for anti-revolutionary forces to increase their influence. The same propensity to place economic techniques, specialization, and work in the fore enabled the Khrushchev clique to usurp leading positions in all spheres of activity and to start the Soviet Union on its slide towards capitalism. The editorial remarked that if proletarian ideology was not emphasized in China, similar elements would "seize the leadership in some places and institutions," inferring that such had already been the case.

The editorial went on to describe the spectrum of attitudes towards the correct position of proletarian ideology in China, including bourgeois intellectuals who oppose it altogether; Party members who separate ideology and professional work, leaving one to Party organs and the other to government departments; other comrades who view the two as equally important; and still others who pragmatically stress one or the other as they think the situation warrants.

The vague, contradictory, and repetitious solution offered by the People's Daily was to make politics a guide for professional activity. Bourgeois elements and "political degenerates" must be kept from usurping positions of influence within the specifically named fields of literature, art,

0438
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

history, philosophy, economics, education, journalism, science, and technology, and the political consciousness of the masses must be raised.

Comment: After three months of unprecedentedly strident emphasis on "bringing politics to the fore" the regime is finally becoming more explicit in explaining just what is bothering it. The editorial summarizes many previous indications of frustration on the part of leading elements in the regime over the growing inapplicability of simple Yenan style revolutionary ideology to the increased complexities of nation building and economic development, a trend which has diminished the influence of less well-educated Party personnel. The article also inferred the existence of genuine and significant debate on internal policies within China, between ideologues demanding a closer relationship between economic method and political theory, and pragmatists who would prefer to continue running the economy in a practical fashion.

As usual the intelligentsia are the scapegoats. If the attacks on Peking Vice-Mayor Wu Han (see WEEKAS 1, 3 and 9) who has in past weeks been identified with both Hu Shih and rightists at the Lushan Conference in 1959, are any indication, they are in for a rougher treatment than ever. The fact that some lesser ranking intellectuals have continued to stick up for Wu Han may be a further indication of ferment within intellectual and government circles, however.

We find it interesting to discover such evidence of debate and ferment in the Mainland over internal policies at a time when Mao Tse-tung has been out of sight for five months. Discussions on the relationship between politics and production which have culminated in the current editorial began in January, more than a month after the Chairman's disappearance.
(ConGenTel 1910) (Confidential)

2. Liu Ning-yi has a Fright

A reliable New Zealand Trade Commission source told us last week that NPC Secretary-General Liu Ning-yi had a bad

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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moment on his return trip from the New Zealand Party Congress (see WEEKA 15). Traveling on a Air New Zealand plane, Liu and his party were destined for Hong Kong from which they planned to make connections for Canton. But Hong Kong was fogged in that particular evening, so the pilot asked for permission to land in Manila. When Manila granted permission but could not guarantee accommodations for the high-level visitors, the pilot decided to divert the flight to Taipei. As soon as he announced his decision over the intercom, the Chinese had a "fit"; and a delegation was immediately dispatched to the cockpit, where an argument ensued. The Chinese begged the pilot to land in Canton, promising diplomatic immunity and comfortable accommodations. Finally through the intercession of a New Zealand Civil Aviation representative who happened to be on board, it was decided to land in Manila after all and then proceed on to Hong Kong the next day.

Comment: Liu must have been glad to get home. Representing Communist China at the farcical New Zealand Party Congress (only 70 people attended, according to the New Zealanders here) was bad enough, but his near escape from being flown into the hands of the Nationalists must have been the last straw. (Confidential)

3. Latest Mao Rumor: Chairman has Throat Cancer

According to a Polish doctor in Shanghai, who told a Polish diplomat in Peking, who circulated the story, Chairman Mao Tse-tung was operated on for throat cancer in Shanghai in early April. The Polish doctor was allegedly called in as a consultant on the case. (Confidential/NOFORN)

Comment: Although no more inclined to accept this story than we have been the other reports on Mao's health, it should be remembered that the Chairman has long been a heavy cigarette smoker.

The head of the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences who, according to last week's Mao story (see WEEKA 15) left a diplomatic dinner to fly through a sand storm to the bedside of an important patient in Changsha, is Huang Chia-ssu.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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He is a noted chest surgeon. (Confidential/Noforn)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

External

4. VIETNAM: Slight Response to Bombings, Political Strife

A. B-52 Raid. The bombing of North Vietnam by U.S. B-52 bombers on April 12 was given routine attention in the Peking press last week. An April 14 People's Daily commentary charged that by taking this action, the U.S. had "seriously escalated its war of aggression." However, the commentary subsequently described the action as a "desperate move in adverse conditions" and proof that the situation in South Vietnam was rapidly getting out of hand for the U.S. It warned the U.S. that such escalation could not "subdue the Vietnamese people nor boost the morale of the puppets and so divert their attention from their internal contradictions." People's Daily also quoted a twenty-year old Mao statement to the effect that while such violence indicated that the enemy had strength left, it was "their last desperate struggle and the people are gradually approaching victory."

A different approach to the bombings was taken on April 14 by Ta Kung Pao Commentator, who described the B-52's as "paper tigers" and claimed that "by sending these clumsy juggernauts over North Vietnam, the U.S. only provides better targets for the Vietnamese army and people who will soon puncture (them)." (Limited Official Use)

Comment: Aside from this relatively sparse comment on the B-52 raids, the Peking press has also thus far failed to comment on the recent U.S. raids in the vicinity of Hanoi. Peking's unaccustomed reticence on these developments may indicate that the regime is curbing its previous tendency to utter threats without regard to their implications (ConGenTel 1878). (Confidential)

B. Political Crisis. NCNA continued its selective use of Western news reports to indicate that the "bitter struggle for power among the different groupings of Saigon puppets remains in a deadlock." The reports emphasized that the "National Political Congress" had failed to stabilize the situation and that the "struggle against the Saigon puppet regime" was continuing. An April 16 People's Daily commentary termed the "National Political Congress" a "U.S. directed farce" which could not avert internal strife nor "allay the anger of the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

broad masses of the South Vietnamese people." The commentary quoted U.S. press reports of Washington's "uneasiness" over the situation and its fear that "anti-U.S. feelings (in South Vietnam) may run even higher with the continuation of the war." (Unclassified)

5. INDONESIA: To the Verge of a Split

A. Sharp Reaction to Raid on CPR Embassy. An attack on the Chicom Embassy, Djakarta on April 15 elicited a sharp reaction from Peking last week. From an April 16 protest note, an April 16 People's Daily editorial, an April 17 People's Daily commentary and numerous NCNA articles, the following points emerged: (1) The Indonesian Government was the organizer and director of the raid; (2) Foreign Minister Malik had given the order for the outbreak; (3) the Indonesians had used GRC agents in the attack and coerced other Chinese to join the raid; (4) the Indonesian Government was thoroughly reactionary, and bent on "pushing the diplomatic relations between the two countries to a rupture..." and was working hand-in-hand with U.S. "imperialists" and Japanese "reactionaires"; (5) the Indonesian Government has an "unshirkable obligation of protecting the life and property of Chinese nationals even if it severs the diplomatic relations between the two countries... (furthermore, the Chinese Government) has the responsibility of firmly protecting its nationals, whatever the circumstances."

Comment: The latest series of articles constitute Peking's strongest indictment yet of the new Indonesian Government. However, the regime still appears willing to leave the initiative for a break with the Indonesians, although its latest outpourings could also in part be intended to provide a case for a Chicom withdrawal should this be decided on. At present, the regime is probably reviewing the situation on the basis of a first-hand report from Ambassador YAO Chung-ming, who returned to Peking from Djakarta April 13. (ConGenTels 1882, 1894) (Confidential)

B. Aid Project Terminated. An April 18 Chicom note to the Indonesian Embassy informed the Indonesians of the regime's decision to end its assistance to the construction of a textile mill in Bandjaran and to withdraw Chinese experts because of Indonesian inability to guarantee the safety of Chinese missions and personnel. The note attributed complete responsibility to the Indonesians for "disrupting economic cooperation between the two countries" and

0443
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

claimed that the regime had tried its "utmost" to carry out the "agreement on economic and technical cooperation between the two countries" despite events since October, 1965. (ConGenTel 1902) (Limited Official Use)

C. Djawoto Resigns. On April 16 NCNA carried the text of a statement by the Indonesian Ambassador to Peking, Djawoto, announcing that he had resigned his post owing to the changed Indonesian situation which made it impossible for him to "execute the tasks given me by President Sukarno two years ago." Djawoto charged Indonesian "right-wing forces" with "systematically (creating) provocations which are serious enough to cause the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries..." He also referred to the "suppression and massacre" in Indonesia of "progressive movements and people." Djawoto also revealed he would "preside over the enlarged plenary conference of the Afro-Asian Journalists Association which will be opened on April 20, 1966 in Peking." (Unclassified)

Comment: Djawoto's resignation provides the Chicoms with a new Indonesian "progressive" to add to those already in exile in Peking, and suggests that a Peking-based "Indonesian Liberation Front" might be formed along the lines of other such bodies already resident in Peking (e.g. the Malayan and the Thai).

D) GOI Discredited

The regime further sought to discredit the Indonesian Government in an NCNA April 19 report carrying a number of Western press accounts of the bloody events which have transpired in Indonesia since last October. Quoting Mao, NCNA optimistically viewed "the unbridled violence of all the forces of darkness" in Indonesia as a symptom of the reactionaries' ensuing death throes."

6. Liu and Chen Continue Travels

A. East Pakistan CPR Chairman Liu Shao-chi and Foreign Minister Chen Yi arrived in Dacca April 15 to begin the eastern leg of their visit to Pakistan. Taking the spotlight from his superior, Chen at a civic reception the same evening shattered the moderate "peaceful coexistence" image proferred by Liu in visits to West Pakistan and Afghanistan by reiterating the traditional militant Chicom world-view and strongly attacking the U.S. Ignoring references to "peaceful coexistence," Chen devoted the major portion of his speech to the "struggles" of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and alleged attempts by the U.S. to retard such movements. In this context, he referred to the

0444

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

"brillant victories" won by the "Vietnamese people...in their struggle against U.S. aggression..." Chen then reiterated the standard Chicom charges that the U.S. was "expanding its war of aggression against Vietnam, and...planning to build a ring of encirclement around China." In this latter connection, Chen charged that the U.S. was trying to bring countries on China's periphery under its control, in order to assist in its "preparations for attacking China," thereby implying that such an attack was not imminent. Chen also defended Peking's actions during last year's Indo-Pakistani conflict in terms of Peking's consistent opposition to aggression and the resultant need to give support to Pakistan against "Indian aggression."

Comment: We view Chen's outburst as an indication that the Chicoms are unable to resist a strong defense of their world-view, even when this may be detrimental to their short-term purposes or embarrassing to their hosts. (ConGenTel 1898) (Confidential)

B. Burma. Following their departure from East Pakistan, Liu and Chen stopped over in Rangoon for a "friendship visit" at the invitation of Burmese chief No Win. Lui's April 17 banquet speech at Rangoon appeared to be a compromise between the regime's compulsion to attack the U.S. and its desire to avoid trampling on Burmese sensitivities. Although his speech did not match the vehemence of Chen Yi's April 15 Dacca diatribe against the U.S. (See A), Liu nevertheless spoke of the Vietnamese people's "fight against imperialist aggression" and of the U.S.' "continued expansion of its war of aggression against Vietnam." He also advanced the opinion that the two most essential points of the DRV 4-point and NLF 5-part positions were "immediate withdrawal of all U.S. military forces in Vietnam and recognition of the NLF as the sole legal representative of the people of South Vietnam." On Afro-Asian affairs, Liu made the customary references to the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" but also treated the regime's recent foreign policy setbacks as evidence of the need to carry out the "anti-imperialist struggle... through to the end" in the face of the "imperialists recent subversive and disruptive activities in Asia and Africa."

Liu's departed Rangoon on April 29, following the issuance of a bland joint communique in which Burma upheld the "restoration of the legitimate rights of the P.R.C. in the U.N." and opposed any

0445
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

"two Chinas scheme." In return, the Chinese pledged support for Burma's policy of "peace and neutrality." The communique also noted that the talks which were held "on matters of common interest to the two countries and on the situation of the Afro-Asian nations' struggle against imperialism" took place in a "spirit of friendship and were most useful." This language suggests that no agreement was reached on these matters "of common interest " or, at the least, the Burmese sought to avoid publicly appearing in agreement with Peking's views lest this compromise their non- aligned status.

Comment: In view of previous Chicom run-ins with the Burmese in general and Ne Win in particular, we are somewhat puzzled as to why Liu in his banquet speech chose to go as far as he did in dredging up such touchy issues as Vietnam and "U.S. aggression," particularly since Liu, if not Chen Yi, managed to exercise a certain amount of restraint on these issues in West Pakistan and Afghanistan. Perhaps Peking is becoming rather fed up over the way that Burma, which as a small, weak neighbor of China's ought to be properly deferential to the Chicom point of view, has remained on balance neutral. On the other hand, Peking may feel that in view of Burma's steadfast commitment to non-alignment it runs little risk of damaging its basic position in Rangoon by bring up controversial issues. (ConGenTel 1905) (Confidential)

7. The Regime's Views on Africa

Peking marked "African Freedom Day" (a legacy of Nkrumah) with a lengthy April 15 People's Daily editorial presenting the regime's analysis of the African situation. The editorial treated the widely disparate and inherently complex African scene in vague, cliche-ridden and even contradictory terms. As an example of the latter, the African revolution was described as "forging ahead like a galloping horse" while subsequently it was noted that the African states were "at the crossroad today" and faced the "momentous choice" between defeating imperialism or slipping back into enslavement.

The editorial devoted considerable attention to the recent wave of coups which has undermined the regime's position in a number of African states, citing these as "proof that imperialism and colonialism are not yet dead in Africa" and therefore the "primary task" of the African people remained the "struggle against imperialism." Resorting to Maoist logic the editorial, however,

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0446

found the "recent counter-offensive sprung by the imperialists" had its bright side in that it "greatly incensed the progressive African countries and the entire African people" resulting in the emergence on the continent of "a new high tide of anti-imperialist struggle" which was bound to triumph in the end.

Predictably, the editorial depicted the U.S. as "the most ferocious and dangerous enemy of the African people." Equal, if not more space, was devoted to denouncing the "Khrushchev revisionists" who were hindering the African people's devotion to the "anti-imperialist struggle" and "rendering service to imperialism" through their specious argument that the colonial system is entering its final phase and therefore "the key problem facing the African countries at present is the socio-economic problem." The editorial itself was contradictory on the phenomena of African independence, at first welcoming its rapid growth as a sign of an awakened Africa, but subsequently implying that owing to the stratagems used by "imperialism" to retain control, the independence achieved by many states was virtually meaningless.

On the ideological side, the independent African nations were pictured as engaged in the "national democratic revolution" which primarily involved the struggle to "erradicate thoroughly all imperialist, colonialist and neo-colonialist influences in the political, economic and cultural fields" for only then could the "fruits of revolution be safeguarded and complete independence be won." During the "national democratic revolution" it was allegedly "entirely possible" for all classes, excepting "imperialist lackeys," to unite closely and form the broadest national front against imperialism." The editorial also called for "greater anti-imperialist solidarity" on an Africa-wide and world scale. Throughout the editorial, the "African revolution" was defined in terms of the struggle against imperialism and for genuine independence in what appeared to be a conscious effort by the regime to live down the implication that its previous references to revolution in Africa were meant to encourage communist uprisings against the existing nationalist leadership. Peking's sensitivity toward recent Ghanian and other charges of subversive involvement in African affairs may also have prompted the editorial's unequivocal assertion that "the future and destiny of Africa will eventually be determined by the African people and by them alone." This is one of the rare occasions we find ourselves

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0447

in complete agreement with the regime, although we hardly feel that Peking's simplistic analysis of African developments accords with reality or that it will help the regime in advancing its interests on the continent. (Limited Official Use)

8. Chicoms Continue Reject U.S. Moves Toward Improved Relations

Following a Chicom Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement describing the Department's decision to allow Chinese scientists to be invited to the U.S. as a "fraud...aimed at deceiving the American people and world opinion" and the attendant implied (although not direct) rejection of this proposal, NCNA carried a pro forma attack on the Secretary's 10-point China policy pronouncement. NCNA called it an "effort to play before American and world opinion the counter-revolutionary dual-tactics of sham peace, but real aggression and sham friendship, but real hostility." NCNA also cited the Secretary's remarks on Taiwan and his recognition of the risk of war with China as evidence that "the U.S. wants to persist in its policy of hostility to the Chinese people and push ahead its policies of aggression and war against China." The article wrapped up the ten points as "a mixture of hostility to China and a deception (whose) real aim is to...launch aggression against China and to contain and encircle it." Moreover, according to NCNA, the ten points "also includes the U.S. scheme to carry out "infiltration in China" in "vain" hope of bringing about the peaceful evolution of China and weakening the revolutionary determination of its people. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: While constant repetition is nothing new to Peking, we nevertheless feel these continued efforts to demonstrate U.S. duplicity, hostility and inability to influence the "revolutionary Chinese people" indicate the regime's concern that U.S. flexibility on China is having an adverse impact internationally and perhaps even domestically.

For the Acting Principal Officer:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED
(2) BANGKOK CANBERRA KARACHI MOSCOW RANGOON SOFIA VNTIANE
BELGRADE CPACPLAD KATHMANDU MUNICH ROME S'PORE COMNAVPHL
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A-704 CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN Air Pouch

Department of State, WASHINGTON

AmConGen HONG KONG April 15, 1966

SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 15

REF:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Low-Level Communes Reportedly Introduced in Yunnan Border Area
2. People's Daily Begins Major Ideological Restatement
3. Mao Mystery Thickens

Military

4. Liberation Army Daily Focuses on Party Committee Leadership Within Military

External

5. Vietnam Treated at Length, But in Familiar Terms
6. Relations with Indonesia Continue to Deteriorate
7. Sino-Soviet Relations: An Honest Revolutionary's Substitute
8. Peking Continues its Outcries Against Sato Government
9. Peking Supports Cambodian Charges of Thai Aggression
10. Joint Sino-Afghan Communique
11. Sino-U.S. Relations: Claimed Downing of Plane; China Debate Scored

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

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Military Item 4 (cleared in draft):Col. Weigand

0449

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. Low-level Communes Reportedly Introduced in Yunnan Border Area

A CAS source (FTB 9773, March 20, 1966) reports that at the beginning of March 1966, ChiCom administrative officials in the southern border region of Yunnan province held a series of meetings with their subordinates to announce the Government's plans to establish soon within the border area "low level people's communes" (jen min chu chi kung she). According to the announcement the number of communes in each village area will depend on the size and population of the village. Each commune will consist of a commune chief, a deputy commune chief, secretary, accountant, work point recorder, storage keeper, sanitation officer, team leaders, and commune members. Members of the commune will work collectively but will cook and eat as family units.

Before joining a commune, all prospective members will sell to the Government privately owned animals at a uniformly fixed price. The Government will then distribute the animals to commune members for use and feeding. Owners of the animals will not be compensated in cash, but will receive instead the receipts for bank deposits. Each commune member will receive work points based on the amount of work performed each day. The annual food and merchandize requirement of each productive worker and his non-productive dependents will be issued on the basis of total work points the productive worker accumulates during the year.

The report appears to provide the details of a Yunnan Border Work Conference convened (no specific date given) by region and reported by Radio Kunming on March 25th. The conference was addressed by Yunnan Party First Secretary Yen Hung-yen and Li Cheng-fang, a secretary of the Provincial Party Committee and an official of the Kunming Military region. It was attended by cadres from the border area special districts, autonomous districts, county CCP committees and border defense units, as well as the leaders of a number of minority nationalities work teams.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0450

Among the tasks outlined at the conference was the realization of a "comparatively big transformation, within a certain period of time, of the backward state of politics, economics and culture of the minority nationalities in the border areas." More specifically it was deemed necessary to "consolidate and develop the agriculture cooperatives, (and) give full play to the superiority of the collective economy." The conference also examined the question of unfolding the socialist education campaign ("Four Clearances") in the border areas. The conferees justified the socialist transformation of the border region as a defense measure, made more urgent by the "serious threat of U.S. imperialism expanding its war of aggression in Southeast Asia and trying to extend the flames of war to our territory."

Comment: In the long run the communization and rectification of the border regions may strengthen regime control over minority nationalities in this strategic area. But the short term validity of these moves as a defense measure is questionable. The resultant rise in dissidence (the CAS source commented that the announcement of the communes had caused a general feeling of unease and concern among the people, several of whom had talked about fleeing the Mainland) will render the area less secure than before. It appears, as it has in other sectors of policy, that the regime is using the war threat as an excuse to accelerate a program that it has wished to implement for a long time. (Confidential)

2. People's Daily Begins Major Ideological Restatement

"During the lengthy course of China's entry into the socialist stage, many comrades have neither seriously considered nor thought through, in fact have been blind to the question /of bringing politics to the fore/. In this fashion, the People's Daily in an April 6 editorial entitled "Bringing Politics to the Fore is the Basis for All Work" began the first installment of a major reiteration of the regime's ideological position. Continuing along on by now all too familiar lines, the editorial voiced the overriding concern that in the long run a backslide towards capitalism, similar to that taking place in the Soviet Union, might occur if proletarian politics and class struggle ceased to be the guidelines of national policy. Although socialism had been established

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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in China many contradictions still existed among the people within the economy. The political and particularly the ideological sphere was still influenced considerably by bourgeois and feudal ideas "since there are still bourgeois elements and bourgeois intellectuals who have not been reformed or not been sufficiently reformed, and the spontaneous tendency to capitalism still exists." In short, the editorial noted that the struggle was far from over.

The achievement of socialism and ultimately Communism required that the gaps between worker and peasant, town and country, and manual and mental labor gradually be narrowed, the editorial continued. To this end, the Central Committee of the CCP and Chairman Mao have formulated a series of principles, policies and measures, including the socialist education movement the half-work half-study educational system, cadre labor, and the establishment of new style industrial and mining areas in which rural and urban life are integrated. However, "when any measure that is directed toward closing these gaps is put into practice it invariably comes up against opposition from the old forces of society." If proletarian politics are not placed in command and these forces are not beaten down, these gaps will widen and undermine socialist society with the result that "the socialist revolution will fail half way."

Comment: That the regime should find it necessary, after several months of unprecedentedly vigorous harping on the politics in command theme, to justify its position once again can be taken as evidence that elements within the Party, government and society have reservations about the validity of the current massive emphasis on ideology. The strongly defensive tone of this sober essay strengthens this impression. In weighing the merits of such conjecture, however, it should be remembered that People's Daily is not a newspaper in the Western sense, but rather a daily indoctrination text to be read aloud and studied at countless political study meetings throughout the country. Constant repetition is a standard ChiCom indoctrination technique, and the regime may simply have decided that the present offers a good opportunity to put its point across once again for the umpteenth time. (Limited Official Use)

0452
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

3. Mao Mystery Thickens

A Western Ambassador passing through Hong Kong last week told us that at a recent dinner party he had given in Peking for members of the Institute of Medical Sciences of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the President of the Institute had excused himself in the middle of the dinner; the Vice-President of the Institute later told the Ambassador that the President had been called to the bedside of a very important patient living in Changsha and had left for that city aboard a special aircraft. This event had occurred at a time when no regularly scheduled commercial aircraft were flying from Peking due to heavy sand storms. From the unusual set of circustances as well as from the fact that Mao Tse-tung's birth place is near Changsha, the Ambassador felt that it was possible to deduce that the very important patient was Mao himself. Of course, the Ambassador added, he did not wish to make too much of this particular story.

Comment: Neither do we, but it is an intriguing piece of gossip. (Confidential/Noforn)

Military

4. Liberation Army Daily Focuses on Party Committee Leadership Within Military

The Liberation Army Daily on April 5 published its seventh editorial on the subject of bringing politics to the fore -- an obtuse, rambling sermon which reflected high-level dissatisfaction with the workings of CCP committees within the PLA. Specifically, the editorial gave the impression that Party committees had become preoccupied with the technical and administrative aspects of soldiering. "A Party committee must pay attention to political ideological work, not professional and technical work." While a committee must be conversant with administrative and technical matters, "it should never lower itself to become a joint office of all the departments." It must exercise its political leadership function by itself and let the other departments handle their own affairs. A Party committee that gives priority to technology becomes delinquent

0453
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

in its political duties and damages the combat strength of the armed forces.

Stressing the cardinal point that Mao's thought was the source of all correct thinking in the Army, the article then went on to present vague allusions to dissension and ideological differences among the Party committees. "Naturally the Party committees must share common ideas if we want our Army to share common ideas. As Chairman Mao pointed out 'if those people do not have concerted action, they should never dream of fighting a war and building.'" But unity is a hard thing to come by and requires repeated effort, "Things are changing all the time and so is people's knowledge. . .they may have different ideas again after they share a common knowledge, and a new unity is again called for." Mao Tse-tung's thought must be used to wage a "grim struggle against all kinds of erroneous ideas. . .(and) curb the influence of all kinds of bourgeois military thinking. . . ."

After a long digression urging Party committees to strengthen basic level political work, recruit new members, promote revolutionary successors, rely on the masses, etc. the editorial returned to its main theme: "Whether or not a Party committee can lead well in placing politics in the fore is, after all, a question concerning the revolutionization of the Party committee itself." All committee members must be thoroughgoing Marxist-Leninists as well as humble and prudent practitioners of democratic centralism. It is never too late to remold, the article continued, pointing the finger at complacent senior cadres. "An old comrade must remain loyal to the Party even if he is old." He must study Mao's works hard with the spirit of rectification, fearing neither "shame nor suffering," for "the higher his position the more he will expose himself to harm."

Sharpening its focus on the upper levels of leadership, the article then warned that first secretaries, while they are ultimately responsible for the work of the committee and should not dodge responsibilities, must not monopolize the leadership of the unit. In a revolutionized Party committee, all should have their say and "vague and double-minded attitudes must be avoided."
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0454
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: Boiled down to its barest essentials what the editorial seems to be saying is that preoccupation with technical matters on the part of CCP committees within the military led them to emphasize weaponry over the human factor and question orthodox Maoist military theories. As a result, rectification is required, and no one, regardless of rank or seniority, can escape the purifying process.

The article lends weight to conjecture that there has been debate within the military on China's ability to fight a war with the United States. It also suggests that the debate was carried out within Party ranks and that the argument is now over. (Limited Official Use)

0455

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

External

5. Vietnam Treated at Length, But in Familiar Terms

A. Peking Welcomes South Vietnamese Political Dissension - Peking stepped up coverage of the South Vietnamese political disturbances with several long NCNA reports on the situation based on a selective culling of Western news agency reporting. Within these NCNA reports, Peking paid particular attention to Western accounts of the alleged blow to President Johnson's prestige resulting from his endorsement at Honolulu of the seemingly now-shaky Ky Government. Attention was also given to the anti-American aspects of the demonstrations in the South and to the problems that Saigon's political instability were creating in the conduct of the war.

Aside from these slanted NCNA "factual" versions of the political disturbances in South Vietnam, Peking somewhat belatedly turned its editorial attention to events there with a People's Daily Commentator April 10 article on "The Mass Anti-U.S., Anti-Puppet Movement Sweeping the Enemy-Occupied Areas in South Vietnam." Commentator predictably saw the disturbances as "fresh proof that rule of U.S. imperialism and its lackeys in South Vietnam is extremely rickety and is fast crumbling." He pictured the U.S. as in a desp rate quandry resulting from the recognition that while its "obediant tool" Ky was floundering and likely to fall without massive U.S. support, such "open support may evoke greater discontent and opposition" which would be against Ky's and Washington's interests.

Playing it safe, Commentator predicted that "whatever the outcome of this round of the struggle may turn out to be, the U.S. imperialists and their running dogs in South Vietnam will find life going from bad to worse." Commentator also concluded that "whatever tricks the U.S. imperialists may play and however desperately they may struggle, their fate in South Vietnam is sealed." (Unclassified)

Comment: We are surprised that the regime is not showing any more exuberance in its treatment of the SVN political situation and appears content with little more than a warmed over version of its position on the inevitability of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. It is possible that owing to the uncertainties of events in the South that Peking does not wish to encourage undue optimism over the prospect of an early Viet Cong victory for fear of weakening the spirit of resolve and sacrifice required for protracted war

0456

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

in the event such optimism is not borne out.

B. Political Implications of Vietnamese Struggle Stressed - Having somewhat neglected the subject in recent weeks, Peking again stressed the importance of the "Vietnamese people's struggle" to the world revolutionary situation. In addition to a People's Daily April 11 article which cited Vietnam as an excellent case in point of the effect of U.S. aggressive policies in arousing the fighting revolutionary qualities of the masses (the intended moral being that the more the U.S. exercises its power, the better the climate for "people's war"), CCP Committee member Liu Ning-yi's speech at the New Zealand CP Conference (item 7) reiterated at length the regime's position on Vietnam. Liu termed the "Vietnamese people's fight against aggression...the focal point of the present struggle between the revolutionary forces of the people of the world and the counter-revolutionary forces of imperialism." He declared that Vietname "eloquently proved that U.S. imperialism is a paper tiger...(and that) revolutionary people who persevere in people's war are invincible." Liu also renewed the regime's support of the DRV's and NLF's position on the settlement of the conflict, and Peking's pledge to "always stand on the side of the fraternal Vietnamese people...no matter to what length U.S. imperialism may go in escalating its war of aggression in Vietnam." (Unclassified)

Comment: The regime's enthusiasm for the "Vietnamese people's struggle" has not apparently rubbed off on to the Northern leaders of this struggle, if the regime's paucity of reference in recent months to Ho Chi-minh and his confederates in Hanoi is any indication. We suspect that Peking's reticence on DRV developments (excepting those connected with military exploits against the "U.S. aggressors") may reflect Chicom displeasure over Hanoi's continued and perhaps increasing alliance with Moscow. (Confidential)

6. Relations with Indonesia Continue to Deteriorate

A. Repatriation of Chinese Nationals Contemplated - The week again featured a series of Chinese protest notes to the Indonesian Government concerning the treatment of Overseas Chinese in Indonesia. No longer did these notes carefully draw the distinction between "right-wing forces" and the Indonesian Government, but in several instances directly attributed to the Indonesian Government responsibility for policies resulting in oppression and mistreatment of Chinese nationals. By far the most significant of these protests, and the one which indicated most clearly the extent to which relations between the two nations had deteriorated, was the note handed on April 12 to the Indonesian Ambassador at

0457
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Peking requesting the Indonesian Government to provide assistance to those Chinese nationals in Indonesia who wish evacuation to China. Following a recital of alleged Indonesian outrages against local Chinese nationals, the note requested that Indonesia perform the following acts for those desiring repatriation: 1) immediately arrange ships to transport them back to China; 2) allow returnees to leave with their effects and funds; 3) ensure their safety enroute to the ports and their needs at the ports, and facilitate their departure, and 4) provide protection to the Chinese consular officials helping in the departure and provide them with the necessary facilities. (Unclassified)

Comment: Our recollection is that Peking supplied the ships used in the 1960 repatriation of an estimated 80,000 Chinese nationals to the mainland. The present request for the Indonesians to assume this responsibility may be a ploy intended to induce Djakarta to counter with an invitation for the Chicoms to supply the ships and thus place the Indonesians in the position of having requested Chinese vessels and therefore having assumed responsibility for their safety. (Limited Official Use) (ConGenTel 1854)

B. Sukarno Again Written Off - Having last week publicly voiced for the first time its recognition of Sukarno's downfall as a political force in Indonesia (WEEKA 14), Peking again made clear to the Chinese public the dimensions of Sukarno's defeat and, by implication, the hopelessness of its own position in Indonesia. On April 9 NCNA quoted AFP and UPI press reports to the effect that Sukarno had been cut off from contact with his Cabinet Ministers and that the Indonesian military was screening his telephone calls and appointments. On April 13 NCNA cited an AP report describing Sukarno as a lonely man increasingly isolated from the Indonesian public and political developments. (Unclassified)

7. Sino-Soviet Relations: An Honest Revolutionary's Substitute

While Peking maintained its silence on the 23rd CPSU Congress (WEEKA 14), the regime highlighted the poor but honest revolutionary's substitute for the glittering "revisionist" conclave at Moscow--the 21st Conference of the New Zealand Communist Party. To this remote gathering of a handful of supporters of Peking's

0458

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

revolutionary line, the regime dispatched CCP Central Committee member Liu Ning-yi, a seasoned and prominent party affairs specialist. In addition to Liu, Hill of Australia and two members of the pro-Peking faction of the Belgium CP made up the entire representation of the international proletariat on hand for the Conference.

Liu's speech and the CCP's Central Committee message to the gathering added to the unreality of the scene. Both made reference to the alleged domestic revolutionary accomplishments of the New Zealand CP and highly praised the Party for carrying out a "tit for tat struggle" against "modern revisionists" and for having exposed the latter's despicable nature. Furthermore, the mind boggles at the picture drawn by Liu of the more than 17-million strong CCP "marching forward shoulder to shoulder and fighting as one" with the few hundred members of the New Zealand fraternity. Outside of these fantasies, Liu's speech consisted of the standard Chicom line on the "paper tiger" nature of "U.S. imperialism," the betrayal of Vietnam by the "modern revisionists," etc. About the only innovation in Liu's speech was his repeated reference to the "revisionist leading group of the CPSU", a usage apparently designed to foster the impression of a CPSU leadership at odds both with the Party's rank and file and with the Soviet people. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: An absolute belief in the correctness and moral rectitude of the regime's course undoubtedly accounts for Peking's willingness to make obvious its paucity of support in "socialist" circles. We also suspect that under the influence of the Yenan spirit, the regime's leadership does not flinch at the prospect of having to battle its way out of extreme adversity. (Limited Official Use) (ConGenTel 1867)

8. Peking Continues its Outcries Against Sato Government

Peking's already flourishing anti-Sato campaign was pushed to new heights during the week as the regime concentrated its fire on the recently concluded Southeast Asian Conference on Economic Development which was hosted by the Japanese Government. The essence of the regime's position on the Conference was presented in an authoritative People's Daily Observer article of April 10 which viewed the proceedings as a "new and important" step by the "Japanese militarists and monopoly capital," working in the service of "U.S. imperialism," to preserve the colonial

0459
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

nature of the Southeast Asian national economies and thereby make these nations "an appendage to American and Japanese monopoly capital." Observer linked the Conference to President Johnson's April, 1965 proposal for Southeast Asian economic development and further charged that the meeting "was directed wholly by U.S. imperialism from behind the scenes using the Sato Government as its organizer." In fact, the dominant theme of the regime's torrent of abusive comment on the Conference was that the "Japanese reactionaries" were acting as U.S. errand boys in carrying out a program of economic and political expansion into Southeast Asia. Peking also viewed the Conference as a revival of Japan's efforts to create a "Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere" and again reiterated its belief that Sato was following in Tojo's footsteps and would meet the same end. (Unclassified)

Comment: Peking undoubtedly views the Conference as the precursor of a far more active Japanese role in Asia and is dismayed by the prospect of the re-mergence to regional influence of a capitalistic Japan which is basically allied to the U.S. and normalizing its ties with the Soviets. In short, Peking's hope for predominant influence in Asia is now faced with the formidable obstacles of the U.S. presence and the growing Japanese and even Soviet involvement in the regime's backyard. It is no wonder that Peking increasingly turns for comfort to Mao-discovered laws on the inevitability of revolutionary victory. (Confidential) (ConGenTel 1830)

9. Peking Supports Cambodian Charges of Thai Aggression

In the first high-level pronouncement on Cambodian affairs in several months, an April 9 Foreign Ministry statement condemned the alleged Thai attack on the Preah Vihear Temple as "another grave act of aggression against the Kingdom of Cambodia instigated by U.S. imperialism and committed by its vassal Thailand." The statement supported an earlier Cambodian charge that the incident was "a prelude to massive aggression against Cambodia." It concluded with an expression of Chinese "firm support for the Cambodian people's just struggle against aggression" and a warning to the U.S. and its "lackeys" that they "must stop their acts of aggression against Cambodia; otherwise, they will have to face the consequences of their own action." (Unclassified)

0460
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: This latest Chicom warning is even weaker than the previous vague line pledging to the Cambodians the support of the Chinese people in "utterly defeating U.S. aggression" against that Kingdom.

We feel that the Chicom attitude toward Cambodia has cooled somewhat during the last few months, possibly as a result of Sihanouk's renewed dealings with the Soviets. Evidence which leads us to speculate about Peking's cooler attitude includes the regime's low-keyed handling of a Cambodian cultural delegation which visited Peking in the last weeks of March and NCNA's appreciable reduction in its formerly extensive coverage of Sihanouk's speeches. (Confidential) (ConGenTel 1853)

10. Joint Sino-Afghan Communique

It is apparent that Peking utilized Liu Shao-chi's visit to Afghanistan primarily as a public relations exercise designed to counter the tarnished image of the regime. As was the case with Pakistan (WEEKA 14) the joint communique marking the end of Liu's visit to Afghanistan was noticeably bland and consisted largely of a Chicom effort to demonstrate the regime's attachment to friendly relations and peace as manifested in its November, 1963 boundary settlement with the Afghans and its support of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" and "ten principles of Bandung." In keeping with the sweetness and light mood of Liu's trip, Peking acquiesced in a formula for the communique which made apparent the existence of differing views "on important world issues, including the Vietnam problem," and moreover restrained any urge to insert a unilateral exposition of the regime's view on these issues. The Chinese got from the Afghans, as they did from the Paks, an expression of support for the "restoration of their legitimate rights in the UN." (Limited Official Use)

Comment: At the least, Liu's travels to Pakistan and Afghanistan have brought first hand awareness to the regime that there are nations of the Afro-Asian group who do not see eye to eye with it on Vietnam and the nature of the U.S. While we do not expect this to result in any major changes in the regime's policies on these issues, nevertheless Liu's experience may have some educational value and lead the regime along more flexible tactical paths. Indeed the language of the Pakistan and Afghanistan communiques suggests that Peking is already aware

0461
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

of the need for such flexibility and is acting upon it. We continue to doubt, however, that the basic Chicom "revolutionary" stance in foreign affairs has been changed; rather it is being better concealed. (Limited Official Use) (ConGenTel 1837)

11. Sino-U.S. Relations: Claimed Downing of Plane; China Debate Scored

A. Plane Downed by PLA Air Force - NCNA announced the shooting down of a U.S. "A-3B heavy attack plane by "an air force unit of the PLA" on the afternoon of April 12. The announcement claimed that the plane was downed "over the area of the Luichow Peninsula, Kwangtung Province" and that prior to attacking, Chinese planes "kept the U.S. plane under surveillance, (and) on many occasions closed in and warned the intruding plane." However, according to NCNA, the plane disregarded these warnings and flew deeper into China's territorial air space whereupon "to safeguard China's territorial rights, the Chinese aircraft shot the enemy plane down." To date the Chicoms have kept silent about the fate of the pilot of the downed plane.

Lin Piao's order commending the air force unit involved in the attack pictured the claimed intrusion as "a serious step taken by U.S. imperialism in its attempt to impose war on the Chinese people" while People's Daily Commentator termed the claimed victory a "new and powerful warning to the imperialists," but called for increased air force vigilance as "the nature of U.S. imperialism cannot change and it will not learn the lesson."

NCNA , on the same day it reported the "air victory", also claimed that U.S. air attacks on April 7 against Chinese fishing boats in the Gulf of Tonkin had resulted in the death of two, the wounding of fifteen and damage to three fishing boats. The U.S. was warned "by a spokesman of the Department concerned" that the "debt will have to by paid and U.S. imperialism would certainly be punished for its act of aggression."

Comment: Peking has probably learned to live with incidents of such nature and will probably do little more than exploit them as examples of alleged unremitting U.S. hostility toward China and the ability of the Chinese armed forces to defeat would-be aggressors. Moreover, Peking's claim that the downed plane had received several warnings appears to be an effort to demonstrate

0462
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

that the regime is not spoiling for a fight with the U.S. Air Force. (Confidential) (ConGenTel 1864)

B. China Debate Scored - A lengthy April 9 article by a "NCNA correspondent" presented Peking's predictable views on the China debate underway in the U.S. The correspondent saw the debate as a reflection of the "strong opposition" of the American people to the escalation of the Vietnam war and of the anxiety of a "section of the U.S. ruling circles" about the possibility or a catastrophic war with China. However, to him the "more profound reason" for the discussion about China was the failure of U.S. policy to prevent the domestic and foreign revolutionary successes of China and the regime's consequent standing as the "greatest insurmontable obstacle" to U.S. global strategy.

The correspondent dismissed the academic witnesses who appeared before the Fulbright Committee as "ideamen in the service of the U.S. ruling classes" who differ only on what counter-revolutionary methods should be adopted in dealing with China. Equally dismissed was their concept of "containment without isolation" which was interpreted as a dual counter-revolutionary tactic involving "continued aggression, encirclement and isolation of China" while "indulging in the vain hope of bringing about 'peaceful evolution' in China so that revolutionary China will degenerate gradually." Confidence was expressed that the Chinese people have seen through these tactics and would not be either browbeaten by U.S. "tough tactics" or deceived by its "soft tactics." It was noted with evident satisfaction that even Secretary Rusk had seen the uselessness of the "two China" formula. The correspondent's piece concluded with the assertion that nothing would come of this/rounds of discussions in the U.S. on China policy for there was no way out of the blind alley of U.S. imperialism's China policy. (Unclassified)

For the Deputy Principal Officer:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED

(2) BANGKOK BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST CANBERRA CPACPLAD DARESAL'M DJAKARTA KARACHI KATHMANDU KLUMPUR LONDON MANILA MOSCOW MUNICH NDELHI PRAGUE RANGOON ROME SAIGON SEOUL SOFIA S'PORE (4)TAIPEI TOKYO V'NTIANE COMNAVPHL TAIWANDEFCOM 13AFMANILA

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0463

ORIGIN/ACTION

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ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 11
OSD 46	USIA 10	NSA 3
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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A-699 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN | Air Pouch HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

INFO : (See last page for infor addressees.)

Hackman

FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG DATE: April 7, 1966

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 14

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE CLASSIFIED

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Pace of Mao Study Campaign Slackens
2. National Industrial and Communications Conferences Held - Basic Level Political Structures Overlooked
3. Regime Focuses Nationwide Attention on Problem of Unemployed Urban Youth
4. Yacht "Chinook" Returns from Mainland

External

5. Vietnam: Chicoms Report on Demonstrations in South
6. Sino-Soviet Relations: No Direct Chinese Comment on CPSU Congress
7. Japan: Peking Indignant Over GOJ Veto of Chicom Delegation
8. Liu Continues Travels
9. Indonesia: Collapse of a Policy

Military

Negative

RFE/OD Noted

4/13 RFE/RC

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,CKamman,JThomas,SYNg:nom/drb,4/7/66

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

0464

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Internal

1. Pace of Mao Study Campaign Slackens

Since February articles extolling the benefit of Mao study, headed by a medallion likeness of Mao and the banner slogan "Mao Tse-tung's Thought Controls Everything," have dominated the front page of the People's Daily. From March 12 through 24 the banner slogan headed the front page every day and related articles sometimes took up as much as three entire pages of the six-page paper. However, with the publication on March 24 of the Party's refusal to attend the Soviet Congress, treatment of the Mao study campaign has been interspersed with other, less arcane topics. References to the Chairman's thought continue to abound, but other stories in the past weeks, and particularly reports of Liu Shao-chi's visit to Pakistan as well as the recent coverage of the Industrial and Communications Conference, (see item 2) have broken the massive continuity of the campaign.

This evidence suggesting that the managers of the drive may have decided to slacken the pace is no guarantee, however, that the national emphasis on studying Mao's works will not resume after a short lull. Provincial media continue to carry reports on local efforts to systematize and intensify the study of the Chairman's thought. Furthermore, during the "Great Debate" on the relationship between politics and production that has occupied so much space in mainland media over the past few months, the regime has expended considerable energy in combatting the once prevalent attitude among cadres that political indoctrination is an off-season activity which takes the back seat once spring planting gets underway in earnest. As the Canton Nan Fang Jih Pao put it "the best opportunity to teach the peasants is when something big occurs in the rural areas - at this time the peasants have the highest number of thought problems and political and thought work is most needed. ...The present busy spring farming season is the key moment for political and thought work." (Radio Canton, March 28th, 2300 GMT)

Whether temporary or not, the current lull in national press treatment of the Mao study campaign provides a welcome rest for readers of the mainland newspapers, domestic and foreign alike. (Limited Official Use)

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0465

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

2. National Industrial and Communications Conferences Held - Basic Level Political Structures Overlooked

On April 2 NCNA announced that the National Industrial and Communications Work Conference and the National Industrial and Communications Political Work Conference had been jointly held in Peking from January 27 through March 5 under the auspices of the State Economic Commission and the Industrial and Communications Political Work Department of the Central Committee. The 28-day gathering was chaired by State Economic Commission chairman Po I-po and key-noted by the Commission's Vice Chairman Tao Lu-chia. The importance of the meeting was highlighted by the presence of CPR chairman Liu Shiao-chi, Premier Chou En-lai and Party Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping. Both Chou and Teng addressed the delegates, who included the Party secretaries in charge of industry and communications work of the regional bureaus, and the provincial and municipal Party committees; the ministers and political department directors of the various central government ministries related to industry and communications; the chairman of the economic committees and directors of the industrial communications political department of the various provincial and municipal governments, among others.

Coining a new formula for whitewashing the past, the cliche-ridden conference communique summarized the events of the past eight years as "three years of vigorous development (the Great Leap); three years of adjustment (i.e. collapse and retrenchment); and two years of a new production high tide (recovery)." (For the antecedents of this formula see WER 1.) While greatly gratified with the successes of 1964 and 1965, conference delegates pointed out the following faults in the industrial and communications system: a) only a portion of the cadres in units were really operating enterprises in accordance with the thought of Mao Tse-tung, b) the industrial and communications sector has fallen far short of the People's Liberation Army in placing politics in command, c) a perfect system of industrial management has not yet evolved.

The report of the conference, which appeared in the April 3 People's Daily, was accompanied by a lengthy editorial predictably urging that enterprises be run in accordance with Mao's thought. This standard but forceful exposition of Maoist guidelines for industrial management demanded that class struggle be waged

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0466

vigorously in the enterprises, that managers practice democratic centralism and rely on the masses, and that the absolute control of all phases of enterprise activity by the Party Committee be strengthened. The reverse/image of the article was that revisionist and capitalist tendencies continue to exist in the industrial communications sector and that friction between party functionaries and technical personnel continues to be a problem in the enterprises. (See WER 14) (Unclassified)

Comment: It is clear from the list of delegates attending the conference that the PLA-type political department network has been established in Party and State organs down to the level of the larger municipalities. (Limited Official Use)

We were struck, however, by the fact that the spread and strengthening of lower level "political structures" was not, as it has been since 1964, a stated work goal of the conference. Further evidence that the establishment of basic level PLA-type political departments may be encountering difficulty can be found in the conference statement that the industrial and communications sector was politically way behind the PLA, the original model for the new network. In this connection we were also interested to note that Ku Mu, who as director of the Central Committee's new Industrial and Communications Political Department, was ostensibly responsible for establishing the new system, was not mentioned as being present at the meeting.

Another point of some interest in connection with the summarization of the events of the last eight years is the palpable fact that the Party still finds it necessary to explain away the failures of the Great Leap Forward. (Limited Official Use)

3. Regime Focuses Nationwide Attention on Problem on Unemployed Urban Youth

Commenting enthusiastically on the urban youth programs of three northern cities, the lead editorial of the March 31 People's Daily entitled "Competing with the Bourgeois for the Next Generation is a Big Event" focused on the problem of what to do with city youngsters and teenagers unqualified for further formal education and unable to find work. The three cities singled out for praise were Taiyuan, which has developed a half work-half study television middle school; Mu-tanchiang, which has in recent years established a successful system of youth and teenager clubs; and Chang-chun which allegedly has developed an

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0467

efficient "planned guidance" scheme for urban youths migrating to the rural areas. (Features on Taiyuan and Mu-tanchiang appeared on March 31 and April 3 respectively. A report on Chang-chun has yet to be published, however.)

The editorial stressed that the proper handling and education of urban youngsters and teenagers was a political task of the highest importance. While the politariat shows great concern for the younger generation and educates it with the greatest enthusiasm, bourgeois influences are also at work trying to lure them from the socialist path. Inferring that unemployed urban youths are particularly susceptible to these tendencies, the editorial went on to point out that the final outcome of the struggle to mold these youths into useful revolutionary successors was far from decided.

The answer to the problem was said to lie in renewed efforts "to completely organize urban youth and teenagers who have not proceeded to higher studies, to manage and educate them properly and to arrange employment for them." The task would require the cooperation of educational, labor, planning, industrial and agricultural departments of the government as well as the Young Communist League, the Women's Federation and urban street organizations. Primary stress in all programs devised would be placed on preparing unemployed youngsters for a future in the countryside. Furthermore, the responsibility of urban organizations would not end once the youths had left the city. "The relevant urban units should continue to serve as their rear base, continue to show concern for them and support them,assuming responsibility for them until the end."

The editorial concluded by urging all cities throughout the county to attach the greatest importance to youth management and to emerge victorious in the "struggle against the bourgeois for the capture of the next generation."

Comment: Neither the theme of "competing with the bourgeois" for the loyality of China's youth or the attention paid to cultivating revolutionary successors is anything new. But reference to these themes in connection with an explicit discussion of unemployed urban youth is striking and suggests that the difficulties of managing idle and potentially delinquent city children are growing. Furthermore, such direct treatment of the problem on the front page of the regime's leading paper is in itself evidence that

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

the problem has assumed such proportions as to warrant concerted nationwide concern and effort.

Up until now, despite the large volume of propaganda on the subject, the number of urban youths moved to the countryside has been relatively small. Last week, for example, Radio Canton, (April 3, 2300 GMT) quoting the first composite figures that we have seen for the area, stated that 30,000 youths had settled down in the countryside during the "past few years," a figure that seems low for a city that size. (See also ConGen's A-611) (Confidential/NoForn)

From now on, however, if the March 31 editorial is any indication, the pace of resettlement should increase markedly. An April 2 NCNA despatch stating that more youths migrated from the cities during the first two months of 1966 than any corresponding period in the past supports this thesis. Such a step up will probably involve more emphasis on sanctions and less on persuasion than the regime has applied so far, however. (Confidential/NoForn)

4. Yacht "Chinook" Returns from Mainland

On April 2 NCNA Canton announced that William Andrews, the American skipper and owner of the yacht Chinook, and his two Filipino crew members had been released after the yacht had entered Chinese territorial waters off the Kwangtung coast by mistake on March 24. (The 32-foot sloop had been on its way from Manila to Hong Kong to participate in the bi-annual China Sea Race.)

Andrews arried in Hong Kong on April 3 and later told ConGen officers that on March 24 he and the two other members of his crew were forcibly apprehended by Chinese fishermen after the Chinook had been blown into Chicom territorial waters by a violent storm. He was taken to a fishing village in Lu Feng county and greeted cordially by local civil authorities who subjected him to a thorough, informal, and he felt, friendly interrogation on the reasons for his presence in Chicom waters. The authorities were satisfied with Andrews' explanation for the presence of sophisticated two-way radio gear which was installed on board the Chinook for the China Sea Race and which was discovered in the course of a careful routine search. He felt the authorities also chose to overlook the fact that a member of Andrews' crew sent a surreptitious radio message to Manila after receiving permission to repair the radio. They were aware that the message had been sent

0469
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

because the crew member made the mistake of trying to inform Andrews in a written note that he had contacted Manila. The police delivered the note to Andrews just before he was released.

Andrews stressed that he had been well-treated by his captors during the nine days of his detainment. When finally released (he whiled away the time by reading, listening to the radio, and teaching police officers how to play gin rummy) the Chinook's fuel tanks were filled with 25 gallons of diesel oil free of charge.

Comment: From Andrews' account it would appear that the Chinese bent over backwards to avoid creating an incident. The radio equipment aboard could have given the Chicoms an ideal excuse to trump up spy charges against him, had they so desired. The lenient handling given Andrews, in our opinion, demonstrates a desire by the regime to emphasize that its quarrel is not with the American people but with the Government.

One striking procedural similarity is evident in the handling of the three recent instances of Americans entering China by mistake or by unorthodox means (U.S. sailor Edwin R. Armstrong and Mrs. Beverley Reilly in addition to Andrews.) In no case did the regime admit any knowledge that the Americans were in China until after their release. (See WEEKA 5). The Chicoms probably have found this procedure convenient because it enables them to decide at their leisure what to do with the new arrivals without pressure from the outside. So far in each case, though for totally different reasons, the regime has decided that the detention and exploitation of those Americans who have entered their jurisdiction either by design or accident would be more trouble than it was worth. (Confidential) (ConGenTel 1800 and A-690)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

External

5. Vietnam: Chicoms' Report on Demonstrations in South

Low-level reportage on the demonstations in Hue, Danang and Saigon formed the bulk of an otherwise routine week of Peking comment on Vietnam. For the most part, the regime's coverage of the demonstrations consisted of selective use and slanting of Western press agency reports. Several NCNA articles stressed the anti-American aspects of the demonstrations and alleged that the outbreaks had "panic-stricken" the Saigon authorities, caused deep concern in Washington, and revealed the inability of the U.S. "to maintain a stable puppet regime in South Vietnam."

Peking's only comment of an editorial nature during the week appeared in a short April 1 People's Daily commentary which declared that the outbreaks showed the U.S. was actually "sitting on live volcanoes" in South Vietnam. The commentary alleged that events had shown that the South Vietnamese people wanted to drive the U.S. out and that the recent demonstrations were "a serious warning to the Johnson Administration." (Unclassified)

Comment: Our impression thus far is that Peking has been rather slow off the mark in making propaganda hay and demonstrating heady enthusiasm over what would appear to be ideal supporting material for its thesis of inevitable victory for the popular Vietnamese struggle against "U.S. imperialism". No significant reason for this relative reticence comes to mind, unless the regime is exercising unaccustomed prudence in awaiting the outcome of these South Vietnamese developments before shooting off its mouth on their significance. (Limited Official Use)

6. Sino-Soviet Relations: No Direct Chinese Comment on CPSU Congress

To date the Chinese have not commented directly on the 23rd CPSU Congress since the CCP's stinging rejection of an invitation was published on March 23. Instead, Peking has contented itself with attacking the Congress indirectly via the words of others. In the two weeks following Peking's announcement of its boycott of the Congress, NCNA reprinted materials from the pro-Peking Communist parties or splinter groups of Albania, Peru, Italy, Belgium, Australia, Ceylon and Argentina. Some

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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items were merely anti-Soviet while a number of them specifically attacked the "forthcoming" CPSU Congress. No comment, Chinese or foreign, has yet appeared on the actual proceedings of the Congress.

As if to emphasize the split in the international movement, a CCP delegation headed by Central Committee member Liu Ning-yi arrived on April 6 in Auckland to attend the 21st Conference of the New Zealand Communist Party -- hardly a match for the Congress still going on in the Kremlin. The thinness of the ranks of out-and-out ChiCom supporters was evident in the list of fraternal parties represented in New Zealand. According to Western press dispatches, there were, in addition to the CCP, delegates from Albania, Belguim and Australia. The latter two represent pro-Chinese factions of split parties. (Unclassified)

Comment: The Chinese may have settled on a tactic of temporary silence for a number of reasons, but one reason which immediately comes to mind is that condemnation of the Party Congress at this time would embarrass Peking by highlighting its position as an outsider in contrast with the prominent participation of erstwhile (and important) Chinese allies such as the Vietnamese and North Koreans. Even an ex-post-facto attack on the Congress is likely to pose problems for Peking in light of Hanoi's and Pyongyang's attendance, but we feel that the ChiCom's overweening sense of rectitude and anti-Soviet outrage will ultimately cause the regime to blast away.

Meanwhile, we note that the plethora of foreign anti-Soviet articles carried by ChiCom media has not yet included any Japanese comment beyond the text of the JCP cable declining to attend the Congress. Several of the articles reprinted b y NCNA have praised the CCP and Albanians for their wisdom in boycotting the Congress, but none has mentioned the JCP -- the only other important party to stay away from Moscow. (Congentel 1798) (Limited Official Use)

7. Japan: Peking Indignant over GOJ Veto of ChiCom Delegation

The Japanese Government's decision not to authorize entry into Japan of a ChiCom delegation from the People's Institute

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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of Foreign Affairs, which had been invited by the opposition Japanese Socialist Party in reciprocity for JSP "friendship" missions to Peking, provided an opening for Peking's third blast at Prime Minister Sato's policies in as many weeks. ChiCom reaction to the GOJ announcement came first in a statement on March 31 by a spokesman of the sponsoring Institute, and was followed by a Ta Kung Pao editorial of April 1 and a People's Daily Commentator article of April 5. In addition, NCNA stories datelined Tokyo quoted at length from statements by Japanese leftists protesting the decision. The basic themes of this flood of contrived indignation were: 1) that the GOJ action and subsequent justification of it amounted to "provocations of a very serious nature" aimed at poisoning friendly relations between the Chinese and Japanese peoples, and 2) that this was only the latest in a long catalog of "reactionary policies" hostile to China, which Japan was pursuing in "subservience" to the U.S. Each of the ChiCom outbursts harked back to Japan's refusal to admit CCP Politburo member Peng Chen for attendance of the Japanese Communist Party Congress in the fall of 1964, very soon after Sato became Premier. Despite the accumulation of bones of contention since then, the ChiCom response this time did not approach even the veiled threat made in a Foreign Ministry Statement of 1964 that "grave consequences" would result from the Peng Chen affair. Instead, Commentator simply predicted a fate similar to "the ignominious death of Hideki Tojo" for the Sato Government -- just as Chinese Cassandras have done regularly for the past two months or more. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: A Japanese Consulate General official told us recently that the Japanese press has become so inured to periodic denunciations of the Sato government that even the March 15 Commentator article, which bared Chinese nuclear teeth, (Weeka 11) received scanty or no attention in Japanese media. Although the latest effort may attract more attention, the ChiCom assertion that "the Japanese people will not allow a handful of reactionaries to engage in such evil pursuits," (i.e., Sato's "reactionary" policies), should serve only to reinforce the GOJ argument that Peking seeks to interfere in Japanese domestic politics. (Limited Official Use)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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8. Liu Continues Travels

Liu Shao-chi continued his state visits to Pakistan and Afghanistan (Weeka 13) last week, departing West Pakistan March 31 for a short stay in Sinkiang before arriving in Kabul April 4. Later, he will visit East Pakistan.

A. Sino-Pakistani Communique. Liu's departure from West Pakistan was shortly followed by the issuance of a bland joint communique which did not appear to give Peking much to cheer about. The communique's description of the Liu-Ayub talks as involving a "frank and friendly exchange of views on the present international situation" indicated persisting foreign policy differences between the two sides. Its failure to include such issues as Vietnam, "U.S. imperialism," anti-colonialism, etc., even in the context of a unilateral declaration by the Chinese side, moreover suggested that Peking gave way to considerable extent before the Pakistanis in the interest of assuring that Liu's visit resulted in outward signs of success. Aside from the usual generalities about solidifying friendship, the only things the regime seemed to have gotten from the Pakistanis in the communique was an expression of "deep gratitude" for Peking's role in the Indo-Pakistani dispute and a Pakistani restatement of its "firm belief that the CPR should be restored its lawful rights in the UN and that any scheme to create 'two Chinas' is bound to fail." Nevertheless, despite the lack of any substantive success in moving Pakistan toward support of the regime's foreign policy goals, from all accounts Liu enjoyed a tremendously popular welcome in Pakistan and his trip clearly accomplished its basic purpose of demonstrating and consolidating Sino-Pak friendship. We cannot, however, help wondering if Peking ever reflects on the fact that one of its greatest sources of popularity abroad derives not from the regime's principled stand on the "revolutionary struggles of the masses," but from its support of the nationalistic aspirations of a state involved in an old-fashioned territorial dispute. (Congentel 1787) (Confidential)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

B. Afghan Visit. After the usual airport ceremonies in Kabul April 4, Liu was guest of honor at a banquet hosted by the Afghan King the same evening. As he did in Pakistan, Liu in his banquet speech, stressed Peking's alleged adherence to the "five principles of peaceful co-existence," with particular emphasis on friendly relations and equality between large and small states. Although he mentioned the struggle of the Vietnamese people" against alleged "frenzied armed aggression by the United States," he did not press the point nor go into the details of the ChiCom position on the subject. Liu interestingly referred to various "temporary setbacks" on the international scene, but explained them away with the "twists and turns" rationale so prominently featured in the People's Daily during recent weeks.

Replying to Liu, the King stressed Afghanistan's desire for friendly relations and its policy of "neutrality." His references to Vietnam were in terms of the "deep worries" which the problem had brought to the "peace-loving" Afghan people and government. The only backing he voiced for ChiCom foreign policy objectives was to call for the "restoration" in the UN of the "rights of the great Chinese people." (Limited Official Use)

Comment: Afghanistan's long border with the USSR and its expressed interests in neutrality fairly well assure that Liu's visit will at most produce only outward manifestations of friendly relations between Peking and Kabul.

Indeed, the visit could be of some advantage to the U.S. if the Afghans make clear to Liu their interest in negotiations on Vietnam. (Limited Official Use)

9. INDONESIA: Collapse of a Policy

A. ChiComs Comment on Suharto Coup. NCNA brought its readers up to date on recent developments in Indonesia with two April 4 NCNA articles analyzing the Suharto coup. Through use of Western and Japanese news sources, the articles detailed the process of Sukarno's capitulation, the Army takeover, and the cabinet shakeup. In the process, for the first time in ChiCom media,

0475

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

NCNA pictured President Sukarno as a mere figurehead retained by the Army as window-dressing. That the regime had written off Sukarno as an important element in the Indonesian political scene also seemed apparent in NCNA's inclusion, without comment, of the conclusions of a Japanese correspondent that Sukarno could only carry on as a symbol, and even his remaining appearance of power would slowly be whittled away, and that the present position of the Indonesian military would not be overthrown.

Comment: Peking's writing off of Sukarno evidently represents the implicit abandonment of regime hopes for a favorable turn in the Indonesian political situation. With the release of the NCNA articles, the dimensions of the regime's policy defeat in Indonesia have been made apparent to the Chinese people, many of whom undoubtedly remember the leadership's absolute commitment to the whims and fantasies of Sukarno which was exemplified in a January, 1965 People's Daily editorial supporting the Indonesian withdrawal from the UN in scatological terms indicating a direct Mao Tse-tung involvement. Of interest, People's Daily on April 5 prefaced these accounts of Indonesian developments with an extract from Mao Tse-tung's "On New Democracy" (written in 1940) showing that the very "unbridled violence of all the forces of darkness. . . indicates. . . they are already in their death throes, and that the people are gradually approaching victory." One day earlier, People's Daily carried yet another article on "twists and turns" in the worldwide revolutionary situation -- the sixth such effort within a month. Our feeling is that this continuing effort to rationalize away setbacks and provide evidence of Mao's omniscience may in large part be designed to minimize the leadership's (including Mao's) personal responsibility for external policies which have ended in disaster. (Confidential)

B. NCNA Issues Parting Shot. NCNA April 1 carried the text of a farewell letter released by its Djakarta branch before it left the Indonesian capital on April 1. The letter took the opportunity to defend NCNA's conduct in Indonesia since its inauguration in 1955 and to ridicule the Indonesian Government's rationale for closing its Djakarta office. It then charged that such "brutal sabotage of friendly relations between the peoples of the two countries runs entirely counter to the desire of the Indonesian people and caters to the needs of imperialism, and

0476

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

U.S. imperialism in particular." (Unclassified)

Comment: This vehement and decidedly superfluous outburst against the Indonesians is a product of Peking's inability to ignore real or imagined slights, a tendency which has lately played havoc with the regime's relations with equally sensitive and emotional Afro-Asian states and contributed greatly to the "twists and turns" currently worrying it.

C. More ChiCom Protests. Peking maintained the steady stream of protests to the Indonesian Government with two April 2 CPR Embassy notes protesting attacks on the ChiCom Consulate in Medan and on Chinese schools and organizations in Lumpung, Djambi. Both notes charged that Indonesian local authorities failed to protest Chinese institutions, and instead "connived at the hooligans' outrages." The notes made the standard demands for public apologies, punishment of the culprits and relief for the victims. (Unclassified)

For the Acting Principal Officer,

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED:

(2)	BANGKOK	CANBERRA	KARACHI	MOSCOW	RANGOON	SOFIA
	BELGRADE	CPACPLAD	KATMANDU	MUNICH	ROME	S'PORE
	BUCHAREST	DARESAL'M	KLUMPUR	NDELHI	SAIGON	(4) TAIPEI
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ORIGIN ACTION

INR-10

RM/R	REP	AI
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ARA	EUR 5	FE 6
NEA	CU 5	INR
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S/IC 1	PC 2	IS/I HOCKMAN 1
AGR 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 3	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 22	NAVY 7
OSD 46	USIA 11	NSA 3
NSC 6	IIEW 1	IYASA 4

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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A-680 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | Air Pouch HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State, Washington

INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG DATE: APRIL 1, 1966

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST Joint WEEKA No. 13

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED APR 6 PM

1966 APR 6 PM 2 49 COPYFLO-PBR

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Mao Photo Fails to Quell Rumors of Illness
2. Leadership Note: Teng Hsiao-ping Out of Sight
3. Mao Study: Northeast Bureau Holds Meeting-Southwest Next?
4. Famous Historian Latest Intellectual Rectification Target

External

5. Vietnam: Busy Week
6. U.S.-Chicom Relations: Peking Goes on the Defensive
7. Relations with the Communist World
8. Sino-Indonesian Relations: "Sliding Down the Road"
9. Japan: New Chicom Attack on Sato Government
10. Liu in Pakistan: Dusting Off the Bandung Image

MILITARY

Negative

REGION noted

4/7/66 FEL/RC

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12 year intervals, not automatically declassified.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0478

Internal

1. Mao Photo Fails to Quell Rumors of Illness

On March 29 the Hong Kong Communist Newspaper Wen Wei Pao front-paged a blurry photo of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai standing with girl militia members in a large unidentified city square. The caption to the photo read simply "Chairman Mao and Premier Chou with the Militia - originally published in the Yang Cheng Wan Pao of March 25." The Yang Cheng Wan Pao photo caption was equally uninformative as to the date and the place the picture was taken. (Unclassified)

Comment: If, as seems likely, the publication of the photograph is an attempt to quell speculation about Mao's condition and whereabouts, the result has simply been to raise more questions. In fact, we find recent regime treatment of Chairman Mao's disappearance from the public scene, most notably the formal March 26 Government denial that anything was wrong, odd in comparison to past practice. (This denial evidentally was given only to foreign newsmen in Peking; it has not been otherwise made public in Mainland media.) Moreover, as far back as we can remember, the standard method for spiking rumors that Mao was ill (which in recent years have arisen annually) has simply been to produce the old man at an identifiable function, at a known time and place and photograph him with guests, usually foreigners. The most recent example of this technique was the June 12, 1965 photograph of Mao with speaker of the Indonesian National Assembly Kartawinata, an official whose rank did not impress us as warranting an audience with Mao but whose visit was apparently seized upon to end speculation about the Chairman's health.

That the regime finds it necessary to counteract the strongest spate of rumors yet which are based on Mao's longest absence on record, with a denial that he is ill and a photograph which could have been taken at a number of Chinese cities at any time between the present and 1964 adds to the impression that something really is wrong with Chairman Mao. This impression will continue to exist and grow until Mao makes an identifiable appearance. (ConGenTel 1768) (Confidential)

2. Leadership Note: Teng Hsiao-ping Out of Sight.

We note with interest that Party Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping has not been involved in any way with the most recent visit to China of the Japanese Communist Party delegation headed by his

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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opposite number, Japanese Party Secretary-General Kenji Miyamoto. Although Teng took part in the talks with the Japanese delegation on March 3 before they went to North Korea, he was not present at the airport when they returned on March 21: he did not attend a banquet given in Miyamoto's honor on the 27th, and did not see him off at the Peking Airport on March 29. According to our records Teng has not been seen in public since March 9 when he escorted New Zealand Communist Party Secretary Wilcox to the Peking Airport. (Unclassified)

Comment: Teng is not a frequent appearer, especially when compared with his counterparts in the State Government, but his failure to be present at functions involving opposite numbers in fraternal parties can be taken as evidence that he is out of town or out of circulation. The reason why he has dropped out of sight is, of course, anybody's guess. (Limited Official Use)

3. Mao Study: Northeast Bureau Holds Meeting-Southwest Next?

An important missing piece in the developing nation-wide pattern of the Mao-study campaign was supplied on March 23 when NCNA Shenyang announced that the CCP Northeast Bureau and the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee had recently held a meeting at Anshan to discuss techniques of arming the rural cadres and masses with Mao's thought. The communique, in contrast to the directives criticizing senior cadres which have been handed down by the Central-South, East China, and North China Bureaus, stressed the strengthening of indoctrination and Mao-study in production brigades and teams. While the communique made clear that effective study at the basic level was impossible if leadership methods and ideology at the commune level and above were faulty, upper level cadres escaped the strong attacks on their lack of revolutionary zeal and sincerity that have marked Mao-study instructions from the other bureaus.

In the Southwestern Province of Yunnan, however, senior functionaries did not get off so lightly. There, the Provincial Party Committee at an enlarged standing committee meeting on March 11 made boldly clear its displeasure with the Mao-study habits of cadres at the county level and above. In a report of the meeting broadcast on March 20 (Radio Kunming 2315 GMT) it said, "The current state of the study of Chairman Mao's works is very far (emphasis added) from compatible with the development of the revolution. Party Committees have not got a firm grasp of leadership for study. Leadership cadres do not study as well as ordinary cadres... Some comrades lack the determination to reform

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

themselves and are not keen on study." They are guilty of "calling on others to study a lot but not studying much themselves, applying to teach each other a lot, but not reforming themselves much."

If the Yunnan meeting is any indication, the Southwest region is the next area to be blanketed by the campaign.

4. Famous Historian Latest Intellectual Rectification Target

Chien Po-tsan, one of the best known historians in Communist China, came under attack in a March 25 People's Daily article by three obscure intellectuals, Chi Pen-yu, Lin Chieh, and Yen Chang-kuei. Linking their criticism of Chien to the campaign against historical playwright Peking Vice-Mayor Wu Han, the authors accused him of applying bourgeois concepts of historiography to his writings while masquerading in the guise of a "Marxist historian." Like Wu Han in the field of historical drama, Chien's bourgeois bias allegedly produced a distorted picture of history which beautifies the role of kings and ministers and uglifies the role of peasant revolutions.

Unwilling to resist the standard Chinese Communist predilection for catch phrase numerology, Chien's attackers summarized the ingredients of his heresy as the "two antis" and the "two pros." The "two antis" refer to a refusal on the part of the historian to interpret history in the context of class struggle, and a refusal to place history at the service of (i.e. distort in favor of) contemporary affairs. The "two pros" encompass the tendency to venerate history for its own sake and the tendency to emphasize historical research and the data gained therefrom at the expense of Marxist historical theory. Chien Po-tsan is therefore guilty of the worst sort of what the Communists call "history-ism." (Unclassified)

Comment: Since the intellectual rectification campaign began in the summer of 1964, various disciplines such as theory, philosophy, ethics, literary criticism, aesthetics, and historical drama have one by one been purged of alleged tendencies to negate class struggle, the key tenet of Maoist orthodoxy. The first indication that historiography was to be the next discipline to come under attack came in an article in Red Flag No. 3 (February 27, 1966) by another noted Marxist historian Yin Ta called "The Revolution in Historiography Must Be Carried Through

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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to the Very End." The article, written but not published in 1964, laid down the guidelines for an assault on "history-ist" writers, but declined to name names in levelling its criticisms. Chien Po-tsan, a former Dean of the History Department at Peking University and writer of the well known "Outline of Chinese History" is the first specific target of this latest phase of the campaign.

Ironically, Chien has figured quite prominently in the criticism of other intellectuals in the past. In 1955, he participated actively in the attacks on Hu Shih. He has even spoken out in the current drive against Wu Han. Now it's his turn. (Limited Official Use)

External

5. Vietnam: Busy Week

A. "American People's Struggle" Hailed. In a People's Daily editorial March 27 and a mass rally the same day, as well as in several NCNA accounts of demonstrating in the U.S. and abroad, the regime took comfort in an "awakened" American people who were depicted as "dealing a heavy blow" to the Johnson Administration by "struggling" against U.S. policy in Vietnam. People's Daily asserted that this struggle was taking on new forms, such as a growing hostility to the "imperialist system" and the "gradual combination of the mounting anti-war movement with the developing Negro people's struggle." According to People's Daily, this growing movement against U.S. policy in Vietnam was indicative of a "daily sharpening of the class struggle and national struggle within the United States." The editorial concluded by stating that the Chinese people "firmly believe that the American people will frustrate the Johnson administration's adventurous scheme for further aggression against Vietnam and for wider war."

The themes expressed by People's Daily were reiterated at great length by several speakers (including representatives from North Vietnam, the Viet Cong and various "progressives") in a mass rally in Peking March 27. The major speaker, Chicom spokesman Liao Cheng-chih, treated the audience of 16,000 to a militant diatribe against "U.S. imperialism" in which he expressed the view that the struggle of the American people against their "imperialist masters" had risen in "mounting waves" and as a result of Vietnam was now at a "new crest." Liao also repeated the standard Chicom formula of supporting the Vietnam people's struggle "to the end." (Limited Official Use)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: Although Peking leaders may well believe that an "awakened" American people will eventually seriously hamper the Administration's efforts in Vietnam, available evidence indicates that they tend to regard this "awakening" process as a long range one and are realistically aware that U.S. domestic opposition to Vietnam has not reached the stage where it exerts a major influence on U.S. policy.

B. More Statements on War With U.S. - Following a period of reticence on the subject, the possibility of war with the U.S. drew renewed comment from several authoritative Chicom sources last week. Liao Cheng-chih (see above) asserted that the U.S. was "spreading the flames of war to the whole of Indo-China and directing its main spearhead towards China." He further charged that "in preparing its war of aggression against China, (the U.S.) was doing its utmost to whip up anti-China hysteria." People's Daily Observer's rejection of U.S. proposals seeking to improve relations between the two nations (see Item 6) in several places made the point that the U.S. was "feverishly planning to carry the war of aggression from Vietnam to China." Finally, Peng Chen, speaking at a rally for a visiting delegation of Japanese Communist Party leaders (see item 9), evoked memories of Foreign Minister Chen Yi's September 1965 press conference with his declaration that "if the U.S. imperialists adamantly carry on their war of aggression in Vietnam, if they insist on 'escalating' the war and on imposing war on the Chinese people, well, let them just come and try. It can be stated with certainty that this will only expedite the destruction of U.S. imperialism." (Unclassified)

Comment: The forum and context of these statements on war impress us as differing considerably from the regime's authoritative and pressing treatment of the subject at the turn of the year. In short, none of the statements of the past week convey a sense of urgency on the question of war with the U.S. and there is an evident sloganizing quality to them. In keeping with the regime's earlier comments, Peking continues to picture war as an event imposed on the Chinese people by U.S. action. (ConGenTel 1753) (Confidential)

C. U.S. Again Charged With Chemical Warfare - Peking dutifully chimed in to the latest Hanoi and Viet Cong campaign against U.S. "chemical warfare" in Vietnam by releasing a March 24 Foreign Ministry statement and a March 25 People's Daily editorial condemning the "monstrous crimes committed by U.S. imperialism against the Vietnamese people." Both the statement and the editorial took the line that such "crimes" showed that

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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the U.S. was losing in Vietnam and was therefore resorting to desperate measures. Both pieces also used charges of chemical warfare as a means of ridiculing the Administration's support for "social revolution" in South Vietnam as well as proof that one "absolutely must not entertain any illusions about the U.S. imperialists...but must carry on the fight against them resolutely to the end." (Unclassified)

6. U.S.-Chicom Relations: Peking Goes on the Defensive

On March 29 a People's Daily "Observer" article presented Peking's authoritative and flatly negative response to recent U.S. statements and actions looking toward improved relations with Communist China. The heart of the regime's position was contained in Observer's reiteration of the line constantly taken at Warsaw that "so long as the U.S. Government does not change its hostile policy toward China and refuses to pull out its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, the normalization of Sino-American relations is entirely out of the question and so is the solution of such a concrete question as the exchange of visits between personnel of the two countries." The article appeared three days after a relatively detailed NCNA report of the Secretary's press conference remarks dealing with U.S.-China relations, which was equally negative and professed to see no evidence in the Secretary's replies of any change in what it called a "fixed policy of hostility toward the Chinese people."

Observer's justification for the regime's position, while it laid expected stress on U.S. "occupation of Taiwan" as a source of tension and brought the charge in several contexts that the U.S. was "feverishly planning to carry the war of aggression from Vietnam to China," revealed at the same time a strong sense of wounded Chinese national pride, which undoubtedly contributes to the regime's negative attitude toward recent American proposals. This can perhaps be best summed up as a feeling of resentment over what the Chinese evidently take to be U.S. condescension in its treatment of relations with them.

Observer sought to explain the "feigned U.S. eagerness" to improve relations with China as a ploy of the "U.S. ruling circles ...to detract public attention from their deployments for aggression against China." Observer thereupon expressed his belief that "surely nobody will allow himself to be fooled by such dual counter-revolutionary tactics."

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0484

Comment: In treating American interest in better relations as a sham and attempting to dismiss the regime's refusal to countenance contacts between the two peoples on the grounds that this is precluded by American "hostility," Peking betrays more than a hint of concern over the adverse effect on Chicom interests of American flexibility towards China. Not only does such flexibility complicate the regime's long standing effort to portray the U.S. as the implacable enemy of the Chinese people; more importantly, the regime has been placed in a position where it now appears in the eyes of many (including possibly some informed Chinese) as the primary obstacle to any improvement in U.S.-Chicom relations. Observer provides a further key to the regime's sensitivities when he dismisses American hopes of "peaceful evolution in China" as a "sheer day dream."

In sum, judging by the Observer article, recent U.S. comments on relations with Peking have put the Chicoms definitely on the defensive, have forced them to admit that the blame for lack of contact between the Chinese and American peoples now rests squarely with Peking and not the U.S. Government, and have complicated the Chicoms' efforts to depict the U.S. Government before the eyes of the American and world peoples as being incorrigibly aggressive and hostile toward China. (ConGenTel (Confidential)

7. Relations with the Communist World

After a lull of some weeks, Peking brought the pot to a boil once more in its polemical battle with the Soviet Union. On March 23 the Chinese published their rejection of an invitation to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress. Their boycott was immediately joined by the Albanians and the faithful New Zealand Communist Party; two days later the Japanese Communist Party cabled Moscow that it would also be absent. Present in Peking during this flurry of boycott activity was a North Vietnamese party delegation led by Politburo member Le Duan, whose "friendly visit" was reported after he left China on March 25. His destination--the 23rd CPSU Congress--was never once hinted at in the Peking press.

A. CCP Letter to CPSU. In its letter dated March 22 replying to the Soviet invitation of February 24 to attend the Party Congress, the CCCP Central Committee justified its refusal to participate by citing recent anti-Chinese documents circulated by the Soviets both domestically and to foreign parties. It accused the CPSU of spreading rumors alleging that the Chinese

0485
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

were "obstructing aid to Vietnam" and "encroaching upon Soviet territory." Besides objecting to these Soviet documents, the Chinese reply attacked the new Soviet leaders for cooperating with "U.S. imperialism" on a broad front--notably in Vietnam and in building a "military ring of encirclement" around China. Finally, the Chinese curiously assured the Soviet people that "once the USSR meets with imperialist aggression and puts up resolute resistance, China will definitely stand side by side with the USSR and fight against the common enemy." (Unclassified)

Comment: The Chinese decision not to attend the Soviet Party Congress is consistent with the hardened Chicom attitude which emerged after the March 1965 Moscow meeting of 19 parties and which has subsequently been aggravated by Sino-Soviet rivalry in Vietnam. Rejection of the invitation appears to put Sino-Soviet party relations at their lowest ebb in the history of the dispute, and the tone of the letter suggests that Peking now views long-term alienation of the two parties as inevitable.

We are intrigued by the puzzling Chinese offer to come to the aid of the Soviets if they are subjected to and resolutely resist "imperialist aggression." While on the surface this pledge creates the impression that Peking is seeking to extract similar defense assurances from Moscow, we feel the vehemence and frequency of Chicom charges of U.S.-Soviet collusion rule out such a simple explanation. We tend to view the Chicom offer rather as a means of advertising the regime's sterling Marxist-Leninist credentials and expressing solidarity with the Soviet people, though we find it hard to conceive that the Chinese foresee an early possibility of fulfilling the pledge. (ConGenTel 1737) (Confidential)

B. Le Duan Visit to Peking.

As a courtesy to the Chinese, probably on Hanoi's initiative, Le Duan stopped in Peking en route to Moscow. He was given a banquet by Chou En-lai and other high CCP officials, and during his stay held "intimate talks permeated with fraternal friendship" with a CCP delegation headed by Chou. The clearest evidence of Hanoi's deference to Chinese sensitivities was Hanoi's separate but equal press treatment of Le Duan's departure for the

0486
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

two capitals. Nevertheless, we doubt that the Chinese will derive much comfort from these efforts to mitigate the regime's obvious loss of prestige inherent in Le Duan's attendance at the Soviet Party Congress, nor is it likely that the decision of the North Koreans to participate improved Peking's mood. (ConGenTel 1752) (Limited Official Use)

C. JCP Delegation Homeward Bound - The Chicoms were successful, however, in persuading the important Japanese Communist Party to stay away from the Congress. It is not clear whether the Japanese Communist Party decision came as a result of long, hard talks between visiting Secretary General Kenji Miyamoto and the Chinese, or whether Miyamoto's reputed independence in international bloc matters was undercut in Tokyo during his absence. In either case, Miyamoto received limelight treatment at a public rally the day after his party fell into line behind Peking, and he himself echoed the Chicom line in a speech at the rally, if NCNA's summary is to be relied upon. On March 29 the delegation left for home via Canton, having stayed away some three weeks longer than the month Miyamoto originally estimated in a press conference when he left Japan. (Limited Official Use)

D. Thanks, But No Thanks. The Chinese Red Cross on March 26 wrote to the Soviet Red Cross, thanking it for its offer of medicines and supplies for Chinese earthquake victims, but stating that the Chinese Party and Government had provided for them and no foreign help was needed. (Unclassified)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

8. Sino-Indonesian Relations: "Sliding Down the Road"

Peking last week reacted sharply to the closure of its NCNA offices in Djakarta and increasing restrictions on its consulates in Indonesia with a flood of protest notes to the Indonesian Govt.

Protesting the closure of the NCNA offices in Djakarta, a March 27 Foreign Ministry note and a March 30 People's Daily editorial rejected Indonesian charges that NCNA had interfered in internal affairs and ridiculed the Indonesian rationale for closing the NCNA offices. Both statements upheld the right of the ChiComs to print the "truth" about the "drastic change" in the Indonesian political situation. The Foreign Ministry note termed the closure "another grave step deliberately taken by the Indonesian Government to undermine relations between the two countries." People's Daily went even further, charging that "the Indonesian Government obviously wants to deliberately worsen the state relations between China and Indonesia." It then warned Indonesia that it had "gone far enough in this direction. If you continue to slide down this road of worsening the relations between our two countries, then you must be held completely responsible for all the consequences arising therefrom."

Communist China's deteriorating position in Indonesia was also revealed in a March 26 CPR Embassy note protesting Indonesian restrictions on the functioning of its consulates in Bandjarmasin, Makasar and Medan and announcing that these consulates had "temporarily suspended" their work as of March 26. The note complained that the Indonesian local authorities had prevented the proper functioning of the consulates by requiring consulate personnel to secure passes before moving about and by other restrictive measures. In view of this, their personnel would be evacuated to Djakarta and their Consular duties would temporarily be taken over by the ChiCom Consulate General in Djakarta. The note closed with a demand that the GOI repeal all "unreasonable restrictions" on these consulates and ensure the safety of their personnel so that they could "go back and carry on their normal work."

Comment: Although the regime's position is obviously worsening, Peking appears inclined to hang on in Indonesia as indicated by the description of the consulates' closure as "temporary" and the demand for conditions allowing them to re-open. Peking's policy is apparently compounded of lingering hopes for the revival of the political fortunes of friendly Indonesians and of concern for the interests of the local Chinese. The latter may include a desire to be on hand in the event a large-scale evacuation of Chinese along 1960 lines is required. In any event, the increasing shrillness and sense of outrage embodied in the regime's latest notes hardly appear calculated to soothe Indonesian passions. (ConGenTel 1758) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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9. Japan: New ChiCom Attack on Sato Government

A People's Daily editorial of March 29 took as its point of departure two speeches by Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina in which he had allegedly "declared blatantly that the Japan-U.S. security treaty could be applied to Vietnam, China and Korea." The editorial deplored policies of the Sato Government which had made Japan a "pawn in U.S. aggression in Asia," encouraged the revival of "militarism," and led to "collusion with the Khrushchev revisionists" and "frequent contact with...U.S. lackeys in Asia." The ChiComs warned that these policies were a "dead-end street," not only because the DRV, DPRK and CPR were "dependable guarantees for peace in Asia," but also because such policies would"never be countenanced by the Japanese people." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Unlike a "Commentator" article of March 15, this editorial avoids reminding the Japanese of ChiCom nuclear capability; it parallels closely earlier attacks such as one by "Observer" on February 4, including the prediction that the present Japanese government would meet the same fate as Hideki Tojo. As the latest in a series of pro-forma exercises apparently aimed at buttressing Japanese domestic leftist opposition, the editorial seems likely to produce little impact amidst GOJ circles who are weary of the same old preachments from Peking. In our opinion, this shrill and unimaginative inveighing against the Sato Government most likely emanates from Peking's frustrations over its poor showing in influencing Japanese policy since 1962 by the use of such "carrot and stick" tactics as the de facto separation of politics and economics and the campaign against the signing of the Japan-ROK treaty. There remains the possibility, however, that the regime's increasing shrillness may presage more emphasis on the stick and less on the carrot. (ConGenTel 1769) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

10. Liu in Pakistan: Dusting Off the Bandung Image

In an event receiving great fanfare in the ChiCom press, Chinese Communist Chief of State Liu Shao-chi arrived in Pakistan March 26 to begin a state visit at the invitation of Pakistani President Mohammed Ayub Khan. After a reportedly tumuluous welcome from the people of Rawalpindi, Liu spent the next few days holding talks with Ayub, attending banquets and visiting various sights in Rawalpindi and Lahore.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Setting the tone for Liu's journey was a March 27 People's Daily editorial which devoted considerable space to making a case for Peking's purported policies of peace and friendship. The editorial expressed China's devotion to the "five principles of peaceful coexistence," and cited as proof of the regime's interest in peaceful and friendly relations the various boundary settlements which Peking has concluded with its neighbors. This Bandung-type phraseology was used by Liu in a banquet speech March 26. The CPR Chairman declared that despite China's and Pakistan's differing social systems, it was "entirely possible for us to develop our friendly relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence." Liu also voiced support for the "just struggle of the Kashmiri people" and promised that China would give "resolute support and assistance" should Pakistan "resolutely fight against foreign aggression." In keeping with his essentially moderate stance in Pakistan, however, Liu treated India in mild terms. Although he also referred to "U.S. aggression in Vietnam," his remarks on the subject were again mild by ChiCom standards.

In his reply to Liu's presentation, President Ayub thanked the Chinese for their support during last year's IndePakistani conflict but also took the occasion to defend the Tashkent Agreement, a diplomatic achievement which has been roundly criticized by Peking. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: Thus far the regime appears to be utilizing Liu's visit to Pakistan to, (1) consolidate its existing friendship with Pakistan in order both to disrupt the latter's ties with the West and to assure that at least one significant opening remains in the encirclement allegedly being forged by the regime's adversaries; (2) counter the impression, which we gather even Peking feels is gaining currency abroad, that the regime's nature is aggressive and unyielding; and (3) demonstrate to both its external and domestic audience that despite recent "temporary" diplomatic reverses Peking still has friends and respect on the international scene.

As of the present we have no information on the nature of the talks which have taken place during the visit. Although Liu in a March 27 banquet speech described his talks with Ayub as harmonious and successful, the duration and frequency of their

0490

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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meetings and the absence of such descriptive terms as "agreement" or "common understanding" could indicate that considerable effort was required to reconcile or paper over divergent views. (ConGen-Tel 1761) (CONFIDENTIAL)

For the Acting Principal Officer:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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POLITICAL

Internal

1. Massive Emphasis on Politics Continues
2. Tung Pi-wu on Provincial Tour
- X - 3. Peking Audiences Amused by War Preparations Films
4. Quote of the Week

External

X 5. B - Peking on Vietnam
6. Liu Shao-chi to Visit Pakistan and Afghanistan
7. Japan: Sato Government Under Fire
8. ChiComs Take Comfortin French Moves Towards NATO
9. United States: Humphrey Remarks Labelled "Kiss of Judas"
10. Indonesia: ChiComs Protest Attacks on Djakarta Offices: Ignore Suharto Coup
X 11. Ambassadors Trickle Back to Posts

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Internal

1. Massive Emphasis on Politics Continues

The massive emphasis on "bringing politics to the fore" which has been so noticeable since the beginning of the year, continued during past weeks. The efficacy of Mao's thought as the source of all wisdom and strength, the sword and buckler of China's defense, the key to spring planting as well as the solution to knotty technical problems still blankets all media -- the People's Daily, for example, is replete with such references -- and all forums from Regional Bureau Meetings (most recently a meeting of the East China Bureau announced March 6 in NCNA) to Poor and Lower Middle Peasant Congresses and philosophical symposiums.

Papier mache folk heroes remain the principal device for popularizing the Mao-study message. While in some areas the campaign to emulate Chiao Yu-lu has bogged down ("a few persons and enterprises have not attached sufficient importance to it" -- Radio Sian March 13, 0400 GMT) elsewhere the drive is being pushed as a vehicle for "rectification with the door open" (i.e. public criticism) of County Party Committees (Radio Chengchow, March 9, 1000 GMT). Naval hero Mai Hsien-te is still the object of emulation. It was announced on March 7 that hospital calls would be limited from now on to hasten Mai's recovery in preparation for a nation-wide tour. In addition, two new model Mao-students have rolled off the press in the past two weeks, a Uighur named Heterazim and a 62 year old senior citizen named Kao Tsu-chang, each designed to create an example for the sector of society they represent. (Unclassified)

Comment: One of the questions uppermost in our minds is how long this typhoon of political hot air can last. If it is not already meaningless to the ordinary citizen, we would guess that a few more weeks at the current level of media saturation will render it so. Furthermore, with spring planting soon to go into full swing, the point is about to be reached at which "repeated political discussions" like those deemed necessary in the People's Daily of March 9 (FBIS No. 47) will begin to affect production adversely. (Limited Official Use)

2. Tung Pi-Wu on Provincial Tour

CPR Vice Chairman and Politburo member Tung Pi-wu has been mentioned in reports from three different provinces over the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0494

past ten days. Although no specific dates were given, Radio Canton broadcasted the details of his visit to Mai Hsien-te's bedside in Canton on March 7 and Radio Nanning covered his inspection tour of Kwangsi on March 8. He met with PLMP representatives in Weichang, Hupeh on March 12. (Unclassified)

Comment: Tung is but the most recent high ranking tourist in the provinces during the past several months. Politburo member Li Hsien-nien was seen in the northeast city of Shenyang last August. Politburo member Ho Lung went to Singkiang last October and paid a brief visit to Canton this February with National Defense Council Vice Chairman Yeh Chen-ying. Party Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping headed west to Chungking last November, while Politburo member Tan Chen-lin visited Hunan in December. Foreign minister Chen Yi spent some time in Canton during his long absence beginning in late December. A tour of the "front lines" is the most oft-rumored reason for Lo Jui-ching's long absence from public view.

Judging from a comparison with 1964 leadership public appearance records, provincial inspection travel by politburo members appears to have increased slightly during 1965 and so far in 1966. Faced by difficulties abroad and ideological indifference at home, the regime may feel a somewhat greater need to get out of Peking and sample grass root opinion. Although Tung Pi-wu's elder statesman position might make him an effective and impartial observer, it seems a sign of the times that a slowed-down Mao should be relying for some of his information on an eighty-year-old fact finder. (Limited Official Use)

3. Peking Audiences Amused by War Preparations Films

British Embassy Officers in Peking have remarked on the audience reaction to two war preparation movies, "Tunnel Warfare" and "Anti-Aircraft Struggle." They said that "Tunnel Warfare," a war of resistance movie full of detailed instructions on how to build, ventilate, and drain village tunnel systems; how to make man traps; how to fortify a village; etc., was treated by Peking viewers as "just another good Western."

"Anti-Aircraft Struggle," which is playing at three Peking movie houses, is a straight civil defense instruction film on

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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what to do in case of air attack and how to shoot down enemy aircraft with rifles and light machine guns. During scenes showing smoothly drilled workers racing out of factories already equipped with rifles and helmets and leaping into well prepared trenches, the audience "collapsed in the aisles." Their reaction, the officers commented, must have been based on the ludicrous contrast between real preparations and those shown in the film. Furthermore, the British viewers got no feeling that the Chinese audience was anxious about the possibilities of an imminent attack. They seemed to regard the movie more as entertainment than instruction. (Confidential)

Comment: These reports throw a different light on popular attitudes towards war preparations than others we have heard depicting a worried population being warned by street committee cadres to prepare for attack tomorrow. If the British diplomats' reading of audience reaction is accurate at least some people in Peking feel that war is a long way off, both in time and distance. (Confidential)

4. Quote of the Week

"A Father's and a Mother's love cannot match the tenderness of the Party and Chairman Mao."

Hsing T'ai Earthquake victims quoted in the People's Daily March 12.

External

5. Peking on Vietnam

A. Allied Troop Reinforcements. In routine terms Peking condemned the decisions to despatch additional South Korean and Australian troops to Vietnam. A March 11 Foreign Ministry statement and a March 15 People's Daily castigated the South Korean and Australian "running dogs of U.S. imperialism" for coming to the assistance of the South Vietnamese and warned the ROK that "for this crime it will certainly receive severe punishment at the hands of the Korean and Vietnamese peoples." (Unclassified)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: The regime's treatment of these developments impresses us as carefully avoiding reference to specific measures on Peking's part in response to these troop increases. Thus, the vague prescription for dealing with this development is the requirement for the "peoples of Vietnam, Korea, China and other Asian countries ... to strengthen further unity, and support and help each other for the thorough defeat of the U.S. aggressors." (ConGenTel 1650.) (Confidential)

B. On Expanded Conflict. The vital subject of war with the U.S. continued to be handled in a subdued manner by Peking. While reiterating the familiar charge that the U.S. was bent on expanding the war in Vietnam, the above-mentioned March 11 Foreign Ministry statement failed to draw from this the inference that the U.S. sought war with China. Peking's most direct reference to war with the U.S. came in a March 14 People's Daily comment on Vice-President Humphrey's March 12 reference to the existing friendship between the Chinese and American peoples. People's Daily charged, among other things, that the U.S. was "preparing to spread its war of aggression to China," but the seriousness of the charge was vitiated somewhat by its context as part of the argument to refute the Vice-President's expression of friendship through painting the blackest possible picture of U.S. intentions toward China. Moreover, Peking's continued circumspection on the subject of hostilities with the U.S. seemed apparent in the regime's decision to forego comment on the reported unanimous desire of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to expand the bombing of the DRV. Finally, perhaps the strongest indication of the regime's shift away from public preoccupation with the issue of war with the U.S. was contained in a March 15 Peking Daily Worker's lengthy reply to a reader's letter on the alleged movement of the "U.S. war strategy" from Europe to Asia. The reply pictured this movement as dictated by the emergence of China as the greatest obstacle to U.S. plans for world domination, the growth of the Asian people's national liberation struggle and by the perfidious behavior of the "modern revisionists." While references to U.S. hostility and military encirclement were plentiful, the Daily Worker reply refrained from picturing the U.S. goal as war with China. It predicated that the U.S. effort to "expand its war of aggression in Asia" would be defeated by the growing anti-American revolutionary tide in all Asian nations. (Limited Official Use)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

C. Unaccustomed Reticence. Probably owing to the participation of the Soviet Union and its "socialist" followers in the activities, Peking has demonstrated a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the "Week of Tri-continental Solidarity with Vietnam." In contrast to the heavy play given the occasion by the Hanoi press, the regime's media has carried only a few routine messages from Chinese mass organizations expressing support for the "Vietnamese people's struggle." (Unclassified)

6. Liu Shao-chi to Visit Pakistan and Afghanistan

NCNA announced on March 13 and 16 that Communist Chinese Chief of State Liu Shao-chi, accompanied by his wife and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, would visit Pakistan and Afghanistan. No dates were announced for the visits. Another NCNA report on March 15 quoted Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto's comment that Liu's visit would promote friendly Sino-Pakistani relations, but also that Pakistan welcomed American cooperation and valued its relations with the U.S., while at the same time its relations with the USSR were "growing." (Unclassified)

Comment: Although firm evidence as to the initiative for the visits is lacking, we feel that Peking most likely prevailed upon Pakistan and Afghanistan to reciprocate at this time the visits to China of King Mohammed Zahir (November 1964) and President Ayub Khan (March 1965). The ChiComs probably regard the visits as an important means of countering the impression at home and abroad that the CPR is diplomatically isolated. In the case of Pakistan, the Chinese may perceive an opportunity to embarrass U.S.-Pakistani relations by the mere presence of Liu in the country (though Bhutto was quick to dispel the notion that the Liu visit to Pakistan had any anti-U.S. motives). Liu also can be expected to cement relations by endorsing completely the Pakistani position vis-a-vis India and Kashmir, as well as possibly pledging additional aid in one form or another. In Afghanistan, Liu may find himself on the receiving end of yet another Vietnam peace initiative. In any case, as the first venture abroad by a ChiCom leader since the recent series of diplomatic setbacks for the regime beginning with the Second Afro-Asian Conference debacle last autumn, Liu's visits could provide an indication of Peking's current foreign policy direction. (ConGenTel 1661.) (Confidential)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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7. Japan: Sato Government Under Fire

A week of extensive (and unfavorable) press treatment of Japanese defense policy and other aspects of the Sato government's more outward-looking policies was capped by a People's Daily Commentator article on March 15 which issued a guarded but unmistakable warning to the Japanese on the danger they court by tying their nation to the "U.S. 'nuclear strategic system.'" Commentator advised the Japanese that "U.S. nuclear protection cannot protect Japan. Quite the contrary, when U.S. imperialism launches a war in Asia, Japan will be involved in it, whether or not it wants to be...." Other articles attacked Japanese "cultural penetration" abroad, the "reactionary nature" and high military expenditures of the new Japanese budget, Sato's remarks in the Diet on Japanese participation in the defense of Okinawa, plans to send troops abroad "in the name of the United Nations," and Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation. (Unclassified)

Comment: In raising the prospect of Chinese nuclear retaliation against Japan, Peking took pains to avoid the appearance that it was resorting to nuclear blackmail. It proclaimed that the Japanese people "who treasure their national interests" would only rejoice in ChiCom nuclear capability, which was designed "solely for defense against U.S. aggression and ... nuclear monopoly." Commentator also recalled (and for some reason this was omitted from the NCNA English summary) that the Chinese had early in the game declared that they "would not under any circumstances make the first use of nuclear weapons." Peking's awareness of the great sensitivity of the Japanese people to the nuclear question apparently accounts for its "treading on eggs" approach in introducing this element into the spectrum of anti-Sato sniping leading up to the Japanese nationwide effort planned for March 20 to "deal a heavy blow to the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries." (ConGenTel 1675) (Confidential)

8. ChiComs Take Comfort in French Moves Towards NATO

The otherwise bleak foreign affairs picture was brightened a bit for Peking when President DeGaulle informed the U.S. and other NATO powers of his intention to "withdraw from the NATO

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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set-up for military integration and rid his country of American troops and bases," as NCNA put it. Chinese reporting of the NATO developments characterized DeGaulle's latest demands as a "bombshell" which reflected three basic French concerns: 1) a desire to "shake off remaining U.S. control," 2) a belief that the "detente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union" had reduced the threat which led to the formation of NATO, and 3) a fear of "military subordination" to the U.S. which could involve France in the Vietnam war -- a war which DeGaulle believes the U.S. "cannot win." A People's Daily article of March 14 placed the French action in broad, Marxist historical perspective, saying that the U.S. was clearly on the slippery path which had always led to defeat of "those ambitious enough to try to be overlords." Furthermore, French initiatives were evidence of the correctness of Mao Tse-tung's view that "the imperialist bloc is accelerating its pace towards disintegration." From that premise, the article leaped to its sweeping conclusion: "U.S. policy to dominate the world is meeting resistance from revolutionary peoples the world over, in particular the oppressed nations and peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and from countries subject to its aggression, control and bullying. Its followers are deserting it, and U.S. imperialism is isolated as never before." (Unclassified)

Comment: Amidst the "twists and turns" which the ChiComs have acknowledged to be inherent in the world revolutionary movement, President DeGaulle's definition of French national aims continues to strike a responsive chord in Peking, where the goal of world revolution tends to coincide closely with Chinese national-chauvinist interests. (Limited Official Use)

9. United States: Humphrey Remarks Labelled "Kiss of Judas"

Vice-President Humphrey's March 12 remarks on the friendship between the American and Chinese peoples were attacked in a brief March 14 People's Daily article. Using quotes from Mao, People's Daily endorsed the concept of friendship between the two peoples and declared that this friendship was growing daily owing to their common struggle against "U.S. imperialism." People's Daily then drew the predictable distinction between the "American people" and the "ruling circle of American

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

imperialism," describing the latter as an "enemy unto death of the Chinese people who shall never be able to co-exist with it as well as an enemy unto death of the American people." The article also derided Humphrey's expressions of friendship as advanced against a background of 100 years of "U.S. imperialist" exploitation of China and more recently, its actions in "occupying Taiwan, violating China's airspace and territorial waters, encircling China militarily, aiming its spearhead of aggression against China and preparing to expand its war of aggression in Vietnam to China." (See also item 5.) Such a friendship, said People's Daily, was actually "the kiss of Judas." (Unclassified)

Comment: Peking thus far appears to be approaching rather cautiously recent developments concerning U.S. policy toward China. Although comprehensive comment may yet be forthcoming, the regime to date has taken no account of the easing of U.S. travel restrictions on scholars nor of Humphrey's March 13 distinction between containment and isolation of the regime. Our feeling is that Peking may be searching for a means to discredit U.S. motives without appearing before the world as belligerent stumbling block to an easing of Sino-American tensions. (ConGen-Tel 1681) (Confidential)

10. Indonesia: ChiComs Protest Attacks on Djakarta Offices; Ignore Suharto Coup

Peking reacted strongly to a series of attacks on the regime's Consular and press offices in Djakarta with a March 11 Foreign Ministry note terming such incidents "shocking" and "out-and-out fascist acts unprecedented in the history of international relations." The note demanded an immediate public apology, compensation for damages, and a guarantee against future incidents. It warned that "the Chinese Government deems it necessary to point out that if the Indonesian Government is helpless before these most grave incidents and fails to stop them, the reactionary right-wing forces will surely create further troubles which will not only continue to seriously jeopardize the Chinese missions in Indonesia but do greater damage to the relations between the two countries." (Unclassified)

Comment: Following publication of the Foreign Ministry note, the Peking press has to date given no further comment to

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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this subject or to last week's apparent gain in power by General Suharto. From Peking's vantage point events of the past few years have probably made clear the fact that the nature of the regime's relations with Indonesia is virtually entirely dependent on the latter's domestic political course. (ConGenTels 1664, 1650, 1656.) (Confidential)

11. Ambassadors Trickle Back to Posts

NCNA reports indicate that during the past two weeks, a number of ChiCom ambassadors have returned to their posts following possible consultations in Peking prompted by the regime's diplomatic setbacks during the past year (see WEEKA 6). In addition to the return to the field of the regime's ambassadors to Somalia, North Vietnam and Pakistan, NCNA also reported that the newly-appointed CPR ambassadors to Nepal and Rumania have arrived at their posts. (Limited Official Use)

For the Acting Principal Officer:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

0502

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POL 54 (14)

DATE: 11 March '66 MSG NO.: A-645 TYPE: airgram

FROM: Hong Kong TO: State

SUBJECT: Weekly 10

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ✓ OTHER: _____

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

✓ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

[redacted]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POL 54 (15)

DATE: 4 March 66 MSG NO.: A-596 TYPE: airgram

FROM: Hong Kong TO: State

SUBJECT: Weekly 9

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ✓ OTHER: _____

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

✓ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

_____ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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A-564 (NO.) | CONFIDENTIAL | Air Pouch (HANDLING INDICATOR)

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

INFO : (See last page for distribution.)

RSC - Hochman

FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG

DATE: 18 FEB 1966

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 7

REF :

~~7-20 item 6 to POL~~ MAR/EPR

POLITICAL

Internal

1. More on Mao Study in the Provinces
2. Heroes: Leaders Visit Mai Hsien-teh - Chiao Yu-lu Emulated Nationwide
3. Another University Department Leaves Peking for the Countryside

External

4. Familiar Tunes on Vietnam
5. Sino-Soviet Relations
6. Outer Mongolia: Aid Talks Begin in Peking
7. Arrivals from Abroad

Military

8. A Different Slant on Camping

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,CKamman,JThomas,SYNg/

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances: DATTLO:Col Treadwell,drb 2/17/66

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Internal

1. More on Mao Study in the Provinces

During the past week the provincial outpouring on Mao-study continued, mostly in the form of provincial Party committee instructions on how to implement the January 16 Central South Bureau directive (WEEKA 5). Although little new appeared on the techniques of revitalizing the campaign, more candid remarks were made on the flaccid attitudes of cadres toward studying the Chairman's works. One of the most notable of these appeared in Mao's home province, Hunan, where Provincial First Secretary Chang Ping-hua made the following ringingly defensive remark to a cadre study meeting:

"Mao Tse-tung's thinking is the acme of Marxism-Leninism in the current era. This is no exaggeration at all; it is the truth. It is the actual truth whether you acknowledge it or not" (emphasis added). Even more revealing were the Hunan Provincial Party Committee's instructions which complained, "the development of the study campaign is very uneven... Certain leadership cadres have erroneous ideas of attaching much importance to professional matters and little to politics, saying that production is practical, study is theoretical, that they work just the same whether they study or not, and that professional work well done means that political thinking is good." They are "outwardly complaisant and inwardly disobedient" about placing politics in command" (emphasis added). (Radio Changsha, February 5, 1130 GMT)

Meanwhile threats of demotion for leading cadres who failed to take personal effective charge of Mao-study in their respective units continued. The Canton Armed Forces Command told its members that "the ability to play a leading role in studying Chairman Mao's works and in the revolution should be regarded as one of the conditions to judge whether a cadre at the regimental level or higher is qualified to be a leading cadre." (Canton Yang Cheng Wan Pao, February 2) (Unclassified)

Comment: The attitude of senior cadres toward the regime is not likely to be improved by further political encroachments on their production and leisure time; still less by the prospect of being passed over by inexperienced young zealots whose main qualification is an ability to cite chapter and verse of the Maoist scriptures. The latter prospect, however, will probably prod ideologically lethargic senior cadres into compliance with

0506

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

the new directives. Nevertheless, the level of "inward disobedience" is likely to remain the same, or even rise. (Limited Official Use)

2. Heroes: Leaders Visit Mai Hsien-teh - Chiao Yu-lu Emulated Nationwide

Propaganda machine cadres worked overtime last week turning out copy on Communist China's latest heroes, model navyman Mai Hsien-te (WEEKA 4) and Lankao County Party Secretary Chiao Yu-lu (WEEKA 6). Mainland readers thrilled to an inspiring account of the meeting between Mai and Vice Premier Ho Lung and National Defense Council Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying who journeyed all the way from Peking to Mai's Canton hospital bedside to transmit Chairman Mao's and Defense Minister Lin Piao's personal regards. After being presented with flowers by the dignitaries, Mai demonstrated the return of at least some of his mental powers (he suffered a severe head-wound during a sea battle with GRC forces) with a spirited rendition of the song "I Am a Soldier." He also managed to utter "Long Live Chairman Mao, Long Live the Chinese Communist Party," at the appropriate moment, and to growl a Pavlovian "fight! fight!" at the mention of imperialists.

In the provinces, the words "Chiao Yu-lu" were on every lip, especially at the Hsien level or above, as Party committee after Party committee urged cadres and members to emulate the example of this ideal cadre. Radio bulletins from many provinces covering the launching of the emulation campaign, reported cadres in tears as they read the story of Chiao's courageous battle against natural disasters in his county, while himself succumbing to incurable liver cancer.

Comment: The weeping over Chiao may not last long. At the rate heroes are being manufactured these days there may be a new model next week. Indeed, study meeting participants all over the Mainland may be finding the plethora of new revolutionary martyrs confusing. The situation conjures up a picture of a typical zealous political student trying to follow the letter of all recent ideological study directives. He is sitting on the ground with a copy of Mao's works in his right hand, Wang Chieh's diary in his left, Lei Feng's diary, well thumbed, is in his lap, and pamphlets about Chiao Yu-lu and Mai Hsien-te balance on either knee. He is staring straight ahead, vacantly. (Unclassified)

0507

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

3. Another University Department Leaves Peking for the Countryside

NCNA domestic service announced on February 8 that the Chinese Language Department of Peking Normal University had decided to move to the countryside as soon as the new semester begins. The reason behind the move was a desire to cultivate better successors to the revolution and to rectify teaching techniques. "Once the students are armed with Mao Tse-tung's ideas, they will be more able to discover more rapidly the problems and shortcomings in teaching," the broadcast said. (Unclassified)

Comment: The Chinese Language Department of Peking Normal University has been preceded to more proletarian and bucolic surroundings by the History and Philosophy Departments of Peking University and the Philosophy Department of China People's University (see WEEKA 5). The need for rectifying this particular department is not known. Generally speaking, however, the Chinese language departments of Chinese universities have a strong and therefore suspect tie with the past. The role of teachers as propagandizers of the young makes it imperative that they be as politically pure as possible.

All the departments moved so far have been concerned with liberal arts subjects, and this pattern should logically continue. The regime would probably think twice before subjecting expensive scientific equipment and valued science students to campus exile. As a purely practical matter, we wonder whether the sections of the famous Peking University library pertaining to the rusticated departments have accompanied them on their move to the countryside. (Confidential)

External

4. Familiar Tunes on Vietnam

A. More Comment on the Honolulu Conference - A Foreign Ministry statement and a People's Daily editorial, both issued February 12, reiterated on a higher-level the regime's earlier denunciation of the Conference as a "prelude to a new and bigger military venture." The statement and the editorial laid stress on the fact that the Honolulu Declaration and joint communique made no reference to the Geneva Agreements, presenting this as evidence that the U.S. and its "lackeys" have not "the slightest respect for these agreements." The editorial also alleged that an important purpose of the Conference was the vain hope of the U.S. "to raise the position of the South Vietnamese puppets."

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0508

Neither the editorial nor the statement broke new grounds on the issue of negotiations. They advanced the familiar arguments that the "1954 Geneva Agreements are the only foundation for solving the Vietnam question," the DRV 4-point program and the NLF 5-part statement are the "concentrated embodiment of the Geneva Agreements," and the "crucial thing" is that the U.S. must militarily withdraw from South Vietnam and the U.S. must recognize the National Liberation Front as the "sole legal representative of the South Vietnamese people."

The editorial and a separate NCNA "correspondent" article ridiculed the Conference remarks on social and political reforms in South Vietnam as a "propaganda hoax" which would involve increased suppression of the Vietnamese people.

Comment: The regime's rather pro forma treatment of the Conference suggests that Peking does not feel that Honolulu marked any significant departure from the present course of U.S. policy on Vietnam which would necessitate adjustments in the Chinese line. (ConGenTel 1492) (Limited Official Use)

B. Efficacy of People's War Reaffirmed - The "fifth anniversary of the unification of the South Vietnamese Liberation Armed Forces," celebrated in Peking on February 14-15, was utilized by the regime to reaffirm the efficacy of its theories on people's war. In a February 14 message from the CPR Defense Ministry to the NLF armed forces and in a February 15 People's Daily editorial, the regime waxed eloquently on the Viet Cong's alleged achievement of building itself within five years from "scattered guerilla units into a strong people's armed force...(which) imbued with a revolutionary spirit...is defeating the numerically superior and better equipped U.S. aggressors." Peking also expressed its customary conviction in the ability of the "heroic people and liberation Army of South Vietnam (to) drive the U.S. aggressors out of their territory and finally fulfill their sacred task of unifying their fatherland." It reiterated its recent pledge that whatever the price, it would "unswervingly do everything in its power, together with the fraternal Vietnamese people and army and the revolutionary people of the whole world to thoroughly defeat U.S. imperialism."

The regime's treatment of the occasion paid particular attention to the alleged international implications of the Vietnamese

0504

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

"people's war," claiming that events in South Vietnam had inspired the revolutionary people of all countries, provided a living example of how "U.S. imperialism" with its formidable military machine can be defeated, and demonstrated to oppressed people that "without the people's forces, there will be no liberation and freedom for the people."

Comment: The February 15 editorial presents a convenient rendition of the regime's views on the implementation and significance of people's war. The major point emerging from this presentation is that people's war is basically a do-it-yourself venture which is heavily dependent on the "high political consciousness" of the leadership and led.

C. Debate in Washington Noted - During the past two weeks, several NCNA reports have appeared on the debate taking place in official Washington on Vietnam policy. Summarizing these reports, a February 15 NCNA article described the debate as "heated", but pointedly declared that it concerned only methods, not fundamental global strategy. The article further stated that the U.S. would not change its "fundamental" policy of aggression against Vietnam." (Unclassified)

Comment: Peking has consistently spoken of the "unchangeable nature of U.S. imperialism," and in line with this sentiment apparently sees little hope for a meaningful change in U.S. policy as long as the Government remains in the hands of the "monopoly-capitalists." As the regime apparently concludes, the long range hope is in the "profound change" taking place in the American people (WEEKA 6) which would ultimately result in a victory for the broad, revolutionary American masses and the desired change in our policies.

5. Sino-Soviet Relations

A. The issue (No. 2, 1966) of the official CCP journal Red Flag which appeared on February 11 carried an article signed "Commentator" which branded two Soviet books published in 1965 as "confessions" of the new Soviet leaders that they had joined forces with U.S. "imperialism." The article, acompanied by excerpts from the books (entitled "Motive Forces of U.S. Foreign Policy" and "USSR--USA, Their Political and Economic Relations,") attacked the alleged Soviet theses that U.S. ruling circles can be divided into "sober and sensible" or "bellicose and

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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aggressive" elements. It linked the Soviet leaders to the books by quoting statements of Brezhnev and Kosygin which parallel the viewpoint attributed to the books, and charged that the CPSU leaders are "trying to erase class struggle from the history of U.S.-Soviet relations.... They advocate power politics and shamelessly flaunt their big-power chauvinist arrogance;...they have sunk in the mire of bourgeois national egoism."

Proceeding from this premise, the article (which was carried in full on the front page of Peking papers for February 11) reiterated the accusation of February 2 that the Soviets were collaborating with the U.S. in forming a "ring of encirclement" around China, and once again called for a "line of demarcation" between the revisionists and real Marxist-Leninists. (Unclassified)

Comment: The article breaks no new ground, but appears designed to remind those who would prefer to straddle the fence in the dispute, e.g., the DRV above all, but also the DPRK, and Romania, that Peking will tolerate no softening towards the U.S. It may also be more than coincidence that the article was published just as Japanese Communist Party Secretary General Miyamoto arrived in Shanghai, reportedly with the intention of seeking Peking's concurrence in a more cordial relationship between the CPSU and the heretofore Chicom-oriented JCP. (ConGenTel 1481) (Confidential)

B. Later in the week Peking found new evidence of Soviet-U.S. complicity in seeking a peaceful settlement for the Vietnam war. A People's Daily Commentator article of February 15 seized upon a statement in a discussion of disarmament in the Soviet magazine New Times (No. 6, 1966) as clear proof that the Soviets were attempting to substitute the "Tashkent spirit" for the Vietnamese revolutionary struggle against U.S. "aggression." The Chicom effort, which apparently distorted the sense of the Soviet article to reinforce the charge that the Soviets have "betrayed" North Vietnam, suggested strongly that the Chicoms fear the widespread attractiveness of a peaceful alternative in Vietnam to armed military struggle. (Limited Official Use)

C. In marked contrast to last year's 15th anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, which was a major speech-making and editorializing occasion, the 16th anniversary was buried in a February 13 cocktail party

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

and film reception given in Peking by the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association which was attended by second-level officials. NCNA reported similar functions in Moscow on February 14. While in Communist practice a 16th anniversary generally calls for less attention than a 15th, de-emphasis of the occasion this year was only one notch above relegating it to oblivion. (Unclassified)

6. Outer Mongolia: Aid Talks Begin in Peking

NCNA reported the arrival in Peking on February 16 of an eight-man Mongolian delegation led by D. Tsevegmid, MPR Ambassador to China, to discuss "Sino-Mongolian economic and technical assistance."

Comment: Chinese workers returned to Outer Mongolia in early summer of 1965 after being completely phased out through the summer of 1964. Although the Chicoms and the Mongolians announced in late 1965 the completion of some projects under a 1960 aid agreement, this is the first indication we have seen that additional aid may be under consideration. Perhaps another straw in the wind in Sino-Mongolian relations is the presence in Peking of Mongolian correspondents since June 1965, according to a Japanese correspondent. We do not know when they were withdrawn, but the post had apparently been vacant for some time. (Confidential)

7. Arrivals from Abroad

A. Japan - Japanese Communist Party Secretary General Kenji Miyamoto arrived in Shanghai on February 10 at the head of a JCP delegation. The group later went to Canton, and is expected to visit Peking soon for important consultations with the CCP on bi-lateral and international Party matters. (Unclassified)

B. Cuba - Reuters reported that Cuban Ambassador Oscar Pino-Santos, who had been on "home leave" for six months, had returned to Peking on February 13. This seems to squelch for the time being rumors of an impending diplomatic rupture between the two countries. (Unclassified)

Military

8. A Different Slant on Camping

Military camping excursions at which youth groups, militia and others participate in military training with PLA units are an established institution. However, a January 31 NCNA release mentions

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0512

"Many PLA Units do Political Camping to Learn Things from Local Organizations." The article relates numerous examples of PLA cadre groups visiting the countryside to learn how the people apply Mao's thinking. The reference to political camping and the PLA learning from local organizations is a new and different twist from the parallel campaign for other institutions to learn from the PLA and to adopt PLA organizational and operational techniques.

It appears evident that this program, if it be indeed part of a broad movement, is designed to help implement Lin Piao's "five-point" principle to bring "politics to the fore." However, more narrowly, the propaganda may relate to a series of recent releases which are directed at showing the close ties between the PLA and people and which appear annually at this time of year.

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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(2)	BANGKOK	CANBERRA	KARACHI	MOSCOW	RANGOON	SOFIA	VIENTIANE
	BELGRADE	CPACPLAD	KATHMANDU	MUNICH	ROME	S'PORE	COMNAVPHIL
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	BUDAPEST	DJAKARTA	MANILA	PRAGUE	SEOUL	TOKYO	13AFMANILA
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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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ORIGIN: ACTION

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INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 7
OSO 46	USIA 11	NSA 3
	HEW 1	HSC 6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Pol 2-1 Chicom

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A-541 NO. | SECRET | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

TO : Department of State, Washington

INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG DATE: FEB. 17 1966

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 6

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Leading Playwright Latest Rectification Target
2. University History and Philosophy Departments Moved from Peking to Countryside
3. County Party Secretary Joins Ranks of Revolutionary Heroes
4. Refugee Reports Young Border Area Recruits Carefully Selected

External

5. Vietnam: Regime Sees Hope for American People
6. Bloc Relations: North Korea, Cuba, and the Moon
7. Japan: People's Daily Observer Attacks Sato Government
8. Indonesia: Stiff Protest to GOI
9. Chicoms Attack U.S. Use of Taiwan
10. Foreign Policy Problems Resulting in Personnel Changes

Military

11. Nanking Army Command Political Work Conference

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FEB 17 PM 03 DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,CKamman,JThomas,SYNg,

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances: DATTLO:LtCol Treadwell:drb, 2/10/66

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. Leading Playwright Latest Rectification Target

Tien Han, Chairman of the Chinese Drama Workers' Union and regarded as Communist China's leading playwright, was fiercely attacked on February 1 in the People's Daily. At issue is an historical play he published in the summer of 1961 lauding a female official in the court of Empress Wu (late Tang Dynasty) as a champion of the people. In the play the official (Hsieh Yao-huan, whose name is also the title of the play) was an imperial maid of honor who after promotion to the post of inspector general of the Yangtze delta region made a reputation as a fearless representative of the peasantry in disputes with bullying, land-grabbing aristocrats. The play ends with Hsieh warning Empress Wu that if she continued to listen to the advice of corrupt and fawning officials, there would be universal unrest throughout the empire.

The critic, Yun Sung (a pen name meaning "cloud pine") charged that Tien Han had created a distorted historical allegory with the express purpose of attacking the contemporary Communist government (i.e. Empress Wu = Chairman Mao, corrupt nobles = Party cadres). Tien implied, Yun continued, that the dictatorship of the proletariat had become an instrument of oppression which the people should overthrow. What was more, Tien was part of a plot shared in by Peking Vice Mayor Wu Han (see WEEKAs 49, 1965; 1 and 3, 1966) and a lesser dramatist, Meng Chao, all of whom had published historical plays hiding similar attacks during July and August 1961. (Unclassified)

Comment: Yun Sung could be anyone, including Chou Yang, Deputy Director of the CCP Central Committee Propaganda departments, and the regime's leading cultural hatchet man. His accusation of hidden attack is serious, and we feel after reading Tien's play, could well be true. Use of cultural media as indirect instruments of political criticism is an ancient Chinese ploy, used recently in the China Youth pictorial hoax - see WEEKA 10, 1965. The unsettled period of 1960-1962 was a time of relative artistic freedom and questioning during which a once prolific but frustrated writer (Tien Han wrote only 3 plays including "Hsieh Yao-huan" between 1950-62) might feel tempted to express himself.

The charges hurled at Tien also throw light on the reasons behind the attacks on Peking Vice Mayor Wu Han. If he indeed

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

0515

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

colluded with Tien Han and Meng Chao in criticizing the government, the guardians of Maoist orthodoxy would have every reason to want his head, regardless of his current position and repute. If this is so, the big question is still why the regime waited so long to axe this band of subtle critics. (Limited Official Use)

2. University History and Philosophy Departments Moved from Peking to Countryside

A French Embassy officer in Peking with student contacts at Peking University told us last week that the philosophy and history departments of the university had been moved off the campus recently. He also had a report that the modern history department (which we gather teaches political courses and is separate from the history department) had been abolished and its books, files, and professors transferred to China People's University.

As far as he knew, the departments had been re-established in the countryside "within 100 or 200 kilometers of the capital." The reason behind the shift was apparently not evacuation in preparation for war, but rather a long-term socialist education effort to link the training of theoreticians and historians more closely with the life of the masses.

The substance and rationale behind the French diplomat's report were buttressed by an NCNA despatch on February 5 stating that the philosophy department of China Peoples' University had decided to move permanently to a commune in the suburbs of Peking. After experimenting since the summer of 1964, the University had found that the countryside was a better base for its operations, and the teaching of a revised curriculum which stressed the study of Mao's work. (Confidential)

Comment: The philosophy and history departments of Peking University have historically been centers of political ferment. Outspoken critics of the regime during the "Hundred Flowers" in 1957 included many professors and undergraduates from these departments. The same was to a much lesser extent true of China Peoples' University, a cadre college which dates back only to 1949. The regime probably reckons that removing these departments will dissipate the bourgeois intellectual atmosphere of the urban campus and make indoctrination of the remaining students easier. The other side of the coin may involve the regime's desire to isolate questioning intellectuals. (Confidential)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

3. County Party Secretary Joins Ranks of Revolutionary Heroes

Since February 7, the mainland press has been full of the story of Chiao Yu-lu, the Party First Secretary of Lankao County, Honan Province, who planned the transformation of his backward, disaster-ridden county into a self-sufficient agricultural production area. Chiao succumbed to liver cancer in the spring of 1964 and was unable to witness the fruits of his work, however.

The greatest virtue of this "outstanding student of Mao Tse-tung" (inevitably, they found a copy of Mao's "Selected Works" and Liu Shao-chi's treatise, "How to be a Good Communist" under his pillow after he died) was his ability to maintain close contact with the peasantry. He never made a plan or took a decision without thorough personal investigation of the human and physical circumstances involved. The poor and lower middle peasants (practically every one was poor or lower-middle in Lankao County) were always consulted. As a result his planning was sound and his leadership effective.

A People's Daily editorial on February 9 confirmed Chiao's canonization by mentioning him in the same breath with military models Lei Feng, Wang Chieh, and Mai Hsien-teh, as one who feared neither hardship nor death for the sake of the revolution.

Comment: Chiao is the first civilian to join the rapidly multiplying ranks of contemporary Maoist martyrs. The message of his example is directed more at Party officials than at the populace at large, as has been the case of Lei Feng, Wang Chieh, et. al. His apotheosis appears to be an attempt to dramatize the criticisms leveled during recent months at County Party Committees, the most important of which was lack of contact with the people. He is the exact opposite of all the office-bound, bureacratic report readers pictured in the People's Daily series discussing the faults of the County Party structure--a picture which we feel is far more accurate than that conveyed by Chiao. (Unclassified)

4. Refugee Reports Young Border Area Recruits Carefully Selected

A twenty year old Shanghai middle school graduate (OIR 5014 January 21, 1966) told interrogators here that only 120 out of 500 volunteers from her school were accepted for service in the border areas last August. The stumbling block was a stiff medical exam which had included a chest X-ray, blood test, dental exam and tests for eyesight, color blindness, and trachoma.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Although the source did not know what provinces the successful applicants ultimately went to, their destinations apparently included other border regions in addition to Sinkiang. Speakers at mobilization meetings also mentioned the need for more manpower to develop Tsinghai, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet. (Secret)

Comment: If this report is accurate, the regime is taking pains to assure that the youngsters who go to the border regions will be able to stand the hardships of frontier life. The implementation of the strict medical requirements (they are new to us), may be a reflection of unhappy past experiences involving physically unqualified youths. A Russian peasant who served time as a prisoner with the 8th Division of the PLA construction corps (OIR 2006, Jan. 28) and left the area in April 1964 reported that youths from Shanghai and Peking attached to the 8th Division often tried to escape and return home. They were always returned, even if they had succeeded in getting home. (Secret)

Note: The provincial radio reported last week that Tientsin youth were now working in Lanchow (Radio Lanchow Feb. 2, 0415 GMT) and Peking youths had been sent to southern Shansi. (Radio Taiyuan, Feb. 3, 1400 GMT) (Unclassified)

External

5. Vietnam: Regime Sees Hope for American People

In a week notable for heavy, but generally low-key, coverage of Vietnam, three themes received prominence: (1) the thesis of a "profound change" in the American people; (2) criticism of the U.S. for resumption of bombing and for taking the Vietnam question to the UN; and (3) discussion of the Honolulu Conference.

A. Peking Hails "Revolutionary Change" in American People - Against a background of regime references to a gloomy and bickering Washington, People's Daily Commentator (February 7) found hope in the "profound change" in the American people which had brought about a "spirited protest" against renewed bombing of the DRV. According to Commentator, "the broad masses of the American people are ranging themselves against U.S. imperialism..." Terming Americans "a very promising people," Commentator referred to Chairman Mao's words of encouragement to former CPUSA Chief William Z. Foster in 1959 and predicted that the "stormy struggle" of the American people would "inevitably rise to a higher level." (Unclassified)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Comment: The thesis of a "profound change" in the American people is old-hat for Peking and one that is periodically dragged up when the regime can adduce some evidence of American opposition to the Administration's policies on Vietnam [redacted], but the regime appears to recognize that our present stand on Vietnam is marked by determination.

B. More Attacks on Bombing Resumption; UN Role Opposed - A February 2 Foreign Ministry statement reiterated Peking's thesis that the U.S. bombing resumption was a "self-exposure" of U.S. duplicity in its "peace talks hoax." The statement also included the regime's long-standing opposition to any UN role in the Vietnam question. In an attempt to add substance to these positions, the Peking press gave substantial publicity to foreign press reports criticizing the U.S. for resuming bombing and taking the Vietnam dispute to the Security Council. (Unclassified)

Comment: The only interesting aspect of the Foreign Ministry statement was its explicit endorsement of a passage in the February 1 DRV Foreign Ministry statement pointing out that "...consideration of U.S. war acts in Vietnam falls within the competence of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China and not of the UN Security Council." However, Peking has frequently countered arguments for UN handling of Vietnam with the assertion that only the Geneva Conference is competent to deal with the issue and we do not believe that this statement represents an appreciable movement by Peking toward the idea of reconvening the Geneva Conference. (ConGenTel 1443) (Confidential)

C. Honolulu Conference - An NCNA report February 9, discussing the results of the Honolulu Conference, declared that the U.S. "would continue with its double-faced tactics of war escalation and peace hoax..." The report stressed that the two sides had discussed a possible increase in U.S. forces, but without deciding the number of additional troops to be sent. The report treated the joint communique's mention of reforms as an attempt to "shore up the puppet Saigon regime by giving it a 'democratic' cloak." The communique's reference to "the best possible use" of U.S. aid was treated as a Washington rebuke for Saigon corruption. Finally, NCNA stressed that although the U.S. had pledged to continue its "peace talks fraud," the Saigon leaders had stated in a press conference that they would refuse to take part in negotiations with the NLF. (Unclassified)

6. Bloc Relations: North Korea, Cuba, and the Moon

A. North Korea. Peking marked Korean People's Army Day this

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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year in virtually the same fashion as last year, including a meeting sponsored by the General Political Department of the Chinese PLA, a congratulatory message from CPR Defense Minister Lin Piao to his Pyongyang counterpart, and the attendance of prominent Chicom leaders at a reception given by the North Korean military attache. The NCNA reports of these events indicated that the Chicoms paid greater attention this year to the "patriotic struggle of the South Korean people against the U.S.-Pak Jung Hi clique" and to the goal of national reunification. Lin Piao's expression of confidence that the "Korean people can definitely drive the U.S. imperialists right out of South Korea" contrasted with last year's emphasis on defending the gains already made by the revolution. The Korean response was in a like vein, reflecting no change in emphasis from last year when reunification and driving out the "U.S. imperialists" had already figured heavily in Korean replies to the Chinese. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: The renewed Chinese interest in Korea was clearly placed in the context of the U.S. "shifting its strategic focus from Europe to Asia" and the conclusion of the Japan-ROK treaty. It is also noteworthy, perhaps, that Peking's treatment of the anniversary closely paralleled that of last year, including routine attacks on "modern revisionism" by both sides at the Chinese-sponsored meeting but not at the North Korean Embassy reception. Thus, outwardly at least, Peking seems resigned to living with improved Soviet-DPRK relations, as exemplified by the North Korean-Soviet military agreement of May 1965. (Confidential)

B. Cuba - Meanwhile, Chicom efforts to establish rapport with another fraternal army were the subject of a fierce denunciation by Fidel Castro on February 6. In replying to the latest Chicom retort in the "rice-sugar" trade dispute (NCNA January 30, our A-518), Castro accused the Chicoms of using personal contact and hundreds of bags of literature to subvert the Cuban armed forces. As reported by Western wire services, he reeled off an exhaustive selection of scornful epithets for the Chinese comrades, and then delivered the final blow: the Chicoms were "interfering in Cuba's internal affairs" just as the former American Embassy at Habana had done. So far, Peking has suffered in silence, but it may be more than coincidence that on February 7, the day after Castro's attack was published, the Cuban trade delegation which has been in Peking since last November left for home. Normal procedure now calls for a high Chinese trade official to visit Habana for a formal signing of the 1966 trade protocol; it remains to be seen

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

whether this will indeed occur. (Limited Official Use)

C. USSR - As far as Peking was concerned, the Soviet soft landing on the moon was not sufficiently newsworthy to merit a single mention in the voluminous output of NCNA. However, at least Peking did not see anything ominous in the soft approach to the moon by the "Khrushchev revisionists."

7. Japan: People's Daily Observer Attacks Sato Government

The Sato Government's foreign policies were attacked on a broad front by a front-page Observer article in the People's Daily of February 4 which took as its point of departure Sato's January 28 Diet presentation. The article levelled its criticism at the alleged Japanese policy of "following the U.S. and aligning itself with the Soviet Union to oppose China," with approximately equal space devoted to Japanese relations with each of the two major "anti-China" powers.

Observer explained Japanese diplomatic and logistical support of American "aggression" in Vietnam in terms of Tokyo's short-term interest in war profiteering and long-term "expansionist" designs in Southeast Asia. The Japan-U.S. security system, which was alleged to include the new Japan-ROK treaty, was a sign that "Japanese militarism is being revived"--a fact which could not be concealed by the "window-dressing" of friendly Japanese relations with the Soviet Union. In sum, the Sato Government since taking office had "more barefacedly pursued a policy of hostility to China." (Unclassified)

Comment: This authoritative denunciation of the Japanese Government reflects Peking's worry over "encirclement," much along the lines of an Observer article two days earlier directed at the Soviet leadership (WEEKA 5). The attack is a logical extension of Peking's previous sniping at the Foreign Minister Shiina's visit to Moscow, but it may have the additional purpose of enunciating the "correct line" for the JCP to follow regarding the new climate of Tokyo-Moscow relations. Specifically, it may have been intended to let JCP Secretary General Miyamoto know before he arrives in Peking on a major Party visit that efforts to persuade the Chicoms to relax their pressure on the Soviets over support for North Vietnam, which he reportedly has in mind, are not likely to bear fruit.

Despite the harshness of the attack, Observer makes no direct or implied threat concerning Sino-Japanese trade or other contacts.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Retribution for Sato's evil deeds is left in the hands of the Japanese people, who will see to it that he and the other "reactionaries" meet the "same shameful end as Hideki Tojo." (Confidential)

8. Indonesia: Stiff Protest to GOI

Reacting swiftly to the February 3 demonstration at the CPR Embassy in Djakarta, the regime released on February 4 the text of a stiff Foreign Ministry note lodging Peking's "strongest protest" over this "great insult and most serious provocation to the PRC..." After listing the sins of the demonstrators (who "even used very rude language to insult Chairman Mao"), the note referred to unsuccessful Chicom Embassy attempts to get protection against the demonstrators. Probably hitting the nail on the head, the note charged that the demonstration "was obviously planned and organized beforehand and occurred with the connivance of the Indonesian Government. The Indonesian Government bears unshirkable grave responsibility for it." Concluding, the note demanded that Indonesia "at once make a public apology" for the incident, return a copper plate bearing the Embassy's inscription which was taken by the demonstrators, and ensure against future incidents. The note also requested an "immediate reply" to the above demands.

Comment: The Foreign Ministry note strikes as being the harshest and most authoritative in a long series of Peking protests to the GOI. More clearly than ever before, the note holds the GOI, rather than merely Indonesian "rightists," directly responsible for the deteriorating state of Sino-Indonesian relations. Although the note appears to reflect a hardening Chicom attitude toward Indonesian transgressions, to date the regime has not followed up its protest or commented on the equivocal response to the note by Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio. One factor which may be limiting Peking's freedom of action is the position of the Indonesia Overseas Chinese as virtual hostages of the Indonesian Government. (ConGenTel 155 to Djakarta, pouched to Dept) (Limited Official Use)

9. Chicoms Attack U.S. Use of Taiwan

Peking's February 1 protest to the U.K. over the American military presence in Hong Kong (of which nothing subsequent to date has been heard from the regime) was followed by a February 2 People's Daily Commentator article and a NCNA report charging the U.S. with using Taiwan as a base to expand the Vietnam war. In

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0582

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the first reference by the regime to the subject in many months, Commentator reaffirmed that "the Chinese people will liberate the island (of Taiwan) without fail." Commentator also warned the GRC it "would not escape most severe punishment" if it continued to serve "U.S. aggression in Vietnam" and maintained its "harassing activities along our Southeastern coast." (Unclassified)

Comment: Peking's attention has been drawn to Taiwan by western press reports of a U.S. logistic build-up on the island. Its vague threats voiced against the GRC do not as yet appear to be a calculated effort to warn of possible Chicom counteraction against Taiwan in response to any U.S. "expansion" of its "war of aggression." (ConGenTels 251, 253 to Taipei, pouched Dept.) (Limited Official Use)

10. Foreign Policy Problems Resulting in Personnel Changes

It has been fairly clear for some time that the regime's series of diplomatic reverses last year have at the least resulted in a substantial shake-up of its foreign affairs personnel. A study of NCNA reports reveals that since the first of this year Peking has appointed seven new Ambassadors, a figure amounting to a change in roughly one-sixth of the existing CPR Ambassadorial positions. In addition NCNA on February 8 announced that Hsu Yi-hsin and Chen Chia-kang (most recently Ambassadors respectively to Syria and the UAR) had been appointed Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs by the State Council. There was no indication that Hsu and Chen were replacing retiring Vice-Ministers and there is the possibility, especially in the case of Chen, that these veteran diplomats have been gently kicked upstairs to positions without substance as a result of displeasure with their performances abroad.

Another indication of the regime's concern over the state of its foreign relations may be contained in the brief February 9 NCNA Chinese service report of meetings currently underway in Peking of various Party and State organs, including the Foreign Ministry and of the Staff Office on Foreign Relations of the State Council. While the period following Chinese New Year is a favorite meeting time, we cannot recall past occasions when foreign affairs organs joined in this practice. The NCNA report also noted that the participants of the various meetings were received by the following leading State and Party personnages: Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Li Fu-chun, Li Hsien-nien, Tan Chen-lin and Po I-po.

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0583

Conspicuously missing from this VIP list was Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi. Earlier in the week Chen did not show at the Ceylonese Embassy's Independence Day reception and his customary role at such a function was fulfilled by Po I-po, more noted for economic than diplomatic talents. In fact, Chen has not been mentioned in the regime's media since his reported interview on December 30 by a Japanese correspondent for Akahata. Chen is most likely taking his turn in soaking up the southern sun, as Mao and Liu Shao-chi have evidently been doing, but in view of recent events it is not far fetched to wonder whether his prolonged absence from the limelight may involve something more than voluntary relaxation.

Military

11. Nanking Army Command Political Work Conference

Since Lin Piao set the guidelines for PLA work in 1966, meetings evidently have been widely held at all levels. An article appearing in the February 6 Peking People's Daily reports on a Party Committee meeting of the Nanking Army Command. The theme of the meeting was on the question of "revolutionization of cadres of regimental and higher levels" and concluded that the key to carrying on the revolution was to be found in taking as one's lifetime combat mission creative study and application of Mao's works, in carrying on the revolution all through one's life, in reforming one's thinking throughout life and solidly establishing the selfless, world outlook of Communism." The meeting admonished that even veteran fighters could find non-proletarian thinking creeping back into their minds and agreed that revolutionization of cadres could be effected by going to the company-level and taking an active part in the "mass struggle."

Comment: The report contains no new line which would indicate a struggle between military and political leaders as has been reported in the press (ConGenTel1464). It continues the argument set before the January Political Work Conference by Hsiao Hua, but emphasizes that ideological reformation of leaders at regimental level and above will be a key element in the application of the "five-point principle." This emphasis, along with the policy to boldly promote from younger officers, may well mean that there is a questioning of the "millet and rifle" dogma as applied to the development of the PLA's structure, and there may well be also a hawk vs. dove struggle on the employment of the PLA in the Vietnam crisis. However, both problems may involve politically and technically oriented leaders alike on one side facing a similar

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0584

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combination on the other side in a struggle over a proper policy direction. It cannot simply be taken as necessarily leading to and reflecting a struggle between Party and military leaders.

On the other hand, it cannot be disregarded completely that the Political Work guidelines are in themselves primarily an extension of the socialist education campaign applied to the PLA and do not necessarily reflect more than normal policy disagreements. The guidelines may simply reflect the Party leaders' fears about the ideological disintegration of the revolution. In this sense the recent argumentation fits logically, and the effort to reindoctrinate the higher-level leadership cadres follows directly from the 1963-64 campaigns to improve Party Branches and cadres at the basic level.

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED:

(2) BANGKOK BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST CANBERRA CPACPLAD DARESAL'M DJAKARTA KARACHI KATHMANDU KLUMPUR MANILA MOSCOW MUNICH NDELHI PRAGUE RANGOON ROME SAIGON SEOUL SOFIA S'PORE (4)TAIPEI TOKYO VIENTIANE COMNAVPHIL LONDON 13AFMANILA TAIWANDEFCOM

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POC 54(16)

DATE: 4 Feb. 66 MSG NO.: A-529 TYPE: airgram

FROM: Hong Kong TO: State

SUBJECT: Weeka 5

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ✓ OTHER: _____

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

✓ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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ORIGIN: ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 27 CHICOM

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A-507 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

Hackman

FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG DATE: January 28, 1966

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 4

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Year of the Horse Off to a Fast Start
2. Liu Shao-chi Reappears
3. We Have a New Hero, Doctor
4. More on Recruiting Party Members from PLA
5. Bright Young Men at the Hsien Level
6. An Effort at Explanation

External

7. Vietnam: Peking Continues Attack on U.S. Peace Offensive
8. India: A Smile and a Frown
9. Laos: U.S. Charged with "Intensified Aggression"

Military

10. Hsiao Hua Report to PLA Political Work Conference

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GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12 year intervals, not automatically declassified.

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Clearances:

SYNg:drb,1/27/66

Contents and Classification Approved by:

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

CONFIDENTIAL

Internal

1. Year of the Horse Off to a Fast Start

This year's Spring Festival marking the advent of the lunar year was celebrated with merry-making, family visits, theater-going, athletic competitions, and banquets. The heavy emphasis of last year to stay at workposts and forego traditional frivolities for a sodden socialist holiday was abandoned. Conferences and congresses made year-end reviews concluding that the situation at home and abroad was favorable, then adjourned for festivities. With something more than official approval, civilians joined with military units in many areas in courtesy gatherings as the final days of the Year of the Snake slithered away. (Unclassified)

Comment: Peking's concession to tradition is in keeping with the regime's efforts over the past year to offset somewhat the impression it has created that "socialism" spells out a life of unmitigated hardship and austerity. Nonetheless, the apparent joy of the season would not have been possible without the general economic improvement clearly visible--and, hence, hard to deny--to the ordinary man. Possibly the concession to tradition also may have come with a sigh from officialdom thinking that, while 1965 held international non-successes one after another, at least domestically the situation really did appear "favorable," although perhaps primarily in economic terms. (Limited Official Use)

2. Liu Shao-chi Reappears

Liu Shao-chi, after an absence from the public scene for exactly two months, headed a number of ranking Peking dignitaries present at an evening party to celebrate the lunar new year at the People's Great Hall on January 20, eve of the Spring Festival. The last reported public appearance of Liu was on November 21 last year when he received a delegation of journalists from Central Africa. (Unclassified)

Comment: Vacationtime down south, probably. (Unclassified)

3. We Have a New Hero, Doctor.

PLA sailor MAI HSIEN-TE, who allegedly continued fighting after a serious brain wound sustained in the skirmish with Nationalist vessels last August, is on the point of being lionized as a model hero. Mai is now a patient in a Canton hospital.

CONFIDENTIAL

0 5 2 8

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Authority NND 939503
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Newspaper fanfare for his new role began on January 18 in headlines and text appearing with coordination in Jen Min Jih Pao, Chieh-fang Chun Pao, Chung-kuo Ching-nien, Kuang-ming Jih Pao, and Kung-jen Jih Pao. They cited the young man as a common soldier proving the Party syllogism: 1) Politics is the commander and soul. 2) One who has the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" has politics. 3) One who has politics will have direction, rationality, consciousness, a commander to lead him, activism and creative power. (Unclassified)

Comment: The package in which Mai Hsien-te is wrapped has a different label but the contents are more of the "Lei Feng and Wang Chieh type," called for by Hsiao Hua, director of the General Political Department of the Army, in his speech at the PLA Conference on Political Work in Peking which ended January 18. (See Military item 10) Mai Hsien-te will serve as another vehicle to carry the regime's message that "politics" (the Party) is to have primary allegiance from members in all sectors of the society--military, youth, commercial, agricultural, scientific, etc. We believe, anachronistically, that Mai as a publicized national hero will die out and be replaced before long because he's still alive. Of course, if he does not survive his current infirmities... or recovers his senses... (Confidential)

4. More on Recruiting Party Members from PLA

Our surmise in WEEKA No. 3 that perhaps the PLA is being used to incubate new Party members ultimately for the civilian sector acquires greater color of credibility from an NCNA domestic dispatch on January 16. In providing tips to PLA company Party branch cadres on how to nurture neophytes speedily, it said that some units run the recruits through tests with the purpose of making them "persistently act as Communist Party members in any circumstances." Presumably this includes civilian, as well as military, circumstances.

Stress in the report, however, is on the need and technique for stepping up Party recruitment. Written as though a full survey of the program had been made, it indicates that considerable discretion is left to company cadre branches although the procedural outline should be: 1) Selecting prospective candidates by the company Party branch; 2) motivating the prospect to seek membership; 3) once motivated, then educating him in Mao's works

0589

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

and testing him Jason-like in various practical circumstances; and finally, 4) inducting him if he passes.

The specifics of the practical testing evidently vary from company to company and depend upon the imagination of the cadre branch. "Awkward and difficult situations," are apparently approved. The only example given was placing the prospect in civilian work and commune homes for a period to engage in "mass struggle." (Confidential)

Comment: Accelerated induction into the Party to increase its numbers may be twin to the efforts to enlarge the Young Communist League and Young Pioneers. (See WEEKA 2) Of course, it also ties in with the aim of giving substance to the theme of keeping "politics in command" in the PLA. (See item 3 and Military) (Confidential)

5. Bright Young Men at the Hsien Level

The People's Daily on January 21 carried special articles by six cadres promoted recently to Party leadership at the hsien level, and also frontpaged an accompanying editorial to point out that the six "young" (thirty-plus) men were representative of many others of similar ages who are rising in Party posts. (Unclassified)

Comment: Contrary to the editorial's assertion that there has been a "large number" of young cadres succeeding to hsien-level posts, we believe that these six constitute part of a relatively small group of successors to veteran cadres who are not anxious to give up their positions.

Behind the publicity given to the promotions is probably a variety of motivations. The hsien-level link between the top leadership and the masses is recognized by the regime as a weak one, and one to be strengthened by encouraging ambitiousness in young cadres with the example of actual cases where members of their generation have gained a modicum of power. The publicity also strengthens the link by warning veteran cadres at this level that, no matter how "red" their personal history, there is competition from below and to continue in their posts they must demonstrate active pursuit of Party policies.

0530
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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In broader terms the purpose of publishing the articles can be fitted to the top leadership's aim of cultivating successors, breaking down opposition from the Old Guard to sharing some power on a low level, and thus easing the inevitable transition from one generation to the next. While the articles constitute a concrete indication of a beginning in this respect, they are no more than that.

It is of interest that the problem of overcoming the traditional Chinese attitude toward the prerequisites of age and seniority was also touched on in Hsiao Hua's report to the PLA Conference on Political Work. Indicating the continued problem in a Chinese society of officials making way for fresh blood, Hsiao called for the promotion of qualified youth to command levels and urged the older cadres to welcome the new ones "with great warmth---and step by step cultivate them as successors who will take over (your) work."

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6. An Effort at Explanation

Amidst exhortations to place "politics in command" (i.e., the thought of Mao) and glowing accounts of the efficacy of Mao's thoughts, there crept a rare note of reason into a People's Daily January 24 editorial on science and technology. According to the NCNA summary, the editorial observed that "it is true that Mao Tse-tung's thinking cannot solve concrete problems." It was then explained that Mao's thoughts were more in the nature of a catalyst serving to "revolutionize the people's thinking, giving them courage, awakening their intelligence and leading them to change their attitude toward technical innovation..."

Comment: While the original intent of the campaign to study Mao may have been to provide the populace with examples of fresh and daring approaches to problems (amply found in Mao's writings), overzealous treatment by the Party faithful has tended to impart to Mao's writings the same all-powerful magical qualities previously believed to have been embodied in Taoist scriptures. Possibly the People's Daily effort to place Mao's works in a more rational perspective was the result of growing cynicism on the part of the educated toward the content of the "study Mao" campaign. It remains to be seen if this possible straw in the wind will be followed by others bringing Mao down from the realm of the supernatural and back to earth. We somehow doubt it.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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7. Vietnam: Peking Continues Attack on U.S. Peace Offensive

Probably as a result of the holiday atmosphere marking the Chinese New Year, NCNA coverage of all foreign areas, including Vietnam, was sparse during the week. Such comment as appeared broke no new ground in condemning the U.S. peace offensive and questioning the sincerity of U.S. leaders.

A. U.S. Said to be Guilty of "Self-exposure" - A January 24 People's Daily editorial, the regime's only editorial comment on Vietnam for the week, claimed that the US had exposed its own professions of peace by its "brutality" and its current military buildup in Vietnam. The editorial reiterated Peking's stand that complete victory for the DRV is the only solution to the Vietnam problem with its assertion that either the U.S. would be driven out of Vietnam, or the country would remain partitioned with the South under occupation and the Vietnamese people "enslaved and dismembered in accordance with the will of the aggressor." The editorial voiced confidence in the ultimate victory of the "Vietnamese people" and, in conclusion, expressed Communist China's "staunch support for the firm stand of the Vietnamese people to carry through to the end their struggle against the U.S."

Comment: The editorial suggests that Peking is reminding Hanoi anew, in the wake of the Shelepin visit, of the consequences of failure to fight to a victorious finish in South Vietnam. At the same time, the editorial is a reminder that Peking itself is willing to run the risks implicit in rising tensions in Indo-China. (ConGenTel 1382) (Limited Official Use)

B. TET Cease-fire Ignored - Predictably, the regime had nothing at all to say about the TET (Vietnamese New Year) cease-fire observed in South Vietnam. Instead, NCNA gave prominence to several attacks made by Viet Cong units on American and South Korean troops during the cease-fire period. (Unclassified)

C. Statements of U.S. Leaders on Vietnam - Chicom propaganda media reported a number of statements on Vietnam throughout the week by President Johnson and Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, with emphasis on alleged American designs to "escalate" the war at the very time its leaders were promoting their "peace hoax." The President's reiteration of U.S. determination and commitment in his Independence, Mo., speech was termed "bellicose," while McNamara's testimony before two Senate committees constituted a continuation of the U.S. "policy of war blackmail against the DRV

DECLASSIFIED
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by threatening to resume bombing of North Vietnam." Rusk was accused of "brandishing a mailed fist" at his press conference upon return from Saigon, and of "threatening war upon China" in his television interview beamed to Europe by communications satellite. The latter charge was related to his identification of China as the "principal source of aggression in the Pacific." Special prominence was accorded to the Secretary's replies to questions on a possible Soviet role in bringing the DRV to the conference table. According to NCNA, he "admitted that the United States has no way of meeting wars of national liberation, and expressed his eager hope that the modern revisionists in the Soviet Union would help the U.S. in this regard."

Finally, in reporting in detail the military expenditures envisioned in the 1967 budget, NCNA asserted that the budget "exposes the sinister designs of the U.S. imperialists in trying hard to peddle their Vietnam peace propositions. . .and also reveals their weaknesses--their strength is far from equal to their inordinate aggressive ambitions and they are in deep financial straits." In fact, the People's Daily of January 24 published the President's budget message (we have not yet seen the issue and are thus unsure whether the text was intact) along with a short commentary which said it was a "war budget, pure and simple. . .. It will not be long before the American people begin to feel the greater pinch and rise up in a new upsurge against the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam."

8. India: A Smile and a Frown

Peking last week offered India both a frown and a rare smile. On January 25 Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai, in a surprising gesture of cordiality, sent warmly-worded messages wishing "prosperity to India and well-being to its people" to Indian President Radhakrishnan (on India's National Day) and to Mrs. Indira Gandhi (on herassumption of the office of Prime Minister). A day earlier, Peking revealed a more usual visage when it released the text of a January 12 CPR Foreign Ministry statement condemning the Indian Government for alleged persecution of Chinese nationals in India. (Unclassified)

Comment: Following the signing of the Tashkent Agreement, the regime may have decided to relax its efforts to cultivate Pakistan ~~by~~ which centered around the use of threats and pressures against India. In the Alice-in-Wonderland world of Chicom diplomacy,

0 5 3 3
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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this week's paradoxical stance impresses us also as a relaxation of Chinese pressure against India and is reminiscent of developments in 1962-63, when Peking moved from hostilities to threatening notes about Indian provocations and lastly to charges of Indian persecution of Chinese nationals before allowing its anti-India campaign to peter out. (Limited Official Use)

9. Laos: U.S. Charged with "Intensified Aggression"

A January 20 Ta Kung Pao Commentator article charged that the U.S., while engaged in its "peace offensive," was actually intensifying military measures against Laos. According to NCNA excerpts, Commentator accused the U.S. of raining "thousands of tons of bombs and toxic chemicals on Laotian civilians" as part of its "plan to spread war to the whole of Indo-China." The article concluded confidently by noting that since "the South Vietnamese people alone are capable of reducing the U.S. aggressors to such dire straits, then the combined strength of the Indo-Chinese peoples will undoubtedly inflict bigger defeats on the aggressors."

In other Chinese actions related to Laos during the week, NCNA approvingly reprinted portions of several militant recent Lao statements calling for a deepening of guerrilla warfare leading to "final victory" over the U.S. and its "lackeys." (Unclassified)

Military

10. Hsiao Hua Report to PLA Political Work Conference

On January 24 NCNA released General Political Department Director Hsiao Hua's report to the PLA Political Work Conference. The release of January 18, covered in Joint PEKA No. 3, already provides in effect a summary of the report. However, the full text is noteworthy in its re-emphasis of the role of the PLA in the "class struggle," the need for unified party direction at all levels and the long-term nature of the whole problem of "army-building."

The importance of the PLA in advancing the "revolution" is stressed both as the main instrument of party power and as the training ground to produce a core of disciplined, indoctrinated young people to penetrate and condition the whole social structure. Thus, Hsiao notes, within the PLA there must be rigid adherence to the ideology of the class struggle both structurally and functionally.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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Hsiao emphasizes the need for absolute party control over military affairs because of the dependence of the whole political system on the PLA. Thus, the Party provides the policy and leadership to guide and control the structure of the PLA--its organization, training and motivation. To control effectively, Hsiao stresses the need for strong party branches at all levels who firmly practice "democratic centralism." He speaks of the need to strengthen the party branches by bringing in new young people who are not inhibited by the conservatism of age. Hsiao also points out the need for exercising a bold style of leadership which will gain a willing response from those affected by Party policy.

Hsiao does not appear to be responding to an imminent fear of fighting. He states that the development of a combat-ready PLA is a long-term task. He covers the possibility of war with the U.S. and ideological enemies, but the heat appears to be generated primarily as a toughener to maintain a combat pitch in an army that has not fought on any large scale for a number of years. He speaks of revolutionizing and modernizing the PLA; not in the sense of the introduction of new hardware, organization or tactics, but in the sense of planting "correct" thoughts and motivation in the minds of men to make the People's Army ready to fight the People's War. Thus, he is recognizing the practical limits of the PLA's combat capability and is emphasizing the single element which is the foundation of its current power--the disciplined, well-trained individual soldier, steeped in the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED:

(2)	BANGKOK	CANBERRA	KARACHI	MOSCOW	RANGOON	SOFIA	VIENTIANE
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ORIGIN/ACTION

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ARA 4	EUR 5	FE 6
NEA	CU 5	INR
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L	FBO	AID 17
S/L 1	PC 2	RS/I HOCHMAN 1
AGR 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 3	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 3C	NAVY 7
OSD 45	USIA 11	NSA 3
NSC 6	HEW 1	NASA 4

(18)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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A-491 (NO.) | CONFIDENTIAL | Air Pouch (HANDLING INDICATOR)

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG DATE: January 21, 1966

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 3

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED

POLITICAL

Internal

1. PLA Political Work Conference Closes
2. Hundreds of Thousands of New Party Members Recruited from PLA
3. NPC Reported Put Off Until Spring
4. Shanghai Professors Reject Wu Han's Self Criticism
5. Captured GRC Agents to Taiwan

External

6. Sino-Soviet Relations: Widening Split
7. Peking Hails Outcome of Habana Tri-continent Conference
8. Vietnam: Chicoms Shift Gear
9. Thai Patriotic Front Calls for "People's War"
10. Peking: The Home Away from Home for Revolutionaries

Military

11. PLA Guidelines for 1966

RFE/10 yes

1/25 RFE/10 yes

COPYFLO-PBR

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Internal

1. PLA Political Work Conference Closes

On January 18 NCNA announced the close of a twenty day political work conference convened in Peking by the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army. The conference, which heard reports on the domestic and international situation from Premier Chou En-lai, Party Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping and Politburo member Peng Chen was chaired by General Political Department Director Hsiao Hua.

The NCNA report of the conference focussed defensive attention on "keeping politics in the fore," and reiterated confidence in political indoctrination and Mao's thought as keys to the invincibility of the PLA. The loud volume with which these comforting old songs were rendered was probably designed to raise troop morale as well as possibly muffle covert questioning among military figures regarding the direction and efficacy of current regime policies. If as in the past, the amount of stress placed on politics (notably the "thought of Mao Tse-tung"), the "human factor" over weaponry, and China's alleged basic invulnerability was a measure of the regime's concern over the adverse drift of world events, the regime is obviously worried now.

Nothing in the report, however, indicated that such concern was about to be translated into direct action. The most threatening passage (misinterpreted in the Western press as describing war with the United States as "inevitable") stated in standard Marxist-Leninist terms that the root causes of war would remain as long as capitalism existed and that the United States had always wanted to impose a war on China. This required that Chinese combat preparedness be treated as a long term strategic measure rather than a temporary expedient.

Heavy emphasis in the report on the enforcement of the Party leadership principle in the Army suggested that the imposition of absolute Party control over the military establishment still causes friction. Furthermore, an exhortation that military affairs be run by the "whole Party" leads us to speculate that topmost Party leaders consider as a potential or real danger the formation of a clique within the Party which considers military affairs its private bailiwick. If this is indeed a problem, it is an interesting phenomenon for a PLA which has for some years been presumed politically exemplary and purged of parochialism. (ConGenTel 1364) (Confidential)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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2. Hundreds of Thousands of New Party Members Recruited from PLA

An interesting by-product of the PLA Political Work Conference was the January 13 NCNA announcement that during 1965 "hundreds of thousands" of fighters and basic level cadres were admitted to the Chinese Communist Party. Both the number and the quality of new Party recruits was the highest in recent years. The vast majority of the neophytes were "five good" fighters, elite YCL members, and Mao-study activists many of whom were ordinary workers, peasants, and students only a year or two ago. Under Party tutelage, however, they had rapidly become vanguards of the proletariat, filling in the gaps left by the "tens of thousands" of Party members who are annually demobilized and transferred to civilian jobs. The large number of new members enabled the Party to continue placing members in every squad and a Party branch in every company, maintaining the Party branch as the leadership core of the company. (Unclassified)

Comment: The Chinese term used for "hundreds of thousands" would not commonly be employed to describe a number below 300,000 meaning that at least ~~ten~~ fifteen percent of the entire PLA was taken into the Party last year. While it would be tempting to conjecture that the increase in numbers is necessary to maintain Party strength in an expanded military establishment, we have seen little to indicate that the PLA has grown significantly, and are inclined to intrepret the increase as a net gain for the Party.

News of the increase further strengthens conjecture that the Party as a whole is expanding (WEEKA 2). The despatch also suggests that the PLA with its exacting physical and political recruiting standards, militant way of life, and institutionalized personnel turnover is being used as a major training ground for new Party members in the civilian sector. (Limited Official Use)

3. NPC Reported Put Off Until Spring

A French Consulate General Officer was told last week by Fei I-min, Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao publisher and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) member that the National People's Congress would probably convene in the spring, but definitely not before March.

The Japanese Consulate General also has a report from a local Communist source, whom they classify of doubtful reliability, that the NPC will convene in March.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0538

Comment: Fei supposedly got his information from the recent joint session of the Kwangtung Provincial People's Congress and CPPCC, which he attended.

4. Shanghai Professors Reject Wu Han's Self Criticism

On December 31 four days after Peking Vice Mayor Wu Han published his self criticism of the play "Hai Jui is Dismissed from Office" (WEEKA 1), the Shanghai Wen Wei Pao, which initiated the attacks on Wu last November, convened a forum of historians from Shanghai universities to discuss the confession. They refused to accept his denial of any connection between his play and rightist agrarian incidents in 1962 (one misguided peasant in Kiangsi allegedly inspired by Hai Jui's battle against land grabbing bureaucrats is said to have demanded his land back from the commune) and found impossible to believe Wu's statement that he had written "Hai Jui" to support rather than attack the Anti-Rightist campaign. Wu maintained that his political stand had been right, but his academic thought wrong. No so, replied his critics. His aberrant academics were the direct result of a wandering political viewpoint. Wu confessed that he had forgotten the class struggle, but his colleagues at the forum went him one better. He had not forgotten the class struggle, they maintained, he had engaged in it, working for the wrong side.

Comment: Wu termed his confession a preliminary effort, indicating that he expected more criticism. However, the tenor of the commentary on his self-criticism suggests that Wu is in even deeper trouble than we suspected. Forgetting the class struggle was a common crime during the rough years following the Great Leap, one that has been treated rather lightly. But witting support of class enemies is a serious charge, which only additional thousands of self critical words can exonerate, if then. (Unclassified)

5. Captured GRC Agents to Taiwan

NCNA January 16 reported the departure for Taiwan "by sea from Fukien" of four captured GRC agents and twelve boatmen, all of whom were among the group released from Kwangtung and Kiangsu prisons last December (WEEKA 50, Dec. 31, 1965). According to the despatch, "the spirit of revolutionary humanitarianism" prompted the Chinese People's Government to fulfill the agents' and boatmens wishes to reunite with their families on Taiwan. The send-off included gifts to the departees of clothing and Chinese New Year goodies. (Unclassified)

0 5 3 4
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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Comment: In the past, the Chicoms have offered to return released agents to Taiwan, but this is the first time any have actually departed. Their route home and whether they arrived safely is not clear, however.

We regard the return of the agents as a propaganda ploy designed to demonstrate the regime's magnanimity and emphasize the theme of all-Chinese brotherhood. The timing of the departure to permit the reuniting of families at the New Year is obviously meant to impress Chinese everywhere. At the same time the regime probably hopes that these tainted New Year's gifts (the agents were only released after thorough "education" and repentance of their crimes") will embarrass the GRC recipients, who must regard them with suspicion, but will be reluctant to send them back. Finally the move may be calculated to give the impression that the regime is totally unconcerned over recent military defections from the Mainland.

We wonder whether some Chinese will not find it strange that, even after "education" and "repentance," these agents and boatmen chose to leave the light of socialist paradise, and return to what propaganda media has always described as the living hell of "U.S. occupied" Taiwan. (ConGenTel 1350) (Limited Official Use)

External

6. Sino-Soviet Relations: Widening Split

The Soviet role in Vietnam and alleged U.S.-USSR collaboration provided the basis over the past week for a wide range of Chicom attacks on Moscow (see also item 7).

A. Vietnam Aid Shipments. An NCNA story of January 15 from "competent sources" described Soviet rejection on three occasions of a Chicom "memorandum" demanding that the Soviet Government publicly repudiate rumors and a Za Rubezhom (Abroad) article to the effect that the Chinese were posing obstacles to Soviet aid shipments to Vietnam (WEEKA 52, Dec. 31, 1965). Soviet rejection of the memo, which a Chicom Vice-Foreign Minister attempted unsuccessfully to hand to the Soviet Ambassador and which was later delivered to the Soviet Embassy in Peking and the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow, only to be returned, was termed by the NCNA article "a new step taken by the USSR along the road of worsening state relations between the CPR and the USSR." This section of the article was printed by the People's Daily in dark type.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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In denying that the rumors had any substance, the Chicoms revealed for the first time in any public source that Soviet military "technical personnel" were travelling to Vietnam. They gave a clue to the possible nature of the "obstacles" at the root of the rumors when they stated virtuously that shipments and transit of personnel were accepted "at once" upon request of the Soviet Government and confirmation by the DRV. This procedure may have resulted in a sizeable snarl at the Sino-Soviet border, nullifying the benefits of the "special express" handling which, the Chicoms claim, keeps shipping time through Chinese territory generally under ten days. (Confidential)

Comment: By injecting the element of "worsening state relations" into the dispute with the Soviets (for the first time we can recall since Khrushchev was ousted), the Chicoms may have given Moscow further ammunition to convince others in the international Communist movement that the onus for "splitting" the socialist camp rests on Peking. We wonder whether this is not a case in which the Chicoms, while striving to goad the Soviets into making rash statements, have lost their sang-froid and have themselves made statements which can be exploited by the other side. (ConGenTel 1346) (Confidential).

B. U.S.-Soviet Collaboration. Chicom propaganda latched on to two widely varying news items during the week to make the point that the Soviets were acting in collusion with the U.S. on the Vietnam issue and in general. The first was the visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina to Moscow, with its concomitant signing of civil aviation and trade agreements and laying of groundwork for a visit by Prime Minister Sato later this year, all of which was indicative, that "the Sato Government's increased contact with the USSR is made at U.S. bidding." To Peking, following on the heels of the Japan-South Korea treaty, the Japanese-Soviet initiatives can only be regarded as "part of a scheme to isolate China."

Additional "evidence" of U.S.-Soviet "collaboration" was the television report by Vice President Humphrey and White House Assistant Bundy on New Delhi talks with Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin. An NCNA story of January 17 gave prominent attention to the statement attributed to the Vice President that "the Soviets are trying to build a containment wall around China." The article also highlighted Bundy's view that the USSR hoped for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. Finally, in a separate article, NCNA reported shifts of American troops from Europe to Vietnam and

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0541

cited Western press comment that this was possible because of tacit Soviet agreement on "relaxation" in Europe. (Unclassified)

Comment: The fact that Peking finds U.S.-Soviet "collaboration" hiding behind every bush strikes us as something more than a convenient cudgel to raise against the Soviets. Rather, it apparently signifies a growing sense of frustration born of fear that Chicom policies are leaving the nation isolated, not only from the world at large but from the countries on China's periphery. (Limited Official Use)

C. Illicit Pictures in the Corridors. An NCNA article of January 10 described the in-fighting between Chinese and Soviet delegations at a December executive committee meeting of the (Communist front) International Union of Students. The Chinese delegation produced an effective weapon in its struggle against the "erroneous" Soviet line in the form of pictures of an "anti-U.S.--support Vietnam" demonstration by Asian students being suppressed. Sure enough, it was the Soviet militia breaking up the "foreign" (i.e., Chinese) student protests of last March in Moscow and April in Leningrad. The Chinese were muzzled when they attempted to "give a true account" of the demonstrations on the floor of the meeting, but they found ample takers afterwards. (Unclassified)

D. Silence on Soviet-Outer Mongolian Developments. While the Chicom press has at least informed its readers of the Shelepin visit to Hanoi and the Tashkent summit (WEEKA 2), it let the Brezhnev visit to neighboring Mongolia pass without public notice. Although Peking could be expected to ignore a purely Party visit, the renewal of the Soviet-Mongolian friendship treaty is a state matter which affects China's vital interests along its northern frontier. Absence of comment thus suggests the Chicoms view with disfavor the timing and contents of the new treaty. [redacted]. (Unclassified)

7. Peking Hails Outcome of Habana Tri-continent Conference

Voluminous press coverage, including a People's Daily editorial of January 18 and two comprehensive NCNA reports from Habana, hailed the "great successes" of the Chicom line on national liberation struggles at the tri-continent Solidarity Conference of Asian, African and Latin American Peoples which ended January 15.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0542

Peking asserted with near elation that "U.S. imperialism was the principal target of attack and exposure in the speeches, discussions and documents of the Conference." As they have done in the wake of other international meetings, the Chicoms delivered a scathing indictment of the "Khrushchev revisionists (who) were in fact doing service to U.S. imperialism by peddling their stuff...and resorted to all kinds of despicable means to smuggle into the conference their contraband 'peaceful coexistence' and all that sort of rubbish." Soviet tactics on Vietnam were "especially vicious," e.g., their proposal to establish an international aid-Vietnam organization and their repetition of the "lie spread by a Soviet journal that China had obstructed the transit of aid material for Vietnam." However, said the People's Daily, the revisionists' "capitulationist, divisive line met with ignominious defeat." Other blows dealt to the Soviets, according to Peking, were the passage of a resolution condemning the United Nations and the scuttling of intensive Soviet efforts to merge the Cairo-based AAPSO into a tri-continent organization controlled by Moscow. (Unclassified)

Comment: It appears that Peking is exploiting the outcome of the Conference as an endorsement of the Chicom line of "people's revolutionary struggle" in an effort to convince both domestic and external audiences that the regime's policies are basically at one with the underdeveloped world, despite the existence of occasional "adverse currents" in the area. Our feeling is that while the Habana meeting confirmed the appeal of the Chicom line to militant dissidents without much standing in their own countries who were heavily represented at the Conference, it probably did little for Peking's position in the third world. Superficial as their "triumph" at Habana may have been, it seems to have bucked up the regime's spirit in its world wide rivalry with the Soviets. (ConGenTels 1352, 1359) (Confidential)

8. Vietnam: Chicoms Shift Gear

Shifting into low gear after its heavy editorial effort of the previous week (WEEKA 2), Peking added little to its substantive comment on President Johnson's 14 Points. Apparently to counter the impact on world opinion of the U.S. peace offensive, the regime launched a shrill propaganda campaign on U.S. "atrocities" in Vietnam. Also receiving attention during the week were the President's State of the Union Message, the travels of Soviet emissary Alexander Shelepin and alleged American logistics problems in Vietnam.

0543
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

A. U.S. Charged with "Atrocities". Following a series of high-level statements by the DRV and the NLF, the regime on January 14 issued a People's Daily editorial and a Foreign Ministry statement condemning the U.S. for following a "burn all, kill all and destroy all" policy and for committing "atrocities" which "far surpassed those committed by the Hitlerite fascist brigands and the Japanese militarists." As evidence, People's Daily mentioned U.S. bombing and the use of "poison gas and toxic chemicals." Although the U.S. was "loudly professing...a 'humanitarian desire' against Vietnam" and offering a "pause in bombing," "no deceit (could) cover up (its) bloodstained hands, nor hoodwink the world public." After calling on all "peace-loving countries and peoples to protest U.S. "fascist atrocities" and support the Vietnamese "people," the editorial concluded darkly that "blood debts must be paid with blood. The Johnson Administration cannot escape justice."

Comment: Peking's propaganda on U.S. "atrocities" is primarily designed to distract world attention from the U.S. peace moves and provide justification for the regime's and Hanoi's negative response to our efforts at negotiations.

B. Chicom Reaction to the State of the Union Speech. Peking's somewhat belated and predictably negative reaction to the President's State of the Union speech was presented in a January 19 People's Daily editorial which described the speech as "a message for expanding the aggressive war in Vietnam and intensifying the attacks on the American people." The editorial covered familiar ground in alleging failure for both the "escalation" and "peace talk" tactics pursued by the United States. Aside from standard references to the "peace talks fraud" serving as a smokescreen for U.S. plans to expand the war and to greater defeats awaiting the U.S. in Vietnam, the editorial drew from the President's remarks "the inescapable conclusion that U.S. imperialism is directing its knife at....the American people." Citing the President's call for wage restraints, tax reform and sacrifices as evidence of the "knife" directed at the American people, the editorial devoted considerable emphasis to the alleged effect of the Vietnamese war in "further sharpening the class contradictions in the U.S. and promoting a new political awakening of the American people." However, the editorial preserved a sense of balance regarding American intentions in Vietnam by noting that "although the U.S. aggressors have been badly battered in South Vietnam, they will still go on with their aggression regardless of the consequences."

0544

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

The editorial interpreted the President's declaration that U.S. troops will stay in South Vietnam until aggression has stopped as demonstrating U.S. intentions to turn South Vietnam into "a colony of U.S. imperialism" and a "war base in Asia." The President's five lines of policy were described as "concrete program of U.S. imperialism to promote its counter-revolutionary global strategy" and scorn was heaped on the "Khrushchev revisionists" for allegedly responding favorably to the President's expressed hope for increased U.S. trade with East Europe and the Soviet Union.

Comment: About the only interesting aspect of the editorial is the week's delay in Peking's reaction to the President's message. Although the regime had forecast its response by loading factual reports of the President's presentation with unfavorable adjectives and asides, it is possible that Peking felt the need to await Hanoi's reaction (latter appeared January 16 in a Nhan Dan Observer article) before committing itself to a detailed analysis of significance of the President's remarks.

C. U.S. Logistics Problems Highlighted. A January 17 NCNA article, termed the "second of a series" on American logistics problems in Vietnam, described in detailed fashion the strains which the Vietnam war allegedly was placing on U.S. shipping and Vietnamese harbor facilities. The report concluded by quoting an AP Correspondent's assertion that the situation is bad and "will get worse." (Unclassified)

D. Sparse Comment on Shelepin. For the second successive week (see WEEKA 2), the regime had little to say about Alexander Shelepin, Soviet emissary to Hanoi. A terse, seven-line NCNA item January 13 revealed that Shelepin had visited the DRV from January 7-13. Two additional items briefly mentioned Shelepin's overnight stopover in Peking, during which Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien hosted a dinner for the Soviet official.

Comment: Although the regime has not commented officially on Shelepin's travels, its attitude was probably expressed by an Albanian commentary (summarized by NCNA Janauary 12) which charged that President Johnson's peace moves and Shelepin's visit to Hanoi were "a concerted action of the Soviet Union and the U.S." (Limited Official Use)

0545
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

9. Thai Patriotic Front Calls for "People's War"

On January 14 NCNA released without comment the text of a militant New Year's message by the Thailand Patriotic Front calling for an eventual expansion of the Thai "people's armed struggle" to the stage of [redacted] "people's war." The statement optimistically reviewed the Front's domestic and international achievements during 1965 and promised expanded activities for the New Year. It justified "revolutionary violence" as necessary to counteract "suppression" by the Thanom Government and [redacted] called upon government functionaries, servicemen and policemen to desert the government and join the "patriotic forces" in driving out the U.S. "imperialists" and destroying its "lackey-- the Thanom-Praphas traitorous government..." Concluding with a call for action, the message urged all "patriots" to "give full support to the armed struggle" in the Northeast and other areas and "combine various forms and means of struggle so as to weaken the strength of the enemy step by step."

Comment: Peking's issuance of the Patriotic Front's militant New Year's message is evidence that the regime has decided to press ahead with its efforts to create both inside and outside of Thailand an organization capable of harassing the Thai Government and directing the beginning stages of insurrection in Thailand. The regime's tactics are undoubtedly designed to divert Thai and U.S. energies from the Vietnam struggle by raising and implementing to the best of its ability the threat of internal disorder in Thailand. However, available evidence indicates that the Front is little more than a paper organization and the message's constant references to the "suppression" tactics of the Thai Government leave the impression that it has a long way to go before attaining its stated goal of "people's war" in Thailand. Our impression here is that the gauge of the Front's future performance will be the extent to which it can enlist ethnic Thais to its cause instead of almost exclusively relying on Vietnamese and Lao minorities to carry on the struggle against the Thanom Government. (ConGenTel 1336) (Confidential)

10. Peking: The Home Away from Home for Revolutionaries

During the past two weeks several pro-Chicom front groups have fled the now hostile Djakarta atmosphere for a new haven in friendly Peking. First to arrive were the Secretaries of the Afro-Asian Journalists Association (AAJA), who were reported by NCNA (January 6) to have "arrived in Peking separately after

0546
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

temporary withdrawal of the AAJA Secretariat from Djakarta." In statements released on January 8 and January 15, the Secretaries condemned the "interference" of the newly reorganized Indonesian Journalists Association in the affairs of the AAJA and claimed that the organization's activities in Indonesia had been harrassed to the point where it could no longer function properly in Djakarta.

The arrival of a second group was announced by NCNA January 12 in a report of a banquet welcoming "the inauguration in China" of the Mission of the Malayan National Liberation League (MNLL). Although the report made no mention that the group had left Djakarta, it appeared from the nature of the announcement that the group's activities would henceforth be centered in Peking.

A probable third addition to the fold is the newly-formed and exile-led Indonesian AAPSO group under the direction of Ibrahim Isa. Since the January 13 NCNA report on the foundation of the group quotes Isa as saying that under present conditions, "there could be no possibility at all for the organization to function properly in Indonesia," we presume this group will also find a home in Peking.

Comment: Peking's support for the dissident Isa faction seems likely to provoke Indonesian sensibilities and further worsen the already low state of Sino-Indonesian relations. (Confidential)

0547

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Military

11. PLA Guidelines for 1966

A New Year's Day editorial from the Liberation Army Daily entitled: "Raise Higher the Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thinking, Continue to Emphasize Politics and Resolutely Strive for the Execution of the Five Principles" fixes the milieu for the development of the PLA during 1966. The editorial reviews the accomplishments of 1965, but stresses that "far from enough emphasis has been placed on politics", and reminds the Party Committees of their leadership role to insure a sufficient and proper emphasis. However, in enunciating the principles to be followed the ideological motivational goal of "advancing the interests of the revolution" is balanced by the practical requisites of sound military training and leadership techniques to maximize the PLA's fighting power within China's environmental limitations.

The Five Principles form the platform for making the PLA "a revolutionary and modern armed force, ready to smash any U.S. war of aggression and to resist the growth of revisionism." The principles are not new in themselves, but this latest statement introduces some slight shades of difference in their meaning and application.

First Principle: Creatively study and apply Mao's works with greater emphasis on application. Cadres, particularly those at the higher levels, are directed to set the example and practice face-to-face leadership. They are told especially to study the theory of the People's War.

Second Principle: Persist in the "four-firsts", with greater emphasis on living ideas. In order to raise class consciousness and revolutionary traditions, cadres are cautioned to generate voluntary enthusiasm for political and ideological work through persuasion and commendation.

Third Principle: Motivate the "four-good" campaign by improving the style of leadership at the basic level. This is done by strengthening the party branches and the practice of direct personal leadership by cadres.

Fourth Principle: Boldly promote outstanding commanders and fighters to responsible and key positions. This principle

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

is stressed as the organization guarantee for accomplishing the stated goals. The criteria for promotion are: Devotion to Mao's thinking and leadership ability. Equal emphasis is to be given to individual capacity and family status.

Fifth Principle: Undergo hard technical training and master the art of night fighting at close range. According to the editorial, application of this principle requires the discarding of "outdated, foreign" dogma and perfecting a small, well-trained regular force backed by a mass militia.

Mao's thinking provides the meat for the development of both the ideological motivation and practical skills which are requisites of a keen fighting force, so saith the CCP. The responsibility to impart the political push within the PLA in understanding these ideas is given to the CCP committees who are urged in the editorial to acclaim the cadres who emphasize politics, educate those who are indifferent and punish those who oppose or are indifferent to the line.

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED:

(2)BANGKOK	CANBERA	KARACHI	MOSCOW	RANGOON	SOFIA	VIENTIANE
BELGRADE	CPACPLAD	KATMANDU	MUNICH	ROME	S'PORE	COMNAVPHIL
BUCHAREST	DARESAL'M	KLUMPUR	NDELHI	SAIGON	(4)TAIPEI	LONDON
BUDAPEST	DJAKARTA	MANILA	PRAGUE	SEOUL	TOKYO	13AFMANILA
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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0549

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A-469 (NO.) | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH (HANDLING INDICATOR)

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG DATE: January 14, 1966

SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 2

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Party Expansion Hinted
2. Progress Reported in Kiangsu Industry and Communications Political Network
3. Rare Statistics Show Rapid Expansion of Kwangtung Work Study System

External

4. Vietnam: Chicoms Condemn 14 Points; Show Sensitivity to Reaction to U.S. Peace Efforts; Give Cold Shoulder to Shelepin
5. FonMin Chen Yi's Akahata Interview
6. Cuba: Food for Thought
7. Sino-Soviet Relations
8. India-Pakistan
9. Africa: Peking Reacts Sharply to Diplomatic Ruptures

Military

10. MIGs Shoot Down Defectors

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

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Clearances: POL:NPlatt,BLevin,CKamman,JThomas,SYNg:drb, 1/13/66

0550

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. Party Expansion Hinted

Adding statistical strength to a vague announcement last November that a "large number" of persons from the Peking area had joined the Party (WEEKA 46, 1965) NCNA on January 8 reported that 20,000 new members from Peking had been placed on the Party roster in 1965. A Peking Daily editorial commenting on the announcement noted that a current task of Party organizations at all levels was the recruitment of "comparatively large numbers of new members." This would have the important effects of strengthening Party leadership, promoting the revolution and "forging closer links with the masses." The long term interests of the revolution would be served if young people were among the new recruits, the editorial continued. "Only by admitting large numbers of fine young people who meet the qualifications of Party membership would it be possible to temper them within the Party," it concluded. (Unclassified)

Comment: The impression given by the editorial and other vague reports on new CCP members is that an expansion program is under way in the Party. The move is a logical extension of the significant enlargement during 1965 of both of the Party's major youth subsidiaries, the Young Communist League, and the Young Pioneers (WEEKAs 44 and 33, 1965).

Press treatment of the Young Pioneers and YCL expansion suggested that the Party, in an effort to insure greater participation in these organizations, had swung away from rigid entry prerequisites to a "recruit now - rectify later" approach. The same may be true of the parent organization, with possible deleterious effects on the future purity of China's principal political organization. (Limited Official Use)

2. Progress Reported in Kiangsu Industry and Communications Political Network

According to Radio Nanking (January 4, 1345 GMT) all special district and municipal Party Committees in Kiangsu, and the "great majority" of county Party committees set up industry and communications political departments during 1965. "A number" of provincial, municipal and county industrial and communications administrative departments have also established political departments or sections. Further down the line, political work offices have been organized in the "great majority" of state-owned enterprises and a "few" joint state-private enterprises. In addition 36,000 "part-time

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

political propagandists" have begun operating in factory work-shifts. (Unclassified)

Comment: Creation of a PLA-type political network in industry and communications, begun in the spring of 1964, has lagged behind similar organizational activity in the more capitalism-prone trade and finance sectors. (WEEKA 47) Now in Kiangsu at least, there is evidence that the industry and communications net is nearing completion. However, the relatively small number of "propagandists" placed so far at the lowest level (36,000 in a Kiangsu industrial work force we estimate at around 1,000,000) suggests that the net is not as fine as originally anticipated. The propagandists are probably not spread homogeneously throughout Kiangsu industry, but concentrated in the Nanking area, giving their small number more effect, however. (Limited Official Use)

3. Notes on Education: A. Rare Statistics Show Rapid Expansion of Kwangtung Work-Study System

Radio Canton reported on January 5 (2300 GMT) that during the past "year and more" work-study schools at all levels in Kwangtung province have "sprouted like spring asparagus after rain." There are now over 3,700 farm-study primary schools with over 1,300,000 students, one fifth of the total number of primary school students in the province. The number of agricultural middle schools has increased (presumably during the "year and more" period) from over 140 to 2,600, the number of students rising from 14,000 to 197,000, comprising one third of the middle school children in Kwangtung. There are now 115 labor universities, instead of four, with some 20,000 students. "Basically, each county has a labor university, each commune has an agricultural middle school and each production team has a primary school."

Since 1964, starting from nothing, over 390 urban factory-study schools have been established in the cities, with 61,000 students.

Comments: These are the first figures we have seen which reveal clearly the ratio of work-study students to total student population. If they are accurate, and not the collective figment of overzealous statisticians in the provincial education department, they show that the new system has been pushed even harder than the torrent of publicity during the past year has indicated (WEEKAs 50, 48, 29, 25, 1965). Such rapid expansion smacks of the Great Leap and has probably been accompanied by haphazard planning, helter-skelter implementation and lack of standards. No wonder the regime

0552
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

has recently put on the brakes somewhat , calling for "five years of experimentation, ten years of popularization " for work-study education.

The percentage of work-study primary school students is of particular interest for it shows that at least 1/5 of the primary school age children in Kwangtung were receiving little or no education at all before the system was expanded. Analyzing the figures a step further it appears that total middle school students (591,000) comprise only 9% of primary school children in Kwangtung--somewhat below the national average of 10.5% (1959) and testimony to the low level of educational opportunity in the province.

B. University Graduates Assume Permanent Commune Posts

NCNA December 11, reported that a group of more than 180 university graduates from 19 institutes of higher learning including Peking and Shantung Universities were assigned last September and October to permanent commune jobs in the suburbs of Peking. Most of them had been liberal arts majors with backgrounds in political science, economics, history, Chinese language and literature. In addition to farming, they are participating in socialist education, propaganda work, teaching, and scientific experiments. (Unclassified)

Comment: Since 1962 the majority of Chinese university graduates have spent a year in "basic level" farm or factory jobs immediately upon leaving university - initially because of the job shortage and more recently because the regime thinks it is good for their ideology.

However, reports of China's scarce university trained youth taking permanent jobs in the countryside have been rare. The above dispatch shows that despite the cut backs in enrollment (200,000 graduates in 1964 vs. 170,000 in 1965) the economy still cannot provide enough high level jobs for products of the higher education system, especially in the liberal arts field. (Unclassified)

External

4. Vietnam: Chicoms Condemn 14 points; Show Sensitivity to Reaction to U.S. Peace Efforts; Give Cold Shoulder to Shelepin

Peking last week cranked up its press machinery and spewed forth for five consecutive days a flood of editorials and news items denouncing President Johnson's 14 points. The intensity and

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

duration of the regime's reaction to the U.S. peace offensive revealed considerable sensitivity over its impact on world opinion. In addition, the Chicoms reacted with predictable coolness to the Shelepin visit to Hanoi.

A. Chicoms Show Sensitivity to Afro-Asian Desires for Peace

A January 7 People's Daily Osberver article described the 14 points as "very impressive on the surface" and then proceeded in detailed fashion to show how erroneous such "surface impressions" could be. Observer also charged the U.S. with responsibility for "tearing up" the Geneva Accords and committing aggression against the Vietnamese people, as a result of which the "people of North Vietnam" were justified in helping their "Southern compatriots." Dismissing U.S. statements of willingness to accept the Geneva Accords as a basis for a settlement, Observer declared that if the U.S. was really in favor of upholding the Geneva Agreements, it should completely accept the DRV four-point proposition, whose "basic spirit is also the spirit of the Geneva Agreements." Observer made it clear that the Four Points themselves were not negotiable.

The impression gained by Observer's lengthy refutation of the 14-points--namely, that Peking was concerned over world reaction to the President's proposals--was strengthened by the regime's releasing on successive days (Jan. 8 - 11) of four People's Daily Commentator articles on the same question. Noting the desires of "many peace-loving countries of Asia and Africa" for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, the articles deplored the Johnson Administration for attempting to "capitalize on this well-meant wish in bringing public pressure on the Vietnamese people." Commentator (January 9) described the U.S. "unconditional discussions" offer as "unacceptable to the Vietnamese people" because it envisaged "negotiations before withdrawal" of U.S. forces. The same article also concluded that negotiations in the present context were unnecessary since all the U.S. had to do was to remove its armed forces in accordance with the already existing Geneva Agreements.

On extremely short notice, a somewhat more flexible approach was introduced by a January 10 Commentator article which was more in keeping with Hanoi's position. Discussing the possibilities for a "political settlement" in Vietnam, Commentator termed the 4-points the "sole basis and most correct path for a political settlement of the Vietnam question." Commentator was careful to

0554
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

point out, however, that the U.S. had not and would not accept the 4-points.

Comment: Although Peking maintained its hard-line position on negotiations during the week, its apparent sensitivity to the results of the U.S. peace effort for the first time forced the regime into a detailed discussion of the U.S. position as well as a defense of its own position on negotiations. Its polite treatment of the "many peace-loving countries of Asia and Africa" desiring a peaceful settlement to the Vietnam problem -- quite in contrast to its previous scorn for such nations as being either misguided or misled -- is ample testimony of Peking's awareness that it has failed to convince many Afro-Asians of the correctness of its hard-line position. (Confidential) (ConGen Tels 1287, 1291, 1303)

B. Chicoms Comment on Mansfield Report

A People's Daily Commentator article Jan. 10 made use of the Mansfield report as a peg to refute the U.S. "peace talks fraud." According to People's Daily, the report was intended to complement President Johnson's "peace offensive" by threatening an "indefinite expansion and intensification of the war." Commentator (neatly excising Mansfield's comments regarding the possibilities of a negotiated settlement) noted the report's reference to "difficult and painful choices," and asserted that the "Johnson Administration has obviously chosen the path of further escalating the war under the smokescreen of 'peace'." (Unclassified)

C. Shelepin Cold-Shouldered

Peking has reacted with expected frigidity to the visit to Hanoi by Soviet emissary Alexander Shelepin. A curt, three-paragraph NCNA item announced January 7 that Shelepin had stopped over in Peking on his way to the DRV. Although the regime has as yet made no direct mention of his activities in Hanoi, it made its attitude clear by reprinting several American press items speculating on the role Shelepin might play in bringing about a settlement on the Vietnam question.

Comment: Hanoi's warm treatment of Shelepin, as revealed by VNA, constitutes yet another DRV rebuff to Peking's attack on the Soviet role in Vietnam. (Limited Official Use)

0555
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

6. FonMin Chen Yi's Akahata Interview

NCNA January 4 carried a lengthy interview of Foreign Minister Chen Yi with the Peking correspondent of Akahata, Japanese Communist Party newspaper. The interview begins on a strong defensive note, with Chen attempting to defend his September 29 press conference which, according to the Japanese questioner, led "some people" to believe that Chen had used "excessively tough words" on that occasion. Chen allowed that he could understand how such a reaction had arisen, but attributed it either to a lack of knowledge of the "ruthless aggression committed by U.S. imperialism" or, in obvious reference to the Soviets, an "obsession with the idea of peaceful co-existence with the U.S. aggressors." Still on the defensive, Chen pictured China as forced to take a tough line against the U.S. owing to alleged American unremitting hostility towards the Chinese people and the "truculent and tyrannical" nature of its policies in general.

Chen implicitly admitted that Communist China had suffered a series of diplomatic reverses in recent months when he tackled head-on the question of "great upheavals in Asia and Africa" which had resulted in "some people spreading the view that China is isolated." Protesting (perhaps too much) against this view, Chen asserted that "China is not isolated...We have friends all over the world." As for the "upheavals," although Chen noted "some adverse currents in certain areas of Asia and Africa," he declared that "the general situation in these countries is excellent."

On Vietnam, Chen reiterated the line that the U.S. was intensifying the war within Vietnam and was "preparing to extend it to Laos, Cambodia, and to the whole of Indo-China." He continued the recent Chicom practice of viewing war with the U.S. as resulting from the latter's "insistence on extending the war to China." In spite of this and other mentions of the danger to China represented by "U.S. imperialists," the general tenor of the interview conveys no sense of urgency on the issue of war with the U.S. Even the standard statements of support for the DRV were somewhat spiritless, being lumped together with "resolute" pledges of support for the "peoples of Laos, Cambodia, Korea, Japan and all others suffering from U.S. imperialist aggression."

Among other topics covered in the interview was the question of alleged Chinese obstacles to Soviet aid for Vietnam, which gave Chen an opportunity to belabor the arguments already set forth in a People's Daily Commentator article (Dec. 23) and to

0556

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

charge the Soviet leaders with "evading the major issue when they reduce the important political question of supporting the Vietnamese people's struggle to a matter of transporting aid material to Vietnam." With his Japanese audience in mind, Chen declared that "no improvement in Sino-Japanese relations is possible unless the Sato Government changes its policy of tailing after U.S. imperialism, reviving Japanese militarism, and being hostile to China." (Unclassified)

Comment: The interview impresses us as being a far cry from the self-assured belligerence of Chen's September 29 press conference performance or the Lin Piao September 3 article on "people's war." It seems more to be part of an effort to refurbish the regime's tarnished image in the Afro-Asian world, but the absence of a large group of foreign reporters and the reiteration of China's dogmatic world-view reduce the likelihood that the effort will achieve anywhere near the impact of the famed press conference. Moreover, the regime gives no sign of recognition that the root of its problems in the Afro-Asian countries and the rest of the world is that its basic policies are out of step with the hopes of most leaders and people for a modicum of peace and security. (ConGenTel 1268) (Limited Official Use)

6. Cuba: Food for Thought

Difficulties between Peking and Habana, heretofore detected only below the surface (WEEKA 1), burst into the open with the front-page publication by the People's Daily on January 9 of an NCNA interview of a "responsible official" of the Chicom Foreign Trade Ministry. The official reprimanded Fidel Castro for having "taken a step which is extraordinary in state relations" by "unilaterally and untruthfully" disclosing the contents of Sino-Cuban trade talks which were in progress in Peking. He asked pointedly why Castro had taken such a step on the eve of the Habana tri-continent solidarity conference, but failed to answer the question, saying merely that "this offers food for thought." Although the Chicom version of past and present trade arrangements with Cuba disputes many details of Castro's January 2 remarks on the subject (which were also summarized by NCNA), it confirms the fact that Chinese rice shipments to Cuba for 1966 are scheduled to decline from 250,000 to 135,000 tons, with a corresponding drop in Chinese purchases of Cuban sugar (see WER #2). (Unclassified)

0557
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: Coming on the heels of a series of recent diplomatic setbacks to the Chicoms in the non-aligned and "Socialist camp" worlds, the public revelation of differences with Cuba represents a new blow to Peking's international prestige. The swift Chicom response to Castro's "extraordinary" disclosure was evidently dictated by a desire to lay Peking's version of the facts before delegates to the tri-continent conference. While the reasons given by the Chinese for their inability to provide the Cubans with the desired amount of rice for 1966 make good economic sense, we suspect economic considerations were not paramount, nor was the stated need to aid unnamed countries (Vietnam implied). We note that Chicom rice exports to Japan for 1966 are expected to rise above the 1965 figure by 140,000 tons, while the decline in exports to Cuba is 115,000 tons. Peking has clearly opted for hard currency over fraternal solidarity with Cuba, which leads us to believe that this solidarity is in a state of disrepair not likely soon to be mended. (ConGenTel 1300) (Confidential)

7. Sino-Soviet Relations

A. A Western journalist has told us that he learned from the Soviet Embassy in Peking in December 1965 that 50 Soviet students are expected to arrive in China in 1966 for study in institutions of higher education. (Confidential)

Comment: It seems likely that the number of students to be exchanged in 1966 between the two countries is fixed under a cultural exchange agreement annual "plan." While the anticipated contingent is surprisingly large in view of increased ideological polemics in the past two months, it is not out of proportion in the general scheme of Sino-Soviet cultural exchanges observed over the past year. Coupled with recent information that Sino-Soviet trade was 15% higher in 1965 than 1964 (reported in WER 51, Dec. 24, 1965), this report suggests that neither side desires a total freeze in state relations insofar as they can be kept distinct from ideological questions. (Confidential)

B. The Chinese delegate to the Habana tri-continent solidarity conference in a speech on January 5 unleashed the expected attacks on U.S. "imperialism" around the globe and charged that "some people" were collaborating with the United States and sabotaging "people's wars." The same unnamed villains were "serving U.S. imperialism time and again in its peace talk

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

intrigue concerning Vietnam,...were using the question of Vietnam to vilify and slander China while clamoring about 'united action' on the South Vietnam question, and guaranteeing tranquility for U.S. imperialism on the Western and other fronts so that U.S. troops could be shifted from West Germany to South Vietnam." Later, on January 8, the Albanian observer cited the Soviet leaders specifically for "betrayal of the national liberation movement." NCNA reported the Albanian speech as having been distributed in written form at the plenary session, from which we gather it was not delivered orally to the assemblage. (Unclassified)

Comment: So far, the Chinese have run true to form at Habana in forcefully airing their differences with the Soviets without ever naming them from the rostrum. As at previous international meetings, the Albanians have no compunctions about identifying the foe (though it appears they may have been foiled in their effort to gain the ear of the conference on this occasion). If the usual scenario is played out to conclusion, the Chicoms will soon release an account of Soviet "manipulations" of the conference, replete with details of Soviet efforts to stifle the telling arguments of Peking and its supporters. (Limited Official Use)

8. India-Pakistan

Peking has made no comment on the Tashkent meeting, nor on the agreements reached there, though it has reported the main points contained in the "Tashkent Declaration." A terse NCNA item on January 4 announced that President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri had begun their summit meeting in Tashkent, and that Soviet Premier Kosygin was present. Then nothing on the summit appeared in the Chinese press until NCNA January 11 carried a five-line announcement of Shastri's death "shortly after he ended talks with Pakistan President Ayub Khan in Tashkent," and the joint declaration was summarized. Finally, on January 12, NCNA reported the condolence call paid at the Indian Embassy in Peking by Vice-Premier Tan Chen-lin and Vice-Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung. (Unclassified)

Comment: We believe that the Chicoms must be dismayed at the prospect of Pakistan settling its differences with India, which would remove one of the primary factors impelling Pakistan to maintain close ties with Peking. Even more galling to the Chicoms must have been the role of Kosygin as a peace-maker, especially as

0554

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

a successful peace-maker. Pakistan having succumbed to the efforts of the "modern revisionists" and others who favored a peaceful settlement, Peking can now hope only that the peace does not last--and even in these circumstances, its hopes for Ayub Khan must have been severely shaken. (Limited Official Use)

9. Africa: Peking Reacts Sharply to Diplomatic Ruptures

Decisions by new governments in Dahomey and the Central African Republic (CAR) to break off relations with the CPR last week produced a strong reaction from an obviously annoyed Peking. NCNA announced the ruptures and also carried the texts of CPR Foreign Ministry notes sharply protesting the "unilateral" and "unreasonable" actions of the new African regimes.

The regime's irritation over its latest African setbacks was further revealed in a People's Daily Commentator January 9 article charging that the ruptures were "imperialist-inspired act(s) of perfidy" which could not "in the least impair China's prestige," but only damage the international reputation of the two new regimes. Commentator showed particular annoyance with the new Bokassa regime in the CAR, which allegedly on January 5 told the CPR Ambassador of its desire to continue relations only to hand him his walking papers the next day. (Unclassified)

Comment: Although Chen Yi in his interview warned of occasional "adverse currents" on the international scene (item 2) the quick loss of two African posts is obviously a bitter pill for Peking to swallow, especially coming as it does in conjunction with public evidence of the regime's worsening relations with Cuba and Hanoi's warm embrace of Shelepin. By now the Chicom public may be wondering if this "adverse current" isn't turning into a roaring tide. Well, there's always Albania to keep the finger in the dike.

Military

10. MIGs Shoot Down Defectors

On January 9 a Nationalist HU-16 amphibian plane flying from Matsu to Taiwan with three Chinese Communist Navy defectors aboard was shot down over the Taiwan Strait by Chinese Communist MIGs. The defectors earlier had landed in Matsu on a LCM which they had taken by mutiny.

The Chinese Communists have understandably published no details of the defection and have limited coverage of the affair

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

to the announcement of congratulations to the unit which had shot down the Nationalist plane after it had "intruded over East China." (Unclassified)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED:

(2)BANGKOK	CANBERRA	KARACHI	MOSCOW	RANGOON	SOFIA	VNTIANE
BELGRADE	CPACPLAD	KATHMANDU	MUNICH	ROME	S'PORE	COMNAVPHL
BUCHAREST	DARESAL'M	KLUMPUR	NDELHI	SAIGON	(4)TAIPEI	LONDON
BUDAPEST	DJAKARTA	MANILA	PRAGUE	SEOUL	TOKYO	13AFMANILA
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0561

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ORIGIN/ACTION

INR-10

RM/R	REP	AF
1		5
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	5	6
NEA	CU	INR
7	5	
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
		12
S/S	PC	R/S
1	2	1
AGR	COM	FRB
2	2	
INT	LAB	TAR
	2	
TR	XMB	AIR
2		10
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	2C	7
OSD	USIA	NSA
46	11	3
NASA	HEW	NSC
4	1	6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

PoL 2-1 Chicom

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A-455 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | Air Pouch HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON 1966 JAN 10 AM 10 22

INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

January 7,1966

FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG DATE:

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 1

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Mao Photo Published
2. New Year's Day Editorials Combine Confidence and Concern
3. Soong Ching-ling Reviews Regime's Record
4. Peking Vice-Mayor Wu Han Criticizes Self

External

5. Vietnam: Chicoms Pour Cold Water on Peace Moves; Ignore Hanoi's Dealings with Soviets
6. Sino-Soviet Relations: Peking Rejects Unity with Moscow on Vietnam
7. Cuba: Peking Ostracizes Fidel, Reports Habana Conference
8. Peking Condemns "Hypocrisy" of Revised U.S. Passport Restrictions
9. Peking Comments on Thai-Cambodian Border Clash
10. Thailand: First Anniversary of Thai Patriotic Front Treated in Low-key

1966 JAN 10 AM 11 26

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GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,CKamman,JThomas,SYNg: Contents and Classification approved by: POL:JHOldridge

Clearances: drb,1/6/65

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0562

1. Mao Photo Published

As if in response to our item in WEEKA 52 (A-435, Dec. 31, 1965) this undated but presumably recent photograph of Mao Tse-tung appeared in the January 1 People's Daily. It shows "better than ten thousand words" that Mao's most obvious major health problem - and a growing one at that - is overweight. (Unclassified)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

2. New Year's Day Editorials Combine Confidence and Concern

Peking's January 1 editorials presented the same dichotomy between optimism and sobriety as the equivalent articles published last October 1, with the People's Daily sounding a very confident, up-beat note ("our people have never been as militant...our country never...so prosperous"), and Red Flag reflecting concern over the ideological lassitude of the populace. The People's Daily presented as victorious fait accompli such alleged political triumphs as the revolutionization of culture, rectification of intellectuals, and the reeducation of Party members, cadres, and masses in the "spirit of thoroughgoing and uninterrupted revolution." Red Flag, on the other hand repetitiously and defensively reiterated the "politics in command" line, indicating that the opposite is more nearly the case. It pointed up the regime's concern over the major ideological problem now emerging in the current context of relative prosperity and the new Five Year Plan, i.e., the tendency among managers to avoid political education by pleading 1) that production or professional necessities are too pressing, and 2) that superior production or professional performance is proof of political purity, rendering further indoctrination unnecessary. Political work must not be weakened whan a conflict with professional needs arises, "let along squeeze it /political work/ out," the article maintained.

Charting the course for the future, both the People's Daily and the Red Flag reverted to sterile sloganry, stressing continued class struggle and more massive, better-administered doses of Mao's thought. The People's Daily pledged a "broader" continuation of the socialist education movement "in stages and groups," indicating an extension of the current piecemeal campaign pattern. Gone, however, is last year's call for "deeper" socialist education, another indication that the excesses of the "four clearances" are being ironed out. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: The dichotomy apparent in the editorials presents further evidence of the gap between the materialist-minded, politically benumbed Chinese people who work hard to improve their own standards of living, and the idealistic regime, which is pleased with the economic progress made, but dismayed at the selfish, apolitical motivation of the masses. However, the strong emphasis placed by the editorials on political solutions to this impasse should not in our view be considered a sign of a new squeeze on material incentive or evidence of any return of the

0564
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Great Leap mentality. The great volume of statements upholding revolutionary tenets and describing the economic efficiency of political work which fills the Chinese press these days appears to us to form a protective barrier behind which administrators and Party functionaries can operate pragmatically. The People's Daily itself helps support this thesis by encouraging the nation to "persist in effectively combining revolutionary spirit with a scientific approach, work with great vigor and enthusiasm yet advance by steady steps, doing all things circumspectly and practically." In the meantime, the leadership, while reluctantly acquiescing in policies which actually place production, not politics, "in command," hopes that by dint of constant repetition of political themes a deeper sense of Maoist orthodoxy will sink into the consciousness. (Limited Official Use)

3. Soong Ching-ling Reviews Regime's Record

Working overtime, the Peking propaganda apparatus which produced the People's Daily and Red Flag editorials also celebrated the arrival of 1966 by publishing a long apologia for regime policies, ostensibly by CPR Vice Chairman Soong Ching-ling (Madame Sun Yat-sen) entitled "Sixteen Years of Liberation." The article, elegantly written and couched in tones of sweet reason designed to appeal to world audiences as well as non-Party Chinese in the mainland, maintained that the achievements of the new China had become an example for the rest of the world -- a living proof that the working classes can take control of their destiny and develop themselves without reliance on the largesse of others. Accomplishment of these exemplary feats would not have been or continue to be possible unless the Party and the people remained ideologically spotless, however. Cadre labor, Party rectification, and socialist education were all necessary to combat the "inevitable" inroads of bourgeois concepts, and to foil imperialist designs to soften China's 'third and fourth generation." Democratic centralism and Mao's works would provide the motive power for "moulding a new national personality in the midst of stern class struggles."

Meanwhile China's foreign policy would continue to be motivated by uncompromising hostility toward imperialism, and full support for the "just revolutionary struggles" of oppressed peoples and classes, tinctured of course by "strict adherence" to the five principles of peaceful coexistence and the ten principles of Bandung. (Limited Official Use)

0565
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: Discussions of Party purity, democratic centralism, class analysis and rectification sound strange coming from non-Party member Soong. As Sun Yat-sen's widow, however, she is a logical choice as an apologist to the rest of the world for the militance of China's external political line.

Much of Madame Sun's message was meant for internal non-Party consumption, too. For,despite pious rejoinders that "the idea of national egoism...is foreign to our words and actions" the thrust of the article was "we're the greatest!" The long sixteen-year view taken and the list of achievements presented must have been intended to provide comfort for those Chinese (including members of China's third and fourth generations) who have been puzzled and disillusioned by the events of the past year. (Limited Official Use)

4. Peking Vice-Mayor Wu Han Criticizes Self

On December 30, the People's Daily published a 20,000 character article by Vice Mayor Wu Han criticizing himself and his 1961 historical drama "Hai Jui is Dismissed from Office." Wu, who has been under attack since November 10 (WEEKA 49), explained that of the many mistakes and defects in his play, the most prominent is a lack of class analysis. Wu admitted that in an effort to dramatize Hai Jui as a champion of the people, he had overvalued Hai Jui's historical role, and played up the Ming official's good qualities while neglecting the bad. These distortions together with an apparent lack of purpose in the play were evidence, as Wu put it, that he had "forgotten the class struggle." He realized, he added, that recognition of his mistakes did not mean the solution of his ideological problems. His standpoint could only be remolded after a lengthy process of struggle and assistance by his critics. He hoped, however, that the present article would do as a starter. (Unclassified)

Comment: Of all the intellectuals to be attacked since the regime began the current cycle of rectification in mid-1964, Wu Han is the first to confess. The almost unseemly haste with which he has produced a 20,000 character self-criticism less than two months after the first peep was uttered against him suggests that the Vice-Mayor wants to keep his job, and get off the hook as fast as possible. This conjecture is strengthened by a description of Wu as a retiring "mousy" individual with no particularly strong convictions, (supplied us by a Hong Kong diplomat formerly stationed in Peking who knew Wu's local reputation). However, the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0566

People's Daily editor's note accompanying the confession stating the hope that the discussion would develop further was a sign that Wu's rehabilitation might be strung out for some time.

Last week, more light was thrown on the timing and motivation behind the series of attacks on intellectuals which began eighteen months ago with the purge of Yang Hsien-chan. The full text of an article by CCP Central Committee Propaganda Work Department Deputy Director Chou Yang, published in the People's Daily on January 1, describes the current round of criticism as the most recent of "five great periods of debate in literature and art" since 1949 and designed to rectify deviations which appeared in 1961 and 1962. Chou's remarks explicitly confirm speculation that the current attacks are a delayed reaction to the "second Hundred Flowers" - delayed because the regime was too shaky in 1962 and 1963 to mount a drive against well-known intellectuals. (Limited Official Use)

External

5. Vietnam: Chicoms Pour Cold Water on Peace Moves; Ignore Hanoi's Dealings with Soviets

Although Peking's comment on Vietnam was not up to the usual volume during the week, the regime made clear its strong opposition to U.S. or any other peace moves on Vietnam.

A. Peace Moves Derided.

On January 2 the People's Daily broke the regime's press silence on the latest U.S. peace moves (WEEKA 52) by reprinting both a December 30 Radio Hanoi commentary and a December 31 Nhan Dan Commentator article on the U.S. "peace hoax." A laudatory editorial note prefacing the articles pictured the U.S. as lately "chanting its worn-out tune of peace more loudly than ever before" and declared, with Harriman, Goldberg and most probably the Shelepin travels (the latter not yet mentioned in regime's media) in mind, that "monsters and freaks of all descriptions are scurrying hither and thither and raising a lot of dust with their sinister activities." The editorial also viewed the DRV pronouncements as having "pointedly scuttled the conspiratorial schemes" of the U.S. and as evidence of the "Vietnamese people's firm resolve to persist in their anti-U.S. patriotic struggle to the very end."

In support of its opposition to date to negotiations, People's Daily on January 5 published some "American, British, French and

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

West German newpaper comments exposing the Johnson administration's peace maneuver as a fraud." However, in an editorial note prefacing this collection of carefully culled western comment, People's Daily revealed the regime's concern over the impact of the U.S. search for peace by noting that the "unprecedented high pitch" of the U.S. "peace clamor" may have caused "some well-intentioned persons to wonder if there might not be a possibility that U.S. imperialism will...end its aggression." The paper comforted itself with the observation that it would be impossible for the "Johnson administration to fool the clear-sighted people with its tricks." These alleged tricks included the use of the "peace hoax" as a smokescreen to cover up U.S. preparations for "escalation" of the war.

Comment: Prior to the January 2 People's Daily article, the regime had maintained a discreet silence on recent Vietnam developments, and it may be of some significance that it awaited the DRV lead before resuming its standard attack on the U.S. "peace hoax." In any event, the combination of the DRV's December 30 and 31 pronouncements and Peking's obvious satisfaction with their content does not bode well for the prospect of a softer Hanoi or Peking stand on negotiations, at least on the public level. (Confidential) (ConGenTel 1248)

B. Peking Ignores Hanoi's Dealings with the Soviet Grouping

A review of NCNA for the week reveals that Peking has not commented on a number of developments relating to DRV-Soviet relations. NCNA ignored the January 2 VNA account of a statement by Soviet Premier Kosygin contending that the USSR strongly supported the effort of the DRV and NLF. The Chicom press agency also had nothing to say about the visit of a DRV economic delegation to East Germany which was afforded great publicity by the VNA. Also of interest, both the DRV and the NLF indicated greater tactical flexibility than the rigid Chinese by sending New Year's greetings to the American people. (Limited Official Use)

6. Sino-Soviet Relations: Peking Rejects Unity with Moscow on Vietnam

The People's Daily of December 30 published an article by its editorial department entitled "CPSU Leaders Are Betrayers of Declaration and Statement," which emphatically reiterates the regime's rejection of Soviet appeals for unity on Vietnam, presents the strongest indication to date that the Chicoms foresee a formal break with the Soviets, and reveals Peking's concern over the

0568
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

effect and extent of Soviet influence on the DRV. A large portion of the article reviews the question of intra-bloc unity since the 1956 CPSU Twentieth Party Congress, with special emphasis on the revolutionary principles of the (1957) Declaration and the (1960) Statement as the only acceptable basis for unity.

The major significance of the article in our opinion, especially in the light of the forthcoming Shelepin visit to Hanoi, is its charge that the Soviets are "vainly trying to use the slogan (of united action) to undermine the fighting friendship between the Chinese and Vietnamese people and the Vietnamese people's unity against U.S. aggression." Despite the alleged lack of success of these Soviet "undermining" efforts, the very fact that the Chicoms have for the first time raised such charges indicates to us that the regime is actively worried that the Soviets have been making gains in the DRV at Peking's expense.

The article reinforces the arguments of the November 11 article which rejected unity with the Soviets until they cease their "collaboration with U.S. imperialism for world domination" by citing Lenin on the need to draw a "line of demarcation against those who serve to spread bourgeois influence among the proletariat." It asks how Marxist-Leninists (ie., the Chicoms) can fail to draw such a line "politically and organizationally" between themselves and the modern revisionists, and lends credence to Eastern European reports that a Moscow-sponsored international bloc meeting is imminent by pointing to the "divisive March (1965) Moscow meeting" and asserting in the same sentence that the Soviets are "now hatching a big plot for a general attack on China and a general split in the international Communist movement and the socialist camp." (Confidential)

Comment: Looking beyond Chicom anxiety over possible Soviet inroads in Vietnam and the peril of being isolated at a bloc meeting devoted to "unity" on the Vietnam question, the article reveals a basic conflict between Chinese nationalistic-chauvinistic ambitions and those of the Soviets. One of the most vivid examples we have seen of the extent to which Chinese pride (and arrogance) figure in the Sino-Soviet dispute is the article's statement that failure to draw a "line of demarcation" would be tantamount to accepting the CPSU as a "patriarchal father party, serving as an instrument under their baton, recognizing their big-power privileged status, and serving as their satellite." (ConGenTel 1242) (Confidential)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0569

7. Cuba: Peking Ostracizes Fidel, Reports Habana Conference

The deterioration in Sino-Cuban relations over the past year was clearly reflected in Peking's downgrading of its treatment of the Cuban Revolution's seventh anniversary, particularly in the omission of any reference to Castro in the speeches and the Jan. 1 People's Daily editorial devoted to the occasion. The emphasis this year was on friendship between the Chinese and Cuban peoples, in contrast to last year's praise for the "Cuban people, led by Comrade Fidel Castro." A considerably stiffer and shorter message from Chinese Party and government leaders to Cuban leaders omitted last year's accolades to Cuban "achievements in socialist construction" and did not repeat last year's support for Castro's five demands for "safeguarding Cuban sovereignty."

At a Dec. 30 public meeting in celebration of the anniversary, Chu Tu-nan, President of the China-Latin American Friendship Association, encompassed the whole of Latin America in his speech attacking American "imperialism" and mentioned for the first time in Chicom media the tri-continent Afro-Asian-Latin American Solidarity conference in Habana. Later, on January 4, NCNA reported briefly on the opening of the conference, and listed in its Chinese service the names of the Chicom delegates. Head of the delegation is Wu Hsueh-chien, a vice-president of the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity who has attended AAPSO meetings in the past but never led a delegation. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: The Chicoms predictably continue to hold dear the Cuban Revolution as showing the need for and the success of "people's armed struggle" along classic Mao-advocated lines, but they have evidently concluded over the past year that Castro has become an irretrievable pawn of the Soviet Union. One consequence of this cooling of relations is the significant drop in Sino-Cuban rice-sugar trade for 1966 (as announced by a chagrined Castro on January 2) and the fact that while last year's anniversary was marked by the signing of a 5-year trade agreement and 1965 protocol, this year's celebrations were attended by a Cuban trade delegation which has remained in Peking over two months and has signed nothing yet. (ConGenTel 1260) (Limited Official Use)

8. Peking Condemns "Hypocrisy" of Revised U.S. Passport Restrictions

A short People's Daily commentary on Jan. 1 denounced in vehement terms the American easing of passport restrictions to permit travel by doctors and medical scientists to China and other previously restricted countries. "Why did the U.S. imperialists suddenly...take an 'elementary interest' in the health of man?" asked the commentary, citing alleged American use of germ warfare

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0570

against the Chinese and Korean peoples, and chemical warfare against the Vietnamese people. "Does this mean their nature has changed?" The answer promptly supplied by the commentary is that it has not, and the American move is nothing more than "nauseating hypocrisy," a part of the "peace smokescreen to cover up preparations for war expansion." (Unclassified)

Comment: Although without immediate results, the American initiative should help to 1) clarify for the benefit of others Peking's primary responsibility for the current state of Sino-U.S. relations; and, 2) contribute to doubts within China, at least among the intellectuals, of the validity of the regime's portrayal of the U.S. as an implacable enemy of the Chinese people. (Limited Official Use)

9. Peking Comments on Thai-Cambodian Border Clash

Following a series of news reports on recent clashes between Thai and Cambodian forces at the Cambodian border post of Osmach, Peking on successive days (January 3 and 4) issued a Foreign Ministry Statement and a People's Daily editorial condemning the incidents as instigated by the U.S. and as further evidence that the U.S. wished to expand the war beyond South Vietnam. The Foreign Ministry Statement warned that China was "closely following the development of the situation" and reiterated the Chicom offer of "full support and assistance" to the Cambodian people. (Unclassified)

Comment: Although the Cambodian border incidents, coming on the heels of U.S. statements on "hot pursuit," have probably reinforced the regime's estimate that growing U.S. frustration in Vietnam will lead us to expand the war, possibly ultimately to China, both the Foreign Ministry Statement and the People's Daily editorial impress us as rather restrained and routine Chicom responses to such border clashes. (ConGenTel 1252) (Confidential)

10. Thailand: First Anniversary of Thai Patriotic Front Treated in Low-key

According to NCNA, a reception was held in Peking Janauary 2 to celebrate the first anniversary of the founding of the Thailand Patriotic Front (TPF). Addressing the guests were Mon Kon Nanakon, "assistant permanent representative in Peking of the TPF," and Liao Cheng-chih, Chicom spokesman on united front affairs. While

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0571

Nanakon urged greater struggle and thanked China for its support, Liao in rather routine fashion praised the group for its achievements during 1965 and "expressed the hope" that the TPF would grow in strength during the new year.

Comment: To date, Peking has given short shrift to the anniversary and has allowed it to pass without editorial comment. (ConGen's A-448) (Limited Official Use)

11. More Chicom Diplomatic Moves

Continuing a series of recent movements of Chicom diplomatic personnel, NCNA (January 4) announced that Chairman Liu Shao-chi had appointed new Ambassadors to Iraq, Syria, and the Sudan. (See WEEKA 52) (Unclassified)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

(2) POUCHED: ~~BANGKOK~~ CANBERRA KARACHI MOSCOW RANGOON SOFIA VENTIANE
BELGRADE CPACPLAD KATHMANDU MUNICH ROME S'PORE COMNAVPHL
BUCHAREST DARESAL'M KLUMPUR NDELHI SAIGON (4)TAIPEI LONDON
BUDAPEST DJAKARTA MANILA PRAGUE SEOUL TOKYO 13AFMANILA
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0572

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ORIGIN/ACTION

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RM/R	REP	AF
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ARA	EUR 5	FE 2
NEA	CU 5	INR
E	P 1	IO 2
GPM 1	FBO	AIO 12
S/S 27	S/P 1	R 1
AGR 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 7
OSD 46	USIA 11	NSA 3
NASA 4		NSC 6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Pol 2-1 Chicom

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A-435 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH

1936 JAN 5 HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG DATE: Dec 31, 1965

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 52

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Mao Celebrates 72nd Birthday
2. Huang Ko-cheng Reappears After Six Years in Limbo
3. Socialist Education Failures Reported in Kansu Province
4. Discussion on Relationship Between Politics and Production Continues

External

5. Sino-Soviet Relations: Peking on Vietnam Freight and UNGA "Collaboration"
6. Vietnam: An Interesting Week
7. Peking on the UN
8. Chicoms Comment on Hot Pursuit Into Cambodia
9. Unprecedented Movement of Chicom Chiefs of Mission
10. Diplomatic Notes

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Drafted by: POL:BLevin, NPlatt, JThomas, CKamman, SYNg:drb,12/30/65

Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JMHoldridge

0573

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. Mao Celebrates 72nd Birthday

CCP Chairman Mao Tse-tung was 72 on December 26. (Unclassified)

Comment: The event went unpublicized in the mainland press, a practice followed in past years prompted by deference to the fiction that the cult of personality does not exist in Communist China. In recent years, however, mainland media have employed subtle and not-so-subtle means at this time to demonstrate that the old man is still going strong. In December 1962, all mainland papers carried a selection of poems by Mao in an evident effort to suggest that his mental vigor was unimpaired. On December 24, 1963, the press reproduced a facsimile of vigorous caligraphy done by Mao for the Tientsin-Hopei Anti-Flood exhibition. Last year between December 21 and 27 Mao was carefully photographed attending the opening of the Third NPC, and receiving everyone in sight; Cuban ballet dancers, Afro-Asian writers, Algerian militiamen, minority drama troupers, etc. This year, however, there is nothing of the sort to date. Mao's most recent outing was an appearance at another geriatric milestone, the eightieth birthday of Anna Louise Strong, on November 24 (WEEKA 48), an event at which it is rumored the Chairman's eyesight was so poor that upon entering the room he proceeded resolutely away from the group waiting to see him. The inference to be drawn from this year's between-the-lines treatment of Mao's birthday and other reports on the Chairman's health is that while he is suffering from no dramatic ailment, he is definitely slowing down. (Limited Official Use)

2. Huang Ko-cheng Reappears After Six Years in Limbo of Staff

Huang Ko-cheng, former Chief/of the Chinese Communist Army and CCP Central Committee Secretariat member, who was fired as chief of staff of the Chinese Communist Army at the same time Marshal Peng Te-huai lost his Defense Ministry job in September 1959, is back in public after six years in limbo. NCNA Taiyuan (December 17) reported that he had been elected an additional Vice-Governor of Shansi Province on December 14. (Unclassified)

Comment: Politically, Huang's new job is probably worth little more than physical perquisites that go with it (a car, a house, and a little "face"). His reappearance, however, is evidence that he has been considered "rehabilitated." Now that one of the group who fell with Peng Te-huai has achieved this status the question that comes immediately to mind is whether there

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0574

will be others to follow; perhaps even Peng himself. According to the latest gossip the former Defense Minister is living quietly in the suburbs of Peking. (Limited Official Use)

3. Socialist Education Failures Reported in Kansu Province

During county-by-county group discussions on December 20, participants in the Kansu Province agricultural "five good" representatives conference (presumably held in Lanchow) pointed out that the struggles between socialism and capitalism in the countryside are being rekindled even in areas which have gone through systematic socialist education. (Read "four clearances"-Ed.) Ma Chi-jen, a production brigade Party branch Vice Secretary, made it clear that "class enemies have by no means retreated; they seize every opportunity to carry out wrecking activities" and are still at work "softening up" and corrupting cadres. Another Party branch secretary, Tseng Chiang-shou, told his colleagues the struggle between socialism and capitalism is "repeatedly appearing" in areas which have gone through socialist education. All exhorted each other to heighten revolutionary vigilance and consolidate the socialist position. (Radio Lanchow December 21, 0415 GMT) (Unclassified)

Comment: These bald and gloomy references to the recrudescence of capitalist tendencies in counties which have gone through the "four clearances" or its equivalent are the first of their sort we have seen. They appear to be more than just ritualistic genuflections to the concept of continued class struggle which are required by Party writ to prevent complacency. Vice Governor Hu Chi-chung's statement inaugurating the campaign at the September 1964 Kansu People's Congress promised that the campaign would be "broader, deeper, more complex and more arduous than any revolutionary campaign in the past," and would also be applied to the "minority race pastoral areas." (ConGen A-232, October 2, 1964) It would appear that the drive was not broad, deep, complex, or arduous enough, and that the minority races have had difficulty absorbing its lessons. (Limited Official Use)

4. Discussion on Relationship Between Politics and Production Continues

Continuing and extending the discussion on the relationship between production and politics from the commercial to the agricultural sphere, (see WEEKA 47) the People's Daily on December 13 published a report of a "debate" on the question conducted during the past two months by Kwangtung Party cadres. Under attack were

0575
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

the same attitudes criticized in the October 29 Peking Ta Kung Pao discussion on commercial political work; i.e., a tendency on the part of cadres to equate ideological purity with work performance, and to regard political work as a soft touch which can be delayed until the slack season. In the absence of sound politico-ideological work, the Kwangtung report continued, cadres have to resort to "material rewards. . .and other means. . . to stimulate production enthusiasm," methods that can only result in separating the cadres from the masses, "obstruct positiveness. . . and impair the Party's prestige among the masses." Increased doses of living Mao-thought, flexibly administered, formed the basis for the page long People's Daily prescription that followed.

More recently, reverse English has been put on the same theme in three separate People's Daily front page items congratulating 1) the cities of Peking and Shanghai (December 17), 2) the coal, steel and petroleum industries (December 23), and 3) the Nanliu Production Brigade Party Branch (December 24) for their successes during the past year. Such production records and achievements, the articles went on at repetetive and defensive length, could only be ascribed to solid political work and Mao-study. (Unclassified)

Comment: Past campaigns have shown that such talk, far from bearing ominous connotations for the material incentive system in China, actually forms a bombastic smokescreen behind which the system can continue to exist. We find it significant and ironic, however, that "debates" about political indoctrination in the country that considers itself the vanguard of revolution should discuss, not alternative themes that could be stressed, but the basic question of whether political indoctrination is at all worth while in the first place. (Limited Official Use)

External

5. Sino-Soviet Relations: Peking on Vietnam Freight and UNGA "Collaboration"

The Chinese kept the heat on in their current round of polemics with the Soviets by taking the post-Khrushchev leaders to task on two scores:

A. Freight Charges on Soviet Aid to Vietnam

Publication by the Soviet weekly Za Rubezhom (Abroad) of rumors from the New York Times that China had demanded dollar payment for freight charges on Soviet aid to Vietnam elicited an NCNA

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

story dated December 22 and a People's Daily Commentator article of December 23 which denied the rumors and branded the episode as a "new instance of the Khrushchev revisionists...joining the U.S. imperialists to vilify China." The truth, according to Peking, is that following the Soviets' request of February 25, 1965, for permission to ship military supplies to the DRV via China, a protocol was signed on March 30 which provided for gratis transportation of military supplies, while freight charges for economic aid shipments continued to be settled under the international rail clearing agreement among "socialist" countries, permitting the Soviets to pay in rubles.

In squelching "malicious rumors" which, it is implied, originated with the Soviets themselves, the Chinese seized the opening to impugn the motives, quality and quantity of Soviet aid to the DRV. According to Commentator, Soviet military aid consists "in great part of obsolete equipment discarded by the USSR armed forces or damaged weapons cleaned out from the warehouse." Furthermore, Soviet aid is not commensurate with Soviet strength, and it is given under a Soviet policy of "involvement in order to have a say, gain control and representation on the Vietnam question . . .so as to strike a political deal with the U.S." (Unclassified)

Comment: The Chinese response to what was evidently a minor item in a Soviet magazine devoted exclusively to foreign press reprints strikes us as indicative of a great sensitivity in Peking to any implication that the Chinese have failed in their duty to the DRV cause. It may also be that Peking feels a special need at this time to extol its own righteousness and defame the Soviets regarding Vietnam in order to lay the groundwork for rebuttal of any international appeal for unity on Vietnam which might emerge from a bloc meeting reportedly being promoted by the Soviet Union. (ConGenTel 1200) (Confidential)

B. UNGA "Collaboration."

Further evidence of U.S.-Soviet "collaboration for two-power world domination" was adduced by a People's Daily editorial of December 27 which charged that the U.S. and the USSR could "hardly suppress their pleasure" at the results of the Twentieth Session of the UN General Assembly. In spite of commendable Afro-Asian efforts "to have the UN act in accordance with its charter and play the role it is supposed to play," People's Daily concluded that the UN "is still a tool of the U.S. ... and is becoming more and

0577

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

more a place where the USSR and the U.S. transact political deals." Hence, the recently ended UNGA was "an anti-China conference which interfered wilfully in the internal affairs of sovereign states." The editorial contrasted Khrushchev's penchant for direct contact with U.S. leaders with the alleged preference of the new Soviet leaders for "deals" with the U.S. arranged in UN corridors where they can "hide themselves among the hundred-odd countries of the UN." According to the editorial, Soviet participation in the "anti-China chorus orchestrated by U.S. imperialism" at the UN was manifested by Soviet delegate Fedorenko's "perfunctory" 12-minute speech in support of Peking's admission to the UN and by the "insinuations of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko who said "certain persons" had assumed a nihilistic attitude towards the UN, spread pessimism about disarmament, and should not interfere in the internal affairs of "others" on ideological or other grounds. (Unclassified)

Comment: The editorial contains the bluntest criticism to date of the lack of Soviet enthusiasm for Peking's admission to the UN. Its sweeping indictment of the Soviets for their alleged collaboration with the U.S. on numerous specific issues, including alleged "secret talks" between Secretary Rusk and Gromyko on the Vietnam question, echoes a recurring theme of the Peking camp in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Throughout the editorial we are struck by the aura of unreality in the Chinese reaction to any possibility of Soviet accommodation with the U.S. In asserting that the peoples of the world "are not fooled" by Soviet manuevers in collusion with the imperialists, Peking appears to disregard entirely the broad appeal of an East-West detente among Afro-Asians, a factor which must have influenced Moscow's reading of where its self-interest lies in the sphere of relations with the non-Communist world. (ConGenTel 1212) (Confidential).

6. Vietnam: An Interesting Week

A. Hanoi and Peking at Odds Over the Soviet Role in Vietnam

The most significant Vietnam development during the week on the Communist side was Hanoi's spirited praise of the Soviet role in Vietnam which was made in the face of increasingly vituperative Chicom attacks on Moscow's motives and performance in that country, (item 5). On the same day that the People's Daily Commentator article appeared embodying the harshest charges to date against the nature and quality of Soviet military aid to North Vietnam,

0578
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

the Vietnamese News Agency (VNA) carried a report on the visit to Moscow of the DRV Vice-Premier Le Than Nghi and the signing there of DRV-USSR aid and technical assistance agreements. The VNA report waxed eloquently on the Soviets' "active support to the liberation struggle of the Vietnamese people." In an apparent effort to contrast Moscow's generosity with Peking's niggardly insistence on "loans" to the DRV, the VNA report pointedly noted that the Soviet assistance would be "gratuitous." It described the talks between the Nghi delegation and its Soviet counterparts as having "taken place in a spirit of brotherly friendship and complete mutual understanding" and it mentioned that Nghi had "held most cordial" talks with the Soviet leaders, Brezhnev and Kosygin. VNA report also declared that "loyal to the principle of proletarian internationalism, the Soviet Union helps the DRV in all fields to meet the Vietnamese people's needs arising from the development of their struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression."

This VNA treatment of Nghi's presence in Moscow contrasts markedly with the agency's handling of the Vice-Premier's visit and his accomplishments in Peking. On December 5, VNA merely reported the fact that an agreement between the CPR on "loans" and a protocol on "goods exchange and payments for 1966" was signed in Peking in the presence of Chou En-lai. (Confidential)

Comment: Since last May and with increasing frequency since the November 11 Red-Flag-People's Daily attack on the Soviet leadership, Hanoi has been treated to a series of strident Chicom lectures on the pitfalls of Soviet aid. The VNA report impresses us as the DRV response to these lectures and as a clear and strong rebuke administered to the Chinese on the entire issue of the Soviet role in the Vietnam conflict. Further, by publicly flying in the face of Peking's portrayal of the Soviets as attempting to sell out DRV interests to the U.S., Hanoi is making no bones of its willingness to stand up to the Chicoms on this issue. (ConGenTel 1218, Confidential).

B. Chicom Silence on Truce and Suspension of Bombing

One non-development noteworthy of comment was the regime's complete silence on the U.S. implementation of a 30-hour Christmas truce and its similar reticence to date on the lull in our air attacks against the DRV. We would have expected the regime to denounce these "peace hoax" measures of the "imperialists," but the regime may be reluctant to run blantantly in the face of world opinion on these developments.

0574

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

What the Chicoms did say on Vietnam during the week returned to normal levels following the extensive play given the previous week to the fifth anniversary of the founding of the NLF. Peking reprinted with obvious delight a lengthy article by DRV Politbureau member Nguyen Chi Thanh which embraced completely the Chicom views on "people's war." (We wonder if the publication of this article by Hanoi which appeared the day before the VNA eulogy on Soviet aid was not intended to soften somewhat the impact of the latter.) The regime's media also dwelt on the alleged "growing difficulties", facing the U.S. in Vietnam. This familiar list of "growing difficulties" included our alleged inability to counter the tactics of "people's war," the logistic bottleneck hampering U.S. forces, the harm caused to the U.S. economy by Vietnam war expenditures and, finally, the alleged international isolation of the U.S. on the Vietnam question.

7. Peking on the UN

In addition to a People's Daily editorial charging U.S.-Soviet "collusion at the U.N." (see item 5), two other People's Daily editorials and an NCNA roundup appeared on the UN as the UNGA Twentieth Session drew to a close.

A. In a Pavlovian reaction, a People's Daily editorial of December 21 noted that the "anti-China farce" of the United Nations' discussion of Tibet was capped by a resolution which, "like all previous resolutions on the same subject, is a flagrant interference in China's domestic affairs and a vicious slander against the Chinese people. It is entirely null and void." Among the targets of the editorial's righteous indignation over the Tibet question were, of course, the "U.S. imperialists" and the "Indian reactionaries." The latter "have never given up their expansionist designs on China's Tibet . . . and have been carrying on provocations on the Sino-Indian borders." The editorial warned India that "no matter how U.S. imperialism and the United Nations under its control may back you, they cannot help you cover up your ugly expansionist features not can they save you from failure in your provocations. . . and subversive activities against China's Tibet." Noting that the Tibet resolution received diminished support this year, the editorial singled out the affirmative votes of Britain, the Netherlands and Norway, which maintain full or partial diplomatic relations with Peking, as a "very unfriendly act towards the Chinese people." (Unclassified)

B. Another predictable Peking reaction was the People's Daily editorial of December 25 on the UN resolution on the Korean

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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question. The editorial vigorously supported the December 23 statement of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, emphasizing that U.S. forces must be withdrawn from Korea, UNCURK be dissolved, all "illegal" UN resolutions on Korea be cancelled, and the Korean question be solved by the Korean people themselves. Going Pyongyang one better, Peking asserted: "If the United Nations really honors its own charter, it should condemn the United States as the aggressor and demand that the U.S. aggressor forces leave South Korea." (Unclassified)

Comment: It is noteworthy that the editorial, while affirming that the "fond hopes" of the U.S. and the UN for Korean reunification under a representative form of government by means of elections under United Nations supervision "will never materialize," nonetheless cautiously avoids endorsing the North Korean declaration that reunification will be accomplished when "the Korean people, by their united force, drive the U.S. imperialist aggressive troops and reinvading Japanese militarists out of South Korea." (Limited Official Use)

C. An NCNA story of December 24 reviewed the results of the UNGA Twentieth session and arrived at the conclusion that the 20th Session "once again showed that the UN is entirely a U.S. instrument." Nevertheless, it went on, "the course of the last session also showed that the U.S. policy of hostility to people of various countries is unpopular and enjoying less and less support." (Unclassified)

8. Chicoms Comment on Hot Pursuit Into Cambodia

A Department spokesman's December 21 reference to "hot pursuit" of the Viet Cong over the Cambodian frontier elicited considerable Chicom comment ranging from the reprinting of two Cambodian statements to the releasing of two Peking editorials and a Foreign Ministry statement. The first Chicom reaction was contained in a People's Daily December 24 editorial which termed the spokesman's statement "a warning signal of overt military aggression against Cambodia." The editorial noted that in the event of a violation of the Cambodian frontier, Cambodia would gain the right of counter-attack and other countries would gain the right to support Cambodia. While the editorial approvingly quoted Prince Sihanouk's somewhat vague statement that "if the U.S. continued to expand the war, it would be attacked from all corners by the Cambodian people, the Vietnamese people, the Laotian people and the Chinese people," it concluded with a reiteration of the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0581

standard line that "should U.S. imperialism dare attack Cambodia, the Chinese people will firmly support the Cambodian people to utterly defeat the U.S. aggressors." A Ta Kung Pao December 27 commentary article was also devoted to the "hot pursuit" issue, but added nothing of substance.

Comment: Peking's reluctance to tie itself clearly to a specific commitment to Cambodia was again demonstrated by a December 28 Foreign Ministry Statement. Although strongly worded, the statement concluded by reiterating the stock phrase that China would give "all-out support" in the event of "military aggression" against Cambodia by "U.S. imperialism and its vassal countries."

Peking's reaction to the "hot pursuit" reference appears to be a typical Chicom effort to give an appearance of strengthening its commitment to Cambodia without actually pinning Peking down. (ConGenTel 1210) (Confidential)

9. Unprecedented Movement of Chicom Chiefs of Mission

During the last six weeks, Peking has announced the recall of a number of its diplomats assigned to the Afro-Asian world. According to NCNA, the following Ambassadors have returned home "upon completion of (their) terms of office": CHANG Shih-chieh (Nepal - November 17); CHANG Wei-lieh (Iraq - November 19); KU Hsiao-po (Sudan - November 20); HUANG Hua (Ghana - December 20); and HSIEH Ke-hsi (Ceylon - December 22). In addition, Embassy Cairo reports that the CPR Ambassador CHEN Chia-kang left the UAR December 26 for reassignment. (Limited Official Use)

Aside from the announced recall of the above Ambassadors, we have received a number of reports of Chicom diplomats returning to Peking for consultation. Embassy Rangoon reports that CPR Ambassador KENG Piao will leave Burma on January 5 to attend a high-level conference of Chicom diplomats in Asia. The Chicom Ambassadors to France and Algeria have also reportedly returned home for consultation. (Tokyo's 182 and Algiers 1347 to Dept.) (Confidential)

Comment: It appears that a meeting of Chicom diplomatic officials is shaping up in Peking. At present, we are unable to determine whether such a meeting is intended to pass on to these diplomats basic foreign policy decisions already taken by the leadership or to obtain from them on-the-scene observations prior to the taking of such decisions. One thing clear is that this

0582
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

unprecedented movement of Chicom Chiefs of Mission has been set off by the recent series of diplomatic setbacks suffered by the regime in the Afro-Asian world. These setbacks apparently also account for the shake-up of Chicom Chiefs of Mission currently underway -- a development which adds weight to rumors of Chou En-lai's dissatisfaction with the performance of the regime's diplomatic representatives.

10. Diplomatic Notes

NCNA reported that on December 22, newly-arrived Ambassadors from Ceylon (D.B.R. Gunawardena) and the Central African Republic (Joseph-Gilbert Mamadou) presented their credentials to Chu Teh, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee. (Unclassified)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED:

BANGKOK	CANBERRA	KARACHI	MOSCOW	RANGOON	SOFIA	VENTIANE
BELGRADE	CPACPLAD	KATHMANDU	MUNICH	ROME	S'PORE	COMNAVPHL
BUCHAREST	DARESAL'M	KLUMPUR	NDELHI	SAIGON	(4)TAIPEI	LONDON
BUDAPEST	DJAKARTA	MANILA	PRAGUE	SEOUL	TOKYO	13AFMANILA
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0583
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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POLITICAL

Internal

1. Ninth Party Congress Reportedly Put Off Indefinitely
2. Szechwan Educated Youth Sent to Settle Yunnan Border
3. Huang Yen-pei Dies

External

4. Vietnam: NLF 5th Anniversary Draws Extensive Chicom Comment
5. Sino-Soviet: Peking Publishes Pravda Editorial
6. Chicoms Silent on Habana Meeting
7. Africa: People's Daily on Rhodesia
8. More Chicom Protests to Indonesia
9. Sino-Cambodian Friendship Praised
10. Increasing Attention to Laos

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0584

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. Ninth Party Congress Reportedly Put Off Indefinitely

A Japanese Foreign office debriefing of the Kyodo correspondent in Peking passed to us last week implies that the Chinese Communist leadership has decided not to hold a Party Congress, at least for the time being. The Kyodo correspondent in an off the record interview last November with a "high" CCP figure asked when the Ninth Party Congress would be held and received substantially the following reply:

"The Russians taunt us for not having a Party Congress. The reason is that they are bound by the peaceful coexistence policy enunciated at the 20th CPSU Congress and think it would be embarrassing to the Chinese to convene a Party Congress which does not make a final decision (meaning in our opinion that the Russians realize that any Chinese Congress would be forced to reaffirm the militant line on permanent revolution and the inevitability of war, thus bearing the onus for formalizing the split in the socialist camp). Mao thinks it would not be fitting to hold a Congress in such circumstances. However, we have national conferences like the All China Political Workers Conference to deal with national problems. Moreover the Central Committee meets every three months."

Comment: The Japanese Foreign Office comment on the report surmised that the Chinese official was almost certainly Liao Ch'eng-chih. We agree, since Liao is virtually the only high ranking official the Japanese correspondents see.

In our opinion, the Chinese reluctance to bear blame for formalizing the Sino-Soviet breach is far from the only reason for the delay in convening the long overdue Ninth Congress. A more compelling consideration is the ageing leadership's growing disinclination to tamper with the Party structure in any way that would give more influence to younger officials outside the original revolutionary band, and vitiate even slightly the pervasive grip they have on all phases of national policy. The regime is also unwilling to provide either the occasion or the platform for a critical appraisal of its policies, an unlikely contingency perhaps, but one which would be more liable to occur under the "democratic centralist" tradition of a Party congress than at the more malleable substitutes, the political work

0585

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

conferences. In addition, the present unstable and uncomfortable period in Peking's foreign relations hardly seems a convenient time to promulgate a formal Party line. (ConGenTel 1167 - Confidential)

2. Szechwan Educated Youth Sent to Settle Yunnan Border

Radio Kunming reports that the first group of Szechwan educated youth, 270 strong, arrived in Kunming by train on December 15. Members of the Szechwan contingent, which will eventually number 2000, will work at State Farms in Tehung Tai and Chingpo Nationalities Autonomous Chou, Lintsang Special District, Hungho Hani and Yi Nationalities Autonomous Chou, and Hsishuangpanna Tai Nationality Autonomous Chou. Before leaving home the youths "pledged to work all their lives at the border area farms." (December 15 2315 GMT)

Comment: The report fills in another blank in the pattern of Peking's long range plans to sinicize the border regions, disperse urban population, and employ idle urban middle school graduates. The going in Yunnan will be as rough for the Szechwanese as it has been for young Shanghainese sent to Sinkiang, and Pekingese sent to Ninghsia and Heilungkiang, although perhaps for different reasons. While the climate is less forbidding in Yunnan, the backward minority nationalities in the area have even less in common with the Han Chinese than the tribesmen along the Northern border. Some of the youths may find that their new location has its compensations, however. Tehung Tai and Chingpo Nationalities Autonomous Chou and Lintsang Special District share a notably wild and hard-to-patrol border with Burma. Hsishuangpanna Tai Nationality Autonomous Chou extends along equally unsecure and undefined portions of both Burma and Laos. Anyone who regretted the pledge to work all his life in the border area might find it easy to leave, not only the state farm, but China altogether.

3. Huang Yen-pei Dies

NCNA reports that Huang Yen-pei, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress died in Peking on December 21 at the age of 88. Huang was also Chairman of the China Democratic National Construction Association, a

0586

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

window dressing democratic party maintained by the regime which theoretically represents the "national bourgeoisie," and a Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Comment: Huang, once a relatively important figure as Vice Premier and Minister of Light Industry when the Communists took power, had for years been little more than a political museum piece.

External

4. Vietnam: NLF 5th Anniversary Draws Extensive Chicom Comment

The fifth founding anniversary of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation (NLF) occasioned extensive Chicom comment on Vietnam. Although much of this comment traversed familiar ground in praising the "successes" of the Viet Cong's "people's war" tactics, important statements on Vietnam were forthcoming from Chou En-lai and Peng Chen.

A. Chou on "Escalation" of War.

Speaking at a December 20 reception at the NLF mission in Peking, Premier Chou En-lai provided the most significant insight in recent months into the regime's thinking on Vietnam and the Sino-American confrontation. Chou listed a series of measures which he alleged the U.S. might take in expanding the war both within and outside Vietnam in order to render the South Vietnamese people "isolated and helpless in their just struggle." The measure listed by Chou included: "extensive bombing" of the DRV including Haiphong and Hanoi; blockading of the Tonkin Gulf; bombing Pathet Lao-held areas in central-south Laos and sending U.S., Thai and "Laotian rightist" troops to occupy that area; bombing and attacking the Xieng Khoung area in Laos; and "instigating the Thais and South Vietnamese to intensify their attacks against Cambodia in the hope of sealing the Cambodia-SVN border."

The Chinese Premier opined that if the U.S. failed in these measures -- and,he added, "it will certainly fail" -- it might, "in accordance with the objective laws governing the development of aggressive wars,. . .go a step further and extend its war of aggression to the whole of Indo-China and to China." Concluding, Chou warned that the Chinese people had been "long prepared" and would "resolutely take up the challenge and fight to the end should

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0587

U.S. imperialism insist on going along the road of war expansionism, and on having another trial of strength with them."

Comment: Chou's remarks indicate that the Chicoms view a war situation with the U.S. as one resulting from U.S. frustrations over Vietnam which would lead us either to invade the DRV or lash out against China. By picturing war as dependent on an American initiative, Chou's statement is another example of the regime's continuing circumspection on the question of direct confrontation with the U.S. (ConGenTel 1183) (Secret)

B. U.S. "Peace Hoax" Again Derided

Both Chou En-lai and Peking Mayor Peng Chen, speaking a day earlier to a mass rally, dwelt on the U.S. "peace hoax." Both castigated President Johnson in familiar terms, and endorsed the DRV 4-point and NLF 5-point proposals as a means of settling the Vietnam question. Both also specifically mentioned the point that the U.S. must withdraw all its troops and war material from South Vietnam, but unlike most previous Chicom pronouncements on this subject they did not imply that such a withdrawal was a precondition for starting negotiations. (ConGenTel 1183) (Secret)

C. Soviet Role Criticized.

The Soviet role in Vietnam was fiercely attacked by both Chou and Peng. Peng referred to alleged "modern revisionist" fears over "people's war," and Chou spoke of those who pretended to "fight imperialism" but in fact used their "aid" only to sell out the Vietnamese people for a "dirty deal with the U.S."

Comment: According to the excerpts released by NCNA, none of the DRV or NLF speakers followed the Chinese lead in attacking the Soviets. (Limited Official Use)

5. Sino-Soviet: Peking Publishes Pravda Editorial

According to NCNA, the People's Daily of December 21 carried the full text of the November 28 Pravda editorial entitled "International Duty of Communists of All Countries," with a 1000-word editorial note attached in preface. The editorial note accuses the Soviets of "merely hurling abuse and throwing one label after another," and of avoiding "replies of substance" to the Chinese article of November 11. It baits the Soviet leaders with such rhetorical questions as "Don't you want to be anti-China heroes? If so, why are you so cowardly that you dare neither to publish

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0588

our article in full nor give answers to the whole series of questions of substance raised in our article?"

The editorial note goes on to recapitulate the specific charges leveled against the Soviet leaders in the Chinese article of November 11 to "prove" that they were in collusion with the U.S. for world domination. A new element in the editorial note which did not appear in the November 11 article is the assertion that the CPSU leaders are "plotting new deals with the U.S. on. . . the question of Germany." In addition, it reiterates the Chicom view that the Soviets are following a Vietnam policy of "involvement through aid in an attempt to gain control and have a say on the Vietnam question," while at the same time cooperating with the U.S. in "playing the fraudulent game of unconditional negotiations." (Unclassified)

Comment: Peking's republication of the Pravda editorial while at the same time daring the Soviets to do likewise follows the established Chinese practice in polemics with the CPSU. The slashing, sarcastic tone of the editorial note is very reminiscent of the worst period in Sino-Soviet relations during the Khrushchev era of 1963-64, e.g., the line taken in the Red Flag editorial "More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Ourselves" of March 1, 1963, in which the Chicoms taunted the Soviet leadership for being "cowardly as mice" in not allowing the Soviet people to read the text of Peking's attacks. The implication of a Soviet-U.S. "deal" on Germany is the first Chinese mention of this subject we have seen since the September 1964 announcement of Khrushchev's intended visit to Bonn.

The vehemence and quantity of Chinese attacks on Soviets in recent weeks may be prompted by concern that Moscow is having some success in influencing Hanoi in a manner contrary to Peking's wishes. In addition, Peking's return to high-pitched polemics on a broad ideological front on issues which include but are not limited to the Vietnam question could represent a Chinese effort to demonstrate to other Communist parties that the basic elements of the Sino-Soviet dispute run deeper and involve weighter principles than question of "united action" on Vietnam. (ConGenTel 1182) (Confidential)

6. Chicoms Silent on Habana Meeting

Although the three-continent conference of African, Asian and Latin American states for "solidarity against imperialism" is due to open in Habana on January 3, 1966, Peking has kept silent

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

about the very existence of the meeting. In contrast, all China's Communist neighbors (USSR, Mongolia, DRV, NLHX-Laos and DPRK) have publicized the conference, and all plan to send delegations with the possible exception of the DPRK, from which we have not yet seen a definite announcement. Since the conference is outside the framework of regular meetings of the Cairo-based Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (despite reported efforts of the Soviets and East Europeans to designate it as such), Peking may feel it can safely ignore it. On the other hand, the Chicoms could conceivably attend, even though the agenda contains such provocative items as disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Whether they attend or stay away, the conference promises to prove highly embarrassing to Peking, judging by what we have heard concerning its advance billing. According to the Cuban Ambassador to Hanoi (VNA, December 1), some 100 delegations comprising 500 representatives are expected. The impact envisioned for the conference by the Soviet bloc was well expressed by Lodoydamba, Deputy Chairman of the Mongolian Preparatory Committee for the conference: "As is known, the imperialists were very pleased to see that the second conference of the heads of state and the governments of Asian and African countries had to be postponed. Under these circumstances, the solidarity conference of the three continents acquires particularly great significance." (Ulan Bator Radio December 6). In short, the Habana meeting appears designed to accomplish what the Soviets were unable to accomplish at Algiers -- the public isolation of Peking on key foreign policy issues from its Afro-Asian brethren and Moscow's prominent presence among the Afro-Asian fraternity. (Limited Official Use)

7. Africa: People's Daily on Rhodesia

A People's Daily Commentator article of December 13 (WEEKA 50) on Rhodesia was followed by an editorial of December 18. The major themes expressed in the two items were that the Zimbabwe (Rhodesian) people and all African peoples must rely on their own efforts to drive out the "imperialists, colonialists and neo-colonialists" and that contradictions between Africans and the "imperialists" are irreconcilable. The Commentator article alleged that "Zimbabwe nationalist organizations have called on the Zimbabwe people to rise and fight against the Smith regime with all the arms at their disposal."

Both items accused Britain of giving only token opposition to the Smith regime, which the Labor Government "is in reality protect-

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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ing." African states who followed the recommendation of the OAU to break diplomatic relations with Britain were praised for taking a decision "which reflected the strong reaction of the masses of the African people." Other culprits in the Rhodesian affair, according to People's Daily, were the "modern revisionists" (Soviets) and the American "imperialists" who acted in concert with Britain in voting for the U.N. Security Council resolution on Rhodesia.

Comment: Rhodesia, in the Chicom view, is surely a classic example of imperialism and colonialism demanding solution by revolutionary people's struggle. In spite of the confident tone of the People's Daily, however, the Chinese carefully avoid repetition of Chou En-lai's boast last June that "Africa is ripe for revolution." (Unclassified)

8. More Chicom Protests to Indonesia

NCNA last week issued the text of two more protest notes from the Chicom Embassy in Indonesia to the GOI. The first note, dated December 15, protested a December 10 raid on the Chicom Consulate in Medan. The second note, issued on December 18, condemned the treatment of Chinese nationals in the Medan area. The notes alleged that "hooligans organized by the Indonesian right-wing forces" had looted and damaged Chinese homes and shops, killed and wounded Chinese nationals, and raped Chinese women. Both notes demanded that Indonesia take action to end the persecution and make restitution to the aggrieved families and to those suffering property losses, but in keeping with previous Chicom practice neither threatened Chicom sanctions should the GOI fail to heed Chinese demands.

9. Sino-Cambodian Friendship Praised

A December 19 People's Daily editorial, on the fifth anniversary of the Sino-Cambodian Friendship Treaty, praised the warm relations between Peking and Phnom Penh and reiterated the Chicoms' pledge of "unqualified support" to the "Cambodian people" should the U.S. "extend its war of aggression to... Cambodia." The editorial lauded Cambodia for rejecting American aid and breaking relations with the U.S., for "taking a clear-cut stand. . .firmly on the side of the revolutionary people," and for its "friendly attitude" toward the CPR. People's Daily also alleged that the U.S. was "preparing to wage a local war of the Korean type in Indo-China," in order to extricate itself from defeat in South Vietnam. The Peking journal then warned that Cambodia was "on guard" and that

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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the "Chinese people (were) following closely every move of the U.S. aggressor against Cambodia and the whole of Indo-China."

10. Increasing Attention to Laos

Probably as a result of American press reports raising the possibility of U.S. escalation moves in the Vietnam area, Peking has recently demonstrated growing concern over our intentions in Laos (WEEKA 50). During the past week this concern was reflected in a NCNA report and People's Daily Commentator article complaining ostensibly of "anti-Chinese activities of the Vientiane authorities which demonstrated that the latter had "subscribed to the U.S. plot for the creation of two Chinas." A specific "anti-Chinese activity" cited was the attendance of "many senior military and civilian authorities of the Vientiane authorities " at a GRC national day reception.

Commentator interpreted these anti-Chinese activities as proof that the Laotian reactionaries are giving support to the "U.S. imperialist scheme to expand the war" to the whole of Indo-China in an effort to "reverse its failures in Vietnam." One component of this "scheme," according to Commentator, involved U.S. "preparations to despatch its own ground forces to Laos and to make the Thais do the same." These forces allegedly would then combine to "join with the troops of the Laotian right wing to attack the liberated areas in central and lower Laos." Commentator thereupon warned that if this actually came to pass, the "Laotian reactionaries" would "meet with resolute counter-blows from the Laotian and other peoples of Indo-China and end as a funeral sacrifice of the U.S. aggressors."

Comment: In keeping with Chou's remarks on the NLF anniversary (Item 4), no mention was made of an active Chinese role in thwarting U.S. expansion of the war into Laos. Our feeling, however, is that Peking would regard the introduction of U.S. troops into Laos as a prelude to an ultimate U.S. strike at China and would thereby tend to think in more fatalistic terms about the inevitability of war with the U.S. (Secret) (ConGenTel 1183).

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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(2) BANGKOK CANBERRA KARACHI MOSCOW RANGOON SOFIA VENTIANE
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ORIGIN/ACTION

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A-399 (NO.) | CONFIDENTIAL | Air Pouch (HANDLING INDICATOR)

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG

DATE: Dec 17, 1965

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 50

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Militant Language Marks Commemoration of December 9 Movement
2. People's Daily Calls for Boost to Household Subsidiary Production
3. "Five Years of Experimentation -- Ten Years of Popularization" Planned for Development of Work-Study Education System
4. Regime Releases GRC Infiltrators
5. Canton Zoo Faces Countryside
6. Biographic Notes: Hu Yao Pang Back in Peking as YCL First Secretary

External

7. U.S. Condemned for Alleged Attacks on Fishing Boats
8. Vietnam: Chicoms Step Up Press Treatment
9. Sino-Soviet Relations: "Line of Demarcation" Sharpens
10. Sino-Indian Border Scuffles Continue
11. Sino-African Relations: Kenya and Rhodesia
12. Peking Denounces December 6 ICC Report on Laos
13. Chicoms Publicize Amalgamation of Thai Front Groups

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GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

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Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,JThomas,CKamman,SYNg:drb

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. Militant Language Marks Commemoration of December 9 Movement

The thirtieth anniversary of the "December 9 Movement" (known to the rest of the world as the anti-Japanese "National Salvation" drive which was kicked off by Peking University students in 1935) was celebrated in Peking last week by extensive editorial coverage and by a giant youth rally in the Great Hall of the People. The editorials stressed stock appeals that Chinese youth integrate with peasants and workers, answer the Party's call to move to the mountainous areas, fight revisionism, avoid becoming "mental aristocrats", carry the revolution through to the end, etc.

However, these basic themes (which were identical to those plumped during the 1963 observance of the date--there was no comment last year) were also overlaid with a strongly militant veneer. The Liberation Army Daily urged revolutionary youth to fear neither hardship nor death and scorn, "even a mountain of swords and a sea of flame." The China Youth Journal counselled preparation for armed struggle, ("the highest form of class struggle") and demanded that the younger generation be ready to take up the gun as well as the pen. The Youth Journal also described the glorious role of the few who sacrificed their lives for the welfare of the majority.

Minister of Higher Education Chiang Nan-hsiang, addressing the youth rally, gave a systematic summary of Central Committee policies designed to immunize future generations from the creeping ravages of revisionism-socialist education, work-study education, and cadre labor-in that order. However, Chiang's measured approach was also marked with the warning that youth take seriously the war threats of U.S. imperialism and be "fully prepared ideologically and materially."

The provincial broadcasts have so far reflected the same combination of jittery militance and stress on internal construction and revolution. Radio Taiyuan and Kunming reported speeches by officials urging that the example of the December 9 Movement be applied to such mundane goals as the creation of stable and high yield farmland. On the other hand Hofei carried an exhortation that "youths be ready to go to the front line to defend the Motherland when she made the call," and Lanchow urged the younger generation to "be fearless of Heaven, Earth, phantoms, U.S. imperialism, war and the atomic bomb." (Limited Official Use)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Comment: In our view the injection of such strong language stems in part from the regime's worry that the revolutionary message is simply not getting across to the younger generation. The romantic emphasis on sacrifice, struggle, heroism, and death is an apparent attempt to add the zest of danger and external threat to the stale and unpalatable brew of internal policies.

The new militance also stems from the regime's concern over developments in Vietnam which are leading it to prepare mentally the nation and most importantly the youth for a possible war situation. These "ideological preparations", to use Chiang Nan-hsiang's phrase, do not necessarily reflect a firm intent to launch an adventurous policy, but rather an uneasy calculation that Peking may yet find itself directly involved.

Recent reverses (Afro-Asian failure, Indonesian coup, etc.) in the regime's revolutionary program may also account in part for the strong tone of the statements. In the past the Party has exploited foreign successes to sell its internal programs. A potent antidote is required to offset the current lack of external revolutionary achievements. (ConGenTel 1101) (Confidential)

2. People's Daily Calls for Boost to Household Subsidiary Production

A December 4 People's Daily editorial entitled "Household Subsidiary Production is the Socialist Economy's Helping Hand" reiterated once again the regime's strong reluctance to tinker with capitalist concessions in agriculture. The article went so far as to criticize cadres unwilling to encourage and support private subsidiary production for fear of fostering spontaneous capitalist tendencies. This attitude was equivalent to "refusing to eat for fear of hiccoughs" and hindered the development of the entire collective economy, it said.

Recognizing the problem of how to divide labor time between collective and private tasks as "complicated and delicate," the editorial states that local conditions should determine where the line was to be drawn for each particular type of work. One type of production (raising poultry, for instance) might be made the chief collective undertaking in one district, but at the same time be the primary private undertaking in another. The important thing was that production be increased.

0595

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Lest these flexible and practical guidelines be interpreted as a carte blanche for private enterprise, the editorial warned that only "proper" household subsidiary production should be encouraged. Any violations of state policy, acts harmful to collective interests, abandonment of farming for trading, or capitalist exploitation would not be tolerated. (See WER 50) (Unclassified)

Comment: The timing of the editorial strikes us as significant for three reasons. Its appearance at the beginning of the important winter private household production season underlines the regime's recognition, however unpalatable ideologically, of the importance it must attach to private production. Its appearance at the outset of a new five-year plan shows that the private agricultural sector will be regarded as a necessary evil for a long time to come. Finally, its appearance in the midst of a fierce cycle of socialist education campaigns may be a subtle warning to overzealous "four clearance" teams (which isolated reports indicate have been confiscating private plots in some communes--see WEEKA 43) to keep hands off the private sector. (Limited Official Use)

3. "Five Years of Experimentation - Ten Years of Popularization" Planned for Development of Work-Study Education System

The unremitting flow of articles and editorial commentary on work-study education has been marked in the past weeks by more solid data on the regime's timetable for the development of the new system.

NCNA on December 5 announced that a "recent" conference on urban work-study institutions, attended by such leading officials as Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i (the alleged father of the system) and Premier Chou En-lai had decided on a policy of "five years of experimentation - ten years of popularization" for the schools. The People's Daily elaborated on this schedule and extended its application to rural farm-study schools in an editorial on December 11. While the half work-half study formula had demonstrated its value over the past year a five year trial period was required to solve problems of curricula, teaching materials, labor schedules, and pedagogical methods which both the rural and urban systems shared. Furthermore city schools needed time to smooth out knotty problems not found in the countryside institutions, especially those related to population crowding and the supply of jobs for graduates, the editorial continued. Solution could be only found after a period of trial and error "groping," the article concluded. (Unclassified)

0596

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: So far there is no indication that the regime plans to replace completely the regular full-day school system with work-study institutions, even after the fifteen year development period is over. The guidelines still call for coexistence of the systems. However, if the work-study system is to have the anti-revisionist effectiveness that the regime hopes (Higher Education Minister Chiang Nan-hsiang mentioned it in the same breath as socialist education and cadre labor--see item 1) the full time schools will ultimately have to go. As long as full time and half time systems coexist, permitting comparison between the two, it seems unlikely that the creation of revisionist "mental aristocrats" can be avoided. (Limited Official Use)

4. Regime Releases GRC Infiltrators

NCNA announced on December 14 that judicial authorities in Kwangtung, Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsu, and Shantung had decided to release sixty-four captured GRC agents and twelve boatmen captured during abortive raids in 1962, 63, and 64. The agents confessed and repented, the despatch continued, after public security officials "took pains to explain the government's policy to them and enlighten them as to the nature of their crimes." Trips to factories and communes and a steady supply of books and newspapers rounded out their "education." The government said that jobs would be given those released, and promised to allow any who so desired to be reunited with relatives on Taiwan. (Unclassified)

Comment: The last release of GRC raiders took place in November 1963 when 17 "Taiwan agents" captured a month before were let go. The current group was detained much longer, probably reflecting a less "repentant" attitude on their part.

Re-education and release of prisoners is an old Chinese Communist propaganda ploy which has served them well since the early stages of the revolution. As in the past the regime will attempt to utilize the latest release to dull the resolve of future infiltrators and to demonstrate their merciful attitude toward their own countrymen. (Limited Official Use)

There are still large numbers of agents under detention, however. On December 14, Radio Canton reported a speech given by a provincial public security official for the infiltrators released from Kwangtung prisons and "over 100 agents awaiting sentence." (2300 GMT) (Limited Official Use)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

5. Canton Zoo Faces Countryside

Recently the city of Canton has supplemented the medical teams, "light cavalry" culture squads, and groups of unemployed youth sent to the rural areas by dispatching groups of itinerant zoo animals to the communes and "remote mountain areas," as November 27 China News Service reports. Team complements include lions, monkeys, parrots, and apes. They perform tricks which amuse the peasants. (Unclassified)

Comment: The files of the Consulate General indicate that the Canton Zoo has been sending animal teams to the larger market towns ever since 1962. The recent change in policy stressing deeper zoo-squad penetration appears to be a reflection of the current massive campaign to "face the countryside," in preparation for the Third Five Year Plan. (Unclassified)

6. Biographic Notes: Hu Yao-pang Back in Peking as YCL First Secretary

One of the officials listed attending the December 9 youth rally at the Great Hall of the People was Hu Yao-pang, First Secretary of the Young Communist League, whose appointment as Third Secretary of the Northwest Regional Bureau last February 3 and subsequent appearance as Shensi First Secretary in March caused comment. The fact that a new Shensi First Secretary, Huo Shih-lien, (a former Chekiang Party Committee Secretary) was sighted in Sian on December 12 at the opening of the Northwest Industry and Communications Conference, as well as Hu's conspicuous absence from recent Northwest regional gatherings leads to conjecture that he may have returned to Peking for good. It should be added , however, that Huo Shih-lien is listed only as a Secretary of the Northwest Bureau and that Hu could still hold the position as Northwest Third Secretary concurrently. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: Speculating about Hu's reappearance on the national scene, we can only guess that he has accomplished the tasks (coping with Sinkiang youth organization problems and holding the fort in Shensi until a successor to the deceased First Secretary Chang Te-sheng was found) for which he was sent West. The continuation of organizational difficulties among Northwest youth may make it convenient for him to retain the Bureau Third Secretary slot. (Limited Official Use)

0548

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

External

7. U.S. Condemned for Alleged Attacks on Fishing Boats

Peking continued to complain loudly about alleged U.S. air attacks on Chinese fishing boats in international waters of the Tonkin Gulf (WEEKA 49). During thepast week, the regime listed five new incidents of alleged U.S. bombing and strafing of "peaceful" fishing boats occurring between November 18 and December 1 and involving the death of three and wounding of fourteen fishermen. The essence of the regime's treatment of these alleged "U.S. piratical air attacks" was contained in a People's Daily December 15 Commentator article, which termed them "explicit, deliberate war provocations against the Chinese people" and proof that the "Johnson Administration is the most barbarous, most brutal, marauding aggressor in the world today." Following the allegation that U.S. imperialism "had committed countless bloody crimes against the Chinese people, Commentator promised that "the day will come when the Chinese people together with the people of the rest of the world will make heinous U.S. imperialism pay for blood with blood." Commentator also voiced the standard warning that "if the Johnson Administration disregards the warnings of the Chinese people and continues its provocations it must be held fully responsible for all the grave consequences arising from them." This warning was prefaced with a reference to the limited patience of the Chinese people.

Peking reinforced its effort to paint a black picture of the U.S. with coverage by NCNA on December 15 of a statement by the Seamen's Trade Union of China protesting the alleged "brutal" persecution and assaulting by U.S. authorities of thirty-three Hong Kong seamen on the British ship Martha Endeavor in the port of Cleveland in mid-November. The Union's statement and supplementary NCNA coverage stressed "barbaric" nature and "senseless violence" of armed U.S. immigration officers.

Comment: Despite Peking's bluster, it is clearly evident that the regime's handling of the alleged air attacks is designed to avoid raising tensions with the U.S. unduly. Significantly, Peking continues to refer to them as either "armed" or "war provocations," avoiding use of the term "aggression" and the attendant stronger implication that we are seeking to impose war on the Chinese people. Moreover, the regime's warnings are couched in the familiar and vague language that the "U.S. must bear full responsibility for the grave consequences arising from them,"

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

although an effort is made to strengthen this language with references to the limited patience of the Chinese people and the U.S. need not to take these warnings lightly. A further indication that the regime is handling the issue cautiously and concentrating on its propaganda implications is contained in Commentator's weakening of the "blood debt" theme by placing it in a vague, future context and including the "people of the rest of the world" in the act. (Confidential)

8. Vietnam: Chicoms Step Up Press Treatment

Peking last week considerably increased its editorial comment on Vietnam, producing two People's Daily editorials (December 9 and 14) and a People's Daily Commentator article (December 11) on themes ranging from Secretary Rusk's December 9 press conference to the alleged inability of American troops to fight successfully in Vietnam.

A. Peking Replies to Secretary's Remarks.

On December 11 Commentator answered Secretary Rusk's December 9 press conference comments on Chinese intentions by informing the Secretary he should well know that the Chinese people were ". . .fully prepared for a war to be forced upon them at any time by the U.S. aggressors." Commentator reminded the Secretary he had been clearly informed about Chinese intentions toward "U.S. aggression" by Foreign Minister Chen Yi's September 29 press conference remarks that China was "fully prepared against U.S. aggression. . .(and) if the U.S. imperialists are determined to launch a war of aggression against us, they are welcome to come sooner, to come as early as tomorrow." Commentator also included Chen's statement that should the U.S. invade the China mainland, "by then the war will have no boundaries."

Comment: As they have done since Chen Yi last June spoke privately on the Sino-American confrontation, the Chicoms continue to picture a war situation as one which will be "imposed" on them by a U.S. decision to "launch a war of aggression." When taken in context with Peking's recent emphasis on the unbeatable nature of "people's war," the Commentator article reinforces our impression that at least for the present, the regime is continuing to steer a prudent and non-provocative course on the question of war with the U.S. (ConGenTel 1110) (Confidential)

B. U.S. Peace Efforts Derided.

Supporting the DRV's recent comments on the U.S. "bombing pause hoax," Peking in a People's Daily December 14 editorial

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

alleged that the "word 'peace' from the lips of Johnson and his like is but an overture to further (U.S.) escalation of the war." People's Daily impugned the American desires for peace, saying that there would be no peace talk if the U.S. had been successful on the battlefield, and, perhaps to justify its hard line of negotiations, claiming that, "short of complete defeat," the U.S. would not give in or enter into serious negotiations. The editorial went on to support the DRV four-point proposal and the NLF five-point statement as "the only correct basis for solution of the Vietnam question." After praising the Vietnamese people for aiding China and defending "world peace," People's Daily concluded by pledging Chinese aid for "as much and so long as the Vietnamese people require" and promised that China would "spare no effort to support the Vietnamese people in defeating the U.S. aggressors."

Comment: People's Daily's continuing attempt to denigrate American desires for negotiations perhaps reflect the regime's concern that not all nations have penetrated the U.S. "peace hoax." The editorial also continues the regime's practice since last August of generalized offers of aid to the DRV as contrasted to previous specific offers of variously "men" or "volunteers" to assist the North Vietnamese, if the latter so requested. (ConGenTel 1133) (Limited Official Use)

C. Chicom Treatment of Ho Chi Minh Interview

On December 9 NCNA released a carefully expurgated version of Ho Chi Minh's recent interview with Felix Greene. Although NCNA quoted many of Ho's replies verbatim, it neatly excised his remarks on the U.S. as "the country of Washington and Lincoln," and notably failed to include his mention of the Soviet Union as one of the countries fully supporting the DRV/NLF line of struggle.

Significantly, NCNA also failed to mention that the interview was filmed for showing in the U.S., and edited two passages in which Ho addressed himself directly to the American people--perhaps revealing Peking's fear of a DRV-U.S. dialogue which might lead to give and take between the U.S. and the DRV. NCNA also cut or paraphrased virtually all of Greene's questions, eliminating completely his expressed opinion that the majority of the American people support the President's course in Vietnam, and that the DRV was greatly exaggerating the scope and significane of the protest movement in the U.S.

Comment: Although Peking's treatment of the Ho interview reveals no serious Sino-DRV differences on negotiations, the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

differences between VNA's full-text version and NCNA's excerpts are perhaps indicative of North Vietnam's greater tactical flexibility as compared with Peking's unwillingness to expose its own people to even the slightest deviation from orthodox vituperation of the U.S. (ConGenTel 1095) (Limited Official Use)

D. Fighting Ability of U.S. Troops Disparaged

A People's Daily editorial December 9, following up a series of derogatory NCNA reports on the efforts of U.S. troops in South Vietnam, concluded that U.S. troops, though well-equipped, could not stand up under attack. The reason of course was that the morale of American soldiers -- the vital "spiritual atom bomb" of a "people's war" -- was low because "the American people do not support such a war." Thus, when "Liberation Army" soldiers attacked them at close range, "the arrogant steel tigers immediately became jelly tigers," according to People's Daily (Unclassified)

9. Sino-Soviet Relations: "Line of Demarcation" Sharpens

While the Chinese Communists themselves confined their remarks on the schism or "line of demarcation" between revisionism and true Marxism-Leninism to a critical review of a recent Soviet book on Yugoslavia (NCNA December 12), they gave considerable press coverage to materials originating in foreign Communist parties or splinter groups favorable to the Peking line. An article from the organ of the Uruguayan left-wing revolutionary movement (NCNA Dec.12) acclaimed the Chinese for opposing revisionism and supporting national liberation struggles. An Australian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist faction) article (NCNA Dec. 11) devoted to strengthening the Party emphasized the need for learning the lessons afforded by the building up of the Chinese Communist Party, and declared that the Australians had set themselves the task of "breaking politically, ideologically and organizationally" with revisionism. The Peruvian Communist Party organ (NCNA Dec. 8) rejected appeals for unity of the international movement, declaring that "there can be no third stand or stand in between those of the Marxist-Leninists and the modern revisionists." An August joint statement of the Australian CP (M-L) and the New Zealand CP (carried by NCNA Dec 8) reiterates that the struggle against revisionism must be "carried through to the end" and that any international meeting of Communists must reckon with "new Marxist-Leninist parties." The statement establishes as an "essential preliminary condition for the resolution of the (ideological) differences" the admission by the CPSU of errors committed at its 22nd Party Congress in relation to the Albanian party. The Chairman of the Australian Communist Party (M-L) in still another article (NCNA December 10) went so far as to accuse the Soviets of resorting

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

to bribery or intimidation to enforce its will on other parties. (Unclassified)

Comment: Factions and splits in foreign Communist parties are by no means a recent phenomenon of the Sino-Soviet dispute, but this latest spate of articles appearing in NCNA indicates that Peking is attempting to draw the "line of demarcation" between Marxist-Leninists and revisionists (as it said must be done in its November 11 refutation of Soviet appeals for unity of the bloc) in every Communist party where it has followers. Perhaps the key phrase in all the outpouring of ideological bombast is the declaration of the Australians that Marxist-Leninists must break with revisionists "organizationally." Peking would evidently like to promote precisely the type of rival party created by its Australian supporters in March 1964 as a foil to Soviet "interference" in Communist parties all around the world. Further signs of Peking's strategy for the international Communist movement may emerge during the visit of Australian Party (M-L) Chairman E. F. Hill to Peking. According to an official of the Australian Trade Commission (protect source), Hill plans to leave Australia on December 19, returning on January 8. (Confidential)

10. Sino-Indian Border Scuffles Continue

On December 12, Peking in a note to the Indian Government protested an alleged Indian armed intrusion and attack on Chicom frontier guards at Tagi La on the Sino-Sikkim border. The note claimed that on December 12 thirty Indian troops intruded five hundred meters into Chinese territory and "opened heavy fire with rifles and artillery fire" on patrolling Chinese guards. In the ensuing firefight, one Chinese and five Indians were allegedly killed and three Indians captured. The note further charged that the Indians, while making constant outcries about Chinese border intrusions, are actually striving to create tension on border "in order to meet their present political needs." It warned that India "must immediately stop its intrusions and provocations...or else the Chinese side will give it such punishment as it deserves."

Probably in response to Indian reports of Chinese culpability for the incident, NCNA on December 15 carried a lengthy article providing alleged proof of the claimed Indian intrusion in the Tagi La area.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: Although wire reports indicate that the Tagi La incident was on a larger scale than most, the Chicoms have thus far treated it in much the same fashion as others in the continuing series of clashes,charges,and countercharges on the border issue. The Chicoms may be currently engaged in aggressive patrolling operations along the Sikkim border, but Peking's treatment of the situation does not suggest that it is presently planning large-scale operations in that area. (ConGenTel 1109) (Confidential)

11. Sino-African Relations: Kenya and Rhodesia

Peking reiterated its solidarity with African peoples who are struggling against "the white man's colonial regime" on two occasions during the week. The first was a reception given by the Ambassador of Kenya on his country's December 11 national day, at which the featured speaker was Vice Premier Ulanfu. The second was a People's Daily Commentator article of December 13 which took Britain to task for its "sham opposition" to the Smith regime in Rhodesia.

A. Ulanfu, highest ranking national minority member of the CCP and head of government, Party and military in Inner Mongolia, managed to encompass a broad range of African peoples whom the Chinese were supporting in their struggles against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism without repeating Chou En-lai's remark about the continent being ripe for revolution which so enraged the Kenyans last June. On Sino-Kenyan relations, which had deteriorated to a new low with the expulsion of an NCNA correspondent in July, Ulanfu expressed the belief that they would improve "by concerted efforts of both sides." For, as he said, "no matter what base measures the imperialists, colonialists and neo-colonialists resort to, they can in no way undermine the friendship between the Chinese and Kenyan peoples." The Kenyan Ambassador's reply received short shrift from NCNA, which quoted him on Rhodesia, endorsement of Chicom admission to the U.N. and non-alignment of Kenyan foreign policy--but not a word on imperialism or neo-colonialism. (Limited Official Use)

B. Two days after the Kenya reception, where Ulanfu provoked a walk-out by British diplomats when he launched into the subject of Rhodesia, People's Daily Commentator redoubled the attack on British policy towards the Smith regime. Commentator's article pointed to the pressures being exerted on Britain by African governments, and declared that "British imperialism has adopted a series of vicious and cunning tactics to pull itself out of the predicament." The economic sanctions announced by the British are merely "histrionics" designed to give the impression that Britain opposes the Rhodesian white settlers, while actually "Harold Wilson...

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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has been working hand in glove with the United States, Portugal and the white colonial authorities of South Africa in supplying large quantities of petroleum to Rhodesia." The conclusion drawn from all this by Commentator was that the imperialists, colonialists and neo-colonialists have exposed themselves, enabling the "Zimbabwe and all other African people to see more clearly that they must reply on their own struggle to win national independence. Commentator approved of an alleged call by Zimbabwe nationalist organizations on the Zimbabwe people "to rise and fight against the Smith regime with all the arms at their disposal." By so relying on their own efforts, Commentator avowed, the Zimbabwe people "will certainly be able to overthrow colonial rule." (Unclassified)

12. Peking Denounces December 6 ICC Report on Laos

People's Daily Commentator on December 12 denounced the December 6 ICC report on Laos as contrary to the letter and spirit of the 1962 Geneva Agreements because "the 'investigation' mentioned in the report was conducted upon the unilateral request of the Laotian rightists and in the absence of the Polish member of the Commission." Commentator accused the British Government of "aiding and abetting U.S. imperialism in its criminal plan to widen the war in Indo-China" by in turn unilaterally publishing the report. He saw in the report's finding that North Vietnamese troops are operating in Laos a "design merely to provide a pretext for U.S. imperialism to carry out its sinister scheme" to send U.S. ground troops into Laos to cut off "what they (the U.S.) call the 'Ho Chi Minh trail'."

Commentator warned the Indian and Canadian members of the ICC that they "must immediately discontinue all their illegal activities" and, in an indirect attack against the Soviets, reminded the two co-chairmen of the ICC of their duty to uphold the Geneva agreements and their lack of any "right to help U.S. imperialism to scrap the agreements and expand its aggressive war."

Comment: In recent weeks there has been a significatn increase in the regime's press coverage of Laotian developments, primarily in the form of reprints of Pathet Laos and DRV comment on the subject. Possibly this reflects the regime's growing concern over US. intentions toward DRV supply routes passing through Laos. Such concern may account for the regime's failure to call for an end to the ICC presence in Laos which, despite its shortcomings in :eking's eyes, may still be regarded by the regime as inhibiting

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

expanded U.S. operations in that country. (Confidential)

13. Chicoms Publicize Amalgamation of Thai Front Groups

An NCNA report of December 14 gave belated Chicom publicity to the November 1 announcement of the "Thai Independence Movement" (TIM) that it would become a member of the "Thai Patriotic Front" and accept the Front's political leadership. According to NCNA it was recently informed of the TIM announcement by Mon Kon Nanakon, "liaison representative" of the organization in Peking who in turn had received word of the move from the "Central Committee of the TIM." According to excerpts carried by NCNA, the TIM announcement called upon all "patriotic forces" to "unite as one and carry out a heroic struggle" against the Thanom Government. (Unclassified)

Comment: NCNA's belated coverage of the announcement and the claimed method by which the Agency received word of it are obviously designed to camouflage the true status of both the TIM and Patriotic Front as creatures of Peking.

The regime's periodic coverage of the activities and declarations of the Peking-based Thai exiles represents a Chicom effort to worry the Thanom government, encourage dissidents in the Northeast and create pressures within Thailand against close cooperation with the U.S.

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

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FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG DATE: Dec 10, 1965

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 49

REF :

1965 DEC 14 PM 4 57 DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED

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POLITICAL

Internal

1. NPC Session Delayed
2. Northwest Militia Conference Held
3. Peking Vice Mayor New Intellectual Rectification Target
4. Chengchow Juveniles Rectified
5. New Mayor for Shanghai

External

6. Vietnam: Chicoms Review Familiar Themes
7. Sihanouk Gives Details on Chicom Military Aid to Cambodia
8. Japan: Chicoms Reaffirm Basic Policies

Action Assigned to RFE/OD

Action Taken N.C.

Date of Action 12/16

Action Office Symbol RFE/HC

Name of Officer

Direction to RM/R File

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,CKamman,JThomas,YSNg

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. NPC Session Delayed

Last week the Asahi correspondent stationed in Peking told a Japanese Consulate officer here that a Chinese official had intimated to him that the National People's Congress would not convene this year. The reporter considered the information reliable enough for him to take the rest of December off on vacation in Japan.

Comment: Although the source of the information was not divulged, we assume that it came from an official in the Liao Cheng-chih trade office. Previous remarks from a high official in the same office (WEEKA 41) buttressed by hints given October 1 visitors to Peking indicated that the NPC was originally planned to take place in December. That the session has indeed been delayed is confirmed by the lack of any public announcement (last year's NPC was announced three weeks in advance) and the fact that the Kwangtung Provincial People's Congress is scheduled to convene in the latter half of December. Provincial Congresses normally precede and very rarely coincide with the national gathering.

Since the new Five Year Plan is almost certain to be the main business of the NPC, it is conceivable that last minute hitches in the preparation of the Plan (perhaps connected with Vietnam war needs) are behind the delay. Our feeling is however, that the delay will be a temporary one. Recent provincial and municipal People's Congresses have all referred to the Plan, giving the impression that the regime is not contemplating any major disruption of its timetable. The most recent of these references appeared at the closing session of the Szechuan Provincial People's Congress at which delegates were urged to "take the first step towards victory in developing the national economy during the Third Five Year Plan" (Radio Chengtu, December 6, 2330 GMT), (ConGenTel 1051). (Confidential)

2. Northwest Militia Conference Held

The first Northwest Regional Militia Conference ended on December 3 in Lanchow. In the course of its two-week duration speakers at the conference stressed the same themes that have marked militia conferences held in other parts of the mainland ever since the regime decided to rebuild the militia in the summer

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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of 1964. Northwest Bureau Secretary Kao K'o-lin keynoted the affair with a militant appeal that militiamen "seriously guard against the scheme of U.S. imperialism to spread the war to China by getting ready at all times to fight any type of aggressive war which might be touched off by U.S. imperialism." He urged that emphasis be placed on study of Mao's works, especially his theories of people's war. Lest any of the delegates lose their sense of proportion, however, Chang Ta-chih, another Bureau Secretary, made it clear that "the civilian role of a militiaman is of greatest importance." (Radio Urumchi, November 22, 1335 GMT) In his summing-up remarks at the close of the conference, Chang again stressed that "militia work should be subordinate to and boost production." One of the chief ways to judge how good militia work was to see how good or bad production was, he said (Radio Lanchow, December 4, 0415 GMT)

The conference, which was attended by 600 representatives of the Han, Hui, Uighur, Mongol, Kazakh, Tibetan, Sibo, Salar, Kirghiz, Manchu, Yuku, and Tu nationalities, also studied the problem of training minority race militia cadres. (Unclassified)

Comment: The conference is significant as the first of its kind in the Northwest region, an area peopled in part by nationalities whose political reliability and trustworthiness with weapons are far from a foregone conclusion. The fact that the regime now feels it can stress militia work in the area can be considered a mark of confidence in its hold over the region and the extent to which the influx of Han Chinese from the east has altered the demographic and political balance in the Northwest. If the conference speeches are any indication, however, the Northwest militia program will stress the militiaman's civilian role and will be used as it has been in other parts of China primarily as a spur to production and a subsidiary channel of mass indoctrination. (Limited Official Use)

3. Peking Vice Mayor New Intellectual Rectification Target

The academic research section of the November 30 People's Daily featured a lengthy article by an unknown theoretician named Yao Wen-yuan criticizing the play "Hai Jui is Dismissed from Office," by Peking Vice Mayor Wu Han. The play is essentially an eulogy to Hai Jui, a celebrated Ming official whose propensity for leveling just criticisms at his superiors, including the emperor, earned him a reputation as one of the greatest imperial censors in Chinese history. The critical article, a reprint from the November 10 Shanghai Wen Wei Pao, which has also been published in the other Peking and Shanghai papers, maintained that Wu Han, by presenting Hai Jui as a courageous champion of

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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the people, had fuzzed class lines and furthered class conciliation. An official of the feudal regime, as everyone knows, could only serve the official class from whence he came. Yao Wen-yuan was also upset by the critical acclaim which greeted the drama when it appeared in 1961 and statements made by Wu Han in the introduction to the play intimating that Hai Jui's courage and outspokenness were traits that members of modern socialist society could learn from. The editors of the People's Daily, somewhat embarrassed by the fact that they reprinted articles praising Wu Han and his work in 1961, have so far declined to attack "Hai Jui." They have, however, asked that comment and discussion begin. (Unclassified)

Comment: It would appear that Wu Han is to come under the same sort of attack that Yang Hsien-chen, Feng Ting, Shao Chuan-lin and others have suffered during the past eighteen months as the regime has moved to tighten the intellectual laxity engendered by the collapse of the Great Leap. His play, which was only the latest vestige of Wu's life long fascination with Hai Jui, is clearly a product of the "second 'hundred flowers'" period in the early 1960's, when movies and novels noted for artistic merit and lack of political content also appeared. (See ConGen A-270)

Wu Han, a historian of some repute, a Vice Chairman of the China Democratic League, and President of Peking's Television University among other posts, has been a Vice Mayor of Peking since 1951, and a very active one at that. Last August he was a member of the Central Government delegation to Lhasa celebrating Tibetan autonomy. In October he went to Pyongyang with Yang Yung's delegation to celebrate the fifteenth anniversary of the Chinese entry into the Korean War. Nothing in our files contains a clue to any personal or political reasons why he is being put on the chopping block now. The political connotations of what he wrote back in 1961 are clear, however, and the leadership is obviously anxious to discourage the development of courageous Hai Jui-type critics. Perhaps the attack is a subtle message to Party members who, restless under Mao's reported growing despotism, are tempted to follow Hai's example. (Limited Official Use)

4. Chengchow Juveniles Rectified

A despatch from Chengchow in the November 22 People's Daily, describing the trials of a street committee worker given the job of organizing a study group for unemployed "social youth," made

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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some rare references to juvenile delinquency in urban China. The group consisted of 32 idle teenagers under sixteen, "all of whome had been influenced by bad people and bourgeois ideology" and eight of whom "had formed bad habits of stealing things." One was a well-known Chengchow hood named Yung Chien-chung who had been involved in several robberies and loved to lurk in the streets picking fights with people. The general attitude of the group was "you work hard for a week and only earn a few coins. We do not want money and we are not going to work."

The organizer Hsu Feng-chih, himself an unemployed middle school graduate who had refused a primary school teaching post and who had been pressed into this job against his will, was given two junk-filled rooms in a workers hostel as headquarters for his study group. He cleaned them himself, as none of his jeering charges would have anything to do with the job. When the rooms were ready, class did not start until each of the students had been dragged in by main force, the door locked, and twenty minutes of uproar had subsided. Hsu felt like quitting on the spot, but encouragement from local Party secretaries and large draughts of the Ta Ching spirit induced him to continue. In a few short months Hsu and Mao's works worked wonders. "Of the 32 children, the eight who were thieves no longer steal; those who liked to pick fights have basically overcome the habit. . .; two have joined the Young Communist League: and eight have answered the call of the Party and gone to take part in agricultural production." (Unclassified)

Comment: The article provides more explicit confirmation than any we have seen for conjecture that juvenile delinquency is a problem in Chinese cities plagued with a surplus of unemployable teenagers. It is a localized reference, to be sure, and one that throws little light on the extent of the problem, however. It should also be noted that Chengchow is one of the modern industrial centers developed since the Communist takeover, a modern socialist workers paradise where such things are simply not supposed to happen. (Unclassified)

5. New Mayor for Shanghai

NCNA December 8 reported that the Second Session of the Fifth Shanghai Municipal People's Congress, which was convened from November 30 to December 8 elected Tsao Ti-chiu as Mayor of Shanghai.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: Tsao has been a Vice-Mayor since 1955. He and Chen Pi-hsien, the new Party First Secretary (see WEEKA 47) who also served as a secretary of the Municipal Party Committee for ten years before stepping into the top job, have been working together for years and should make a smooth operating team.

It is clear that in the absence of a figure as prestigious as K'o Ching-shih, the leadership has decided to divide his posts among several men.

External

6. Vietnam: Chicoms Review Familiar Themes

Coverage of Vietnam in the Peking press was down considerably from last week, perhaps reflecting a relative lull in the fighting in South Vietnam. Such comment as there was traversed familiar ground in praising the "people's war" in Vietnam and the "American people's struggle" against U.S. policy in Vietnam and in condemning U.S. "piracy" against Chicom fishing boats. Indications of the regime's lack of intention to pursue a more active role in Vietnam were provided in the matter of fact treatment of Vietnam at the recently concluded Canton and Shanghai People's Congresses (see below) and by Peking's continued emphasis on the outstanding success to date and the inevitable victory of (the Vietnamese) people's war.

A. Vietnamese Issue at Shanghai and Canton People's Congress

The Subject of Vietnam received routine and short shrift at the Canton People's Congress and was not specifically raised at the Shanghai People's Congress. The absence of any fanfare on Vietnam at these Congresses appears to indicate that the regime is without intention to initiate major changes in its current handling of Vietnam. At the Canton Congress, which concluded its 3½ day meeting on December 5, the almost moribund "Aid Vietnam, Resist America" line was mentioned in passing and pictured as a stimulus to the alleged achievements in Kwangtung during the past year. At Canton, demands for further economic and political progress were linked to the need to assist Vietnam and defeat American imperialism. The main theme of the Shanghai People's Congress was the promotion of an increased production and greater economy movement. The brief NCNA report of the Congress failed to mention Vietnam by name as a subject touched on by the meeting.

B. Terrorism Praised as Instrument of People's War

The terrorist bombing of a U.S. billet in Saigon Dec. 4 was greeted by a People's Daily Dec. 5 commentary as the "latest addition to the series of brilliant victories won by the South

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Vietnam People's armed forces in the past two months." The commentary pointed out that no security measures, however strict, could give safety to American soldiers ". . .engulfed in the boundless sea of people's war in South Vietnam." In another comment on the Vietnam war, People's Daily (December 3) reiterated Peking's thesis that regardless of the numbers of troops or nature of the material sent by the U.S. to Vietnam, in the last analysis the war would be decided by the courage and selflessness of the revolutionary people (termed the "moral atom bomb" by People's Daily).

C. American People's "Struggle" Hailed

Red Flag, the Party ideological journal, joined the growing list of Chicom commentators on the American people's "struggle" against U.S. policy in Vietnam, according to a summary released by NCNA December 7. Although repeating familiar Chicom arguments that the "struggle" signifies a new awakening of the American people, Red Flag takes the argument one step farther by contending that this movement "mercilessly strips naked the capitulationist line of the Khrushchovian revisionists" by showing the irreconcilable antogonism which exists between the American people and their rulers. According to Red Flag, the movement also represents a deepening of the class struggle in the U.S. and augurs a change on the American scene.

D. U.S. "Piracy" Attacked.

People's Daily Commentator (December 2) added a final threatening note for the week, accusing U.S. planes of recently killing and wounding nine Chinese fisherman and warning that such a "blood debt" would have to be repaid . Though in Chinese terms one could hardly go further in issuing a threat than by putting it in terms of a blood debt, Peking has used this language on several previous occasions without anything coming of it. Commentator's remarks appear to provide the latest example of Peking's progressive cheapening of the language of threat and diplomacy.

7. Sihanouk Gives Details on Chicom Military Aid to Cambodia

The text of Prince Sihanouk's November 27 speech in Phnom Penh (FBIS, Nov. 30) clears up some of the confusion surrounding Communist China's military aid to Cambodia, (WEEKA 48). Sihanouk made clear that Peking has offered a new military aid package to Cambodia which he claimed would involve armaments capable of equipping an additional 20,000 Cambodian troops. The Cambodian leader stated that this was in addition to previous Chicom arm

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shipments sufficient to equip 29,000 men. Moreover, Sihanouk revealed that the CPR would supply three MIG-17-type jets as well as four transport planes, four training aircraft and three patrol boats.

In effusive letters to Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Lo Jui-ching (published by NCNA Dec. 6), Sihanouk lauded China and expressed his "profound gratitude for such generous military aid."

Comment: In an interesting aside in his Phnom Penh speech, the Prince pictured the Chicoms as being capable of producing jet aircraft. According to Sihanouk, China had previously "never given us aircraft as aid, for the reason that it has just built its aircraft factory." The Prince also described the three MIG-17 jets as having been "just manufactured" by the Chinese. (Limited Official Use)

8. Japan: Chicoms Reaffirm Basic Policies

Nan Han-chen, Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade and frequent Peking spokesman on Sino-Japanese relations, last week reaffirmed Communist China's fundamental position toward Japan. Speaking at a reception in Peking, Nan criticized the Sato Government for alleged hostility to China and for blocking non-governmental trade, but also praised and looked forward to an expansion of the rapidly increasing trade between "friendly firms."

Comment: Nan's remarks indicate that Peking's recent villification of the Sato Government over the Japan-ROK Treaty will be without affect on Sino-Japanese trade. (Unclassified)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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1965 NOV 29 AM 11 26

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

INFO : (See distribution list on final page.)

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FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG DATE: Nov 26, 1965

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 47

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED

POLITICAL

Internal

1. New Party First Secretary for Shanghai
2. Peking Commercial Paper Discusses Relationship Between Politics and Business
3. Quote of the Week

External

4. Chinese Communist Comment on U.N. Chirep Vote
5. Vietnam: Chicoms Play up Vietcong "Victories"
6. Indonesia: Peking Protests Treatment of Overseas Chinese
7. Sino-Soviet Relations
8. Laos: Chicoms Protest Bombing of Khang Khay
9. Tunisia: Bourguiba Pictured as U.S. Servant
10. Peking Maintains Drumfire of Protest Over Japan-ROK Treaty
11. Visitors

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals not automatically declassified.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Internal

1. New Party First Secretary for Shanghai

The NCNA despatch of November 12 which reported observances in Shanghai of Sun Yat-sen's birthday anniversary identified Chen Pi-hsien as First Secretary of the Shanghai CCP Municipal Committee. (Unclassified)

Comment: Chen fills one of the vacancies created when Ko Ching-shih died last April. Successors to Ko's other positions - First Secretary of the CCP East China Bureau and Mayor of Shanghai - have not been announced.

Chen, A Fukienese, has a strong East China Party background. He was Fourth Secretary in the original East China Bureau (abolished in 1954), and has been member of the current East China Bureau since its inception in 1961. He was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee in 1956. As Second Secretary of the Shanghai Party Committee since 1955, Chen was probably responsible for running the day-to-day affairs of the city while Ko was alive, leaving the latter free for regional and national duties. While his promotion involves no dramatic personnel shift, and his stature does not compare with that of Ko (a politburo member and Vice Premier in addition to his other duties). Chen's relative youth (53) and his new post as boss of China's largest city clearly mark him as a comer. (Limited Official Use)

2. Peking Commercial Paper Discusses Relationship Between Politics and Business

While setting the framework for a new public discussion of the relationship between business and politics, the editors of the Peking Ta Kung Pao on October 29 alluded to the following popular practices and attitudes towards political work in commerical enterprises:

A. People think that political cadres have a "soft" job which has little to do with professional realities and is unable to produce fast results. They question the efficacy of political work because they always accomplished their assigned tasks in the past regardless of what degree of stress was being laid on indoctrination.

B. People are too busy for political work and put off attention to ideological matters until leisure hours. Whenever political

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

study conflicts with professional exigencies during working hours politics go by the board.

C. Neglect of politics stems from "force of habit."

D. Because political efficiency is difficult to assess, there is a tendency to equate ideological purity with work performance - to treat successful completion of tasks as evidence of effective indoctrination. (Unclassified)

Comment: The Ta Kung Pao comments constitute rare explicit data on public attitudes toward the regime's program of re-emphasizing grass roots indoctrination, which began in 1964 with the establishment of PLA-type political organs throughout the economy. They show that despite the addition of new political units and commissars, and the intensification of ideological study sessions, politics are far from being "in command." We find the reference to political work as a soft touch particularly intriguing. The implication is that because political efficiency is inherently unquantifiable, and the political cadre consequently unratable, the new personnel can, and do, relax on the job. (Unclassified)

3. Quote of the Week

"The leadership should grasp live thoughts and eliminate all mental obstacles on time to strengthen spontaneity steadily."
Honan CCP Committee Mao-Study Organization
Directive (Radio Chengchow, November 18, 1130 GMT)
(Unclassified)

External

4. Chinese Communist Comment on U.N. Chirep Vote

Chinese comment on the Chirep vote, as contained in a People's Daily editorial of November 19 and a Ta Kung Pao editorial of November 21, treats the vote results as a blow to the U.S. and as evidence of "China's rising international prestige and influence." However, both editorials declare that expulsion of the "Chiang clique. . . and restoration of China's lawful rights" in the U.N. would be "far from enough" and then go on to reaffirm the regime's recent demands that the U.N. "free itself from U.S.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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control, cancel its slanderous resolution condemning China and the DPRK as aggressors and all its other erroneous resolutions," condemn U.S. imperialism, review and revise the Charter and include as members all independent countries "to the exclusion of all imperialist puppets." Perhaps reflecting a sour-grapes attitude, Peking's present position is summed up by the editorial's description of the U.N. as "a U.S. tool for aggression. . . (and) a stock exchange for political dealings between the U.S. and USSR." Hence, "China may as well stay out of a U.N. like this." (Unclassified)

Comment: In representing the above demands as requirements for the U.N. to return to "the path of its purposes and principles," the regime has not specifically made them preconditions for its entry into the U.N., and thus has left itself some flexibility in approaching the issue in the future. (Limited Official Use) (ConGenTel 950)

5. Vietnam: Chicoms Play up Vietcong "Victories"

A People's Daily editorial of November 19 hailed NLF "victories in the South Vietnamese people's war." It alleged that the recent succession of "resounding victories" by the Vietcong at Plei Me, Chu Lai, Danang, Bau Bang and Drang demonstrated that the "situation on the battlefield has still not developed to the benefit of U.S. aggressors, but is actually becoming more favorable to the Vietnamese people." Much of the editorial travels along the familiar road of "invincibility of people's war" and "men over weapons," attempting in the process to justify the emphasis in Chicom military theory on close combat by ascribing Vietcong victories to such a tactic. The editorial makes no reference to a possible Chinese role in Vietnam, as has been the case in Peking's comment on the subject in recent months. In fact, the editorial's emphasis on the "inevitability" of U.S. defeat in Vietnam creates the presumption that no Chicom role there is required. (Unclassified)

Comment: The editorial appears to us as a product of Peking's continuing effort to counter the growing impression abroad of U.S. progress in Vietnam. We also surmise that one element involved in the Vietcong's recent willingness to take heavy casualties in order to inflict losses on U.S. troops is the hope that rising U.S. casualties will contribute to U.S. domestic opposition to Vietnam

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

policies. Peking's publicity on Vietcong "victories" may be in part an effort coordinated with this DRV tactic. (Confidential) (ConGenTel 948)

6. Indonesia: Peking Protests Treatment of Overseas Chinese

NCNA on November 22 carried the text of two recent and lengthy Chicom notes to the Indonesian Government protesting strongly the "sustained persecution of Chinese nationals" by "Indonesian right wing forces." The notes, dated November 4 and 19, provide a detailed account of "outrages" committed against local Chinese allegedly by organized groups acting under the instigation of the Indonesian military. In addition to giving an account of destruction and looting of Chinese homes and businesses, the notes single out as "most serious provocations to the Chinese people" the burning of portraits of Chicom leaders and national flags.

The notes demand an end to such incidents, compensation to the victims, including emergency relief to those in dire straits as a result of mob action, punishment of the culprits and those behind them, apologies for the destroyed portraits and flags, etc. No sanctions are mentioned in the event the Indonesians fail to comply with the demands, nor is there any comment in the notes on the effect of anti-Chinese actions on Government-to-Government relations. (Unclassified)

Comment: As reflected in the November 4 note, Peking is aware that Sukarno is striving to put an end to incidents of this nature, and therefore probably realizes that there is little to be gained from a harsh attitude toward the formal Indonesian Government structure. (Limited Official Use) (ConGenTel 954)

7. Sino-Soviet Relations

A. On November 20, the People's Daily published the full text of Pravda's November 16 report by its Peking correspondent commenting on the massive Chicom "Refutation of New CPSU leaders" article (WEEKA 46). The editorial note prefacing the text harks back to charges often heard in earlier days of the Sino-Soviet dispute that the Soviet leaders are afraid to inform the Soviet people of the "facts" adduced by Chicom leaders to support their indictment of Soviet policies. The editorial note concludes that the three things most feared by the Soviet leaders are: "U.S.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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imperialism, (true) Marxism-Leninism, and the Soviet people and all revolutionary people of the world." (Unclassified)

Comment: The Chicom reaction to the Pravda article is entirely consistent with Peking's long-standing view that polemics in the Sino-Soviet dispute must be public. This view is in turn based on a conviction that open debate can serve only to expose the Soviets as "revisionists" and to reveal the Chinese as defenders of orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The Pravda article, on the other hand, although harshly worded was evidently an effort to play down the significance of the Chinese attack, in accordance with the Soviet policy of avoiding a showdown with Peking if at all possible. Although Moscow remains reluctant to join in battle with Peking, additional "provocation" from the Chinese side is likely to be forthcoming in the months to come. (Confidential) (ConGenTel 952)

B. Meanwhile, a sidelight to one of the key issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute came to our attention this week. A Western European correspondent was told by the Polish Ambassador in Peking that the withdrawal of 47 Chinese research workers from the Dubna nuclear research center in the USSR (which was announced by NCNA on June 23, 1965) was the result of their being denied full access to data and facilities at the center. It appears that the Soviets take seriously--at least as far as the Chinese are concerned-- the matter of nuclear non-proliferation, or as it is dubbed by Peking, "nuclear monopoly." (Limited Official Use)

8. Laos: Chicoms Protest Bombing of Khang Khay

Following NCNA reports that four U.S. F-105 fighter-bombers had bombed the Pathet Lao stronghold of Khang Khay and inflicted damage on the Chicom Cultural and Economic Mission and NCNA offices there, Peking on November 22 issued a Foreign Ministry statement strongly protesting the action as "a serious move by the U.S. imperialists to spread further the flames of war in Indo-China and one more open provocation against the Chinese people." The statement also charged the U.S. with intensifying the war in Laos in coordination with the "escalation of its war of aggression in Vietnam," specifically mentioning attacks by Laotian "rightists" against "liberated areas in central and lower Laos which are adjacent to South Vietnam."

Switching gears, the protest also accused Vientiane of following the U.S. "two Chinas" plot and of otherwise colluding with the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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U.S. "in carrying out planned provocations against China." Vientiane was warned that it "must bear serious responsibility for these actions which are in violation of the Geneva agreements and hostile to China." (Unclassified)

Comment: Peking's pro-forma response to this incident differs radically from its aroused and bellicose reaction to a similar incident in June 1964, which, however, involved Chinese casualties. At that time the regime warned of possible counteraction by the Chinese people and seized on the incident to call for emergency discussions by the Geneva-conference nations leading to a full-fledged conference. Reasons for Peking's different handling of the two incidents likely include: (1) an awareness by the regime of the futility of empty threats of Chicom intervention and (2) Peking's well-known distaste (during the last year or so) for any conferences or discussions which might lead to negotiations on Vietnam, probably resulting from greater confidence on the part of the Chicom leadership that U.S. intentions in the Indo-China area are limited. Chicoms may also be wary of drawing too much attention to the latter's logistic importance to the Vietcong.

9. Tunisia: Bourguiba Pictured As U.S. Servant

Communist China's sensitivity to criticism at a time when its international fortunes are at a low ebb was revealed last week in a Peking press campaign against Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba for alleged anti-Chinese statements, including those made in a September 11 interview with a correspondent for the French journal, Realites.

The theme of the campaign was expressed in a November 20 People's Daily Commentator article entitled, "Whom does Habib Bourguiba Serve?" The answer of course was that he serves U.S. "imperialism" and "slanders China" in order to gain American aid. Both Commentator and a protest note to the Tunisian Foreign Ministry (released by NCNA November 19) showed particular sensitivity to Bourguiba's alleged description of Chinese leaders as "madmen" intent on unleashing war and promoting racism. Such comments were termed "unwarranted" and the Chicom view that the root cause of all world tension is U.S. "imperialism" was reaffirmed.

Comment: Although the Chicom protest is sharp in tone and describes Sino-Tunisian relations as being "seriously impaired," nonetheless it concludes by expressing a hope rather than a demand for corrective Tunisian action. Further, the vagueness of the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Chicom warning in the event the protest goes unheeded-- "you will reap what you sow"--allows considerable flexibility for Peking, which in any event is probably not very anxious to precipitate a diplomatic rupture with an African state during this period of Chicom diplomatic adversity. (Limited Official Use) (ConGenTel 494)

10. Peking Maintains Drumfire of Protest Over Japan-ROK Treaty

For the second week in a row (see WEEKA 46) Peking vented its displeasure at the recently-ratified Japan-ROK Treaty. Elements of this week's campaign included a People's Daily November 18 editorial on Korea, an article in the same edition of the paper on the alleged revival of Japanese militarism, and a mass rally in Peking November 19.

The mass rally, which was given considerable play by NCNA, was addressed by Kuo Mo-jo and numerous foreign "friends" such as Frank Coe, an American resident in China. Kuo's speech, like Peking's other offerings on the subject for the week, broke no new ground but merely repeated hackneyed Chicom assertions that the treaty was a "war treaty" which threatened North Korea and China with aggression by a revived Japanese militarism acting in collusion with U.S. imperialism." (Unclassified)

Comment: The regime's anti-treaty comment declined heavily as the week ended, indicating that Peking's campaign may have passed its peak. (Unclassified)

11. Visitors

A. Tanzanian Official. Rashidi Kawawa, Second Vice-President of Tanzania, arrived in Peking from Pyongyang November 22 for a two-day visit at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai. His visit was preceded by considerable coverage by NCNA of alleged remarks he made in North Korea condemning U.S. "imperialism" and of the Tanzanian-North Korean joint communique which reflected views on Vietnam endorsed by Peking. Speaking to a banquet welcoming Kawawa, Chou En-lai warmly praised the Tanzanian leader for his Pyongyang statements and launched into a bitter tirade against the U.S. Chou also waxed at great length on the importance of Afro-Asian solidarity and how the recent Chinese performance at Algiers allegedly

0623

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

contributed to this solidarity. While NCNA reported that Kawawa's reply pictured Tanzania as supporting the Chicom and DRV position that "the people of Vietnam should be allowed to settle their own problems," the agency's coverage of his speech was extremely brief, possibly indicating that some of the visitor's remarks did not fall on friendly ears. Nevertheless, the very fact of Kawawa's presence in Peking has been given heavy play by the Chinese, who are anxious for evidence to show that their relations with Africa are good despite the collapse of the Afro-Asian conference.

Comment: It appears possible from the dearth of NCNA coverage of Kawawa's reply that he overstepped policy guidelines in North Korea and may have later gotten the word to tone down his remarks in China. More solid evidence may be available if the two sides decide to issue a joint communique (none was available to date although NCNA has already announced Kawawa's departure). (Limited Official Use)

B. Cambodian Military Delegation. A Cambodian military delegation, headed by Minister of Defence Lt. Gen. Lon Nol, arrived in Peking November 21 for talks with Chinese military officials. Speaking at a banquet the same evening, PLA chief Lo Jui-ching gave his guests the familiar Chicom assurance that should "U.S. imperialism dare to spread the flames of its war of aggression to peace-loving Cambodia, the 650 million Chinese People will not stand idly by. They will assuredly give all-out support to the fraternal Cambodian people." (Unclassified)

C. Former French Diplomat. The presence of Jean Chauvel, diplomat and French representative at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China, as French Foreign Ministry representative at the current French industrial exhibition in Peking has naturally raised speculation that Paris or Chauvel personally may attempt to probe the question of negotiations on Vietnam. Thus far, however, there has been no evidence which would lead to confirm such speculation. (Limited Official Use) (WER 47)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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(2) BANGKOK CANBERRA KARACHI MOSCOW RANGOON SOFIA VNTIANE
BELGRADE CPACPLAD KATHMANDU MUNICH ROME S'PORE COMNAVPHL
BUCHAREST DARESALAAM KLUMPUR NDELHI SAIGON (4)TAIPEI TAIWANDEFCOM
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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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L	P&R 1	AID 12
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OSD 46	USIA 11	NSA 3
NASA 4	HEW 1	NSC 6

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TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON 1965 NOV 22 PM 1 38

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POLITICAL

Internal

1. Campaign to Emulate Wang Chieh Goes into High Gear
2. New Party Members Recruited in Peking

External

3. Peking Blasts New CPSU Leaders
4. Peking Attacks Japan-ROK Treaty
5. Southern Rhodesia: British Charged with "Hypocrisy,"; "Struggle" Encouraged
6. Chou En-lai and the American Consulate General in Hong Kong
7. Peking's Comments on U.S. Build-up in Vietnam
8. Sino-Indian Border Incident

Military

9. Chicoms Claim Another Victory Over GRC Naval Forces

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Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,CKamman,JThomas,SYNg: DATTLO:Cdr.Haigh drb, 11/18/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. Campaign to Emulate Wang Chieh Goes into High Gear

Last week, local Party committees, military district authorities, PLA political departments, trade union federations, YCL organs, and other indoctrination units throughout the provinces directed their charges to "mobilize" themselves to study the life and diary of Wang Chieh, the new revolutionary martyr. (See WEEKA 45). It was clear from the directives, which occupied the major portion of provincial newsbroadcasting time during the week, that Wang Chieh's example is to be utilized as the inspirational fuel for all major current campaigns, and also as the latest patent medicine for a wide variety of ideological ills. Diligent civilian students of Wang's diary will find their revolutionary fervor heightened, their production quotas exceeded, Party organs rejuvenated, and socialist education furthered. Leading military cadres in Kwangtung plan to apply Wang to heal "sore spots in their thinking," (Canton City Service Nov. 14, 1045GMT) while other units look forward to an increase in their ability to resist U.S. imperialism. The PLA in Tibet has even been told that intense Wang-study will help it "love Tibet, the border areas, and the Tibetan race." (Radio Lhasa Nov. 12, 1300 GMT). (Unclassified)

Comment: From all indications, the campaign to learn from Wang Chieh will be on as large a scale as Lei Feng's apotheosis in 1963. However, size and intensity are no proof of effectiveness, as past campaigns have shown. Many Chinese considered the furor over Lei Feng a "gust of wind" which passed quickly leaving little behind. They are likely to regard Wang Chieh the same way.

Wang has already passed Lei in one respect however. Whereas Lei was awarded only the honorific title "Rust-Proof Screw (of the revolutionary machine)," Wang is known not only as "All-Purpose Screw" but also as a "Spiritual Atom Bomb." You can't do much better than that. (Limited Official Use)

2. New Party Members Recruited in Peking

NCNA November 14 reported that during 1965 a large number of politically advanced persons in Peking municipality have been admitted to the CCP. Party organs in Peking's mines, factories, communes and government offices have stepped up recruitment of new members as well as the training and testing of candidates. (Unclassified)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0627

Comment: Items in the press on recruitment of new Party members occur rarely and invariably resuscitate conjecture on the size of the Party as a whole. The last official figure given was "more than 17 million" (ConGen A-63, July 24, 1964). According to Korean War non-repatriate Morris Wills, a source he considered reliable reported that Party membership had expanded to a total of 21 million in 1963, but that the number was subsequently reduced to a current total of between 18 and 20 million members. Unfortunately, lack of data makes it difficult to either confirm or deny Wills' report. (Confidential)

External

3. Peking Blasts New CPSU Leaders

A joint People's Daily-Red Flag article of November 11 dispelled any remaining ambiguity surrounding Peking's position towards the new CPSU leaders. The article, which ran to 18,000 Chinese characters, rejected categorically Soviet calls over the past year for unity of the international Communist movement and revealed that the Chicoms view the split with the Soviets as permanent, barring complete Soviet capitulation. The basis of the schism between them is, according to the article, a "class antagonism between proletariat and bourgeoisie," and is therefore, by Maoist definition, "an irreconcilable antagonism."

The article does not confine its refutation of the Soviet position to ideological points; on the contrary, it spells out concrete grounds of disagreement. As the Chicoms see it, the "crux of the matter" is that the Soviets are "collaborating with U.S. imperialism to dominate the world." Thus, the article is the clearest manifestation to date that the heart of the dispute involves differences between the Chinese and Soviets over the question of how to deal with the U.S., with all the implications this has for such situations as Vietnam and Taiwan, as well as the broader problem of the correct line on peaceful co-existence. Paradoxically, by laying primary emphasis on Moscow's "mistaken" policies towards the U.S., the article creates a distinct impression that all the other serious sins of the Soviets (which are listed in detail throughout the article) could be tolerated by the Chicoms if only Moscow had the correct outlook on opposition to "U.S. imperialism."

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Testifying to the importance of Vietnam in Peking's schema, of the article's seven parts one entire section is devoted to an attack on Soviet policy in Vietnam. Peking charges that the Khrushchev policy of disengagement has given way to the new leaders' policy of involvement, but with the same aim as before--"peace talks which could go on indefinitely," thus allowing the United States to "hang on indefinitely." Specifically, the article states that Kosygin approached Chinese leaders last February en route to Hanoi and urged that a way out of Vietnam be found for the United States. The Chicoms claim that their refusal to make a "deal" with the U.S. was accepted by Kosygin, but that he soon went back on his word and again began promoting negotiations. Soviet aid to Vietnam, far from being a sign of support for the Vietnamese people in their struggle with imperialism, is attacked for being insufficient and an effort to involve the Soviets in Vietnam so that they might "meet the needs of U.S. imperialism" with which they are "working in close collaboration." As a reflection of Chinese Communist policy on Vietnam, the article confirms that Peking remains adamantly opposed to negotiations, but in spite of blaming the Soviets for inadequate aid, does not raise the threat of active Chicom involvement there.

The article is also a source of information on Peking's foreign policy in general. It persists in the simplistic view of the world (typified by Lin Piao's September 2 article) as the scene of "fierce struggle between the revolutionary people of the world on one hand and the imperialists headed by the U.S. and their lackeys on the other." It makes much of the regime's alleged dedication to principles which are not subject to bargaining or compromise as the basis of Chinese foreign policy. However, the regime leaves itself a certain amount of maneuvering space by reaffirming its willingness to unite with "all the forces opposing the U.S.," even "capitalists" provided the latter's contradictions with the U.S. can be exploited to Peking's advantage. Finally, the article contains an implicit recognition of the foreign policy reverses suffered by the regime in recent months. It characterizes the world situation as one in which a process of "great upheaval, great division and great reorganization is taking place." This formulation had been used a few days earlier by Liu Ning-yi and Chen Yi and is apparently the standard rationale adopted by Peking to describe its setbacks of late. (ConGentel 886). (Confidential)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Comment: Besides the fact that this article and the resulting resumption of verbal hostilities by the Soviets in a Pravda article of November 16 mark the opening of an apparently new phase in the Sino-Soviet dispute, there are a number of inferences that may be drawn from it regarding forthcoming developments in Peking's policies at home and abroad. First, the article raises the question of Hanoi's reaction to Peking's intimation that the North Vietnamese are in effect dupes of the Soviets. It implies that Chicom patience over Hanoi's continued expression of gratitude for Soviet aid may not be inexhaustible.

Second, the intransigency of the regime on the need for single-minded opposition to the U.S. and its concomitant belief in the rectitude of its own position hold out the promise of further difficulties in its dealings with the third world.

Third, although this attack may have been triggered by Chinese disgust with the Soviet attitude towards Vietnam, there has been an increasing tendency in recent weeks for Peking to make a fetish of the regime's devotion to "principles" in international behavior. It is possible that a sense of ideological purity and socialist morality may now pervade the thinking of the leaders to the extent that the Chicoms may decide to force a showdown on such matters as formalizing the schism in world Communism, effecting a partial or total rupture of Sino-Soviet bilateral relations, or compelling Hanoi to choose allegiance to one or the other center of Communist power.

Fourth, the article's attacks on the Kosygin economic reforms at the October Plenum indicate continuing Chicom devotion to a Stalinist-type centrally planned and managed economy, with a minimum of capitalist concessions to the peasantry. Nor is it too far-fetched to regard admonitions that true "Marxist-Leninists must never abandon or slur over principles" as directed towards possible internal factions favoring "revisionist" policies or "socialism in one country." This may be the hidden meaning of the couplet at the article's conclusion-- "with power and to spare, we must not cease the pursuit or halt in mid-course for the sake of idle laurels." (Confidential)

4. Peking Attacks Japan-ROK Treaty

Peking has vigorously attacked the Japanese lower house ratification of the treaty with South Korea, but Peking's harsh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

words do not appear to forecast any change in the regime's willingness to deal economically with Japan.

A November 15 People's Daily editorial pictured the treaty ratification as "a serious step taken by U.S. imperialism in ganging up with Japanese reactionaries for actively widening the war in Asia." Borrowing the strident language of Chen Yi's September 29 press conference, the editorial declared that "even in the extreme case of China being invaded at the same time by U.S. imperialism, Japanese militarists. . . other imperialist powers, Indian reactionaries and all sorts of allies and followers of U.S. imperialism. . . they will get themselves smashed to smithereens." (We are of the opinion that the Soviet Union is included within the category of allies and followers of U.S. imperialism, although the People's Daily formulation is far more subtle than Chen Yi's recent reference to attacks by "modern revisionists in the North.")

Peking further emphasized its opposition to the treaty with a November 16 Government statement on the subject. The statement followed closely along the lines of the People's Daily editorial, and the only new element in it was the declaration that the "Chinese Government cannot but express great indignation at this serious step taken by the Sato Government of Japan and protest against it." The vague nature of this protest and the failure to mention any possible sanctions in the event it went unheeded further reinforces our impression that Peking presently is not contemplating any major action to head off the treaty.

Comment: It is possible that the Chicoms, with their "siege" mentality, may be genuinely concerned over the long-range possibility of Japanese rearmament under the aegis of the U.S. However, the failure to date to back up the verbal attack with anything that could be construed as a threat to Japanese economic ties with the mainland indicates that the regime does not really view the Japan-ROK treaty as adding to its security problem. To us, it appears that Peking's tactics, including the vast publicity given to the issue, are aimed at contributing to pressures within Japan against the treaty.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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5. Southern Rhodesia: British Charged with "Hypocrisy,"; "Struggle" Encouraged

Southern Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence last week provided Peking with ammunition to ridicule the policies of the Labor Government and to call for armed struggle in Southern Rhodesia.

From a Government Statement and a People's Daily editorial both issued November 14 and from several NCNA news items, the following two common themes emerged: (1) The Smith Regime and the British Government were "jackals of the same lair" who differed only on how to maintain colonial rule in Southern Rhodesia; (2) since Britain had no intention of bestowing independence on Rhodesia, and since outside forces such as the U.N. were of no use, the only course open to Africans in Rhodesia was armed struggle. To give added play to this latter thesis, NCNA approvingly carried several pronouncements by African nationalists calling on Africans in Rhodesia to carry out warfare against the Smith Regime. From a distance of 7,000 miles, Peking also loudly proclaimed itself to be "behind" the Zambabwe people.

6. Chou En-lai and the American Consulate General in Hong Kong

A Western Ambassador stationed in Peking who was vacationing in Hong Kong last week has told us of a comment made by Chou En-lai concerning the American Consulate General in Hong Kong (that's us). During the Ambassador's brief contact with Chou at a recent national day reception, Chou asked if the Ambassador was busy; when the latter replied that, yes he was busy but more due to administrative matters than to his regular diplomatic duties, Chou commented that he (Chou) was also kept very busy on the administrative side thanks to the large size of the staff under his jurisdiction. Chou then went on to make the observation that his administrative difficulties were comparable to those of the American Consulate General in Hong Kong which, he said, has a large staff and many sections. Because these sections aren't able to get along with one another, Chou remarked, "even with their large staff the Americans don't know much about China." (Confidential)

Comment: We hope that we know more about China than Chou knows about us. In any event, we find it interesting that Chou should touch upon the activities of the ConGen, which have not been brought up in public Chicom media for quite some time.

7. Peking's Comments on U.S. Build-up In Vietnam

Peking reacted to recent Washington announcements of a further U.S. military build-up in Vietnam with a NCNA November 13 report

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

outlining the alleged "mortal weaknesses in the U.S. war adventure." The weaknesses cited by NCNA included a growing popular American campaign against the "unjust" U.S. war in Vietnam, the alleged low morale of American troops in Vietnam and a lengthy supply line complicated by a shortage of shipping.

In an apparent continuing effort to counter the impression of U.S. progress in Vietnam, Peking also gave considerable attention to an alleged Viet Cong victory at Bau Bang on November 12 in which "two battalions of the US. forces of aggression were annihilated." NCNA's comment on the "victory" included the assertion that "in the four months from July to October, more than six thousand U.S. troops were knocked out of action" and the claim of a succession of Viet Cong victories over American troops in the central highlands and near Saigon since the latter half of October. The Ta Kung Pao editorially cited the Bau Bang "victory" as proof that "the final outcome of fighting is decided by the courage of man and that the people's war is invincible." To contribute further to the appearance of substance behind the claimed Bau Bang outcome, Peking touched off a host of congratulatory messages from Chinese "popular organizations" to their Vietnamese counterparts on this alleged victory of the Vietnamese people. The common theme of these messages was that Bau Bang demonstrates the "ever growing strength of the Vietnamese people while the U.S. aggressors descend into ever more miserable defeat." (Limited Official Use)

Comment: Not too long ago an announcement of intended U.S. reinforcements for Vietnam would have brought forth Peking's response about "not standing idly by," etc. Now Peking appears compelled by its own widely recognized reluctance to become involved militarily with the U.S. to dwell on the alleged invincibility of people's war. (Confidential)

8. Sino-Indian Border Incident

An exchange of shots between Indian and Chinese forces on the Sino-Sikkim border was followed immediately by a Chicom note to the Indians dated November 13 lodging "the strongest protest with the Indian Government against this provocation by Indian troops crossing the boundary and making unwarranted attack on the Chinese frontier guards on duty." The note inferred that the Indian armed attack in question was still underway and warned that "the situation

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

is extremely grave, and the Chinese authorities concerned are following it closely." After another day or two of taunts and insults flung at the Indians, the matter dropped out of the regime's press. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: We view this localized incident as an expected aftermath of the recent Sino-Indian border crisis and without any particular significance. Undoubtedly, there will be similar such incidents in the months ahead. (Confidential)

Military

9. Chicoms Claim Another Victory Over GRC Naval Forces

The Chinese Communist press on 17 November depicted as a "decisive victory" the clash between the GRC frigate "Yung-Chang" and the submarine chaser "Yung-Tai" and eight PLA fleet gunboats off the coast of Chung-Wu, Fukien on the night of 14-15 November. According to the Chicom version, the frigate "Yung-Chang" was sunk and the "Yung-Tai" fled after being damaged. No Chicom losses were stated and the regime's press quote captured GRC survivors as saying that they were hopelessly out-fought and had no chance.

The NCNA radio photo service distributed a photo showing Chinese People's naval forces giving medical care to captured GRC sailors who were reported as expressing deep gratitude for the lenient treatment accorded to them.

The regime is treating this latest alleged naval victory along exactly the same lines as it did the August 6 clash with GRC naval forces. It pictures the "victory" as an indication of the combat-sharpness of PLA forces and as "a serious warning to the U.S. imperialists who are frantically escalating their war of aggression against Vietnam and intensifying their military provocations against China." (Unclassified)

Comment: Although the regime is crowing about the naval "victory," it has kept silent on the IL-28 defection and on how the U.S. should view that development. (Limited Official Use)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

POUCHED:

(2) BANGKOK CANBERRA KARACHI MOSCOW RANGOON SOFIA VNTIANE
BELGRADE CPACPLAD KATHMANDU MUNICH ROME S'PORE COMNAVPHL
BUCHAREST DARESALAAM KLUMPUR NDELHI SAIGON(4) TAIPEI 13AFMANILA
BUDAPEST DJAKARTA MANILA PRAGUE SEOUL TOKYO TAIWANDEFCOM
LONDON

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ORIGIN/ACTION

INR-10

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR 3	FE 6
NEA	CU 3	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AIO 13
2	1	1
AGR 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 7
OSD 46	USIA 11	NSA 3
NASA 4	HEW 1	NSC 6

1965 NOV 22 PM 10 40

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1965 NOV 24 AM 6 15

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AIRGRAM

FOL 2-1 CHICOM

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A-329 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | Air Pouch HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON 1965 NOV 22 PM 8 19

INFO: (See distribution list on last page.)

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG DATE: Nov 11, 1965

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 45

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Regime Promotes New Revolutionary Hero
2. Reduction in Length of Primary and Secondary Education Contemplated

External

3. Editorial Silence on Vietnam Broken
4. Adverse Indonesian Developments Reported at Length
5. Sino-Soviet Relations: Chronicle of Anti-Chinese Statements; Peking on October Revolution
6. NLHX Manifesto Supported

Action Assigned to RFE/OD

Action Taken

Date of Action

Action Office Symbol

Name of Officer

Direction to RM/R

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,CKamman,SYNg,drb:11/10/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. Regime Promotes New Revolutionary Hero

The latest Lei Feng is a bright young martyr named Wang Chieh who blew himself up last July while teaching Kiangsu militiamen demolition techniques. Wang, a squad leader in Tsinan PLA unit engineering company was on detail training commune militia on July 14 when some explosives accidently went off. "At the most critical moment he disregarded his own safety and threw himself on the point of the explosion," (apparently one of the lengthier detonations), saving the lives of twelve others.

Predictably, Wang kept a diary, --100,000 words long, in fact--stuffed with good deeds, pure intentions and Mao's thought. By his own account Wang was the hardest struggler, the frugalest liver, the most ardent socialist theatergoer, and the worst demolitions expert to come down the straight and narrow revolutionary path since Lei Feng died beneath a falling telephone pole some three years ago. His only aim, as expressed in his diary entry of February 8, 1962 was to become "a real man...a tame tool of the Party, and an orderly of the people."

On November 6 the General Political Department of the PLA issued a directive calling on the whole army to follow Vice Chairman Lin Piao's call to "Learn from Wang Chieh," in an effort to create a new high tide in the study of Mao's works. Separate similar appeals were issued by the All China Federation of Trade Unions and the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League. Provincial PLA and Party units also received instructions to rev up their campaign machinery. All the Peking papers responded during the past week by printing extolling editorials and exerpts from Wang's diary. The ultimate accolade was bestowed last week when the 23 year old soldier became a posthumous Party member. (Unclassified)

Comment: Finding revolutionary martyrs during peace time is a difficult task. The circumstances surrounding Lei Feng's death were hardly the sort that brought a lump to the throat of the masses, nor were those which led to the demise of others who have followed, one of whom was run over by a train, another of whom collapsed after a particularly taxing mountain goat-chase, and another of whom fell into a ravine while fighting a forest fire. Wang Chieh was no exception.

Even the most sympathetic analysis of Wang's diary makes Lei Feng look a towering literary figure by comparison. His entries are so pat, simple, and empty, that even the dullest

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

peasant will wonder about their authenticity. The fact that Party propagandists feel constrained to base what appears to be yet another major campaign on such fluff is an indication of the regime's ideological stultification. (Limited Official Use)

2. Reduction in Length of Primary and Secondary Education Contemplated

According to a Japanese Consulate source, a recently arrived 27 year-old repatriate who was a schoolteacher in Mukden revealed that the present twelve year primary and secondary school formula is under review. The formula, which calls for six years of primary school, three years of junior middle school, and three years of senior middle school has been criticized as "too lengthy." As a result, an abreviated scheme requiring five years of primary school and a combined total of five years for both junior and senior middle school is "being tried out everywhere." The ex-teacher believed that the changeover to the new system would be completed in two to three years. (Confidential)

Comment: Shortening the basic term of schooling, if actually put into effect, will ease somewhat the growing demand placed on limited facilities by an enormous school age population. It will also close the gap between educational level and actual job opportunities which has undermined the morale of many youngsters sent to the countryside who felt they had been trained for better things. On the other hand, general educational standards are likely to suffer in the long run. (Limited Official Use)

External

3. Editorial Silence on Vietnam Broken

Peking broke a two months editorial silence on Vietnam with two People's Daily editorials on the subject within three days of each other. The first editorial was published on November 5 and appeared designed to counter the growing impression abroad that the Vietnam war situation was now going more favorably for the U.S. The editorial declared that the "U.S. propaganda machine has worked overtime to create an atmosphere of optimism," but the recent NLF "victories" at Plei Me, Chu Lai and Danang demonstrate that "superiority lies not with the U.S. imperialists, but remains forever in the hands of the Vietnamese people." It further forecast that the South Vietnam situation "will never develop according to the subjective wishes of U.S. imperialism but according to the rules of people's war." The editorial

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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reiterated the standard Chicom assertions on men over weapons and on the ability of a people's war conducted by millions to swallow up the enemy regardless of his strength.

The second People's Daily editorial on November 8 was pegged to a November 5 protest by North Vietnam over the "arrival of U.S. reinforcements on a large scale to escalate the war of aggression against Vietnam." In rather uninspired fasion the editorial ticked off Peking's standard line on the U.S. "peace hoax" and on the impossibility of the U.S. "escaping its ultimate fiasco in Vietnam." The editorial revealed Peking's opposition to negotiations in its description of the "conflict between the Vietnamese people--and U.S. imperialism" as "irreconcilable." (Limited Official Use)

Comment: The editorials notably omitted reference to any Chicom role in Vietnam in the event the U.S. "expands its war of aggression." As has been Peking's tendency in recent months, the editorials picture the Vietnam situation as a "people's war" in which victory is assured the Vietnamese people through protracted struggle. The presumption behind this line is that active Chicom involvement is not required for the ultimate victory, although Peking will recognize its international proletarian duty by morally and materially assisting the Vietnamese people in their struggle.

One possible factor accounting for Peking's editorial attention to a routine North Vietnam protest may be the regime's concern that the tide of U.S. reinforcements is in fact causing increased difficulties for the Viet Cong.

4. Adverse Indonesian Developments Reported at Length

During the week the Chinese public was informed in detail by the regime of the growing anti-Communist and anti-Chinese tide in Indonesia. NCNA reported the details of a Noverber 4 note to Indonesia pretesting a riot two days earlier against the Chinese Communist Consulate at Medan which was alleged to have been "organized by the Indonesian right wing forces (and) carried out at the instigation and with the support of the Medan military and government authorities." The note demanded an Indonesian public apology, the formal return of the Chinese flag and emblem which had been carried away, punishment of the culprits and instigators and a guarantee for the future safety of the Chinese Consulates at Medan, Bandjarmasin and Makasar.

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

On November 5 NCNA carried a long report on the "evil anti-China current spreading in Indonesia." The report noted that despite President Sukarno's call for an "end to activities designed to whip up hatred against China,...on the orders of the right wing forces, Indonesian Army units and hooligan" have committed a succession of outrages against Chinese diplomatic personnel and local Chinese. NCNA reeled off a number of these incidents, denying in the process alleged rumors concerning Chinese involvement in the September 30th movement and Chinese arms cached in Conefo building materials. The NCNA report ended on the pessimistic note that the anti- Chinese movement "has not ceased, and there are even signs of its spreading and growing in intensity."

Finally, People's Daily on November 7 again published a long NCNA round-up on developments in Indonesia for the period following that covered by the initial NCNA round-up of October 19. This latest round-up appears to have been based on Western and Indonesian press reports and presents a largely factual account of the adverse situation now facing the regime. The round-up's only effort to relieve an otherwise completely gloomy account of recent PKI and Chinese Communist set-backs is a brief reference to U.S. press reports which are described as expressing the "fear that the Indonesian progressive forces and people may fight back." (Limited Official Use)

Comment: It appears that Peking hopes that a hard-line approach to Indonesia may provide those in Djakarta who seek to preserve the essentially radical international posture of the Republic with ammunition to use against the Army. Although Peking to date appears to have been successful in encouraging Sukarno to speak in its behalf, as long as the traditionally anti-Chinese and anti-Communist military and Moslem elements retain the upper-hand the regime's prospects in Indonesia appear bleak.

Should Peking conclude that there is little chance of restoring its position in Indonesia, it is possible that the regime might take a more active and covert role in helping the PKI resist the military. (Confidential)

5. Sino-Soviet Relations: Chronicle of Anti-China Statements; Peking on October Revolution

In the People's Daily for November 10 the Chinese resumed their practice of the Khrushchev era by publishing a compendium of

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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"anti-Chinese" statements by CPSU leaders and others in the Soviet camp since the March Consultative Conference of Parties in Moscow. This time, however, it was not Khrushchev whose remarks were being reprinted but Brezhnev, Polyansky and Ponomarev. In an editorial note prefacing nearly three pages of text, the new Soviet leadership is alleged to have told the Chinese Party and Government delegation (headed by Chou En-lai) just a month after Khrushchev's downfall that "there was not a shade of difference between themselves and Khrushchev on the question of the international Communist movement or of relations with China." The purpose of publishing the "anti-Chinese statements," explains the editorial note, is to "expose the new leadership of the CPSU in their true colors as revisionists and splitters and show the complete falsity of their talk about 'united action' and a 'halt to public polemics'." In addition to CPSU statements, other countries are represented in the following quantitative order of "anti-Chinese statements" Czechoslovakia (only country exceeding USSR), Hungary, Bulgaria, Italian CP, French CP, GDR, and Poland.

The chronicle followed by only three days a tough editorial in the People's Daily on the anniversary of the October Revolution. The editorial reminded the Soviets that the central task of revolution is "seizure of state power by force of arms" and that "victory in one country" is not enough. It said the impairment of relations between the two parties and countries was "no fault of ours.... The Soviet people do not wish to see this happen." Other treatment of the anniversary also stressed solidarity and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples, with a clear implication that the new Soviet leadership is to blame for mutual differences. At a Soviet Embassy reception on the eve of the anniversary attended by Chou En-lai, Peng Chen, Chen Yi and other top Party and government leaders, Chen praised the accomplishments of the Soviet people but devoted much of his speech to substantiating the thesis that U.S. imperialism is "nearing its doom." Another sign of the cooling attitude of Peking to the new Soviet leaders was the downgrading of "sincerest and warmest" greetings extended last year in a Party-government message to "warm" greetings in this year's message.

Meanwhile, an analysis of the Chicom account of the latest Communist front international meeting (WIDF at Salzburg) indicates that North Korea may have moved somewhat closer to Moscow in the ideological dispute. Its firm backong of the Chicom position at two meetings in September has given way to abstaining (along with the DRV) on issues where the Chinese and Soviets are most sharply

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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divided. Like Hanoi, however, Pyongyang has continued to stand firm on the necessity of condemning U.S. "aggression" in Vietnam. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: Attacks on the new Soviet leadership come as no surprise, since the Chicoms have made it plain since March that they regard present Soviet policies as Khrushchevism without Khrushchev. Nevertheless, the latest developments may be a prelude to bigger things to come at the anticipated December CCP Congress. (Confidential)

6. NLHX Manifesto Supported

Peking is now giving considerable attention to the Manifesto of the Laotian National Political Consultative Conference which was first published in verbatim text and without comment by NCNA on October 27. On November 8 NCNA carried a statement on the Manifesto by an unidentified "leading official" of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Chinese "united front" counterpart of the Laotian source of the Manifesto. On the following day the People's Daily editorially commented on the Manifesto and three Chinese "popular" organizations issued statements on the subject.

The regime's treatment of the Manifesto is without surprise. Of greatest significance, Peking to date has failed to address itself specifically to that section of the Manifesto which reserves the NLHX's "right to call for--material support from the peace-loving peoples and countries of the world--(including) money, food, medicines and all other necessary means to improve our life and increase our equipment in the fight." On this point, the People's Daily editorial merely notes that "the Chinese Government and people have always supported the patriotic and just struggle of the Laotian people." The other Chinese statements affirm that the Chinese people "will continue to give all necessary support and assistance to the Laotian people." In somewhat stronger fashion, the English NCNA version of the People's Daily editorial further declares that "the Chinese people are ready to fight together with the Laotian people for smashing U.S. policies of war and aggression and for safeguarding peace in Indo-China and Southeast Asia." However, the Chinese version of the editorial uses the term "strive together with the Laotian people" not "fight together-- etc,", a possible indication that the regime does not wish to create concern among its populace over prospective hostilities with the U.S. on Laos.

0642

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

The remainder of Peking's comment is devoted to expressions of support for the political content of the Manifesto, including the latter's demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces alleged to be illegally in Laos and the holding of tripartite talks among the Lao factions. The regime also hails the Manifesto as a sign of strengthened unity among the Lao people which would contribute to the defense of Laos and the frustration of U.S. plans to expand the war in Indo-China. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: The Chicom reaction to the NLHX Manifesto seems calculated to give a maximum appearance of support while avoiding a direct, official Peking commitment to do anything. Indeed, there is nothing in Peking's comments to indicate any change in the regime's present policy of going along with the status quo in Laos to avoid either jeopardizing Viet Cong supply lines or stimulating a strong American reaction to developments in a country bordering China. However, if Peking should ultimately decide to play a more direct role, the political groundwork has been laid. (Confidential)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED:

(2) BANGKOK, BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, CANBERRA, CPACPLAD, DARESALAAM, DJAKARTA, KARACHI, KATHMANDU, KLUMPUR, MANILA, LONDON, MOSCOW, MUNICH, NDELHI, PRAGUE, RANGOON, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, SOFIA, S'PORE, (4)TAIPEI 13, TOKYO, VNTIANE, COMNAVPHL, AFMANILA, TAIWANDEFCOM

0643

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ORIGIN ACTION

INR-10

RMVR	REP	AF
1		5
ARA	EUR	FE
	5	6
NEA	CU	INR
	5	
E	P	ID
	1	
L	SCI	AID
	4	12
S/IC	S/PC	RSR
1	1	1
AGR	COM	FRB
2	2	
INT	LAB	TAR
	2	
TR	XMB	AIR
2		10
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	7
DSD	USIA	NSA
46	11	3
PC	HCM	NSC
2	1	6

1965 NOV 8 PM 1 30

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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A-316 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIRPOUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

1965 NOV 10 19

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

RMVAN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

NUCKMAN

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG DATE: NOVEMBER 5, 1965

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 44

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. T'ao Chu Returns to Central-South Region - Peking Meetings Over?
2. More Emphasis Than Ever on Mao-Study
3. Young Communist League Waters Down Standards in Recruiting Drive

External

4. A-A Conference Postponed: Chicom Boycott Bears Fruit
5. Algerian Revolution Anniversary Celebrated in Peking
6. Sino-Soviet Relations: Polemics Stepped Up
7. "Thai Independence Movement" First Anniversary

RFE/OD noted

Nov 10 INR/RFE/AC Rwkmeeker file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED 1965 NOV 9 PM 1 15

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,CKamman,YSNg:drb, 11/4/65

Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

0644

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. T'ao Chu Returns to Central-South Region - Peking Meetings Over?

The Canton Yang Cheng Wan Pao reported on October 24 that CCP Central South Regional Bureau First Secretary and Vice Premier T'ao Chu had the day before received delegates to the National Youth Conference on Scientific Experimentation at Foshan, Kwangtung. (Unclassified)

Comment: This is the first time that any of the Regional Bureau First Secretaries has been sighted back in his own bailiwick since their unusual appearance together in Peking for the National Day celebrations sparked speculation of a top level conference. The assumption is that the meetings, if any, are now over. While the other regional chiefs have not yet appeared in their areas, the fact that they have not been sighted in Peking for several weeks leads to speculation that they, too, have gone home. Northeast Bureau First Secretary Sung Jen-chiung, North China Bureau First Secretary Li Hsueh-feng, and Southwest Bureau First Secretary Li Ching-chuan last appeared in public at a reception for model workers in Peking on October 10, (see WEEKA 41). Northwest Bureau First Secretary Liu Lan-tao made his last appearance in Peking on October 13 greeting the Central Government delegation on its return from the Sinkiang Tenth Anniversary celebrations. (Limited Official Use)

2. More Emphasis Than Ever on Mao-Study

Since the beginning of 1964, study of the works of Mao Tse-tung has been pushed as the solution for all Communist China's problems, be they ideological or practical. In recent weeks new indications have come out of the mainland of the pervasive extent to which the campaign has gone, and the organizational efforts made to insure that a well thumbed copy of the Chairman's writings is in the pocket of every Chinese. On November 1, Radio Sian (2210 GMT) announced the establishment of a spare-time Party school in Chiangjen brigade, Hsiliu commune, using as its basic text Edition B of Mao's works, in an effort to implant more firmly in cadres' minds the seeds of the socialist education (read "four clearance") campaign just past. On the same day, Canton City Service (0440 GMT) told listeners that Communism evening schools had been set up in various parts of the city under the joint auspices of Street Party Committees, Street Administration Offices, and police stations. Special local committees chosen from those elements were mapping out Mao-study plans for the residents in their areas.

0645

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

On October 10, the Peking Kuang Ming Jih Pao stated that more than 57 million copies of selected readings from Mao's works had been sent to the rural areas this year. After the number of various individual editions of Mao articles had been added, a total of 100 million Mao books had reached the Chinese countryside since January. Returnee Morris Wills told us this week that white-collar workers he knows in Peking study Mao four times a week, twice during office hours, and twice at evening sessions. These Mao-study sessions are inviolable, and unaffected by recent conscious Party efforts to cut down the number of redundant meetings called by other organizations with which workers are affiliated. (Confidential)

Comment: A conversation overheard last month by Wills between two Peking ditchdiggers taking their lunch break from work on a trench behind the Foreign Languages Press may help put these stories of collective diligence into better context:

Ditchdigger A (sarcastically): "Friend, if you have any problems, study Mao's works. They'll solve everything."

Ditchdigger B: "I don't care how much you study Mao, he can't solve my problem."

Ditchdigger A: "What's that?"

Ditchdigger B: "I need more money, that's what. And no amount of Mao-study's going to make me any more money!" (Confidential)

3. Young Communist League Waters Down Standards in Recruiting Drive

YCL organs in Hofei have recently completed a recruiting drive which by September had gained them 3,000 new members since the beginning of the year. Most of the new youth leaguers come from proletarian or poor peasant class backgrounds. However, following the principle of "attaching importance to behavior," the Hofei YCL organization also recruited "progressive" youths who had "rebelled against their exploiting-class families." (Radio Hofei, October 29, 0940 GMT) (Unclassified)

Comment: The Party has realized that automatically excluding the children of bourgeois or landlord parents from YCL membership simply perpetuates a group of dissatisfied young outsiders forced

0646

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

to grow up with the same attitudes as their parents. As a result, emphasis over past months has been placed on recruiting some youths from the Rightest side of the tracks. At least part of this theory, however, may be a rationalization for padding recruitment figures in an effort to satisfy demands by the YCL leaders for a larger membership. Other recent articles in the mainland press, particularly China Youth, which urge basic level YCL organizations to take another look at applicants who have been turned down, and to overlook minor faults, also lend weight to the impression that the League is watering down its entry standards to increase participation in the league. (Limited Official Use)

External

4. A-A Conference Postponed: Chicom Boycott Bears Fruit

On November 2, NCNA was able to report with satisfaction and relief from Algiers that the "forcibly convened" Foreign Ministers' Meeting which was to have been the prelude to a full-dress "Second Bandung" Conference had decided to postpone the conference indefinitely and "the Bandung spirit. . . prevails once again after overcoming all obstacles." It was clear from Peking's statements throughout the week that its boycott of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in no way signified a relaxation of its efforts to block the conference. These efforts included a 2000-word People's Daily editorial on October 29 addressed to the Foreign Ministers as an "appeal" (though its tenor was more one of demand) and considerable diplomatic activity abroad resulting in an outpouring (at least as reported by NCNA) of foreign statements calling for postponement. The People's Daily editorial and the lengthy NCNA account of the stormy Foreign Ministers' sessions that eventually culminated in postponement stressed that it was the American "imperialists," hard at work behind the scenes, who were twisting the arms of Afro-Asians to gain support for convening Bandung II as scheduled. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: The regime's fulminations against the conference (Congentel 768) are an indication of the extent to which it feels its prestige and face are involved in the issue. As in its approach to other foreign policy issues of late, Peking worked itself up to the point where it had elevated its desired goals into a matter of principle, at a cost of flexibility in the process.

Peking's reports of the postponement as a victory for the forces of "unity" hides the fact that the acrimony among the nations upon which Peking once relied in its "struggle against

0647
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

imperialism" has left Afro-Asian "solidarity" in a state of great disarray. However, the wounded Chinese ego may be somewhat assuaged by the knowledge that their boycott was instrumental in putting off once again the oft-postponed meeting, this time, perhaps for good. At this stage we wonder if further attempts to convene the conference will be greeted by enthusiasm from any quarter. (Confidential)

5. Algerian Revolution Anniversary Celebrated in Peking

Despite sharp disagreement between Algiers and Peking on the Afro-Asian Conference, Premier Chou En-lai and Vice Premiers Chin Yi and Li Hsien-nien showed up at a November 1 reception at the Algerian Embassy in Peking on the anniversary of the Algerian Revolution. Chen Yi delivered a speech which emphasized friendship and sympathy with the Algerian people but displayed considerable coolness towards the Boumedienne Government. Judging by the NCNA summary of his remarks, the bulk of his speech was devoted to a blistering attack on U.S. imperialism. Only at the end did he manage a statement that "the Chinese Government and people are prepared to work together with the Algerian Government and people for the great cause of Afro-Asian unity against imperialism and for the further development of friendly relations between our two countries." In contrast, Algerian Chargé Khouri Mohamed spoke of Algeria's domestic achievements, then reminded the guests that Algeria intended to "remain true to its policy of strict non-alignment." He voiced support for peoples the world over who are struggling to free themselves from colonialism and to oppose "deliberate aggression by the world's biggest imperialist power." This was his strongest anti-imperialist remark reported by NCNA--hardly a match for Chen's dramatic declamation that "history is... leading to the final extinction (of the imperialists and their followers) in the raging fire of the struggle of the world's peoples against U.S. imperialism." (Unclassified)

Comment: The Chicoms, who have scarcely contained their anger at the Algerians over the past two weeks with respect to the Afro-Asian Conference, must nourish hopes that once the Conference issue has blown over the Algerians can be brought back into the fold of "true believers" in the Chinese world revolution doctrine. We wonder, however, whether the Algerians will soon forget the scorn heaped upon them by the Chinese representative at A-A Preparatory Committee meetings, details of which were dutifully reported to the world by the Chicom press.

0648

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

6. Sino-Soviet Relations: Polemics Stepped Up

The October 31 issue of People's Daily devoted more than a full page to reprinting the full text of the Albanian Zeri i Popullit's October 16 article marking the first anniversary of Khrushchev's ouster. (An English text is available in the Albanian section of FBIS for October 20.) The article emphasizes that the present Soviet leadership has continued Khrushchev's policy of "two-power domination of the world" and charges that, if anything, "the new leaders have gone farther (than he) in executing the Khrushchev revisionist line."

According to the article, "it is now proved that there exists a secret plan on Vietnam between the imperialists and the modern revisionists." Furthermore, it alleges, the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in a "conspiracy" to establish an atomic monopoly, as shown by Gromyko's proposals at the U.N. for nuclear non-proliferation. An indication of the possible future course of the polemics is the statement that "compromise between the Khrushchev revisionists and Marxist Leninists (i.e., Chicoms) is out of the question. . . the fight against the Khrushchev revisionists must be carried through to the end. . . . The present differences are not the result of misunderstanding. . . (they) mirror the struggle on an international scale between two antagonistic classes--the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. They are irreconcilable and will be resolved only when modern revisionism is shattered, both politically and ideologically." (Unclassified)

Comment: The basic theses of the Albanian article were elaborated earlier this year by Peking in the People's Daily-Red Flag article of June 14. Nevertheless, the vehemence and shrillness of the Albanian article approaches the level of mid-1963 exchanges between the Chinese and the Soviets. It may have come as a reaction to recent signs that the Soviets are adopting a more militant tone in setting forth their side of the dispute. (Congentel 779) (Confidential)

7. "Thai Independence Movement" First Anniversary

Despite the recent threats of "people's war" in Thailand voiced by a People's Daily Commentator article of October 7, Peking treated the first anniversary of the founding of the "Thai Independence Movement" in a routine manner. According to an NCNA report on November 1, the occasion was marked by a reception in Peking which featured speeches by Mon Kon Nanakon

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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and Kularb Saipradit, who were described respectively as the liaison representative of the movement and a "well-known Thai writer," and by Liao Cheng-chih, a prominent but not first level Chicom official.

The NCNA report of the reception speeches dealt largely with remarks made by the Thais, perhaps owing to a Chicom decision to let the Thai "Movement" figures carry the ball to avoid the impression that the organization is a creature of Peking. The Thai speakers stressed the need for united front tactics in Thailand at present, and characterized the goal of the movement as unity "of all patriotic and democratic forces in a struggle to drive out U.S. imperialism and overthrow the Thanom Government of traitors."

Liao's speech expressed satisfaction with the alleged rapid growth of the "patriotic anti-U.S. forces of Thailand" and toasted the "victory of the Thai people in their struggle against U.S. imperialism." He avoided linking the Chicoms in any way to this "struggle of the Thai people." (Congentel 791) (Confidential)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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(2) BANGKOK CANBERRA KARACHI MOSCOW RANGOON SOFIA VNTIANE
BELGRADE CPACPLAD KATHMANDU MUNICH ROME S'PORE COMNAVPHL
BUCHAREST DARESALAAM KLUMPUR NDELHI SAIGON (4) TAIPEI TAIWANDEFCOM
BUDAPEST DJAKARTA MANILA PRAGUE SEOUL TOKYO 13AFMANILA
LONDON

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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ORIGIN/ACTION

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L	FBO	AID 12
PA 2	S/IC 1	S/P 1
AGR 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 7
OSD 46	USIA 1	NSA 3
NASA 4	HEW 1	NSC 6

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Pol 2-1 CHICOM

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A-285 NO.	CONFIDENTIAL	Air Pouch HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: OCTOBER 22, 1965

SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT REEKA No. 42

REF :

1965 OCT 29 AM 6 28

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH RM/R

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Peking Youths Arrive in Tibet
2. Attention Focussed on County Party Leadership
3. Network of Basic Level Finance and Trade Political Units Nearing Completion
4. Training Course Organized for PLMP Officers
5. Korean War Non-Repatriate Morris R. Wills Leaves Mainland

External

6. Chicoms Urge Afro-Asian Conference Postponement
7. Vietnam: Chicoms See U.S. Demonstrations as Proof Peking Policies Correct
8. Japan: Peking Hails Struggle Against Japan-ROK Treaty
9. Break in Relations Between British Red Cross and Peking?
10. Chen Yi Defends Regime's Foreign Policy
11. Sihanouk Ends China Odyssey
12. India: Chicoms Continue "War of Words"
13. Sudden Change in Indonesian Climate

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GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,JThomas,CKamman,SYNg:drb

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0651

Internal

1. Peking Youths Arrive in Tibet

Radio Lhasa on October 16 announced that the first group of educated Peking youths had arrived in Lhasa "recently" to take part in agricultural construction in Tibet. They were received on October 12 by high-ranking local representatives of the Party, government and PLA.

Comment: This is the first indication we have had that East China urban youths, following the pattern already established in Sinkiang, are being sent to settle in Tibet. The presence of military figures in the reception committee suggests that they may be destined for work on PLA Construction and Production Corps farms, as in Sinkiang. If the movement of Han youth to other national minority regions is any indication, the resettlement is likely to be permanent.

The relocation of Han youth may represent a new stage in the Sinification of Tibet, where past efforts have been confined to the transfer of Party and government institutions under the protection of the PLA. (ConGenTel 658) (Limited Official Use)

2. Attention Focussed on County Party Leadership

Apologizing for having neglected reportage on county affairs and having "done a poor job" of popularizing methods of improving CCP county leadership, the editors of the People's Daily announced on October 12 that the paper was starting a new column devoted to the rectification of county Party committees. The editors invited cadres from the county (hsien) level and below to contribute ideas which would help solve the problems besetting the county committees. Many of these problems, the editors admitted, were "related to the spiritual state of the leadership cadres."

The seven articles which inaugurated the column and took up most of the front page on both October 12 and 13 listed a fairly stock set of bureaucratic grievances: office-bound cadres plaguing the lower levels with phone calls and redundant requests for information; endless unnecessary meetings; lack of meaningful contact and understanding between hsien cadres, who "float around" at the top levels, and rural officials in the communes; "top-heavy over-staffing;" etc. (Unclassified)

Comment: The Party press has for years exhorted cadres to reduce meetings and paperwork, and base more of their decisions on

0652

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

information gained at first hand in the "front lines" of production. However, the sharp and specific focus of the People's Daily on this problem as well as the editors' breast-beating for having neglected this key link in the chain of command suggest that the leadership has decided that the hsien is a major bottleneck in the implementation of Party policy guidelines and indoctrination, and demanded a fresh approach. The decision probably grew out of the National Agriculture and Forestry Political Work Conference last August (WEEKA 34).

The gusto with which commune cadres, who have borne the brunt of criticism in the past, are teeing off against their immediate superiors gives the impression that the lower-level officials are enjoying the shift in emphasis. After years of pressure from above and below, "supervised" by Poor and Lower Middle Peasants, "struggled" in "clearance" and "anti" campaigns, who can blame them for relishing a moment of revenge. The Party may even have instituted the series as least partially as a means of rebuilding the morale of "front line" cadres whose enthusiasm may have been worn thin by the contradictory demands of recent months. (Limited Official Use)

3. Network of Basic Level Finance and Trade Political Units Nearing Completion

NCNA October 16 reported that the Finance - Trade Political Department of the CCP Central Committee held a national political work conference from September 10-October 10. It was revealed at the conference that finance-trade political departments had been established in about 90% of the Party committees at the county level and above; political organs had been set up in 80% of finance-trade administrative departments; and 60 - 70% of the necessary political instructors had been provided for the basic level units.

The conference urged cadres to emphasize the political content of routine work in addition to standard socialist education; to maintain a close relationship with the local Party committee that supervised them; and to step up political indoctrination during the rush seasons when the volume of agricultural purchases and industrial sales was high. (Unclassified)

Comment: The PLA style political commissar network, in the finance-trade sector, now nearing completion, has taken longer to

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

erect than the Party originally expected. The fact that it still is not complete is evidence of the magnitude of staffing problems the regime has encountered. The last national conference in trade and financing, which also urged that politics be the prime consideration in all work, was held only last February. These gatherings are normally an annual affair, and to convene such a long one within such a relatively short period of time is an indication of the regime's concern that political indoctrination be stepped up in this important economic sector where presumably "capitalist" temptations are the greatest."

4. Training Course Organized for PLMP Officers

Chuchiang County, Kwangtung, started a training course for Poor and Lower Middle Peasant Association (PLMPA) office holders on October 13, (Radio Canton, October 14, 10:40 GMT). 160 chairmen of commune and brigade PLMPAS and PLMPA group leaders of key production teams are enrolled for the first session. The course was set up because the students, termed "activists who have emerged during the socialist education campaign" in general "lacked experience in the work." The aim of the training was to produce a leadership nucleus for PLMPAS throughout the county. (Unclassified)

Comment: The establishment of a special training course for a very small number of officers from a multi-layered commune PLMPA structure fits in with conjecture made in WEEKA 38 that PLMPAS may be intended to be elite supervisory organs rather than mass channels of indoctrination. The need for a course also points up the problem the regime faces in relying upon elements of rural society which although politically loyal and active, are by definition neither particularly experienced or educated. (Limited Official Use)

5. Korean War Non-Repatriate Morris R. Wills Leaves Mainland

Korean War non-repatriate Morris R. Wills arrived in Hong Kong on October 19 accompanied by his wife and daughter. Eleven years had passed since his decision to proceed to Communist China rather than return home. After debriefing at the Consulate and documentation for travel, Wills and family will go to his home in Fort Ann, N.Y. (Unclassified)

0654

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: Wills, the only "turncoat" who was permitted to attend Peking University, is reputed to be the brightest and best travelled of the group. (Confidential)

External

6. Chicoms Urge Afro-Asian Conference Postponement

Peking's position on the holding of Bandung II has come around full circle with the publication of an October 16 NCNA report from Algiers that the Chinese and "some other nations" had proposed a postponement of the Conference at a meeting of the Preparatory Standing Committee. The proposal was to be discussed at a meeting of the Standing Committee on October 19. (Unclassified)

Comment: We agree with the analysis offered by Embassy Algiers that the Chicoms have now counted noses and find that they haven't the support to block Soviet attendance at the conference. They are probably also concerned over the lack of support for their efforts to turn the Conference into an anti-American sounding board. These concerns have led Peking to seek postponement, but even this may prove to be difficult to achieve. Sihanouk has said Cambodia will support postponement; Nyerere issued a public statement supporting postponement after the CPR Ambassador had called on him twice in five days, but said Tanzania - a member of the preparatory committee - would be unable to send a representative to the committee meeting; Massamba-Debat of the Congo (B) also told newsmen he had "no objection" to postponement. (Showing to what desperate straits the Chicoms have been driven, they also cited the Philippines as favoring postponement.) It looks as though support for the Chinese drive to put off the conference is luke-warm at best, and they may be faced with the unpalatable alternative of attending the meeting only to find themselves outflanked by the more "moderate" Soviets and third world powers, or boycotting it and losing great prestige precisely in the group they most avidly wish to cultivate. (Confidential)

7. Vietnam: Chicoms See U.S. Demonstrations as Proof Peking Policies Correct

Peking last week gave heavy play to the only thing it could count as a bright spot in an otherwise bleak foreign policy picture - the recent American demonstrations against U.S. policy in Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

It seized upon the protests as evidence that its Vietnam policies are, after all, correct. Extensive Chicom coverage of the demonstrations included a People's Daily editorial October 18 as well as numerous NCNA news items emphasizing that the scope of the movement is unprecedented, that a broad united front is in process of formation in U.S., that the U.S. "peace hoax" has been exposed, and that the Johnson Administration is deeply alarmed.

The People's Daily editorial, after observing that the "awakening American people will be the ones to place American imperialism in its grave," cited the alleged unity and organization of the movement as well as its broad base as evidence of a rapid growth in the political consciousness of the American people. People's Daily also asserted that an irreconcilable antagonism existed between the American people, who desired peace, and their government which desires war. (Unclassified)

Comment: Despite Peking's obvious satisfaction over the demonstrations, the Chicoms are probably aware that the present level of American anti-Administration sentiment on Vietnam is still below that required to alter U.S. policy toward Vietnam or weaken its implementation. Evidence for this judgment is contained in the People's Daily editorial, which concludes that "if Vietnamese people, American people and people of the entire world... institute a broad united battle line, then it is possible to defeat the U.S. aggressors." The use of the conditional form suggests that Peking does not regard this as a likely possibility in the near future. (ConGenTel 655 to Dept.) (Limited Official Use)

8. Japan: Peking Hails Struggle Against Japan-ROK Treaty

Following a spate of NCNA news articles quoting Japanese Communist sources, the Chicoms on October 17 issued a low-key Ta Kung Pao Commentator articlecommenting on recent Japanese demonstrations against ratification of the Japan-ROK Treaty. The article rehashed familiar Chicom arguments against the treaty, picturing it as a "U.S. imperialist" effort to revive Japanese militarism and link it to the "South Korean puppets" and the "Chiang Kai-shek Clique" to form a "Northeast Asia military alliance." Betraying lack of confidence over the outcome of the treaty in the Japanese Diet, however, Commentator noted that even

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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if the State Government succeeded in "ramming" the treaty through the Diet, the Japanese and Korean peoples had shown by their struggles that the treaty was "illegal, null and void." (Unclas.)

Comment: Although Peking undoubtedly hopes that the demonstrations will reach the level of the 1960 Security Treaty riots, there is no indication in the rather pro-forma Commentator piece that the Chicoms actually expect this to happen. (Limited Official Use)

9. Break in Relations Between British Red Cross and Peking?

The local representative of the British Red Cross told a Consulate General Officer last week that she had not been informed through usual Red Cross channels of the departure from the Mainland of either Ernest Stanley Jones (a British missionary who arrived in Hong Kong last week after seven years in a Shanghai jail) or Morris Wills, the Korean War POW. She had read about Jones' departure in the newspaper, and was informed of Wills' arrival by the Consulate General which had received notification through diplomatic channels. Standard notification procedures were last followed in the William C. White case in August, when the local Red Cross office was informed of his arrival by the Chinese Communist Red Cross via Peking and London.

Comment: The breach in normal British-Chicom Red Cross communications is probably connected with Peking's refusal on September 26 to send a representative to the Vienna Conference of the International Red Cross owing to the presence there of a delegation from the GRC. At that time Peking also announced its decision to sever ties with the Standing Commission of the International Red Cross. While it remains to be seen what Peking is up to, the Chicoms may hope that a disruption in the working level arrangements hitherto in effect with non-Communist Red Cross societies such as the British will put additional pressure on the International Red Cross to expel the GRC. (Confidential, ConGenTel 659)

10. Chen Yi Defends Regime's Foreign Policy

At an October 13 banquet in Kunming for visiting Prince Sihanouk, Chen Yi made a rare acknowledgement that some foreign opinion regards Chicom foreign policy as "adventurous," particularly after his September 29 press conference. He made no attempt to refute this view, but instead asserted that it was necessary for

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

the Chicoms to take "risks" in opposing "U.S. imperialism." Any compromise would bring the regime, in Chen's words, to the same end as "the Chiang reactionaries and Khrushchev revisionists." The only condition under which compromise could exist, he said, is that "the U.S. imperialists must give up their policy of aggression and war. But this is impossible."

Chen endorsed Sihanouk's estimate that U.S. imperialism would be forced to retreat if only fifteen countries refused to co-operate with it. He agreed with the Prince's prediction that "the time will soon come when many countries will unite to oppose U.S. imperialism." Chen also devoted considerable attention to Sino-Cambodian relations (see Item 11) (Unclassified).

Comment: Chen's speech may be a sign that the Chicoms are determined to push ahead with what they consider to be the necessary and correct foreign policy, regardless of international opinion. Yet, in contrast to the oft-repeated Chicom assertion that a broad anti-U.S. front is already in existence and growing rapidly, Chen's endorsement of Sihanouk's views on the international attitude toward "U.S. imperialism" impresses us as a sober and even pessimistic Chicom view of the world. In a sense, Chen Yi indicated that while the tone of Chinese foreign policy will remain bellicose and even "adventurist ," the regime nonetheless is aware of the realities of its present position in the world and remains anxious to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S.

It appears to us that the existing Chicom foreign policy situation is one in which Peking's long-standing frustration over its inability to counter U.S. moves in Vietnam or to compete successfully with the attraction exerted by U.S. and Soviet power and material wealth have been reinforced by its failure to attract the "anti-imperialist" world through a spiritual, "revolutionary" message. This mood probably accounts for Chen's recent series of bellicose remarks.

11. Sihanouk Ends China Odyssey

Prince Sihanouk wound up on October 16 the tour of China and North Korea he had begun on September 22. His last two stops were Harbin, where he unleashed a thinly veiled blast at Soviet foreign policy in the presence of Liu Shao-Chi and Chen Yi, and Kunming, where Chen Yi reciprocated the favor by praising Sihanouk's "great aptitude and penetrating insight as a statesman." Chen

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

expressed his gratitude to Sihanouk for "speaking out for justice on the international forum" in China's behalf at a time when "U.S. imperialists and other reactionaries have wantonly slandered China." Chen regretted that Chicom economic aid to Cambodia was "too small," but conditioned any increase on an improved performance of the Chinese economy.

Sihanouk responded dutifully to Chen's solicitation of his opinions on the Chinese Foreign Minister's September 29 press conference by endorsing the position taken by Chen on all major international themes. Only on the subject of the Second Afro-Asian Conference did he mention that Cambodia's opinion was slightly at variance with that of the Chicoms. Whatever the difference may have been, Sihanouk announced Cambodian support for the Chicom effort to postpone the conference in an October 17 statement at Rangoon airport.

Some of the warm glow in evidence between Sihanouk and the Chinese leadership after his return from North Korea became more understandable in the light of Sihanouk's disclosure in Rangoon that he had been uninvited to the November 7 celebrations in Moscow by a cigarette-puffing Soviet Ambassador in Pyongyang reading from an old piece of paper. (Unclassified)

Comment: Sihanouk in his October 14 letter told Chen Yi that Cambodia considered China as "its number one friend." We don't imagine that this brightened very much an otherwise dismal month during which the Chicoms were finding it increasingly difficult to find supporters willing to go all the way with them in taking on the two major world power centers. (Limited Official Use).

12. India: Chicoms Continue "War of Words"

Although far from the frenetic pace of last month, Peking continued to keep its note writers busy with protests to India. On October 19 and October 20 the regime presented India with protests on two widely differing subjects. The October 19 note rejected an Indian note of September 27 which accused China of kidnapping three Indian soldiers along the Sino-Sikkim border and reiterated the Chicom claim that the soldiers had entered Chinese territory. To back up its version, NCNA on October 19 issued an alleged admission by the three captured Indians that they had been ordered by their superiors to enter Chinese territory where they had been captured. In a more threatening vein, NCNA

0 6 5 9
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

also issued on the same day remarks by a "leading official" of the CPR Ministry of National Defense who following a reference to China's ultimatum of September 16, warned India that it should not "mistake China's forbearance for a sign of weakness."

China's second note of October 20 protested the Indian Government's banning of an overseas Chinese newspaper, the China Review, and demanded that India cancel its "unwarranted order." (Unclassified)

Comment: The notes and remarks appear to be pro-forma. Peking would probably agree with us that the most recent installment of the Sino-Indian border problem is virtually a closed chapter, except for some continuing righteous Chicom growls. (Limited Official Use)

13. Sudden Change in Indonesian Climate

Peking's prolonged silence on Indonesian developments ended with the publication of an October 18 Chicom note to the Indonesians lodging a "strong protest against the alleged serious incident of Indonesian troops attacking and searching the office of the Commercial Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia." The note termed such behavior "a brutal encroachment upon the personal safety and dignity of diplomatic personnel, a gross violation of international law--and an extremely serious provocation against China and the Chinese people." It demanded an apology for the incident and punishment of the culprits. The note also spoke of "anti-Chinese clamors" which were alleged to be prevalent in Indonesia since October 1 and warned that "an anti-Chinese wave is starting in Indonesia" which if not checked will lead to "serious consequences."

On October 19, NCNA published a lengthy round-up of events in Djakarta which, it noted, was based on foreign and Indonesian press reports. NCNA attributed its previous silence to lack of contact with its Djakarta correspondent owing to the control of Indonesian radio and telecommunications facilities by Army authorities, an excuse which ignored the news agency's failure to make earlier use of foreign and Indonesian press reports. The NCNA round-up was thoroughly hostile to the Indonesian Army leadership and contained much which could inflame currently high Indonesian anti-Chinese sentiments. It also attempted to convey the impression that the Army leaders were acting in defiance of Sukarno's wishes

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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for a "political settlement" of the September 30 "incident" by carrying out a program of "suppression and terror" against the Communist Party and "popular" organizations.

The NCNA round-up attacked the Soviet attitude toward the September 30 coup, indignantly noting that Izvestia "went so far as to call the September 30 Movement a rebellion" and defending the PKI organ, Harian Rakjat against Izvestia 's charges that it supported a movement devoid of popular support. One aspect of NCNA's attack on the Soviets is that it presents perhaps the clearest indication to date of Peking's active sympathy toward the September 30 group.

The Chicoms intensified their defiantly hostile attitude toward the Indonesian military leadership with a strongly worded October 20 NCNA statement on the failure of the Chinese Communist Embassy in Djakarta to fly its flag at half mast during the mourning period for the murdered Indonesian Army Generals. NCNA branded as "sheer fabrication" Indonesian reports that the Indonesian Government had lodged a protest with the Chinese Embassy over the flag issue and stridently declared even "if there had been such an unjustifiable protest the Chinese Embassy would have categorically rejected and refused it." The Chicoms took the position that the flying of their flag was "within Chinese sovereignty" and they would follow their own rules on the subject. The NCNA statement also referred to "rightist" efforts to instigate an anti-Chinese wave in Indonesia as a means of sabotaging friendly relations between the two countries and peoples. The statement warned the Indonesians that while they have the freedom to "take more undisguised and rabid anti-China actions...we remind you that the Chinese people are not to be bullied at will by anyone."

Comment: Chicom stridency is probably the result of emotional indignation over what is regarded as an Indonesian affront to national dignity. This emotional reaction is compounded by Peking's recognition of its basic inability to do anything to alter the unfavorable course of Indonesian development. It is also possible the Chicoms may feel that a hard line in 1959-60 produced some results in easing the dispute at that time over the status of the Chinese in Indonesia and that the same course is presently worth another try.

On a more fundamental level, the nature of the Chicoms reaction to Indonesian developments is undoubtedly colored by the fact that at a time when Peking is facing growing foreign policy

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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problems, one of its staunchest allies is almost overnight transformed into a hostile power. In short, the Chicoms have obviously been thrown off stride by the Indonesian situation and are thrashing about in anger and frustration over this most unwelcome development.

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED:

(2) BANGKOK CANBERRA KARACHI MOSCOW RANGOON SOFIA VNTIANE
BELGRADE CPACPLAD KATHMANDU MUNICH ROME S'PORE COMNAVPHL
BUCHAREST DARESALAAM KLUMPUR NDELHI SAIGON (4)TAIPEI TAIWANDEFCOM
BUDAPEST DJAKARTA MANILA PRAGUE SEOUL TOKYO 13AFMANILA
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ORIGIN/ACTION

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PC 2	S/IL 1	RSIR HOCKMAN 1
AGR 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 7
OSD 46	USIA 11	NSA 3
	HEW 1	USC 6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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A-268 (NO.) | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH (HANDLING INDICATOR)

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

INFO: (See last page for distribution)

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG DATE: OCTOBER 15, 1965

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKLY No. 41

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. High Level Meeting Held in Peking?
2. People's Daily Bemoans Low Level of Mass Political Consciousness
3. National People's Congress to Convene in December

External

4. Thailand: Peking Raises Spectre of Increased Insurgency
5. Chicoms Comment on Laos
6. Sino-Soviet Dispute Continues Dominate "Socialist" Gatherings
7. Regime's Version of Chen Yi Press Conference Released
8. Chen Yi Defends Demarcation of Sino-Mongolian Boundary
9. Silence on Indonesia Continues

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Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,JThomas,CKamman,YSNg:drb,10/14/65 | Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

1. High Level Meeting Held in Peking?

NCNA October 10 announced that the following Party and State leaders had joined Chairman Mao to receive groups of model workers, PLA representatives, and representatives of minority nationalities which had taken part in the National Day celebrations: Politburo members Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Teng Hsiao-ping, Tung Pi-wu, Peng Chen, Li Fu-chun, Li Hsien-nien, Li Ching-chuan, Tan Chen-lin; Alternate Politburo Members Ulanfu, Lu Ting-yi, Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Po I-po, Military Affairs Committee Members Hsu Hsiang-chien, and Yeh Chien-ying; Politburo Secretaries Li Hsueh-feng, Lo Jui-ch'ing; Vice Premier Tao Chu; Politburo Alternate Secretaries Liu Lan-tao, Yang Shang-k'un; and Northeast China Regional Bureau First Secretary Sung Jen-chiung. (Unclassified)

Comment: Most of the top national leaders as well as all the Party Regional Bureau First Secretaries (Li Ching-chuan, Tao Chu, Li Hsueh-feng, Liu Lan-tao, and Sung Jen-chiung), are included in this list. The presence in the capital since October 1 of the regional chiefs who normally lead the National Day festivities in their own bailiwicks is a strong indication that a top-level policy meeting has been in session in Peking. The temporary absence of both CPR chairman Liu Shao-chi and Foreign Minister Chen Yi to greet Prince Sihanouk in Harbin on his return from North Korea does no damage to this speculation since they were both in Peking until recently. Vice Premier Ho Lung's sojourn in Sinkiang is not necessarily significant. In our view, Ho is a big name, but has little to say in high policy decisions.

We are interested to note that Politburo Secretariat Administrative Staff Office Director Yan Shang-k'un was listed among regional bureau chiefs Tao Chu, Liu Lan-tao, and Sung Jen-chiung. Although his background does not match those of the other regional Party bosses, it is possible that Yang has been designated East China Regional Bureau First Secretary to fill the vacancy caused by K'o Ch'ing-shih's death. (ConGenTel 601, Limited Official Use)

2. People's Daily Bemoans Low Level of Mass Political Consciousness

Echoing the subdued, frank, and somewhat discouraged tone of the October 1 Red Flag lead editorial, the People's Daily on

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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October 11 exhorted its readership to realize that "all work is for the revolution." People do not necessarily understand this basic concept, the article went on to say, and "do not necessarily do their work with this consciousness." They may comprehend the revolutionary nature of Party and army work, socialist education and class struggle, but fail to identify their routine day to day jobs with national construction, support of world revolution, and the ultimate creation of a communist world. This is because "the ideological influences and forces of habit carried over from the old society are very stubborn and tend to limit people's thinking to the narrow view of personal gain and personal interests." The solution to the problem, the editorial continued, reverting to cliches, was to put politics in command and raise the people's revolutionary consciousness. "If everybody develops a revolutionary spirit," the People's Daily concluded on an uncharacteristically hesitant note, "works consciously for the revolution and is enthusiastic and militant, our people will be able to make still greater contributions to the cause of revolution throughout the world." (Unclassified)

Comment: The People's Daily is saying that despite years of rectification, class struggle, socialist education, and giant doses of Mao's thought, the revolutionary consciousness of China's masses is still pitifully low. It is difficult for us to see how a more intense application of politics, which has been "in command" for so long without success, is going to have much effect.

We find it puzzling to have candid, pessimistic statements appearing in both Red Flag and the People's Daily at a time when high level meetings to determine future policy are apparently in progress in Peking. Not only the timing, but also the substance of the statements is confusing. The regime's boasts that its sixteenth year was the "best ever" are coupled with hand wringing over the tenacity of old ideas and the lack of revolutionary consciousness among the populace. It may be that precisely because the year was so good the militant ideologues are pressing for a reduction of capitalist concessions granted after the Great Leap. However, the pragmatists among the leadership probably recognize, albeit with distaste, that the success of China's recovery is owed to the very same concessions and dare not tamper with them. The complaints in the recent editorials about persistent old ideas, low revolutionary consciousness, and the long hard struggle to built communism may therefore be a warning to the zealots

0 6 6 5

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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against pushing too hard and too fast. At the same time, the editorials' emphasis on socialist education and the revolutionary value of every menial task (a la Lei Feng) is evidence that the present prosaic policy will be pushed behind a facade of the usual slogans and compaigns.

3. National People's Congress to Convene in December

According to the Japanese Consulate, a high ranking official of the Liao Ch'eng-chih trade office told an opposite number in the Japanese Takasaki Office during recent negotiations in Peking that the National People's Congress would convene in December. The Third Five Year Plan will be presented to the gathering. The Chinese official also stated that neither the plan nor any of its details will be published. (Confidential)

Comment: This is the first confirmation we have had of the expected NPC meeting. (Confidential) (ConGenTel 611)

External

4. Thailand: Peking Raises Spectre of Increased Insurgency

Peking last week attempted to apply pressure on Thailand to discourage it from close cooperation with the U.S. in Vietnam. This was done by the surfacing on October 6 of former Thai Premier Pridi Phanomyong for a meeting with Mao Tse-tung and the appearance the next day of a strongly-worded People's Daily Commentator article which threatened "more widespread and intensified patriotic struggle" in Thailand if the Thai authorities did not cease their cooperation with U.S. activities in Vietnam. The article warned that the Thai people would not allow their government to "sellout" their sovereignty but would "...rise in struggle against it." (Confidential)

Comment: Although the Commentator article is pegged to an October 4 DRV Foreign Ministry government to government statement protesting Thai complicity with U.S. "aggression against Vietnam," Peking's message is presented in people-to-people terms and is much more explicit about the consequences of a Thai refusal to heed its warning. As far as we are aware, it represents the first time that the Chicoms have directly commented on the subject of "people's war" in Thailand.

Peking's attention to Thailand may simply be a psychological ploy, prompted in part by DRV anxiety to relieve pressure on the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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nation caused by U.S. air attacks. On the other hand, Chicoms may calculate that by working through "Thai Independence Movement" and "Patriotic Front" they might be able to step up current desultory level of anti-Thai activity among Laos and Vietnamese of North and Northeast Thailand, and so divert Thai energies from assisting U.S. effort in Vietnam. We believe, however, that any attempt of this sort will be a carefully controlled one designed to avoid the level of Chicom involvement which might lead to direct U.S. retaliation. (Confidential) (ConGenTels 577, 588)

5. Chicoms Comment on Laos

People's Daily Commentator article on October 8 indulged in what impressed us as a pro forma attack against alleged U.S. intent to launch new offensive against "Liberated Areas" of Laos as part of its plan to "widen the war of aggression in Indo-China." Commentator warned that the result of such action would be that "U.S. imperialism will inevitably have to face the combined counter-actions of the Indo-Chinese and Southeast Asian peoples." (Limited Official Use)

Comment: Unlike a July 30th People's Daily editorial on the same subject, Commentator made no mention of Communist China's unwillingness to "stand by with folded arms" in the face of U.S. "setting fire to Laos and Indo-China." This omission may result from Peking's awareness that its numerous threats of direct military involvement in the area have been generally debased by lack of follow-up action. Regime may now be shifting to less specific threat of expanding "national liberation wars" throughout the area as a means of countering U.S. action. (See item 4) (Confidential)

6. Sino-Soviet Dispute Continues to Dominate "Socialist" Gatherings

On October 8 and 9 the Chinese released their versions of clashes with the Soviets at three different international meetings held in September. Battle lines at each of the meetings were drawn along the specific issue of resisting U.S. imperialism in Vietnam and the more general issue of peaceful co-existence and disarmament. The Soviets were accused of manipulating the meeting, insisting on majority votes instead of unanimity for passage of resolutions, controlling the chairman, and creating

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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disturbances by walking out or turning off the lights, not to mention their more serious ideological sins of supporting disarmament instead of armed struggle, peaceful co-existence instead of liberation struggle, and supporting a negotiated peace in Vietnam instead of smashing U.S. imperailism once and for all.

It appears that the Chinese were unable to make any headway at the Prague Conference of Food and Beverage, Hotel and Restaurant Workers Trade Union International (where only the delegations of Albania, Indonesia, Korea and Ceylon supported them) of the Santiago, Chile, Executive Committee meeting of the International Organization of Journalists (where Mali, Indonesia and Ceylon stood by them). However, at the Budapest General Assembly of the World Federation of Scientific Workers they apparently succeeded in blocking a Soviet resolution on Vietnam, formulated at an executive council meeting in May and submitted to the Assembly for rubber stamp approval. Their alternative resolution was backed only by the Albanians, Japanese and Koreans, but they yielded to a North Vietnamese proposal alleged to be "identical in fundamental spirit" to their own and which the Soviets also voted for. Nevertheless, the Soviets had their way when it came to a disarmament resolution. (Unclassified)

Comment: Peking's continuing account of all the gory details of conflicts at "socialist" gatherings is probably a product of the regime's belief that its revolutionary interests are best served by publicly contrasting revolutionary purity with the perfidious behavior of the "modern revisionists." (Limited Official Use)

7. Regime's Version of Chen Yi Press Conference Released

NCNA on October 7 released the regime's version of the highlights of Chen Yi's September 29 press conference, possibly in an effort to keep the record straight in view of the many versions of his remarks currently in circulation. The NCNA version does not differ materially in substance from the version we put together last week (WEEKA 40). Indeed, in our opinion the NCNA version in its total effect is as hard or even harder than the versions reported earlier by various foreign correspondents. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: The release of the press conference by NCNA in effect puts the official stamp of approval on Chen's remarks.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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That the Chicoms waited over a week in issuing their version indicates that there may have been some doubt among higher Peking echelons as to the advisability of confirming via NCNA what Chen had said in view of the adverse foreign reaction to some of his more violent statements. It appears, however, that the prevailing Chicom mood of self-righteousness decided the issue in favor of standing by their Foreign Minister's presentation. (Confidential)

8. Ch'en Yi Defends Demarcation of Sino-Mongolian Boundary

The NCNA text of Ch'en Yi's September 29 press conference (item 7) contains his response to a question on the CPR-MPR boundary fixed by a protocol between the two nations dated June 30, 1964. To the assertion by a Chinese reporter representing a non-Communist Hong Kong paper that Outer Mongolia is just as much a part of China as Tibet, Ch'en Yi replied that Mongolia had obtained independence in 1924 after a revolution, while Tibet had always been part of Chinese territory. Furthermore, Ch'en declared that the present Chinese Government had "succeeded" to the commitment undertaken in the treaty of August 14, 1945, between the Chiang Kai-shek government and the Soviet Union, recognizing the independence of the MPR. He admitted that "there are Han chauvinists in China who have always refused to recognize the MPR," but noted the regime was "opposed to such Han chauvinism" and that it had continued to give aid to the Mongolians despite their having followed the Khrushchev revisionists. (Unclassified)

Comments: The Chicoms apparently do not wish at this time to invoke the potentially serious consequences which would arise from endorsing Chinese irredentist claims to areas now in Mongolian and Soviet hands. Ch'en neglected to mention that the GRC in 1947 renounced its earlier recognition of the MPR and his revelation of the continued existence in China of "Han chauvinist" ideas about Outer Mongolia probably does little to reassure the MPR against the possibility of yet another shift in the Chinese governmental attitude toward an independent Outer Mongolia. (Limited Official Use)

9. Silence on Indonesia Continues

To date the regime has failed to comment or even report factually on recent Indonesian political developments (WEEKA 40)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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During the week it continued efforts to create the impression that business with Indonesia is going on as usual by releasing the text of a joint communique signed October 4 by the NPC Standing Committee and the visiting Indonesian MPRS delegation. The communique read as if nothing had happened in Indonesia in the past week: it endorsed the standard Chinese Communist position on a number of international issues and reaffirmed Peking's support of Indonesia's confrontation policy toward Malaysia.

Comment: In view of reported Chinese Communist covert arms shipments to Indonesia in recent months, we are inclined to believe that Peking was cut in on and probably approved the idea of a pre-emptive coup by the PKI aimed at preventing an Army seizure of power. We have no evidence, however, to suggest that the Chicoms had any say in the actual timing and operational aspects of the "September 30" incident. (Confidential)

For the Acting Principal Officer:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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INFO/ACTION

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ARA	EUR 5	FE 6
NEA	CU 5	INR
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L	FBO	AID 12
S/P 1	G/PM 1	S/IL 1
AGR 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 2	SFA 1	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 7
OSD 4C	USIA 11	NSA 3
NASA 4	HEW 1	NSC 6

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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A-248 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

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RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: OCTOBER 8, 1965

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKLY No. 40

REF :

Action Assigned REE/OD

Action Taken

Date of Action

Action Office Symbol

Name of Officer

Action to RM/R

POLITICAL

Internal

1. National Day Celebrated: Some Political Policies to be More Flexibly Implemented
2. Sinkiang Tenth Anniversary Celebrations Spotlight "Khrushchev Revisionism"

External

3. October 1 View of the World
4. Cambodia: Sihanouk Visit Draws Phnom Penh Even Closer to Peking
5. Chicoms and Indonesia: A Time of Worry
6. United States: Peking Claims U.S. Plane Destroyed over Kwangsi
7. Chen Yi Press Conference

Military

Negative

Outer Mongolia

8. Chinese Highway Aid Project Completed

1965 OCT 11 PM 2 49

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED

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Y-24 MPR - FN / CPR

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified

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Internal

1. National Day Celebrated: Same Political Policies to be More Flexibly Implemented

Giant float-borne statues of Mao and his works, a fourteen foot dairy cow, regiments of smart-stepping doctors and nurses fresh from rural duty wearing straw coolie hats, hordes of red-scarved children clutching balloons, troops of heavily armed precision-drilled militia, folk dancers waving pom-poms, and thousands of athletes performing socialist physical jerks in unison were part of the colorful procession that flowed past Communist China's top leadership and 2,000 probably somewhat bewildered foreign guests in Peking's T'ien An Men Square on October 1. This year's National Day celebrations, following the gargantuan but sterotyped scenario repeated each year on both May 1 and October 1, included a mass evening carnival featuring revolutionary songs and anti-imperialist cultural presentations. Similar exercises were held in other cities where millions, NCNA relates, "danced their way past reviewing stands...giving expression to the joy of creative achievement."

The peals of public merrymaking found a rather weak echo in regime speeches and statements, however. In particular, the October 1 Red Flag lead editorial struck a discordant note by focussing on the tenacity of old ideas and customs in the new society and explaining that revolution could only be pushed forward by subjecting these ideological holdovers from the old society to an intense process of criticism and self-criticism. The editorial gave warning that in today's powerful proletarian dictatorship old ideas "generally clothe themselves in socialist and Marxist-Leninist terminology and slogans in order to survive and spread influence," and that more attention would have to be paid this insidious phenomenon. However, while the struggle against outdated conventions and habits would be "protracted," involving "repeated" rectification, the process of criticism must be "carried out correctly," using the "democratic method... of maximum reasoning." Furthermore, the editorial continued, the process of criticism should not entail "rejecting our legacy and negating everything."

The People's Daily October 1 editorial, while less introspective and more ebullient, also reflected the Red Flag's cautionary message. At the same time that it assured the people that politics remained in command and that the socialist education campaign would continue

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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without relaxation, the editorial urged cadres to push programs "cooly and calmly," without going to extremes, always bearing in mind what was possible in addition to what was necessary. While class struggle remained the key to revolutionary progress, the article continued, the conflict must be viewed in the proper context, and neither be exaggerated, played down, nor igonored.

In his speech at the Tien An Men Square parade, Peking Mayor and Politburo member Peng Chen also stressed the "earnest" practice of democracy "in order to commit fewer...mistakes." He exhorted cadres to learn from the masses and "encourage the airing of different views," creating the impression that cadres had gotten more out of touch with the people than usual. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: Taken as a set, these statements can be interpreted to mean that although the emphasis and direction of internal political programs will remain essentially the same, efforts will be made to iron out some of the excesses and abuses that have cropped up during the past year in the implementation of socialist education campaigns (most notably the "four clearance" drives, which in some places were pushed to the extent that cadres committed suicide). The statements highlight the current contradiction between militant ideology and practical methodology in Peking's approach to domestic policy. They appear to indicate that at least for the time being, the regime will continue to muddle through by relying essentially on material incentives to stimulate production, while hoping to offset the unhealthy ideological impact produced thereby through reliance on socialist education. The over-all impression is that while the leadership is as keen as ever to assure the creation of a "generation of revolutionary successors," they are aware that some of their efforts to solve the problem have been characterized by heavyhandedness, and that the need is now for more flexible tactics. There is also evidence that both the tenacity of old ideas clothed in orthodox slogans, and the tendency of the Party apparatus to over-react to instructions from the top have caused the leadership, with sadness (Malraux found Mao "triste," we remember), to stretch their projections of the revolution even further into the future than circumstances and human nature have already required. (Confidential, ConGen Tels 547, 562).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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2. Sinkiang Tenth Anniversary Celebrations Spotlight "Khrushchev Revisionist" Activities

"The subversive activities of the Khrushchev revisionist group" in Sinkiang constituted one of the major themes of articles and speeches marking the 10th anniversary of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region (WEEKA 39). Most mentions of the activities of "modern revisionists" followed the pattern of the anniversary message sent on September 29 by the State Council to the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region People's Council. This message declared that the Khrushchev revisionist group's subversion had been "completely smashed," but called on the people of Sinkiang to be ready at all times "to smash further sabotage by the modern revisionists and aggression by the Indian reactionaries, to safeguard the frontiers and consolidate the nation's defenses."

Similar statements were included in a September 30 People's Daily editorial on the Sinkiang anniversary celebrations, a speech that same day in Urumchi by Vice Premier Ho Lung, and an October 2 speech in Peking by Hsieh Fu-min, chairman of the NPC Nationalities Cimmittee. Wang En-mao, First Secretary of the Sinkiang party committee, in his speech to the Urumchi meeting at which Ho Lung was the feature attraction, spoke of the activities of the revisionist clique as an "important part of the joint anti-China scheme of the Khrushchev revisionists, the U.S. imperialists, and the Indian reactionaries."

Both the Hsieh Fu-min speech, and the People's Daily editorial, spoke of the contributions of the people of Sinkiang to the work of the People's Liberation Army in defeating the Indian reactionaires and safeguarding the frontier. The editorial pointed out that Sinkiang owes much of its progress to the fraternal aid of the Han people in political, economic and cultural fields.

As the anniversary celebrations ended in Urumchi, the central delegation headed by Ho Lung was reported to have arrived in Kuldja (Ili), capital of the Kazakh Autonomous District, on October 4. This is the first visit we know of to Kuldja by a major central government figure since the 1962 riots in that city. (Unclassified)

Comment: The fact that virtually every pronouncement on the Sinkiang anniversary gives prominent attention to the subversive activities of the Khrushchev revisionist group in that region

0 6 7 4

DECLASSIFIED
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appears to be a warning to the national minorities that things will not be permitted to get out of hand as they did in 1962, culminating in the Kuldja riots. The renewed attacks on "modern revisionist" subversion in Sinkiang give no evidence of any increase in Soviet activities there since Chou En-lai declared the situation "improved" in October 1963, following the expulsion of Soviet consulates in Urumchi and Kuldja. They were probably largely prompted by Chicom displeasure with Soviet policy in the recent Indian-Pakistan-China go around. (Confidential)

External

3. October 1 View of the World

There was nothing new or startling in the Chicom October 1 statements on external affairs. The regime's anti-U.S. tirade perhaps reached a new height, but the substance was much the same and the statements did not strike us as an effort to whip up popular emotions in expectation of an imminent clash with the United States.

The regime defiantly renewed and emphasized its commitment to the "national liberation struggle" in language intended to contrast its willingness to pay "whatever price (it) must pay to contribute to the defeat of U.S. imperialism" with the behavior of the modern revisionists in "betraying Marxism-Leninism... colluding with the U.S. ...and selling out the revolutionary interests of the peoples of the world."

There was the usual optimism regarding the "excellent revolutionary situation" in the world. However, the emphasis given to the regime's devotion to principles in foreign policy which, as Chou En-lai noted, would be upheld regardless of "whatever storms may arise on the international scene," seemed to reflect a defensive awareness on the part of Peking that international opinion has reacted adversely against the regime's policies concerning the Indian border, revolution in Africa, the second A-A conference, Vietnam negotiations and dispute with the Soviets, and that Peking has become isolated from opinion in much of the world. We wonder if these assertions of devotion to principle also mark a decision by Peking to plunge ahead along what it considers to be necessary foreign policy lines even if this entails abandonment of the "Bandung image" of good-neighborliness, peaceful co-existence, etc.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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Peking's appearance of isolation was further strengthened by the fact that the only real dignitary on hand for the October 1 occasion was Cambodia's Sihanouk and that notable absentees were official delegations from North Vietnam and North Korea, Peking's erstwhile allies in its anti-Soviet confrontation. (Confidential)

4. Cambodia: Sihanouk Visit Draws Phnom Penh Even Closer to Peking

Cambodian Head of State Norodom Sihanouk (WEEKA 39) last week concluded a 13-day visit to the CPR which strengthened Sino-Cambodian relations but left unclear the extent to which Peking would back Cambodia economically and militarily. Concrete evidence of Sihanouk's strong support for Chicom foreign policy objectives was contained in a militantly-worded joint communique issued October 3. In addition to supporting the Chicom position on Vietnam and on "U.S. imperialism" generally, the communique calls for an "immediate reorganization" of the United Nations from domination by "certain big powers, notably the U.S."

On the key question of Chicom support for Cambodia, the communique modifies past phraseology by stating that "in case the Kingdom of Cambodia should one day become the victim of an armed aggression, the Chinese people will firmly stand by the Cambodian people and support them with all their forces." (The Chinese language version of the communique reveals that strength rather than forces would be a more appropriate translation of the term used.) Speaking at a banquet on the same day that the communique was issued, Premier Chou En-lai appeared to make this pledge somewhat more specific when he said: "If U.S. imperialism presses ahead along the dangerous path of war expansion, we will unhesitatingly join the heroic Indo-Chinese peoples in resolutely, thoroughly, completely and totally driving the U.S. aggressors out of Indo-China and the whole of Southeast Asia."

Comment: Chou's supplementary remarks indicate that Sihanouk may have been less than satisfied with the rather vague wording of the communique on this point, and may have requested more specific assurances of protection against attack. We doubt, however, that Chou's remarks represent any change in Peking's oft-repeated position that should any war with the U.S. arise it would be because we had "imposed it on the heads of the Chinese people."

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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Viewed in this light, and considering the fact that no new Chicom aid projects have been mentioned, it would appear that Sihanouk received little of a concrete nature in return for his plugging of Peking's line. (Confidential) (ConGenTels 559, 565).

5. Chicoms and Indonesia: A Time of Worry

On October 3 Chicom leaders Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai cabled Sukarno expressing their pleasure at the news that the Indonesian leader was still on the scene. Their message also contained the hope that Indonesia would "develop still further the spirit of opposing imperialism and old and new colonialism, and of opposing Malaysia"--policies which the Chicoms had found to be so congenial to their own interests in the past. The Liu-Chou cable represents the only Chicom comment to date on recent developments in Indonesia and, in fact, the regime appears to be making a conscious effort to keep the disturbing news about Indonesia from the Chinese people by giving considerable press coverage in routine terms to the activities of the various Indonesian delegations on hand for Oct. 1 (Limited Official Use)

Comment: We can only surmise the anxiety of the Chicom leadership over the prospect of losing the support of one of their dearest friends on the international scene in recent years. Should this come to pass, aside from further isolating the regime at a time when its international image has already been considerably tarnished, it will also face Peking with the problem of reconciling the spreading phenomena of "reactionary nationalism" (as manifested in political upheavals in Burundi, Algeria and now possibly Indonesia) with its oft-repeated assertion that "at present an excellent revolutionary situation lies before the people of the whole world."

We had serious doubts that the Chicoms intended to translate into reality Indonesian-inspired rumors concerning Peking's willingness to provide a nuclear bang for the benefit of Sukarno's prestige. These doubts were reinforced by Chen Yi's remark at his Sept. 29 press conference that Peking had not received requests from other nations for assistance in manufacturing nuclear bombs. It now seems to us that any lingering prospect for a Chicom gift of a nuclear blast to the Indonesians has been virtually foreclosed by recent developments in Djakarta. (Confidential)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

6. United States: Peking Claims U.S. Plane Destroyed over Kwangsi

According to NCNA, on October 5 PLA aircraft downed a U.S. plane over Kwangsi Province. The announcement claimed that the downed plane was one of a flight of four U.S. planes which entered Kwangsi airspace that day.

Peking reacted to the incident in a manner similar to its treatment of the shooting down of a U.S. plane over Hainan about two weeks earlier (WEEKA 38). NCNA quoted a "responsible official" of the Ministry of National Defense as condemning the instrusion and stating that "if the U.S. imposes war on the heads of the Chinese people, and seeks a trial of military strength, well please come on, that's fine with us...whenever....wherever they come... no matter how may come...we will wipe them out." Also on October 5, NCNA carried a report charging the U.S. with alleged air attacks against Chinese fishing boats operating in the South China Sea and warning that the US. must stop this "piratical behavior" or otherwise "bear full responsibility for the grave consequences." (Unclassified)

Comment: Although the Defense Ministry official's statement borrows some of the strident terminology used in Chen Yi's September 29 press conference, Peking's over-all reaction to the incident seems intended mainly to give appropriate emphasis to China's defensive capacity. As in the Hainan incident, there is no indication that Peking as yet regards occasional violations of its airspace as "imposing war" on China. (Limited Official Use)

7. Chen Yi Press Conference

On September 29 Chen Yi held an unprecedented four hour press conference before three hundred correspondents at Peking, including western reporters on hand for the earlier Li Tsung-jen show. Chen's remarks were noteworthy, we believe, for revealing a sense of frustration which permeates Chen and probably the entire Chicom leadership over recent series of unfavorable foreign policy developments (see Item 3).

To date we have had to rely on a number of versions of Chen Yi's remarks, not all of them identical, to piece together an account of the conference. We have just learned that NCNA has issued a special fourteen page supplement on Chen's press conference

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

probably in the hopes of putting his remarks in a better light than is now the case with the various versions in circulation. We expect to have this version momentarily and shall promptly forward it along with any comment to the Department.

A. Let Imperialists, Revisionists Come -- Apparently Chen touched off world-wide adverse reaction with his outburst at the climax of the conference when, with a waving of arms, he shouted "I hope tomorrow that the U.S. imperialists come to China...let the Indians come with them. Let the British come too ...let the revisionist leaders in the north combine with them" for China in any event would emerge triumphant in the end. Chen qualified his remark about the revisionists from the north by expressing the belief that the "great Soviet people...and party" would not follow their leaders in such an eventuality, thereby adding insult to injury as far as the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are concerned.

B. Second Afro-Asian Conference -- It appears that Chen demanded an assurance of success in advance if China were to support the holding of a Second A-A Conference in Algiers. While there is some confusion as to what he specifically said a clarification of Peking's position on this subject is contained in the joint Sino-Cambodian communique which set the precondition that the A-A Conference should give "absolute priority to the struggle against imperialism, above all ... U.S. imperialism ... otherwise the Conference would lose all significance." From various reports concerning Chen's recent trip to Algeria, Mali and Guinea and the lack of joint communiques at the end of his visit to these countries, it appears that the Chicoms are not getting their way with these countries, a factor which may have contributed to Chen's come-down on a project which the Chicoms had been so enthusiastically pushing.

C. The UN -- Chen pictured the UN as a place where the U.S. and the Soviet Union deal with each other, and according to one report, stated flatly that "China cannot join this United Nations." It appears clear from a variety of accounts that Chen reiterated the two recently invoked additional preconditions for Chicom entry into the UN: 1) the UN must annul the resolution declaring China as an aggressor in Korea, and 2) a reorganization of the UN would have to take place, involving the admission of "all independent nations" and the ousting of "imperialist lackeys."

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

D. Vietnam -- Chen recalled his efforts to convince Afro-Asian leaders that the war in Vietnam was of global importance as it was part of the U.S. imperialist scheme to control the world. He expanded at length on this subject to the assembled reporters and our feeling is that Chen's harping on this point reflects Chicom recognition of Afro-Asian resistance to the regime's views on Vietnam.

E. Hong Kong -- Chen's rather vague treatment of Hong Kong and his warning that Peking would "take measures when necessary" if the U.K. allowed Hong Kong to be used as a base for U.S. aggression against China (not Vietnam) suggested that Chicoms do not contemplate any action in the foreseeable future to change the status quo of Hong Kong.

Comment: Through a second-hand source we have learned that Chen's outburst re "let Americans come, etc..." came after he had been standing on a brilliantly lighted platform for more than three hours answering detailed and at times pointless questions from the floor. The same source opined that Chicom inexperience in fielding impromptu questions by hard-bitten Western reporters was also a factor in accounting for Chen's momentary loss of composure.

Outer Mongolia

8. Chinese Highway Aid Project Completed

As reported by NCNA on September 28, the 23-kilometer highway from the Mongolian capital of Ulan Bator to the coal-mining city of Nalaikha was formally opened at a mass rally in Nalaikha on September 27. The ranking dignitaries attending the celebration were B. Dugersuren, a vice-chairman of the MPR Council of Ministers, and Chang Tsan-ming, the Chinese Ambassador in Ulan Bator. However, it appears that neither of them spoke; speeches were delivered by Wang Cho-chih, Commercial Counselor of the CPR Embassy, and Lubsan Tsultemu, director of the highway bureau of the State Construction Commission. According to the NCNA report, the highway was built under the terms of the May 1960 aid agreement between the CPR and MPR. (Unclassified)

Comment: A Consulate officer traversed the Ulan Bator-Nalaikha highway in August 1965 during the course of the U.N. Human Rights Seminar in Mongolia. It is a narrow (about 24 feet in width), concrete road, smooth and evidently well built. Traffic

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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consists mainly of trucks and motorcycles, and is quite heavy in the vicinity of Ulan Bator, diminishing to moderate as one nears Nalaikha. Chinese workers could be seen putting finishing touches on the road at one or two places, but only in small groups of 10 - 20 men.

The road clearly must have been begun before the 1965 construction season. Given the total withdrawal of Chinese laborers from Mongolia by autumn 1964 (reported in our WEEKA 27 of 7/3/64 and confirmed by British Charge d'Affaires R. A. Hibbert who arrived in Ulan Bator in November 1964), it seems likely that the project dates back at least to 1963.

Completion of the highway may account partially for the reappearance of Chinese laborers in Mongolia in the spring of 1965. Several hundred Chinese clad in standard blue work clothes and coolie hats were seen in August at a high-rise apartment site and an earth-moving job involving reconstruction of the large plaza in front of the headquarters of the State Construction Commission. Hibbert says that the figure of 4,000 Chinese (WEEKA 37) is current among East European diplomats in Ulan Bator, but that neither the Mongols nor Chinese diplomats will discuss numbers or details.

We find it significant that speeches at the dedication rally were delivered by very low-level officials, and wonder whether the Mongolian press accounts of the ceremonies (not yet available here) give any credit at all to the Chinese. At any rate, it is common knowledge among citizens of Ulan Bator that the Chinese built the road. (Limited Official Use).

For the Acting Principal Officer:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED

(2) BANGKOK CANBERRA KARACHI MOSCOW RANGOON SOFIA VNTIANE
BELGRADE CPACPLAD KATHMANDU MUNICH ROME S'PORE COMNAVPHL
BUCHAREST DARESALAAM KLUMPUR NDELHI SAIGON (4)TAIPEI TAIWANDEFCOM
BUDAPEST DJAKARTA MANILA PRAGUE SEOUL TOKYO USAFMANILA
LONDON

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ORIGIN ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

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TO : Department of STATE WASHINGTON, D.C.

1965 OCT 11 AM 8 27

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

GROUP-3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

FROM : AmConsul HONG KONG DATE: Oct 8, 1965

SUBJECT : Hong Kong/Macau Weeka No. 29

REF :

CONTENTS

		PAGE
Hong Kong		
1.	Communist China's National Day Celebrated in Hong Kong.	1
2.	LI Tsung Jen's Press Conference.	2
3.	CHEN Yi on Consequences of U.S. Use of Hong Kong.	2
4.	Constitutional Reform.	2
Macau		
5.	Lobo Dies.	3
Psychological - Negative		
Military - Negative		

Hong Kong

1. Communist China's National Day Celebrated in Hong Kong: (UNCLASSIFIED) October 1st, the sixteenth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, was celebrated in Hong Kong with the usual round of dinners, parties, and receptions, with many speeches delivered by local Communist big-wigs. Local Communist-operated banks, businesses, restaurants, and union halls were gaily decorated and bedecked with flags, and were closed for the day. However, for most of Hong Kong it was business as usual. The police, although on alert, were unobtrusive, and no incidents were reported.

Drafted by: HK/MrDOergel:bhrsmg:10/7/65 Contents and Classification Approved by: HK/MrMSpohl

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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COMMENT:

The Communists probably spent more on this October 1st than in the past, one expensive item being a spectacular display of fireworks. However, as in the past, there was virtually no indication of public spontaneity in the celebrations.

2. LI Tsung Jen's Press Conference: (UNCLASSIFIED) Hong Kong's Communist press claimed that 64 journalists from Hong Kong and Macau went to Peking for General LI Tsung Jen's August 26 press conference (Weeka 28), a figure not much in excess of our own estimates. Local Communist papers gave prominent coverage to LI's press conference, but unrepresented papers generally played down the conference, and dismissed Li's allegation concerning an American anti-CHIANG Kai Shek plot as being either unlikely or too old to be of interest.

COMMENT:

LI's press conference must have been a distinct disappointment to the newsmen, and could hardly have increased his prestige.

3. CHEN Yi on Consequences of U.S. Use of Hong Kong: (CONFIDENTIAL - Begin UNCLASSIFIED) The journalists from Hong Kong and Macau, among others, were treated to a more stimulating press conference September 29, when CHEN Yi spoke to them for four hours. During the press conference Chen repeated Chicom charges that the British authorities are allowing Hong Kong to be used by the U.S. as a stronghold (previously the Chicoms had used the term base) in its "aggression" against Vietnam. He added that in the future the British authorities were sure to let Hong Kong become a U.S. stronghold in aggression against China. Chen said that if the British did not adopt a wiser position, the Chicoms would "take measures when necessary." (End UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: (Begin CONFIDENTIAL)

Chen's vagueness as to contempleted "measures" and their timing, as well as his placing of the threat in the context of U.S. aggression against China, rather than Vietnam, suggest that the Chicoms are not considering any action in the foreseeable future to change the status quo in Hong Kong (Conte 537).

4. Constitutional Reform: (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE - Begin UNCLASSIFIED) Two Members of Parliament, Mr. Nigel FISHER and Mr. David STEEL, spent six days in Hong Kong early in October, and, not surprisingly, Hong Kong's major political societies made pronouncements on constitutional reform while the MPs were here. The Reform Club reiterated its proposals for election of Legislative Council members, and the Civic Association proposed that members of the Urban Council (which Civic would rename "Municipal Council") be appointed to the Legislative Council "until such time as there are open elections to the Legislative Council." The Hong Kong Labour Party suggested the possibility that all of Hong Kong's political groups would join together to push for self-government.

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 23-1 Chicom

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A-232 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

1965 OCT 4 AM 8 33

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG DATE: October 1, 1965

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 39

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Li Tsung-jen Meets the Press
2. Ho Lung Helps Sinkiang Celebrate Tenth Anniversary
3. Masses to Participate More in Streamlined Industrial Management
4. Peking Issues Statistics on Flow of Youth to Country Side

External

5. Vietnam: Another Quiet Week
6. Have you any Wool?
7. October 1 Visitors
8. Chicoms Withdraw from IRC Meeting to Forestall "Two China" Plot
9. Afro-Asia: Peking Hosts GANEFO Meeting; Asian Committee Established

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Drafted by: BV

POL:BLevin,NPlatt,JThomas

Clearances:

Contents and Classification approved by:

POL:JHoldridge

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Internal

1. Li Tsung-jen Meets the Press

The Li Tsung-jen press conference took place as scheduled in Peking on September 26, attended by 300 Chinese and foreign journalists and press attaches (for whom the proceedings were simultaneously translated into English, Japanese, Russian, Indonesian, French and Cantonese). The old ex-Acting President of Nationalist China, resplendant in a new Mao-style boiler suit, saved his strength for the question period while Ch'en Ssu-yuan, his former Kwangsi political secretary who returned with him last July, read Li's long prepared statement.

The statement dwelt on several predictable themes; a comparison of the progress and purity of the new China with the dissipation and rot of U.S. society; an attack on the modern revisionists; an expression of pleasure at being home; an endorsement of Mao's "wise and brilliant" leadership; an attack on the American role in Vietnam. By far the most space was devoted to a blast at the United States' role in Taiwan. In an effort to sow dissension between the GRC and the United States, Li recounted the United States unending efforts to "perpetuate its occupation" of Taiwan and cited as examples, official American disapproval expressed in 1949 over Chiang K'ai-shek's withdrawal to Taiwan, and the offer in 1955 by a "U.S. Republican big-wig" of support if Li organized a coup to overthrow Chiang.

When queried on the "big-wig's" identity by a Canadian journalist during the question period Li, it would appear from local press reports, refused to answer. He also balked at a question put to him by a Hong Kong newspaperman as to how much money he still had in the United States, how many of his children remained there, and how much cash he had left them. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: It is evident that during the months he has spent in Communist China Li has done his homework well, to the point that he can spout the jargon as well as anyone. His credibility as an independent non-Communist booster of alleged progress achieved on the mainland has suffered accordingly. By requiring Li to reel off a letter-perfect attack against the U.S. in Taiwan, against the revisionist sins of Khrushchev, and a stock barrage against the U.S. in Vietnam, and even arranging his appearance in a boiler suit, rather than the business suits he has been wearing, Li's stage managers have dulled the impact of his message.

However, the carnival created around Li will not be entirely without gain for the regime. The fact that so many foreign

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

journalists were present at the conference will guarantee a wide coverage of his words. We note however, that many of the Hong Kong Chinese reporters present represented Hong Kong's "yellow press" which makes a living on sex, sensation, and dog track tips - hardly the kind of vehicle that will achieve lasting political effect. (ConGentels 513 & 532, Confidential)

2. Ho Lung Helps Sinkiang Celebrate Tenth Anniversary

NCNA September 27 announced that a 65 member joint CCP-Central Committee-State Council delegation headed by veteran Politburo member and Vice Premier Ho Lung had left Peking for Urumchi to participate in the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. The deputy chiefs of the delegation were Kao K'o-lin, Secretary of the Northwest Regional Bureau; Ch'en Man-yuan, Deputy Minister of State Farms and Land Reclamation; Chang Ta-chih, Commander of the Lanchow Military Region; Liu Chun, Deputy Director of the Central Committee United Front Work Department and Vice Chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Commission (a busy traveller these days who was recently a member of the Central Government delegation to Tibet -- WEEKAS 36, 37); and Liang Pi-yeh, Deputy Director of the PLA General Political Department.

Among the 100,000 joyous greeters that awaited the delegation in Urumchi were Sinkiang Party First Secretary Wang En-mao, Region Chairman Saifudin, and Vice-Chairman Iminov. In his welcoming speech Saifudin mentioned the defeat of past imperialist plots to subvert Sinkiang. "Today," he continued, "modern revisionism is colluding with imperialism to undermine the solidarity of the various nationalities in Sinkiang....and these plots and activities have likewise been defeated." The unity theme continued to receive rather defensive stress at a banquet that evening. Ho Lung termed Sinkiang solidarity "a bulwark which no force can destroy, a reliable guarantee for the defeat of all class enemies at home and abroad..." Saifudin capped the evening by reciting a poem in praise of national unity.

The Ho Lung visit crowns a voluminous press build-up in recent weeks for Sinkiang's 10th anniversary. Among standard reports of happy herdsmen and well-fed Uighurs were interesting figures on the increase of Party members and cadres in the Region. Radio Uruchi (Sept. 6, 1320GMT) reported that Sinkiang now had 220,000 CCP members, 190,000 cadres and 18,000 party organizations

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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compared with 18,000 CCP members, 12,000 cadres and 15,000 basic level party organizations in 1955. 106,000 of the Party members and 106,000 cadres now in the Region come from the minority nationalities. The remainder, which constitute more than half the members [redacted] are, we assume, Han Chinese who moved into the area. (Unclassified) (See also NCNA Sept. 28.)

Comment: Both the Sinkiang and the Tibetan celebrations are public evidence of a much greater effort by Peking in the nationalities field. The increase in activity dates roughly from the end of 1964, at which point Li Wei-han, former United Front Work Department, was dropped as Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress. The stepped up attention to minority affairs evident since Li dismissal is further evidence that the regime has been far from satisified with the "socialist progress" of China's lesser nationalities. We doubt that once the noise from Sinkiang and Tibet has died down that there will be much more real progress to show for all the effort.

In retrospect, the choice of Ho Lung to represent the Central Government in Sinkiang, makes the choice of Public Security Minister Hsieh Fu-chih, a freshman Vice Premier, to head the delegation to Tibet look like an expression of Peking's displeasure with Tibet's "progress." (Limited Official Use)

3. Masses to Participate More in Streamlined Industrial Management

The fifth essay on the organization of the industrial production upsurge, entitled "Face the Workshifts and Teams, Face the Masses in the Service of Production" appeared in the People's Daily on September 24. It complained that in spite of the development of revolutionary management innovations, i.e., Party committee jurisdiction over factory direction, participation of supervisory personnel in productive labor, stress on political work among workers and staff, many industrial enterprises still clung to outmoded bourgeois management techniques copied from abroad and inherited from pre-"liberation" days. The result was a top-heavy, multi-layered industrial bureaucracy which was out of touch with the masses, and which stifled production. The editorial noted that an effort to rectify organizational redundance and the tendency of management to emphasize "control" at the expense of politics and reliance on the masses, Mao Tse-tung had this year

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

decreed that "management is also socialist education," and ordered that politics be placed more firmly "in command." This was interpreted as requiring emphasis on the reduction and merger of supervisory units, labor for cadres, and mass participation in management. Being "sent down" (Hsia Fang) was just as glorious a revolutionary honor as receiving a promotion, the editorial piously assured those executives who were headed for the workshops. Fulfillment of one's assigned task was all that mattered. Those who remained in supervisory positions were to acquaint themselves thoroughly with the needs of the ordinary worker and the basic level workshop thereby facilitating a two way flow of ideas and increasing the activism and the initiative of the masses. While the need for specific regulations and systems was recognized, major efforts were called for to raise the political consciousness of workers in order to fit their role as co-"masters" of the enterprises.

Comment: Exhortations to streamline supervisory staff, spend more time engaged in productive labor, and work harder to give the ordinary laborer the impression that he is in control of his destiny are old songs to industrial cadres in Communist China. The tone of the article suggests, however, that this time the Party is in earnest, at least as far as the hsia fang of superfluous supervisors is concerned. How long it will take for normal Parkinsonian growth to replace lost tissue remains to be seen. The Chinese have a natural penchant for multi-layered bureaucracy that predates "revolutionary consciousness" by thousands of years.
(Unclassified)

4. Peking Issues Statistics on Flow of Youth to Country Side

On September 23 NCNA revealed that since 1962 one million educated city youth had gone to work in the countryside. These had joined the "tens of millions" of children who had returned to their villages (presumably during the same period) after completing their studies in the cities. In the first eight months of 1965 alone, 250,000 urban youth had left the cities for a new life in the communes and reclamation areas.

Specific local figures given in the despatch included: 80,000 intellectual youth (unclear how many of these originated in the cities) sent to develop 205 state reclamation farms in the old revolutionary base areas of Kiangsi; 7,000 youths from Chungking sent to work in 430 forestry areas and stockbreeding farms in the Tapa mountains; more than 17,000 youths from major Fukien cities organized with over 30,000 "rural intellectuals" to form 3,000 mountain farming teams in the Wu Yi range; and 3,000

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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intellectual youth from Canton sent to Hainan Island.

According to a Shanghai Liberation Daily article of May 26, 50,000 youth from that city went to work in Sinkiang "over the past two years."

Comment: The figure of one million urban youths leaving the cities since 1962 is the first composite statistic on the flow of young people to the countryside given since the failure of the great leap forced the regime to scuttle its ambitious education plans and initiate the unpopular shift. The number stretched over a 3½ year period strikes us as small, testifying to the difficulties rural areas must have been having in absorbing large quantities of soft, green, homesick youth. Other problems have been the recalcitrant attitudes of parents who want their children near and of commune peasants who resent sharing their rations and work points. That these difficulties continue is indicated by the fact that the 1965 rate of transfers has not changed appreciably with 250,000 in eight months compared to 320,000 for all of 1964 (People's Daily May 5, 1965).

External

5. Vietnam: Another Quiet Week

For the third week in succession, Peking gave relatively little editorial attention to Vietnam. Standing out in an otherwise dull week were (1) continued protests over alleged U.S. use of poison gas in Vietnam and (2) a slap at Soviet policy on Vietnam by Liu Shao-chi.

A. "Poison Gas " Protests Continued - Peking continued its poison gas protest campaign (WEEKA 38), issuing two commentator articles (Ta Kung Pao September 24 and People's Daily September 25) and a CPR Red Cross protest on September 22. All the protests gave heavy play to the U.S. Defense Department announcement that the American commander in South Vietnam "always had the authority" to use certain types of riot-control gases. At the same time, the articles ridiculed American statements that the gases were "non-toxic" or "non-lethal." (Unclassified)

B. Liu Hits Soviet Vietnam Policy - CPR Chairman Liu Shao-chi, speaking at a banquet in honor of Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk on September 28, made a thinly-veiled attack on Soviet policy in Vietnam. Liu accused the "modern revisionists" of sacrificing the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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CONFIDENTIAL

interests of the people in order to "compromise with U.S. imperialism." He charged that although such people professed support for the Vietnamese people, they were actually "giving covert support to the peace talks scheme of the United States and trying to induce the Vietnamese people to capitulate." (Unclassified)

Comment: The Chicoms have periodically charged Moscow with counselling the DRV "to capitulate." While we have not seen any evidence of Moscow's urging negotiations on Hanoi, past experience teaches that the Chicom version of events does not rate automatic dismissal, even though the overlay of propaganda and exaggeration may at times be thick. We wonder, for example, if the Soviets were included in DRV Premier Phan Van Dong's expression of understanding in his August 31 speech for "the justifiable concern of many people that further continuation of the war would bring more devastation and suffering to the Vietnamese people." (Limited Official Use)

6. Have you any Wool?

The Sino-Indian dispute was transformed into a livestock contest during the week with India running off with the blue ribbon for the best yak of the show. A group of Indians satirized Chinese demands for the return of allegedly abducted livestock by driving a flock of sheep to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi. Being devotees of Karl, not Groucho, Marx, Peking saw no humor in the situation and rammed a note to the GOI protesing the "ugly anit-Chinese farce" as an attempt by the Indian Government to cover up its "crimes of aggression against China and the wretched picture of its troops fleeing in panic from the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim border." Meanwhile, down on the shifting border, things were fairly quiet with the exception of the capture by the Chicoms of three Indian soldiers who were alleged to have intruded into Chinese territory along the Sikkim border.

Earlier in the week (on September 24), the Chicoms forwarded a note to the Indians which resorted to invective and bluster in an attempt to create the impression that the Indians and not the Chinese are the real trouble-makers in the situation. In addition to what has by now become a routine allegation of Indian occupation of Chinese territory, the note inferred that the Indians were responsible for the flight of the Dalai Lama and "several thousand persons" into India.

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Rather than go into the hair-splitting efforts of the Chinese to prove their case against the Indians, we will leave off here, waiting breathlessly to see if the clever Chinese can rescue their herds through raising high the banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought. However, so far it seems that the Chinese have been fleeced by the India response to their numerous protests.

7. October 1 Visitors

A. Sihanouk Arrives - Cambodian Chief of State Norodom Sihanouk arrived in Peking September 28 as the leading visiting attraction in attendance for Communist China's National Day celebrations. Sihanouk is the guest of Chairman Liu Shao-chi and, from NCNA accounts,it appears that the regime went to extraordinary lengths to provide a "rousing, colorful welcome" involving hundreds of thousands of Peking residents for the Cambodian ruler.

As expected, Sihanouk has pleased his guests by attacking "U.S. imperialism," but for the most part his public statements have consisted of praise for Chicom policies and attitudes. The Chicoms have also lavishly praised Combodia's "valiant struggle against U.S. imperialism" and Liu repeated assurances of Chicom "all-out support and assistance" to Cambodia if the U.S. imperialists should "dare to spread flames of war of aggression" to that "peace-loving kingdom."

B. Indonesian Guests - Two Indonesian delegations arrived in Peking on September 27 and 28 to attend the CPR National Day celebrations. One delegation, representing the Indonesian Provisional People's Consultative Congress, is headed by Chaerul Saleh. The other is a National Defense Institute delegation led by Major General Wilujo Puspojudo. (Unclassified)

C. Other Visitors - Of course the faithful Albanians are on hand for the celebration with a delegation headed by Lieutenant-General Kadri Hazbiu. Pakistan is represented by a delegation headed by Minister of Commerce Ghulam Farrique. NCNA reports that over 1600 overseas Chinese, including those from Hong Kong and Macao, will be in Peking for the occasion. To date, there has been no mention in the Chicom press of any Soviet or DRV delegation in attendance for the anniversary.

Comment: This year's guest list is a far cry from last year's fifteenth anniversary celebration which featured the ever-available

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Sihanouk, the Presidents of Mali, Congo (B) and North Korea, DRV Premier Pham Van Dong and Rumania's Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Maurer. However, there have been other years when the Chicom guest list was composed largely of run of the mill figures, e.g. 1963 and 1962. (Limited Official Use)

8. Chicoms Withdraw from IRC Meeting to Forestall "Two China" Plot

As was the case in 1957 on the occasion of the Nineteenth International Red Cross Conference, Peking on September 26 announced its refusal to attend the forthcoming Twentieth IRC Conference scheduled for Vienna from October 2 to 9 owing to the organization's "defiance of repeated protests by the Chinese Government" in inviting representatives of "the Chiang Kai-shek Clique" to attend the meeting. The regime also declared that it was severing all relations with the Standing Commission of the International Red Cross, a move whose implications were not spelled out by the regime nor clear to us here. It pictured the situation as another effort by the U.S. to use international organizations and conferences "to engineer the creation of 'Two Chinas'."

Comment: Peking's refusal to attend the IRC Conference and its severing of relations with the Standing Commission appear to be the "grave consequences" the regime warned of in the event the IRC invitation to the GRC was not withdrawn. (Limited Official Use)

9. Afro-Asia: Peking Hosts GANEFO Meeting; Asian Committee Established

The Peking press gave heavy play last week to the Second Council Meeting of the GANEFO Federation held in Peking September 21-23. Highlighting the meeting was the announcement on September 25 of the formation of an Asian Committee of GANEFO with Communist China as chairman. A further announcement stated that the first Asian GANEFO would be held in 1966, exact time and place to be decided at a subsequent meeting.

Chicom press coverage of the meeting emphasized the "success" of the Federation despite the disruptions caused by such "imperialist" sports federations as the International Olympic Committee.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Chicom delegate Huang Chung, in a speech to the Council Meeting on September 23, stated the obvious when he praised GANEFO as "the only world sports organization which has openly proclaimed its political stand."

Comment: It strikes us that the formation of an Asian Committee represents a retreat from Sukarno's original vision of GANEFO as an organization encompassing the "New Emerging Forces" of all areas of the world. Perhaps the apparent lack of interest of those eligible for GANEFO membership has impressed Peking with the difficulties of setting up "revolutionary" attractions capable of weaning away newly independent nations from such "imperialist," but vastly more prestigious international standbys as the International Olympic Committee and the United Nations.

For the Acting Principal Officer:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED:

(2) BANGKOK CANBERRA KARACHI MOSCOW RANGOON SOFIA VNTIANE
BELGRADE CPACPLAD KATHMANDU MUNICH ROME S'PORE COMNAVPHL
BUCHAREST DARESALAAM KLUMPUR NDELHI SAIGON (4)TAIPEI TAIWANDEFCOM
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FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG DATE: September 24,1965

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 38

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Greater Concern for Peasants' Welfare Urged
2. Li Tsung-jen to Hold Press Conference for Overseas Correspondents
3. Poor and Lower Middle Peasants Association Given Direct Supervision over Production
4. Birth Control Propaganda Refocussed in Rural Areas

External

5. Peking Relaxes War Scare
6. Vietnam Again Treated in Low-Key
7. Chicom-African Developments

Military

8. Work Conference on People's Militia

SECRET

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SECRET

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Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,JThomas,YSNg/DATTLO:Lt.Cd.Treadwell: Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances: drb,9/23/65

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. Greater Concern for Peasants' Welfare Urged

Noting that the peasantry requires not only food to lead a proper life but also clothing, housing, medical services, social activities, culture and entertainment, the People's Daily on September 19 urged rural leadership to concentrate on increasing commune members' cash supply. Attention must be paid to this problem in order to maintain the peasants' enthusiasm for production and support for the regime, the front page editorial continued. While developing collective subsidiary production should be the principal means of increasing the flow of cash to commune members, exploitation of private sideline production was also "perfectly correct," the article continued. Village cadres should realize that the development of private sideline production was not a capitalist management technique. "Just the opposite, it's a necessity of socialist economic life." Furthermore, they should also realize that "doing good political work among the masses and caring for the material interests of the masses are not mutually incompatible, but actually complement one another." In fact, what basic level functionaries must do is to step up ideological work in order to insure that whatever new cash comes into the hands of commune members is spent correctly.

Comment: The editorial is a rural companion piece to the June 21 People's Daily directive on promoting the welfare of industrial workers, and a further development of the line promulgated this spring that people should eat better food and wear better clothes as long as their ideologies remain pure. It's the thought (of Mao Tse-tung) that counts.

In what strikes us as a realistic but revisionist effort to maintain popular morale the regime seems to have eschewed, for the moment at least, the orthodox tenet that material comfort corrodes revolutionary ideals. Basic level cadres, however, who have always been taught to tighten the people's belts, are going to find the new instructions exceedingly confusing.

2. Li Tsung-jen to Hold Press Conference for Overseas Correspondents

General Li Tsung-jen, the former Nationalist Vice President who returned to Mainland China last July after sixteen years in

0695

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

the United States has invited representatives of the Hong Kong press, radio, television, and locally based correspondents (with the exception of those representing countries engaged in "aggression" in Vietnam) to a press conference in Peking on September 26-27. The list of invitees includes local officials of the KMT Central News Agency and representatives from other KMT oriented-press media such as General Ho Sai-lai, Board Chairman of the newspaper Kung Sheung, and a long time KMT adherent. Although the participants are supposed to pay their own expenses for the two days of the news conference, liberal financial assistance has been offered to carry those unable to afford the expense. The press visitors will subsequently be split up into three groups for a ten-day all-expenses-paid tour, one to Manchuria, one to Central China, and one to East China. The All-China Journalists Association is picking up the tab for the tours. The son of a former KMT governor of Kwangtung told us that a number of his father's cronies in Hong Kong had recently received letters from Li urging them to follow in his footsteps.

Comment: The principal purpose of the invitations appears to be an effort to refocus the spotlight on Li Tsung-jen and gain more political mileage out of his return than has resulted so far. The regime's hope is apparently to encourage more GRC/KMT defections, and also to present Communist China in a more favorable light by using a well known non-Communist like Li to explain its policies on such major issues as Vietnam, "U.S. imperialism," etc. An intentional by-product of the invitation will be the attendance by many of the reporters at national day ceremonies on October 1, which leads us to wonder whether the Chinese Communists may be planning something spectacular to show their guests. (ConGentel 419, Confidential)

3. Poor and Lower Middle Peasants Association Given Direct Supervision Over Production

A Kwantung farmer from the Shihchiaoli Production Brigade of the Tanshui Commune in Huiyang Hsien (OIR 5246, September 10, 1965) reports that the Poor and Lower Middle Peasants Association (PLMPA) established in September 1964 in his brigade in conjunction with the "four clearance" movement had the following functions:

1) To supervise the work of the brigade.
2) To assist the commune in implementing its policies at the brigade level.
3) To assist the brigade leader in establishing production targets.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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The PLMPA consisted of peasants who had a good reputation among the local inhabitants for honesty, diligence, and "progressive thoughts," and who had been authorized to join the association by "four clearance" cadres running the campaign.

In one of the production teams subordinate to the brigade, ten out of a total population of one hundred and thirty (eighty of whom were production workers) were chosen as PLMPA members. Of these ten a committee of five was formed to represent the brigade PLMPA at the team level, and to advise the team leader (also a member of the committee), on all decisions concerning agricultural production and the disposal of farm products. The committee also solicited ordinary production team members for suggestions on the work of the team, a new development which was welcomed because it gave team members a feeling of heightened responsibility in running their affairs.

Comment: From available information PLMPAS "supervision" hitherto has been limited to a police function; collecting evidence and denouncing cadres suspected of corrupt practices, embezzlement of work points, etc. This is the first report we have seen which ascribes to a PLMPA a direct supervisory role over daily production decisions. The report may be an indication that the role of the PLMPA has changed in areas where the "four clearance" drive against corruption is over.

The small size of the association strengthens the impression gained from OIR0255, (which described a commune with a population of 18,000 from which a PLMPA of 1,600 was chosen), that the PLMPA is an elite rather than a mass organization. Furthermore, if accurate the current report indicates that the PLMPA is in the process of becoming a genuine channel of power rather than simply a tool of indoctrination and surveillance. We still lack sufficient information to determine the extent and effectiveness of this direct link between the PLMPA and production. The supply of peasants with "progressive-thoughts" probably varies from place to place, and from time to time.

4. Birth Control Propaganda Refocussed in Rural Areas

The Shanghai Hsin Min Wan Pao (July 23 - the latest issue of a rare publication we received last week) tells us that cadres of the Chensheng brigade, Nanhsiang Commune were concerned last year

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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over the reduction in work out-put last year that resulted from an increase in maternity leave granted members of the Chouwang production team. Applying Maoist analysis to the problem the worried functionaries soon isolated the principal contradiction; ladies from the production team with fewer children were being lax in observing birth control procedures because they did not feel the economic pinch of a large family. Female team members with many children needed little urging to adopt the necessary methods. Arguing with irrefutable logic that if the current trend continued "women members with less children will in a few years become women members with more children," the cadres then decided to concentrate birth control propaganda on women with smaller broods.

Consequently they held a birth control exhibit and five times invited visiting health personnel to lecture on the subject and check all women and children in the brigade. The results have been good, the article concluded, and now more than 100 "women with less children" are practicing birth control.

Comment: Articles in any Chinese Communist public media on birth control are extremely rare. The appearance of this one may be evidence of the mounting concern and growing attention that clandestine reports indicate the government is showing toward limiting the population. The essential meaning of the article is that regardless of how many children a family has, the fewer new babies the better. It remains to be seen whether this message can be put across in rural China where implementation of birth control has been most difficult and without much success.

External

5. Peking Relaxes War Scare

Early on the morning of September 17 Peking delivered an ultimatum to the Indians demanding that they dismantle within three days all "illegal military structures on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself" or otherwise "bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising therefrom." The Chinese note also demanded the return of four Chinese and several hundred head of livestock allegedly abducted by the Indians and an immediate halt to "all Indian intrusions along the Sino-Indian boundary." No time-limit was placed on these latter series of demands. Although obviously designed to relieve Indian pressures on the Pakistanis, the harsh and uncompromising nature of the note appeared to forecast that

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Peking would seek to achieve this end not only through words, but possibly by the application of force in the Sikkim-China border area.

Some ten hours before the expiration of the ultimatum, however, the regime took the unusual step of extending for another three days the time-limit in which India was required to dismantle the disputed structures. While the note conveying the extension of the ultimatum contained the same uncompromising demands, it appeared tous that Peking's failure to act on the first ultimatum took some steam out of the crisis. Further, by turning what was a straightforward, old-fashioned ultimatum into' a more complex affair involving an extension of the time-limit, new argumentation, etc., it appeared that the Chicoms were seeking to obfuscate the issue by argument and counter-argument and so keep up pressures on Indians while not committing themselves beforehand to serious involvement. One factor possibly motivating Peking in this exercise was the hope of forcing the U.S. and Soviet Union into a posture of support for the Indians thereby a) proving the regime's contention of collusion on the issue between the "imperialists" and "modern revisionists" and, b) further solidifying its relations with the Pakistanis at our expense.

What began with a bang apparently has ended with a whimper with Peking's announcement on September 22 that the Indians have dismantled all disputed military structures in the Sikkim border. (The regime's account of the Indians stealthily destroying the structures does not ring true and further indicates the regime's intentions in this exercise were limited to the psychological sphere.)

Peking's announcement of this "diplomatic victory" and the cease-fire in the Pakistani-Indian conflict reduce significantly the prospect for any large-scale Chicom attack along the Sino-Indian border. Nonetheless, the Chicoms may continue their psychological warfare campaign on the border as a means of maintaining pressure on the Indians during any forthcoming negotiations with the Pakistanis. Whether or not the regime succeeds in this, its actions during the Indian-Pakistan conflict have probably earned it a measure of gratitude in Karachi. However, it seems to us that to the rest of the world, Peking's role as a mischief-maker in a widely deplored crisis has by now been made apparent.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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The regime's continuing attacks on the UN achievement of bringing about a cease-fire are also hardly calculated to improve its standing with the vast majority of articulate world opinion (e.g. the joint message to India and Pakistan by the participants in the Arab summit meeting urging a peaceful settlement of the dispute).

A by-product of Peking's handling of the Sikkim affair has been the provision of the clearest example to date of a trend observable since the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 1964--that of the regime's cheapening of the language of international diplomacy through shrillness and bluster to the point where Peking's intentions cannot be accurately fathomed from taking at face value either its public statements or diplomatic instruments. (Confidential)

6. Vietnam Again Treated in Low-Key

Peking continued to concentrate its energies on the tense situation along the Sino-Indian border and gave only routine attention to Vietnam.Peking's major efforts for the week consisted of (1) highlighting the alleged shooting down of an American plane over Hainan Island and (2) a CPR Foreign Ministry statement condemning alleged U.S. use of poison gas in South Vietnam.

A. Hainan Incident -- The downing of a U.S. plane over Hainan Island September 20 was treated by the regime as evidence that "U.S. imperialism" is "seeking step by step to impose war on China" and desires "sooner or later to engage in a trial of strength with the Chinese people." In its treatment of the incident Peking also reiterated the line that China would never attack unless attacked and did not want war, but was not afraid of it and was well prepared for it.

The Peking press had hailed the incident as a glorious Chicom victory made possible by the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" and has given prominent play to Defense Minister Lin Piao's order of commendation to the naval air unit alleged responsible for downing the plane. As expected, the regime is taking propaganda advantage of the captured pilot, Philip E. Smith, and has quoted him as saying he "hated this war" but had been "forced to participate."

Comment: The Chicoms are treating the incident with routine, strident language and give no indication of using it to heighten tensions with the U.S. On the contrary, as was the case in previous

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

"incidents" and also in the regular run of Chicom propaganda in recent months, they picture war between U.S. and China as arising only if "forced on the Chinese people by the U.S. imperialists" and their comment to date on the incident implies that they as yet do not view this to be the case.

B. U.S. Charged with Use of Poison Gas -- Responding to the current campaign initiated by North Vietnam and the NLF, Peking on September 18 issued a Foreign Ministry statement condemning the U.S. for allegedly using poison gas in South Vietnam. The statement contended that the U.S. had recently sent a bacteriological and chemical warfare unit to South Vietnam and that it was preparing to wage a criminal germ war."

C. Additional Evidence of Differences Between Peking and Hanoi - A further indication that Peking and Hanoi do not see all things in the same light is revealed in a comparison of the press treatment given by NCNA and VNA to the Vietnamese Workers Party Delegation now touring France at the invitation of the French Communist Party. While NCNA has ignored the visit, VNA reports have heaped effusive praise on the French Communists. Peking must be particularly galled by Nhan Dhan's acclaiming Hanoi's consorting with the "modern revisionist" French Communist Party as "a considerable contribution" to Communist unity.

7. Chicom-African Developments

A. Chen Yi Returns Home - Foreign Minister Chen Yi (WEEKAS 36 and 37) completed an African safari which took him to Algeria, Mali and Guinea with brief stop-overs (enroute) in Pakistan and (on return) Syria and Afghanistan. Chen's stay in Guinea was sparsely covered by NCNA and no Sino-Guinean communique was forthcoming at the conclusion of the visit, factors which lead us to believe that there may have been less than unanimous agreement on such subjects as Vietnam and the Second Afro-Asian Conference. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: From the available evidence, Chen does not seem to have gained any notable support for Peking's policies from the countries he visited. Of interest, despite hectic developments this week along the Sino-Indian border and in the Pakistan-India crisis, Chen failed to stop over in Pakistan on his way home, possibly out of sensitivity toward Indian charges of Pakistan-Chicom collaboration against India. (Limited Official Use)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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B. Agitating for Revolution in Africa - A Kenyan journalist just back from a tour of China has told a Consulate General officer that Peking has recently been encouraging African visitors to foment armed revolution upon their return home. According to the journalist, a member of the host All-China Journalists Association suggested to him that African revolutionaries should stage revolutions along the Zanzibar pattern(i.e. raid police barracks for arms; then revolt after which they could expect Chinese help). The Kenyan newsman contends that the above formula was reiterated to him several times during his journey in China, and that some of his African friends received even more specific advice and promises of Chinese support. (Confidential)

Comment: We hope the journalist will tell the same story when he returns to Kenya and thus further contribute to existing African suspicions of Peking's "revolutionary" policies toward the continent. At the least, the fact that the Kenyan sought out Consulate General officers to tell his story soon after leaving China indicates that the Chicom Embassy in Nairobi has some spade work to do in picking future travel grantees. (Confidential)

Military

8. Work Conference on People's Militia

A work conference on the People's Militia was held recently by the General Staff and Political Departments of the PLA in Peking, according to a September 12 NCNA release. The participants, who included leading members of all services and many civilian organizations, heard reports by Hsu Hsiang-chien, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Council, and Lo Jui-ching, Chief of the General Staff.

The Conference summed up the progess that has been made in the building of the militia in the course of the socialist education movement and laid down guidelines for the immediate future: (1) to pay particular attention to the selection, training and education of militia cadres; (2) to insure that the PLA continues its active part in militia development by assisting in the organization and training of militia units, and (3) to charge provincial military commanders with militia development as a primary mission.

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: No change in the course of militia development is indicated by the conference. The proceedings reflect the Party leaders' views on the great strategic importance of the militia to China and perhaps the need for preparedness at this time. The guidelines set forth continue already-established policy on the improvement of basic level organization, the quality of cadre and the active role of the PLA in militia work. Reflecting the regime's infatuation with the concept of a "people's war" fought with vast masses of manpower, the representatives at the conference reportedly pledged that if the "U.S. imperialists" thrust war upon the heads of the Chinese people, "we will submerge them in a human sea."

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

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FROM : AmConGen HONGKONG DATE: SEPT 17, 1965

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 37

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Tibet Autonomous Region Formally Inaugurated - People's Congress Ends - Panchen Appears
2. Politics in Command at Opening of Second National Games
3. Quality Approach Favored in Education
4. Agricultural "Base Points" Established for Cadres

External

5. Sparse Comment on Vietnam
6. Indian-Pakistan Conflict Used to Prove Correctness of Regime's Foreign Policies
7. Chen Yi Continues African Trip
8. North Korea: National Day Observances Show Little Change from Previous Year
9. Evident Outer Mongolia Embracing of the Soviet Union to the Exclusion of Communist China

FE/IC noted

9/21 FE/IC

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12 year intervals, not automatically declassified

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Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,JThomas,SYNg

Clearances:

Contents and classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

1. Tibet Autonomous Region Formally Inaugurated - People's Congress Ends - Panchen Appears

The first Tibet People's Congress closed on September 9 after Chairman Ngapo Ngawang Jigme "with elation" declared the Autonomous Region officially inaugurated. Earlier on September 8, the Congress elected the regional government with Jigme as Chairman (governor) and seven vice chairmen (of whom only two are Han Chinese).

At the concluding session the head of the Peking Delegation, Public Security Minister Hsieh Fu-chih invited all those Tibetans involved in the 1959 uprising who had fled the country to "leave darkness for light," and return home. So long as they admitted their guilt before the people, "whatever their past crimes,. . . their past will be pardoned in all cases. . ." In the course of this speech Hsieh strongly attacked neighboring India for encroachments on the Tibetian border (see item 6).

Meanwhile, in Peking the Nationalities Committee of the NPC, and the Nationalities Affairs Commission of the Central Government also held a meeting on September 9, celebrating the creation of the new Region. Those attending included the Panchen Lama (in his first appearance since his disgrace last year), CCP United Front chief Hsu Ping, NPC Nationalities Committee Chairman Hsieh Fu-min, and Tan Kuan-san, Secretary of the CCP Tibetian Regional Committee.

On September 10 the People's Daily hailed the inaguration of the autonomous region as "a miracle rarely witnessed in human history," referring to Tibet's leap from feudal serfdom through the democratic revolution toward the socialist era. Foreign pronouncements that the creation of the Region marked "the death of Tibet" were hardly surprising, the editorial remarked defensively, since the old feudal Tibet had indeed passed away.

The first session of the Second Tibet (CPPCC) Committee, which opened on September 4, ended on September 11. Chang Kuo-hua was elected chairman of the committee with 13 vice chairmen, including Chou Jen-shan, Wang Chi-mei, Hsieh-yao-tun-chu, and Sang-po Tsai-wang-jen-tseng. The Panchen was also given a place on the standing committee.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Hsieh Fu-chih left Lhasa on September 11 for Peking with some members of his delegation, including delegation Vice Chief, Southwest Bureau Secretary and CC United Front Work Department Deputy Director Liu Chun. The remaining members formed five separate groups to make tours of various Tibetan districts. (Unclassified)

Comment: The new Autonomous Region People's Council has 37 members; 24 Tibetans, 10 Han Chinese, 1 Hui, and 2 from other nationalities. While most of the top officials remain the same, the majority of names on the new Autonomous Region People's Council list are new, indicating a purge of the Panchen's followers.

The Panchen's appearance in Peking and his election to the CPPCC Standing Committee in Tibet seem to be ploys designed to scotch rumors that he is in danger, and to demonstrate anew the Party's all-merciful attitude towards wrongdoers. In addition, it is possible that the regime still has use for the Tibetan religious leader, if only in the negative sense that his complete removal from any office would be detrimental to the Han image. Nevertheless, the strong language used by Peking in speaking of his "crimes" just two weeks ago (WEEKA 35) suggest that the Panchen still is in the dog-house. (Limited Official Use)

2. Politics in Command at Opening of Second National Games.

The Second National Games of the Chinese People's Republic opened in Peking on September 11 amid proletarian hoopla that would make a Roman circus pale by comparison. Chairman Mao, and virtually all the regime's top leaders joined 100,000 others in the Peking Worker's stadium to watch the opening exercises. The highlight of the day was a "mammoth display" of mass calisthenics entitled "Song in Praise of the Revolution" performed by 16,000 youths on the field backed by a giant "living screen" of 8,500 students flashing colored cards a la UCLA to form pictures and slogans. Among the sporty themes depicted were "Support Vietnam, Down with U.S. Imperialism," "The People's Communes are Good," and "Carry the Revolution through to the End."

The People's Daily greeted the occasion with an editorial which maintained that the purpose of sports was "to improve the people's physique in the service of production, national defense, and proletarian politics." In addition sports cultivate collective (we say "team") spirit and Communist education. Furthermore, the article continued, were an enemy to attack, the athletes could

0706
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

join the Army immediately and with their physical skills aid in "submerging the enemy in the vast sea of People's War."

China's sportsmen, the editorial went on, had established athletic relations with counterparts in more than 60 nations, resolutely opposing the U.S. Imperialists' plot to create "two Chinas" in international sports, and had also "broken the imperialist monopoly" in international sports.

Despite their virtues, however, the editorial allowed as how China's athletes also have their ideological problems. Political work must be strengthened in athletic circles, and the "tendency among some competitors to win medals at the expense of sportsmanship must be opposed," the editorial maintained. (Unclas.)

Comment: The elaborate and expensive convention of Communist China's first set of national games since the Great Leap is designed to provide the Chinese people and the world with another demonstration of national recovery and to project, using NCNA's obsequious reference, "the happiness and pride of the people living in the era (shades of imperial "reign") of Mao Tse-tung." In addition to salving national pride wounded by exclusion from major international contests like the Olympics, the games will give a boost to the regime's physical fitness program, which has up to now relied for most of its fuel on ping pong triumphs and the mass swimming campaign. (Unclassified)

3. Quality Approach Favored in Education

A September 6 People's Daily editorial marking the return of Mainland children to school for the fall term set the guidelines for education this academic year by reiterating the slogan, "Less (quantity) but finer (quality)" (Shao Er Ching). The growth of a student, it maintained, does not depend on piling up layer upon layer of knowledge, but upon whether the child can apply what he has learned to the realities of class struggle, production struggle, and scientific experimentation. Unremitting sterotyped cramming leaves the child no time to digest the material and ends up by producing a "foolhardy bookworm."

The "less but finer" approach also must apply to ideological indoctrination and extracurricular activities, the editorial continued. Calling many long meetings and organizing a great number

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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of outside activities may look superficially imposing but "actual results are not great." Politics are of course the "commander and the soul," but the "formalistic" quantitative approach weakens rather than strengthens its impact. A lighter load of activities and studies will produce healthier, better rested, more active children, the editorial concluded. (Unclas.)

Comment: Ever since the spring of 1964 education authorities have been urging teachers and principals to lighten the student's workload and to forsake traditional rote-teaching for methods that develop student initiative. The September 6 editorial takes the idea a step further by adding the currently prevalent "link labor and leisure" theme to educational guidelines, and extending the quality-over-quantity approach beyond the purely pedagogical sphere to include political work in schools. This straightforward directive is an indication of Party recognition that over-scheduling of political activities, both curricular and extra-curricular, has reached a point of diminishing returns, even among the nation's most politically impressionable age group. (Unclassified)

4. Agricultural "Base Points" Established for Cadres

Radio Ch'angsha reported on August 29 (11:45 GMT) that Hunan Province has had great success setting up agricultural "base points." It defined these base points as places in various types of commune and brigade where leadership cadres from all levels could come and stay, and together with peasants and rural technicians seek ways of increasing production. Some advanced "points" have become demonstration areas for the techniques of rural political leadership. Establishment of these "points" commenced in 1963 when the socialist education campaign began, with the result that 4,000 brigades throughout the province now have them.

Another report, from Hainan Island (Radio Haikow September 6, 2205 GMT), stated that over 2500 office cadres from all levels had been organized into 500 work teams and sent out to work at "base point brigades." (Unclassified)

Comment: One of the major recent themes in the Party's campaign to increase cadre participation in labor has been an exhortation to "squat at a point" (Tun Tien) and get a thorough knowledge of local conditions, rather than simply conduct superficial tours. These reports appear to mean that the Party has particular points in mind; areas suitable for cadre reception and

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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training. If this is so, the establishment of "base points" seems a weakening of one of the fundamental purposes of cadre labor, i.e. direct contact with the masses. However, the persistent reluctance of many commune cadres to get their hands dirty (documented most graphically in an August 19 People's Daily article about Shansi functionaries) plus the disruption caused basic level agricultural units by random invasions of soft office workers may have forced the creation or special cadre labor areas. (Unclassified)

External

5. Sparse Comment on Vietnam

Peking touched lightly on Vietnam during the week, perhaps because of distractions provided by the Indian-Pakistan crisis (see item 6). Even routine references to NLF and DRV military successes against "US aggressor and puppet forces" were considerably fewer than usual.

The announced landing in South Vietnam of twenty thousand troops of the First Cavalry Division was treated on September 15 by the People's Daily Commentator as "giving the lie to the Johnson's administration's professions of a desire for peace talks and for a settlement in accordance with the Geneva Agreements." In a rare expresssion of frankness which perhaps indicates that the regime is getting the message intended to be conveyed by our statements and actions regarding Vietnam, Commentator noted that while "(the US) aggressive amibition has met with heavy set backs, it is still far from being ready to give up." Commentator concluded with an expression of conviction that "the Vietnamese people... by relying on their heroic and unyielding struggle and with the support of the people of the world (will) certainly drive out the US aggressors..." Notably absent from Commentators' remarks were any references to the Chinese people's determination to "fight shoulder to shoulder" with the Vietnamese people or to supply volunteers at the latter's request.

The only other mildly significant comment on Vietnam was contained in Chou En-lai's replies to a series of written questions posed by the editor-in-chief of the Middle East News Agency which were reported by NCNA on September 12. Chou accused the United States of "feigning" a desire for peace talks in the hope of staying on in South Vietnam indefinitely. He took note of [redacted] our readiness "even to discuss the four-point proposition of the DRV," but dismissed this position by reiterating the standard Chicom line that the withdrawl of all US armed

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

forces from South Vietnam "is precisely the key" to the DRV's four-point proposition. (Interestingly, VNA in a September 14 round-up of international support for the DRV position omitted Chou's reference to the withdrawl of US troops from South Vietnam, dwelling instead on his remarks concerning the UN's lack of any competence "to interfere" in the Vietnam question.")

6. Indian-Pakistan Conflict Used to Prove Correctness of Regime's Foreign Policies

Peking kept up a steady stream of comment on the Indian-Pakistan dispute, but the absence to date of any accompanying efforts to stir up popular feelings on the issue (e.g. mass rallies, etc.)reinforces our earlier estimate that the regime is unlikely to intervene actively in the situation (WEEKA 36). Besides lengthy argumentation which sought to establish the alleged fact that India is the aggressor and Pakistan the victim, the regime during the week utilized the crisis to lash out at two favorite antagonists -- the UN and "modern revisionists." (Confidential)

A. Intentions Toward India - There was no effort either to deepen or renew last week's charges and implied threats concerning alleged Indian aggressive actions on the Sino-Indian border and the need for the regime to strengthen its defenses in the area. Instead, the regime confined itself to expressing in a September 12 People's Daily editorial the line that "in order to defend peace in this area and safeguard the norms of international relations and the Bandung principles, it is necessary to condemn and halt the Indian act of aggression and support the Pakistani struggle." The editorial thereupon voiced "resolute support of Pakistan's just struggle against aggression and the Kashmir people's struggle for self-determination."

In an obvious effort to discomfort further the worried Indians and demonstrate solidarity with the Paks, Peking also chose this particular time to renew in a September 14 note to the GOI its long-standing protest against the Indian Government's "forcible closing and taking over of the Calcutta Branch and Bombay agency of the Bank of China and up till now refusing to hand back (the Bank's) seized assets."

Comment: Terms such as "resolute support" are very mild expressions when measured by the standards of the regime's pronouncements in matters where it felt its interests were vitally concerned, including the 1962 clash with the Indians where prior

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

to moving, Peking took pains to build up a case that it was acting in self-defense against Indian aggression which had already caused the death of a number of Chinese border guards. Our impression is that while still anxious to appear helpful to Karachi, Peking has somewhat backed away from menacing noises toward India either out of possible concern over the US reaction or of awareness of generally hostile world opinion toward outside intervention in the widely regretted dispute between the Indians and Pakistanis. (Confidential) (ConGenTel 390)

B. Discrediting of UN - One aspect of Peking's treatment of the GOI-Pak crisis has been an effort to discredit the UN. A People's Daily September 14 editorial focused on the organization's "extremely disgraceful role in the massive armed aggression launched by India against Pakistan." Particularly noteworthy was the editorial's charge that U Thant was "acting as Washington's political broker" in his mission to Pakistan and India -- a charge which represents the regime's most direct and harshest attack on the current Secretary General.

The editorial also drew a parallel between the alleged current UN effort to "whitewash" the aggressor and failure to distinguish between aggressor (India) and victim (Pakistan) and the past UN resolution "vilifying Korea and China as the 'aggressors.'" Earlier in the week Chou En-lai used this particular issue seemingly to set an additional precondition for Peking's entry into the UN. Chou referred to the organization's "slander of China as an aggressor" as "one of a series of grave mistakes by the UN...(that) must be thoroughly corrected and no bargaining can be tolerated."(ConGenTel 385) (Confidential)

The People's Daily reeled off the Congo and the Dominican Republic as among cases "too numerous to mention" where the UN has rendered service to aggressors.

Comment: Our impression is that the Chicom position on the UN role in the crisis is way out of step with world opinion. The regime's apparent lack of awareness of this situation is yet another indication of how dogmatism and/or emotionalism seems increasingly to be divorcing it from reality. The Chicoms may also be concerned that a successful handling of the Pak-GOI conflict may generate increased pressures for either a UN role or other forms of negotiations on Vietnam. (ConGenTel 413) (Confidential)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

C. Attack on Modern Revisionists - Peking has portrayed Soviet policy toward the Indian-Pakistan support as "showing impartiality toward the Indian aggressors" and as evidence of Moscow's partnership with the US for world domination. NCNA on September 14 made clear that it regarded Peking as the target of the Tass statement of September 13 condemning "forces which seek to profit by the worsening Indian-Pakistan relations and (who) by their incendiary statements push them toward the further aggravation of the military conflict." The news agency described this statement as following the "exact tone of official US propaganda in attacking by innuendo countries which uphold justice and support Pakistan in its resistance to Indian aggression." (To date there has been no editorial treatment of the Tass statement and either the regime is cranking up a major reply, or possibly has chosen to brush off the charge lightly for fear of drawing even more attention to it.)

In its most recent comments on the Soviet position, the regime has moved from the thinly disguised circumlocation of "modern revisionists" to direct attacks by name on the Kosygin offer of Soviet good offices to Pakistan and India. In the same vein, a September 15 Ta Kung Pao editorial followed the charge that the "modern revisionists" are openly collaborating with the US imperialists by noting "little wonder that the Americans should have gleefully declared that 'the US and Russia are in the unusual position of agreeing on a major issue.'" (Limited Official Use)

7. Chen Yi Continues African Trip

Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi (WEEKA 36) continued his African trip this week, visiting Algeria and Mali before heading to Conakry September 15 as the guest of Guinean leaders. At a press conference of September 9 in Algiers, Chen courted his hosts by declaring that Algeria's political stability was a favorable factor for convening the Second Afro-Asian Conference on schedule. At the conclusion of his visit to Mali, Chen noted that his talks with Mali leaders had produced "an identity of views" and that the two sides had agreed to "coordinate...efforts..." for the Afro-Asian Conference. (Unclassified)

Comment: According to NCNA reports, Chen's public statements in Mali emphasized the A-A Conference, economic assistance and the "anti-imperialist struggle" (see also WER 37). He did not mention Vietnam. NCNA has continued to be flexible in reporting

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Chen's itinerary, mentioning his Guinea trip only on the day that he arrived in Conakry. (Limited Official Use)

8. North Korea: National Day Observances Show Little Change from Previous Year

Peking last week observed Korean National Day in a manner similar to its 1964 celebration of the occasion. A message of greetings from Chinese leaders to North Korean leaders on September 8 was followed by a Peking rally the same day. The next evening, Premier Chou En-lai was the guest of honor at a reception hosted by the North Korean Charge. (Unclassified)

Comment: A comparison of the 1965 and 1964 celebrations reveals little difference between the two observances with regard to speech content or participating personnel. Although there have been recent indications of coolness between Peking and Pyongyang, these were not reflected in the National Day observances. (Confidential)

9. Evident Outer Mongolia Embracing of the Soviet Union to the Exclusion of Communist China

Local acquisition of the rarely obtained Chinese language Outer Mongolian newspaper, Meng-Ku Hsiao-Hsi Pao, reveals the extent to which the Outer Mongolians have evidently cast their lot with Moscow. The just-received June 12 issue of the paper reports on the proceedings of the Seventh Plenary session of the Central Committee of Mongol People's Revolutionary Party held on June 4, 1965. Among other things, the Plenary session expressed effusive thanks for Soviet economic and technical aid and also noted that Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia will give aid to Outer Mongolia during the forthcoming Fourth Five-Year Plan beginning in 1966. Not a mention was made of the quite substantial Chicom aid given to regime in happier days gone by nor was there any reference to Chicom help in the new Five-Year Plan.

The Plenary session also expressed full support of Soviet efforts to "utilize all conditions and channels for holding bilateral or multi-lateral talks...with the object of improving the relations and connections between various forces in the Communist movement." (Limited Official Use)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: We are not sure how this/complete swing to the Soviet Union and studied ignoring of Communist China fits in with a recent report that 4,000 Chinese workers are expected in Outer Mongolia. We wonder whether the continued existence of a Chinese language paper in Ulan Bator indicates the existence of a sizeable colony of permanent Chinese residents in the city or the possible utilization there of Chinese labor from Soviet Far Eastern areas. (Limited Official Use)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0714

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1		5
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FROM : AmConGen Hong Kong

DATE: Sept. 10, 1965

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 36

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. First Tibet People's Congress Continues - Chang Kuo-hua Promoted
2. ChiCom Radio Celebrates Twentieth Anniversary
3. Shanghai "Comfort Delegation" to Sinkiang Includes Parents of Resettled Youth

Military

4. Rectification Accompanies Deranking in Shantung

External

5. Lin Piao's Ideological Exercise on Occasion of 20th Anniversary V-J Day
6. Vietnam: ChiComs Show Concern Over International Receptivity to Negotiations
7. Continued Pressure on HKG
8. Peking's Position on the India-Pakistan Conflict
9. Chen Yi on Safari
10. Dominican Republic: Peking Scores "Act of Reconciliation"

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals. Not automatically declassified

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Drafted by: Maj.Col.Treadwell

POL:BLevin:JThomas:NPlatt:NG:db:9/9/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: John H. Holdridge

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0715

Internal

1. First Tibet People's Congress Continues - Chang Kuo-hua Promoted

The torrent of press and radio coverage of the first Tibet People's Congress continued this week, much bolstered by the release of the full 9,500 character text of Public Security Minister Hsieh Fu-chih's speech to the delegates. In his address, Hsieh described Tibet's recent history as a process of class struggle carried out by the regime's million serfs against their exploiting masters, represented most recently by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen. Ever since the serfs under the leadership of the CCP and with the help of the PLA had overthrown their wicked classmasters, the Tibetans had returned from the brink of racial extinction and progressed by leaps and bounds until arriving at the present advanced stage.

The class struggle still continued, however, and Hsieh urged that all elements must unite to "expose and smash all instigations and sabotage activities by the class of slave owners and the upper strata of the reactionary elements." The furtherance of Tibet's revolution, Hsieh continued, depended on the development of large numbers of Tibetan cadres, and on everyone working together to uphold the banners of Mao's thought and Party policy.

Chang Kuo-hua, the former Tibet Work Committee Second Secretary who was first cited by Radio Lhasa at 1300GMT on Sept. 31 as First Secretary of the Autonomous Region Party Committee ~~on Sept. 31~~ (a broadcast monitored 12 hours before listed him under his old title) in a political report to the congress on Sept. 2 told delegates that Tibet had entered the stage of socialism. The main future tasks were to "develop the mutual aid and cooperation movement in a big way, gradually carry out socialist transformation as conditions mature," and press on with socialist construction and national defense.

On Sept. 3 Acting Chairman of the Tibet Preparatory Committee Ngapo Ngawang Jigme followed up on Chang's speech by proposing the "systematic and steady socialist transformation" of Tibet "under proper guidance, where conditions mature." (NCNA Sept. 8)

The delegates also heard similar speeches and instructions by CCP Central Committee delegation Vice Chief and Southwest Regional Bureau Secretary Chang Ching-wu, and Yen Hsiu-feng, another

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Secretary from the Bureau.

On September 6 Chen Ming-yi, a commander of PLA forces in Lhasa praised the role played by the Chinese military, which has operated since it entered the region in 1950 under the "brilliant" leadership of Mao and the Central Committee, the "correct" leadership of the Military Committee and the Southwest Bureau (another indication that the Southwest Bureau has had Tibet under its jurisdiction since its inception) and the "direct" leadership of the Tibet CCP Work Committee. In addition to struggling against class enemies at home and abroad, attacking local rebels, and counter attacking in self defense, the PLA had "helped build the Tsinghai-Tibet, Sinkiang-Tibet and Szechuan-Tibet highways and "engaged in all kinds of agricultural and sideline production." (Radio Lhasa, June 9, 1300 GMT)

Festivities connected with the congress have also included the opening of a new bridge linking the Tsinghai-Tibet and Szechuan-Tibet highways, the opening of the Exhibition Hall of Tibetan Revolution at the foot of Potala Hill, "gala" garden parties, meetings, and cultural presentations. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: The impression given by the reportage is that Chang Kuo-hua may have become the leading resident Party proconsul in the region. Chang Ching-wu, while still listed as the Central People's Government's representative stationed in Tibet, could conceivably move to Chengtu where he would continue to supervise Tibetan affairs in his capacity as Secretary of the Southwest Bureau. Indeed he may have moved already. His physical absence from Tibet has been rumored for several years. Chang Kuo-hua's strong military background points up the leading role that the PLA will continue to play in Tibet.

The tenor of Congress pronouncements so far indicates that the regime is not about to rush pell-mell into a crash program to socialize Tibet. The watchword seems to be "as conditions mature," evidence that the authorities realize how premature conditions are now.

In addition to other possible reasons we have mentioned (See WEEKAs 34, 35) the timing of the creation of the Tibetan

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Autonomous region may also have been prompted by a desire for administrative tidiness. With a new Five-Year Plan due to be launched in 1966 and a new period of Chinese Communist history supposedly dawning, the government may have felt strongly the need to tie up its one remaining administrative loose end, Tibet, if not in fact, at least in name. (Limited Official Use)

2. ChiCom Radio Celebrates Twentieth Anniversary

NCNA reports that a rally commemorating the founding of the Yenan New China Radio station was held on September 5 in Peking and attended by Politburo Member P'eng Chen, Party propaganda chief and Minister of Culture Lu Ting-yi, workers and staff members of the Broadcasting Administrative Bureau and "foreign specialists working in the bureau." Keynoting the joyous event, Lu told his audience that the broadcasts of their organization, "the voice of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thinking" enjoyed high prestige at home and abroad because "they never tell lies or deceive the people." The achievements of the unit had been accomplished despite the scrapping of contracts and halting of supplies by the Khrushchev clique. Lu went on to describe the increasingly difficult times that the imperialists were encountering throughout the world and urged his listeners to read Lin Piao's article "Long Live the Victory of People's War" carefully. He congratulated the Bureau on having established a political department and advised that the example of the PLA be closely followed. He also approved the Bureau's plan to send its staff on rotation to take part in the socialist education movement and physical labor. It would make them better class strugglers, he said. (Unclassified)

Comment: Constant reiteration of the truth can become tedious, and a little time in the communes hewing and carrying usually provides a refreshing change of scene. We trust that when the staff get back from the countryside, they will be bright-eyed and eager to get back to work telling truer truth than ever, with the new truths the same ones which held good when they left. We can only wish the same sort of vacation for that paragon of veracity, Lu Ting-yi. That the Russians welshed on their agreements to provide transmitting equipment shows that they probably had their doubts about Radio Peking's reliability too. Besides, its uncomfortable hearing yourself denounced over your own equipment. (Limited Official Use)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

3. Shanghai "Comfort Delegation" to Sinkiang Includes Parents of Resettled Youth

A Shanghai People's Comfort Delegation to Sinkiang arrived at the Urumchi railroad station on August 16 amid the joyful din of gongs and drums. The delegation, led by Deputy Mayor Sung Jih-chang consisted of representatives from "all circles" in Shanghai, cadres of varying ranks, and "parents of youths working in Sinkiang." After a brief stay in Urumchi, the group left to visit and "carry out comfort activities" at the first, second, and sixth agricultural production divisions and other subordinate units of the Sinkiang Production-Construction Army (Radio Urumchi, August 16, 1320GMT). On August 22, the group was welcomed at Shih-Ho-Tzu by Deputy Political Commissioner Wang Pei-mo who expressed sincere thanks to the people of Shanghai for sending their sons to help build Sinkiang. (Shanghai Wen Wei Pao, August 24) (Limited Official Use)

Comment: Delegations from Shanghai to Sinkiang have apparently previously consisted solely of officials who were presumably concerned with administering the flow of youth to the border province. The inclusion of parents is new to us, and underlines the regime's deepening concern for the morale of resettled youth already demonstrated by the visits of Chou En-lai and Chen Yi. (WEEKA 32). This novel addition is also aimed at quelling the anxieties of parents in Shanghai over the welfare of their offspring by sending a few (probably staunch activists) out to see for themselves. (Limited Official Use)

Military

4. Rectification Accompanies Deranking in Shantung

The Party branch of the Red Fourth Company of a certain PLA unit in Tsinan, "taking advantage of the rising ideological consciousness" which accompanied the abolition of ranks in the PLA, has "organized criticism," and developed the mass standpoint among Party members and cadres. At a meeting to examine cadres' democratic work attitudes, company soldiers submitted 32 articles criticizing cadre errors, of which 17 were directed at the company commander. He later corrected his errors. (Radio, Tsinan, July 30, 1300 GMT)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Comment: In this particular company at least, deranking has been accompanied by a rectification campaign. While we have no such clear evidence for other units, we suspect that the process is underway throughout the PLA. The focus of criticism on the company commander lends weight to the impression that the political commissar has been the chief beneficiary of the abolition of ranks, and that Party control has been even further strengthened by the move. (Limited Official Use)

External

5. Lin Piao's Ideological Exercise on Occasion of 20th Anniversary V-J Day

The 20th anniversary of V-J Day brought forth one of the most lengthy and authoritative articles on Chinese Communist revolutionary theory in recent years. Authored by Lin Piao, a close confidant of Mao and member of the Politburo, the article treads largely on familiar ground, extolling the Chinese revolutionary experience as guided by the infallible thoughts of Mao as the model for the revolution of all the "oppressed peoples of the world." Perhaps the only noteworthy innovation in the article is Lin's effort to describe the contemporary world scene in terms of Mao's successful strategy of "encircling the cities from the countryside." Thus Lin declares, "taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called 'the cities of the world,' then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute 'the rural areas of the world' ... In a sense the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities of the rural areas." Lin is content to rest with this catchy turn of phrase, making no effort to support this assertion with further argument or analysis. His formulation, however, in a sense represents a Maoist extension of Lenin's Thesis On The Colonial Question concerning the weakening of the imperialist/capitalist powers through the undermining of their position in the colonial and under-developed areas. It also represents a typically grandiose Chinese appraisal of the significance of their revolution in "remoulding the whole world."

Lin affords standard Chicom treatment to such matters as the prime importance of revolution in Africa, Asia and Latin America (a longstanding Maoist revision of Marx's emphasis on mature capitalist societies as the center of revolutionary activity)

0720
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

showing quite clearly the extent to which Peking views the under-developed countries as pawns in its game. Lin further deals with the "perfidy" and "cowardice" of the "modern revisionist" attitude toward wars of national liberation, the role of war as "a great school" in "tempering the people and pushing history forward," men over weapons, etc.

He devotes considerable space to the bitter and protracted nature of wars of liberation and the need for self-reliance in pursuing the revolution through to a victorious conclusion. While these themes are neither startling nor new, the emphasis on them suggest 1) an effort to make clear to the Chinese people the long range nature of the revolutionary struggle on both the domestic and international fronts, with prospects of temporary set-backs on the road to inevitable victory and 2) an exhortation to Hanoi to keep up the struggle, not count heavily on external assistance and stoically bear the suffering in the firm belief that revolutionary perserverance will result in inevitable victory. Significantly, Lin accepts the thesis that Vietnam represents the testing ground for people's war and advances the claim that "Vietnam is the most convincing current example of a victim of aggression defeating US imperialism by a people's war."

Though blurred by ideological cliches and ambiguity of language, Lin's presentation makes clear the Chicom view of non-aligned leaders as transitional figures on the stage of history and the need in such countries for further revolution under the "leadership of the proletariat." The recent expression in general fashion of such views by Chou En-lai in Africa has already served the regime poorly in Kenya, Tanzania and other African nations.

Our over-all impression of Lin's speech is that it vividly demonstrates the growing gulf between the rigid ideological beliefs of the men in their seventies who lead Communist China today and the realities of the outside world--which are made even more complex by the regime's success in destroying Communism as an international movement.

6. Vietnam: Chicoms Show Concern Over International Receptivity to Negotiations

Peking's comment on Vietnam during the week betrayed the regime's concern over international receptivity to negotiations as a means of ending the war. Peking's fears were expressed by Premier Chou en-lai speaking to a September 2 DRV 20th Anniversary reception,

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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by PLA General Staff Chief Lo Jui-ching in addressing a September 3 rally marking the 20th Anniversary of V-J Day , and finally by Foreign Minister Chen Yi in a September 6 press conference in Karachi.

Although speaking at a reception hosted by the DRV Ambassador to mark the 20th Anniversary of the founding of the Hanoi regime, Chou made only passing references to Sino-DRV friendship, choosing to use the occasion to concentrate almost entirely on a tirade against the "U.S. peace swindle." Contending that the "Vietnames people" had gained "rich experience" against the U.S. both in "negotiations" as well as fighting, Chou reiterated the standard Chicom formula for complete withdrawal of U.S. troops as a prerequisite for settling the conflict. Lo Jui-ching, at a mass rally the next day, reiterated Chou's line on the "peace swindle" and castigated the "Khrushchev revisionists" for advancing, at a time when the "U.S. peace swindle was losing its vitality", the thesis that the U.S. desires a peaceful solution of the Vietnam war and should be afforded a face saving way out of the situation.

The extent of Peking's concern over moves toward negotiations on Vietnam was made crystal clear by Ch'en Yi's remarks at a Karachi press conference on September 6. Ch'en declared it was "impermissible" to have the UN interfere in the Vietnam question and also "wrong" for mediation to be carried on in the name of the non-aligned nations. He noted one either "sides with the Vietnamese people, the side of justice, or with the US, the side of injustice." Those who side with justice, Ch'en alleged, "should demand the withdrawl of US troops from South Vietnam and should definitely not offer one's good offices or mediate." (Confidential)

Comment: Aside from disabusing the Afro-Asian world of any doubts as to the regime's stand, we wonder if Peking's frequent and emphatic denunciation of negotiations are not intended to head off any thoughts by Hanoi of a peaceful settlement of the issue. (Confidential)

7. Continued Pressure on HKG

A Peking People's Daily Commentator article of September 4 repeated the lines of protest contained in the September 1st note protesting the alleged use of Hong Kong by the US as a "base for aggression"(WEEKA 35), but went on to link the Hong Kong issue with

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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a general charge that the UK "works hard to help the US crime of aggression in Vietnam." (ConGenTel 345) Commentator also added the observation that "it is entirely proper for the people and public opinion of Hong Kong to demand that the British authorities immediately stop this criminal activity (i.e. U.S. use of Hong Kong as a base for aggression." (Confidential)

Comment: We frankly are unable to give a confident assessment of future moves that the Chicoms may make and would not be surprised if Peking itself is playing the score by ear. (Confidential)

8. Peking's Position on the India-Pakistan Conflict

Peking last week reacted to the growing Indo-Pakistani conflict with expected support of the Pakistani position. The initial Chicom reactions to the fighting in Kashmir were contained in an NCNA article September 4, a People's Daily Observer article September 5 and a press conference given by Foreign Minister Chen Yi in Karachi on September 6. All three accounts emphasized that 1) the fighting in Kashmir was the result of a revolt by the Kashmiri people against Indian oppression and denial of the right of self-determination, 2) the speciousness of Indian charges that Peking had helped train Kashmiri guerrillas and, 3) the solution to the problem was self-determination and return to the plebiscite agreement. The September 5 Observer article, invoking memories of the Sino-Indian border dispute, contended that China had had experience with Indian attempts to "bully" and "threaten" its neighbors.

The deepening crisis brought forth a September 7 CPR Government statement condemning the GOI for "criminal aggression" against Pakistan and terming Delhi's action "a grave threat to peace in this area." It expressed "firm support for Pakistan... and solemnly warn(ed) the Indian Government that it must bear full responsibility for all consequences of its criminal and extended aggression."

By Peking's standards the above language is not unusually strong, but the statement implied possible Chicom diversionary actions along the Sino-Soviet border in its complaints about Indian entrenchments still on "Chinese territory on the Sino-Sikkim border" and continuing Indian intrusions against Chinese territory in the border regions. These alleged actions, the statement continued, were being closely watched and required strengthened Chicom defenses and heightened alertness along the regime's borders.

0 7 2 3

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

In typical Chicom fashion, the statement also attempted to utilize the GOI-Pak struggle to demonstrate the correctness of the regime's policies on India and the UN. "US imperialism" and "modern revisionism" also came in for a share of blame for having backed the GOI.

On September 8 the regime embodied the position set forth in its Government statement in a formal protest to the Indian Government. The protest demanded that the GOI dismantle all "aggressive military structures illegally built" on Chinese territory in the Sikkim border area and otherwise stop all acts of aggression in the "Western, Middle and Eastern sectors of the Sino-Indian border." (Confidential)

Comment: We view the implied Chicom threat of troop deployment along the Sino-Indian border as more in the nature of a psychological warfare ploy and an effort to keep up Pakistan's dander than an expression of serious intent to stip up major troubles along the Sino-Indian border. We believe the Chicoms are leery of creating pressures which might draw the US further into the scene. (Confidential)

9. Chen Yi on Safari

According to NCNA, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi left Peking September 4 for a visit "to Mali and other countries." Following stopovers in Karachi (item) and Damascus, where he held talks with Pakistani and Syrian officials, Ch'en arrived in Algiers September 7 for a visit of unspecified length. Thus far, no arrival date has been given for his visit to Mali and NCNA has furnished no news on what "other countries" may be included on Ch'en's itinerary. (Unclassified)

Comment: Ch'en will probably concentrate on matters concerning the Second A-A Conference in both countries, hoping to use Mali's special relationship with Peking as a means of advancing in Africa the regime's position on the Conference. Embassy Bamako indicates that Ch'en's Mali visit may also deal with economic matters.

NCNA's failure to give a precise timetable for Ch'en's trip suggests that he may be angling for other invitations.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

10. Dominican Republic: Peking Scores "Act of Reconciliation"

Peking took note of Dominican developments via a September 6 People's Daily Commentator article which castigated the "act of reconciliation" between Dominican's opposing factions as imposed by the U.S. in an attempt to disarm the "patriotic Dominican people and army." Commentator cautioned both President Johnson and the "modern revisionists" against rejoicing too soon over the "reconciliation, because U.S. actions in Dominica had sharpened the "contradictions" between the U.S. and the Dominican people to the point where the latter now understood the necessity of persevering in armed struggle in order to defeat U.S. "imperialism." The article approvingly noted that "many patriotic troops and people" had already gone to rural and mountain areas to take up "prolonged struggle." (Limited Official Use)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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(2)	BANGKOK	CANBERRA	KARACHI	MOSCOW	RANGOONSOFIA	VNTIANE	
	BELGRADE	CPACPLAD	KATHMANDU	MUNICH	ROME	S'PORE	COMNAVPHL
	BUCHAREST	DARESALAAM	KLUMPUR	NDELHI	SAIGON	(4)TAIPEI	13AFMANILA
	BUDAPEST	DJAKARTA	MANILA	PRAGUE	SEOUL	TOKYO	TAIWANDEFCOM

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Authority NND 939503
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ORIGIN ACTION

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1965 SEP 7 AM 9 49

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Pol 2-1 Chicom

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A-160 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

3 Sept 1965

INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

Hackman

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG DATE:

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA No. 35

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Tibet Peoples Congress Opens - Panchen Attacked Again
2. Mainland Press Celebrates End of Sino-Japanese War
3. Round-Trip Agricultural Education Scheme Stressed at National Conference

External

4. Peking Protests to British Against Alleged US Military Activities in Hong Kong
5. Coolness Between Peking and Hanoi?
6. Japan Warned on 20th Anniversary of V-J Day
7. Algerian Government Delegation Concludes Visit

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,YSNg,JThomas:drb,9/2/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

0726

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. Tibet Peoples Congress Opens - Panchen Attacked Again

The First Peoples Congress of the Tibet Autonomous Region opened on September 1. Standing beneath a huge picture of Mao Tse-tung the chief of the Central Committee delegation to the Congress, Public Security Minister Hsieh Fu-chih, congratulated the Tibetans on the progress that had enabled them to reach Automonous Region status, and wished them well on their/revolutionary road. (Text of speech as yet unavailable.) way along the

Among Peking's messages of congratulation was an August 31 telegram from the State Council praising the Tibetans for a series of victories over the past 15 years under the wise leadership of the CCP and chairman Mao, carried out under the "courageous protection of the PLA." Specific victories cited included suppression of the counterrevolutionary armed rebellion led by the Dalai Lama, and "exposure and criticism of the anti-people, anti-fatherland, and anti-socialist activities of the reactionary slave owners group represented by the Panchen." The telegram further exuded confidence that the Tibetan people, now the "real masters" of their area, would under Party government leadership advance further down the socialist road.

Comment: The continued propensity to flog the Panchen seems to mean that he remains in deep trouble, and has not availed himself of the chance for self reform given him last year when removed from his position of titular power.

The seemingly rather hasty bestowal of "autonomous" status on Tibet, rather than being an indication of great socialist progress, could in fact be a ploy designed 1) to give the outside world an impression of stability amid actual conditions of increased internal unrest or 2) to help counter the bad world press Peking has been getting since January over the sacking of the Panchen, Khamba activities, etc. Although we have no concrete evidence of increased unrest in Tibet, the choice of the relatively unknown public security minister as chief Party delegate, as well as the knowledge that the establishment of the Tibet Preparatory Committee (PCART) in 1956 was timed in part to cover local disturbances, lend some weight to the first thesis.

As far as we can tell now, the assumption of "automony" will have no great effect on the Tibetan Party or government structure. (ConGenTel 299, Sept. 1, 1965)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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2. Mainland Press Celebrates End of Sino-Japanese War

Anticipating the twentieth anniversary of the end of the Sino-Japanese War on September 3, the China Mainland press has erupted in a veritable cascade of military articles about the war. In addition to a series called "Reminiscences of Revolution" which has appeared every day in the People's Daily since August 10, Mainland media have carried a 15,000 character effort by ex-Marshal Yeh Chien-ying entitled "The Great Decisive Strategic Battles" and reprinted (in the August 21 Red Flag) Mao Tse-tung's famous 1938 article "Problems of Strategy in Guerilla War against Japan." The articles have one thing in common. They affirm the correctness and stress the power of Mao's "People's War" theory. Yeh Chien-ying's discussion of the great battles against the Nationalist forces goes a step further by emphasizing that when it came to large scale regular warfare, Mao was no slouch either.

Comment: Although the substance of the articles is primarily historical, the regime is obviously using them to reassure the Chinese people and argue to others that a Communist victory in South Vietnam is, after all, inevitable. Also, at a time when fighting is going on next door, readers may find tales of the Red Army's and the PLA's past potency particularly comforting.

3. Round-Trip Agricultural Education Scheme Stressed at National Conference

NCNA August 23 reported that the Ministry of Agriculture recently held a national conference of secondary and university level agricultural education. The meeting pressed for active and steady development of the half-farming, half-study system, and the enrollment of students from the countryside who would return to their communes after graduation.

Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i and other national leaders received the delegates to the conference. In an unusual expression of interest Liu stayed and listened to the collective report from the responsible members of the meeting, and gave them an "important directive." Vice Premier T'an Chen-lin also addressed the meeting.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

The report stated that since 1964, more than half of the higher institutions of various branches of agriculture, and more than two-thirds of agricultural secondary schools had introduced the system of half-farming and half-study. A few advanced institutions, and a large number of secondary schools had practiced the principle of "coming from the communes and returning to the communes"(She lai she ch'u)when enrolling students.

The conference stipulated that except for certain advanced specialties both the half-farming and half-study system and round-trip enrollments would henceforeth be pushed in all secondary and higher level agricultural institutions.

According to another NCNA despatch (August 24) the round-trip principle was first established in 1962, and that by 1964 total admissions of students from the communes had reached 30,000.

Comment: The leadership's interest in half-farming, half-study schools and "from the communes to the communes" agricultural students, far greater this year than in the past, is but another evidence of the regime's current massive emphasis on agriculture. The round-trip enrollment principle strikes us as eminently sound - so much so that we wonder why it has not been pushed before. Rural students who enter school on the assumption that they will return to the countryside do not suffer the morale problem that has plagued many Chinese children who are sent to the communes after having been led to expect a more glamorous future as technicians or intellectuals. The round-trip students should be better able to raise the technical level of the peasantry than the over-educated city kids who have to be taught how to hold a hoe. However, the round-trip students are probably taught precious little besides agricultural extension courses. The national educational conference was held under the exclusive aegis of the Ministry of Agriculture . The Ministry of Education was not even mentioned in the reportage.

External

4. Peking Protests to British Against Alleged US Military Activities in Hong Kong

Within the week, Peking delivered two protests to the British on activities in Hong Kong. The first protest was delivered orally and described the Hong Kong Government's repatriation from Hong

DECLASSIFIED
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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Kong to Taiwan of four survivors of sunken GRC naval ships as an "obvious act of support for the US and Chiang clique in their harassing and disruptive actions along China's coast /which/ is something /the Chinese Government/ absolutely will not tolerate." Both the British and we interpreted this protest as a Chinese Communist effort to apply additional indirect pressure on the Hong Kong Government concerning the crash of a US military plane.

In more direct fashion, Peking on September 1 delivered to the British a written protest against "its allowing the US aggressor forces to use Hong Kong as a base of operations for their war of aggression against Vietnam." The note termed US military activities in Hong Kong an "increasingly grave threat to the security of China and Southeast Asia," and "firmly demanded" that the British Government immediately "stop all the activities of the US aggressor forces in Hong Kong." It concluded with the warning that should the British Government "allow Hong Kong to be drawn into the whirlpool of the US war of aggression, it must bear full responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom." (Confidential)

Comment: The September 1 note represents a considerable sharpening of Peking's policy toward the US role in Hong Kong (see WEEKA 34). By having publicly come out in such a firm and formal manner on the subject we believe that Peking is counting heavily on the Hong Kong Government's sensitivity toward its huge neighbor to achieve some degree of satisfaction of its demands. Peking's position may have also been influenced by the desire to redeem prestige in the eyes of the local Chinese who have reportedly commented on the regime's failure to take overt action in support of Vietnam despite numerous threats to do so.

Despite the strong language, the protest failed to reiterate the claim (made in March, 1963 as a by-product of the Sino-Soviet dispute) that Hong Kong is Chinese territory, suggesting that the regime may not intend to carry the matter so far as to imperil the Colony's position as a prime source of foreign exchange for Peking. (Confidential)

5. Coolness Between Peking and Hanoi?

Peking marked the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the DRV with a joint message of "warmest congratulations" to DRV

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

leaders from Mao and other Chinese Communist notables. The message spoke of the valiant struggle of the heroic Vietnamese people against U.S. imperialism which by "weakening...U.S. imperialist forces /and/...exposing /the U.S./as a paper tiger" serves the "revolutionary struggle of the world's people against U.S. imperialism." It expressed confidence that the "heroic Vietnamese people are bound to defeat U.S. imperialist aggression and win final victory." The message noted that the Chinese people "have made all necessary preparations and are determined to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnamese people to the very end to defeat U.S. imperialist aggression."

Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi also marked the occasion with a surprisingly matter-of-fact and brief message to his DRV counterpart, Nguyen Duy Trinh. Ch'en's message extended only warm greetings and wished the DRV "new and still more brilliant victories in their great struggle to resist U.S. aggression." Conspicuously absent was any expression of Chinese Communist support or assistance in this struggle.

The remainder of Chinese Communist comment on Vietnam during the week continued to emphasize the glorious victories of the Vietnamese people as exemplified by the alleged downing of the 500th U.S. plane over North Vietnam and the so-called NLF victory over U.S. Marines at Van Tuong.

Comment: We note that in the last few weeks Peking has avoided substantive comment on Vietnam, especially on matters involving Chinese Communist-North Vietnamese relations. Further, the Mao message to Hanoi, while couched in warm terms, and speaking of the Chinese willingness to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnamese people to the very end, appears to represent a slight retreat from the previous formulation concerning the regime's willingness to despatch men to assist the Vietnamese, if the latter so request.* Ch'en Yi's message contains a more concrete indication of Peking's failure to utilize the occasion to strengthen or even repeat previous commitments to Hanoi. In fact, given the care with which Peking choses its words, Ch'en Yi's use of "warm" instead of "warmest" paradoxically hints at a slight chill in Peking-Hanoi relations.

*NOTE: The term "fight" is used in the NCNA English version of Mao's text, the Chinese version uses the term "struggle" (tou cheng). Use of tou cheng also represents a retreat from previous Chinese usage of the expression "war (tso chan) shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnamese people."

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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If there is something of a chill between Peking and Hanoi, we can only speculate as to the causes. However, it is conceivable Peking could have been irritated over a) Hanoi's recent actions in advancing claims to having "enriched" Marxist-Leninist theories on revolution (hitherto an exclusive Chicom province) (Nhan Dan August 19 editorial), b) giving considerable press coverage to warm remarks about the Soviets made last week in Moscow by the head of the visiting DRV National Assembly delegation, and c) despatching a Party delegation to France at the invitation of the "revisionist" French Communist party.

6. Japan Warned on 20th Anniversary of V-J Day

Aside from utilizing the 20th anniversary of Japan's defeat as a means to demonstrate to both internal and external audiences the fighting qualities of the Chinese people and the infallibility of Mao's doctrine on People's War (see item 2), Peking also seized on the occasion to renew, in fairly standard fashion, pressures on Japan for a more favorable attitude toward the regime. Typical of these pressures was a lengthy Ta Kung Pao editorial on August 31 which spoke of reviving Japanese militarism and pictured the ascent to power of the Sato cabinet as a new indication of tightening collusion between "US and Japanese reactionaries (who are) travelling along the old path...of former Japanese militarism, that is, invading first Korea, then China." The editorial described Japan as "the largest US military base...in the Far East" and warned/"should the US launch a large-scale aggressive war, using Japan as its base, then, ultimately it will bring down upon the Japanese nation unimaginable after-effects."

In somewhat contradictory fashion, the editorial paid tribute to the strength of the Japanese people which was alleged to be growing despite efforts by some, including "Khruschev revisionists," to disrupt their unity. This growing people's strength, the editorial claimed, would prove to be an "insurmountable obstacle" to the plans of "US and Japanese reactionaries" to revive militarism and prepare for a new war. Ta Kung Pao concluded on the note that "the Chinese people have always advocated friendship between China and Japan and the restoration of normal relations between them." (Unclassified)

Comment: The editorial attempts to exploit Japanese concern over the role in the Vietnam war of US military bases in Japan as

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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well as nationalistic sensitivities among some circles over alleged US domination of Japanese foreign policy. A not very subtle effort at nuclear blackmail is clearly intended in the editorial's use of the phrase "unimaginable after-effects."

Despite the bluster surrounding the occasion, we see no evidence of Peking's desire to curb its growing economic ties with Japan, although the regime will undoubtedly continue to use such ties as an additional point of political pressure on Tokyo. (Limited Official Use)

7. Algerian Government Delegation Concludes Visit

The Algerian Government Delegation led by Rabah Bitah (WEEKA 34) left for home August 30. A joint communique on the visit released by NCNA on August 28 "reaffirmed" that the Second Afro-Asian conference would be held as scheduled on November 5 in Algiers. The text of the joint communique also expressed "both sides' resolute support for the just struggle of the Vietnamese people against US aggression." It stated that the two sides "considered that the Vietnam question should be settled by the Vietnamese people themselves and that all solutions to this problem must respect the stipulations of the 1954 Geneva agreements concerning the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam." However, delegation leader Bitah, in a banquet speech on August 27, adopted a more extreme position by reportedly voicing the resolute support of the Algerian people for the "heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people" and the view that peace could come to Vietnam only by recognition of the NLF as the "sole and genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people." (Unclassified)

Comment: Bitah's statements on Vietnam contrast with the relative silence on Vietnam by Ben Bella's envoy Mohammed Yazid during the latter's visit to Communist China three months ago and may be attributed to either his lack of diplomatic experience or his anxiety to assure continued strong Chicom support for the Conference. (Limited Official Use)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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(2)	BANGKOK	CANBERRA	KARACHI	MOSCOW	RANGOON	SOFIA	VNTIANE
	BELGRADE	CPACPLAD	KATHMANDU	MUNICH	ROME	S'PORE	COMNAVPHL
	BUCHAREST	DARESALAAM	KLUMPUR	NDELHI	SAIGON	(4)TAIPEI	13AFMANILA
	BUDAPEST	DJAKARTA	MANILA	PRAGUE	SEOUL	TOKYO	TAIWANDEFCOM
			LONDON				

0734

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ORIGIN/ACTION		
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INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 7
OSD 46	USIA 11	NSA 3
	H5 1	NSC 0

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-141 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH (TELEGRAPHING INDICATOR)

TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON, D. C.

INFO: (See distribution list on last page.)

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG DATE: Aug 27, 1965

SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA NO. 34

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

X 1. PLA-Style Political Structure to be Adopted Throughout Agricultural Sector

0 2. Tibet to Become Autonomous Region Next Month

0 3. Urban Population Redistribution Program Reported

X 4. Shansi Party Congress Held

External

5. Peking Highlights NLF Military Achievements: Other Developments

6. US Air Disaster - Mainland Media Silent

7. Rumania: Praise Lavished on "Socialist Brothers"

8. United States: Comment on Negro Riots Ebbs

9. Visitors

1965 AUG 30 PM 12 30

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GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL:BLevin,DAnderson,NPlatt,JThomas,YSNg:drb, 8/26/65, Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:BLevin

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. PLA-Style Political Structure to be Adopted Throughout Agricultural Sector

Signs noted in WEEKA 28 that the agricultural sector was undergoing a political reorganization along PLA lines similar to that which occurred last year in industry, communications, trade, and finance were confirmed this week. On August 21, NCNA (Chinese) announced that a national conference on political work in China's agriculture and forestry had been convened recently by the Agriculture and Forestry Political Work Department of the CCP Central Committee (0022/1135/6593/2651/2398/3112/6752). Participants included responsible members from the Agriculture and Forestry Political Work Departments and/or Rural Work Departments of the CCP Regional Bureaus, and the provincial, (autonomous) regional, and municipal party committees; responsible members from the political departments of the agricultural and forestry ministries and related departments of the central government; responsible members of several hsien CCP Committees; and representatives from the political departments of certain state farms and water conservation construction units.

Now that socialist education had raised the political consciousness of the peasants and a production upsurge was in progress, the conference maintained, it was necessary to carry political work a step further by mobilizing all rural CCP and YCL cadres and establishing "specialized political organs" in the countryside. Stress was also laid on learning from the PLA in rural political work. The conferees were received by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i, and heard an important report by Politburo member T'an Chen-lin.

Meanwhile in the provinces, the Rural Work Department of the Fukien Provincial Party Committee held a conference of rural work department heads which decided to establish "on a trial basis, political instructors in brigades and 'political team leaders' in production teams" to be responsible for political and ideological work. (Radio Foochow, Aug. 12,1050GMT) (Unclassified)

Comment: The wording of these reports suggests that while a new Central Committee political work department has been set up to replace the former Rural Work Department and political depart-

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0736

ments have been established in all the agricultural ministries, old-style Rural Work Departments still continue to operate in some Party Committees at the regional, provincial and local levels. We estimate that these will soon be reorganized to fit the new national pattern. When this is done, the task of grafting the PLA political system on every sector of the Mainland China economy will be complete.

The same problems that have been involved in staffing the political departments throughout industry, communications, trade, and finance will be multiplied many fold in the agricultural sector, which is several times the size of all the others put together. Just where enough suitably trained and motivated commissars to minister the ideological needs of 500 million politically supine peasants are going to come from is the big question. As a starter, however, our guess is that Tan Chen-lin, if he is not already in charge, will be called upon to run the new machinery. (Limited Official Use)

2. Tibet to Become Autonomous Region Next Month

The 158th meeting of the State Council held on August 23, agreed that the First People's Congress of the Tibet Autonomous Region should be convened September 1. The decision to hold the congress was made possible by the completion of elections in all of Tibet's 70 hsien*(54 held people's congresses, 16 held people's representative conferences - the former were elected from below while the latter were appointed from above). (Limited Official Use)

Comment: Tibet's metamorphosis into an Autonomous Region has taken place much faster than we expected. Peking's decision to eschew its slow, deliberate approach to the sinification of the region may have been predicated on dissatisfaction with the rate of development achieved, and confidence that the pace can be forced now with less risk than during the immediate post-Great Leap Period. However, although Peking has played up Tibet's arrival at Autonomous Region status as an indication of rapid political progress in the area, we can see no evidence that Tibetans are any better prepared for the transplanting of Chinese Communist political institutions than they were before. (Limited Official Use)

*The assertion in WEEKA 32 that Tibet has 103 counties was incorrect.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

3. Urban Population Redistribution Program Reported

The Chinese wife of William C. White, the Korean War returnee who left Communist China last week (WEEKA 33), told us that a new redistribution program designed to alleviate population density in Shanghai, Nanking, and Peking will go into effect at the end of August. Under the program, any person living in these three cities who has a husband or a wife living in any other Mainland city will be transferred, together with members of the immediate family, out of Peking, Shanghai, and Nanking to join the spouse in the other city. Mrs. White said she heard the news from a cadre in the accounting department of the First Machinery Building Factory in Peking, where she worked as a Chinese language instructor. She said that news of any government measure affecting residential housing in overcrowded Peking travelled fast and was practically impossible to keep secret. (Confidential)

Comment: The report is unconfirmed, but has a plausible ring. The grumbling of family members forced to leave the three major cities will probably be offset by the sighs of relief from others who remain behind and are allowed more living space.

In the course of several interviews, Mrs. White impressed us as a straightforward and accurate observer of her own relatively limited scene. (Confidential)

4. Shansi Party Congress Held

Radio Taiyuan (August 9 1200 GMT) reported that the First Session of the Second Shansi Provincial CCP Congress was held from July 30 to August 6 (coinciding almost exactly with the Party congress in neighboring Honan - see WEEKA 32).

The communique, a stock document that made the usual noises about socialist education, production upsurge, Mao's thought, the new Five Year Plan, etc., stressed that "numerous facts which had come to light in the past two years or so in the course of the socialist education movements have shown that in cities as well as in the rural areas there exist at present serious opportunism." The class enemy, this singularly uninformative communique continued, was attempting to "usurp leadership" through a peaceful evolutionary restoration of capitalism.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

The reportage on Shansi's first Party congress since 1957 revealed no significant changes in the top leadership of the province. Tao Lu-chia remains as Party First Secretary. (See WER) (Unclassified)

Comment: Such bald references to opportunism and capitalism in the cities as well as the countryside are rare, and may indicate that these tendencies are especially strong in Shansi. It might be pointed out, even if half in jest, that Shansi, in addition to producing the Mainland's most emulated production brigade at Tachai is also the home province of twentieth century China's best known capitalist, H. H. Kung. (Unclassified)

External

5. Peking Highlights NLF Military Achievements: Other Developments

A. NLF Victories Hailed - An August 23 People's Daily article reviewing the war in South Vietnam for the first seven months of this year appears to be the latest in a series of implications by Peking that the regime's direct intervention in South Vietnam is not required under present circumstances owing to the outstanding military successes of the NLF to date (WEEKA 32).

People's Daily claimed that during the period under review, NLF forces in one way or another had put out of action one hundred and ten thousand ARVN troops and had "wiped out more than three thousand US troops --- and shot down or destroyed more than five hundred planes." It was further alleged that the NLF controlled four-fifths of the territory of South Vietnam containing a population of more than ten million.

Although praise was afforded to the skillful manner in which the NLF carries out "mobile warfare and offensive warfare as well as guerrilla warfare," the article did not allude to outside moral or material assistance as a factor in accounting for the alleged NLF victories.

The article also provided an analysis purportedly demonstrating the inevitability of the US defeat in South Vietnam. Included within the analysis were such points as the difficulty faced by US troops in adjusting to the climate and terrain of South Vietnam and the mobilization of the South Vietnamese in a people's war which, like the sea, will swallow up the "US aggressors." It

0734
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

concluded on the note that "however arduous may be the course of the anti-US armed struggle of the South Vietnamese people, the basic law of development of the war situation cannot be altered... the US aggressors and their lackeys are doomed to failure." (Limited Official Use)

B. Speculation Aroused by Circumstances Surrounding NLF Letter to Mao - The delayed delivery and reportage of a letter to Mao Tse-tung from NLF Chairman Nguyen Hu Tho leads us to speculate about the political significance of the unusual sequence of events concerning the matter. Nguyen's letter was dated June 1, delivered to Chou En-lai in Peking on August 12 by the NLF permanent representative there and reported by NCNA on August 19.

The letter itself is notable for its eulogistic references to the Chicom regime and for the warmth of its thanks for the "valuable sympathy and support from the Chinese Communist Party and brotherly Chinese People." As an example of the letter's tone, Nguyen refers to "the staunch and unyielding revolutionary spirit of the Chinese people /which we/ regard as an example for us to emulate."

Comment: It may be that the Chicoms chose to publicize the letter at this time as a means of demonstrating to Moscow and perhaps Hanoi the extent of Peking's following within the NLF. Speculation about possible friction between Peking and Hanoi over relations with the NLF is strengthened by the failure to date of the VNA to report anything more on the subject than a brief paragraph on August 13 stating only the fact that the Nguyen letter was delivered to Chou on August 12.

The specific timing of the NCNA story may have also been affected by Chicom displeasure over the current lengthy tour of the Soviet Union by the DRV National Assembly delegation which is but one of several signs of Hanoi's continuing efforts to maintain decent relations with Moscow.

In any event, evidence that differences on Vietnam continue to be a lively issue within the "socialist camp" is provided by PKI Chairman Aidit's August 19 press conference remark at Djakarta which, according to NCNA, noted that "it is not right for those who have extended assistance to Vietnam to publicize how enormous was that assistance." (Confidential)

C. Germ Warfare - People's Daily "Commentator" on August 24 took account of a North Vietnamese protest against the alleged

DECLASSIFIED
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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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presence in South Vietnam of a US Army bacteriological and chemical laboratory to picture the US as "contemplating the use of bacteriological weapons to stave off failure in its war of aggression in Vietnam." "Commentator" concluded "that no toxic gases ... no fleas, rats nor scorpions can help the US to reverse its failure." (Unclassified)

6. US Air Disaster - Mainland Media Silent

Although the local Hong Kong Communist press has responded with surprising alacrity to the tragic crash in Hong Kong harbor on August 24 of a US C-130 aircraft which took the lives of 58 American servicemen, mainland press media, except for a brief factual item, have maintained silence.

Both the Hong Kong Wen Wei Pao and Ta Kung Pao carried editorials on the day following the crash which, while avoiding any specific threats, were far stronger than any past warnings to the Hong Kong Government on its policy toward a U.S. military presence here. The editorials described Hong Kong as "virtually playing the role of a logistic base" for U.S. naval and air forces and pointedly noted Hong Kong's proximity to China's Kwangtung Province. The Wen Wei Pao editorial concluded by "reminding" the Hong Kong authorities that "should they permit the U.S. to use Hong Kong as a military base, they would only cause themselves to be buried along with U.S. imperialism." (Unclassified)

Comment: Peking's failure to date to comment on the air tragedy indicates that the regime is not planning to escalate the incident into a international issue. Moreover, Peking is probably anxious to avoid any further Soviet jibes concerning the status of Hong Kong and thus has been content to utilize the local Communist press to apply public pressure on the Hong Kong Government. (Confidential)

7. Rumania: Praise Lavished on "Socialist Brothers"

Following along lines contained in the Teng Hsiao-p'ing speech to the Ninth Congress of the Rumanina Communist Party (WEEKA 29), Peking marked the celebration of Rumanian National Day with numerous expressions of support for Bucharest's policy of greater independence from the USSR. The keynote of the regime's treatment of the

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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occasion was set by an August 22 message by Mao Tse-tung and other high Chinese leaders to Rumanian government and party leaders. As reported by NCNA, the message praised the Rumanians for "important contributions to the cause of opposing US imperialist policies of aggression" and for "upholding the unity of the socialist camp and defending the principles guiding the relations between fraternal parties and fraternal countries." Relations between the two countries were described as "conforming to the principles guiding the relations among brother socialist countries: they are those of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty; of equality and of mutual support and mutual assistance."

Aside from a series of congratulatory exchanges, the regime's press during the week provided extensive and highly favorable background and feature coverage of Rumania's "successes achieved in socialist construction." (Unclassified)

Comment: Peking's fervent embrace of a "socialist country" which has been lukewarm in its support of the Vietnam war and palpably anxious to improve its ties with the United States indicates the high priority the regime affords to the weakening of the Soviet position within the "socialist camp." (Limited Official Use)

8. United States: Comment on Negro Riots Ebbs

Peking's coverage of US race problems dropped considerably following the restoration of order in Los Angeles and the absence of any new exploitable developments. The most recent major Chicom comment on the subject was an August 19 People's Daily editorial which revealed the extent of the regime's fascination with the mystique of "revolutionary violence" by approvingly noting that "more and more American Negroes are coming to realize....they must meet counterrevolutionary violence with revolutionary violence" and by exhorting the Negroes to "go out into the streets and wage resolute struggle."

Both the editorial and an August 18 statement on the same subject by the China Peace Committee spelled out in greater detail than before the Chicom assertion that the "Negro struggle" aids "world peace" and the "people of Vietnam" by striking powerful blows at "American imperialism."

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

The editorial also makes a specific effort to use the Los Angeles riots to discredit the US in African eyes. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: The editorial is obviously intended to gain propaganda mileage, but probably also represents the views of the American scene held by the Chicom leadership. As regards the latter, the editorial affords further evidence of the unreal concepts of the U.S. which influence Chicom foreign policy. (Limited Official Use)

9. Visitors

1. Congolese Rebel Leader Arrives. NCNA announced August 19 that Gaston Soumialot, President of the Supreme Council of Revolution of the Congo (L), had arrived for "a visit of friendship." On August 25 Soumialot was received by Mao Tse-tung. (Unclassified)

Comment: Although NCNA has given few details on the purpose of Soumialot's visit, it seems likely that the two sides will discuss means of getting the faltering Congolese rebellion back in motion. (Limited Official Use)

2. Algerian Government Delegation in Peking - Rabah Bitah, Algerian State Minister now roving the Afro-Asian world on behalf of the twice-postponed Second Afro-Asian Conference, arrived in Peking August 24 for meetings with CPR leaders. According to NCNA, both Bitah and Foreign Minister Chen I on August 24 expressed the desire "that China and Algeria, together with other Afro-Asian countries, should do their utmost to make the second African-Asian Conference a success." Chen I added "we should work to hold the conference in Algiers as scheduled." The visiting Algerian held talks with Chou En-lai on August 25. (Unclassified)

Comment: The Algerian envoy arrives at a time when having been burned once, Peking may be reluctantly adopting a degree of flexibility concerning November 5 as the opening date for the conference. (Confidential) (ConGenTel 210 to Dept)

3. Nepalese Foreign Minister - Nepalese Foreign Minister Kirti Nidhi Bista arrived in Peking August 25 for a visit at the invitation of Foreign Minister Chen Yi. The same evening, Chen

0 7 4 3
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

hosted a dinner for Bista and spoke there of Nepal's "just and righteous" stand on Vietnam. Bista in reply ignored Vietnam and praised Chicom-Nepal cooperation in various fields. (Limited Official Use)

For the Consul General:

Burton Levin

Burton Levin
Acting Chief, Political Section

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0744
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INR-10

POL 2-1 Chicom

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INFO: (See last page for distribution.)

RS/R - Hackman - 1

AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: **AUGUST 20, 1965**

JOINT COMMUNIST CHINA WEEKA No. 33

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Relatively Quiet Week
2. United States: Negro Rioting Linked with Class Struggle and Vietnam
3. Laos: Peking Coordinates Position with Pathet Lao
4. Diplomatic Notes
5. Another "Turncoat" Returns

Internal

6. Chairman Mao Cures the Peasants
7. Notes on Youth
8. Basic Levels "Link Labor and Leisure"

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,DAnderson,JThomas,YSNg:drb, 8/19/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

0745

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

1. Vietnam: Relatively Quiet Week

Peking reacted in relatively restrained fashion to the reported ROK decision to send a combat division to South Vietnam. The remainder of Chicom comment on Vietnam during the week consisted of routine reports of alleged Viet Cong victories and surprisingly few expressions of endorsement of the Government's August 7 statement condemning the President's July 28 announcement of additional U.S. troops to Vietnam.

A. ROK Troops to Vietnam Protested - In contrast to the vociferous and strong official reaction against the January 8 ROK decision to send 2000 troops to South Vietnam, the Chicoms to date have reacted to the reported recent ROK proposal to send a combat division to South Vietnam only on a press level and in a relatively restrained manner. On August 16 the Ta Kung Pao Commentator termed the ROK proposal "a new and serious step in the aggressive war in South Vietnam." Commentator noted that further U.S. steps to "internationalize the war" would only accelerate its own defeat and he dismissed the military significance of the proposed ROK contribution by rhetorically asking "what is the use of some thousands of troops from South Korea when hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese puppet troops have proved no good?"

On the following day the People's Daily Commentator condemned the proposed ROK reinforcements as "another grave step taken by the Johnson Administration to spread the war flames and internationalize the Vietnamese war." Commentator referred to the consequences of this action, the most serious of which was that the "US imperialists cannot...escape righteous condemnation of the people of the world by throwing more foreign mercenaries into the war."

Comment: On January 13 the Chicoms used a government statement to warn of the serious implications of the first ROK decision to send troops. This statement noted that, "if the U.S. continues to expand its aggressive war in SVN and even internationalizes that war, the Chinese government and people will have to give further consideration to duties incumbent upon them for the defense of peace in this area." Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi also viewed the development as important enough to send a note to the DRV Foreign Minister which expressed determination to "frustrate this scheme with firmness."

0746

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Peking's strong warning in January failed to head off the ROK reinforcements and the regime was not prepared to back up its warning with actual action. We feel the regime's present restraint results from a desire not to repeat the January scenario and call further attention to what might appear to be Chinese reluctance to do anything more than protest. We also note that the reference by both Commentators to "internationalization" of the war is made almost in passing and does not seem to represent much of an effort to warn against another Korean War.

B. No Mass Compaigns Underway - Despite recent references to an "Aid Vietnam Resist America" campaign (WEEKA 32), the week brought forth little evidence of preparation for such a campaign. On the contrary, the absence to date of a plethora of organizational and mass endorsements of the Government's August 7 statement on U.S. reinforcements indicates that the regime at the present time is not engaged in an extensive effort to arouse popular opinion on Vietnam. During the week only the Peace Liaison Committee of the Asian & Pacific Regions, The China Peace Committee and the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity (the latter two in a joint statement) voiced opposition to the President's July 28 announcement. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: Our impression concerning the lack of officially stimulated mass action on Vietnam was strengthened by the observation of Reuters correspondent G. V. Berger. Freshly out of Peking, Mr. Berger informed us that from his vantage point "Aid Vietnam Resist America" seems to be more of a political slogan than a call to action. (Confidential)

2. United States: Negro Rioting Linked with Class Struggle and Vietnam

Following a series of characteristically slanted NCNA articles on the Negro rioting in Los Angeles and other cities, the People's Daily "Commentator" on August 16 described the rioting as a "veritable revolutionary movement" which had brought "the Negro struggle to a new height." Harking back to Chairman Mao's statement that, "in the final analysis, a national struggle is a question of class struggle ", the article ridiculed President Johnson's civil rights program as merely a device to consolidate

0 7 4 7
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

the "rule of American monopoly capital." "Commentator" also repeated the claim that the demonstrators had linked their own domestic struggles with those against U.S. "aggression" abroad, (WEEKA 32).

"Commentator's" analysis of the Negro question was endorsed by Premier Chou En-lai in a August 17 speech at the Indonesian National Day reception. Chou also pledged the support of the Chinese people to all those "who were opposed to racial discrimination." (Unclassified)

Comment: Peking's quite predictable and extensive response to the incidents in Los Angeles is part and parcel of its continuing effort to portray the alleged vicious nature of American political life. The American Negro's lack of response to the regime's exhortations doesn't seem to faze it one bit. Peking may feel secure in the belief that its superior knowledge of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist science of human development enables it to see more clearly than the Negro himself the true course of the latter's present movement.

3. Laos: Peking Coordinates Position with Pathet Lao

Pulling back a step from its apparent demand that the International Control Commission cease functioning in Laos (WEEKA 30), Peking last week brought itself into line with the Pathet Lao position on the subject. As reported by NCNA on August 16, Foreign Minister Chen Yi in a letter to Prince Souphanouvong fully endorsed the July 23 Pathet Lao conditions for the future functioning of the I.C.C. in Laos and called for an end only to the "illegal activities" of the Commission.

Comment: We wonder if Peking's apparent retreat in the face of differences with the Pathet Lao position is a product of the regime's inability or reluctance to impose its views on a Communist Party evidently controlled by the DRV. If so, the situation has obvious implications for Vietnam. (Confidential)

4. Diplomatic Notes

A. Indonesia's Independence Anniversary Greeted Warmly.

Peking devoted considerable attention to the 20th Anniversary of Indonesian Independence which was commemorated on August 17.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi and a NPC delegation headed by Li Hsueh-feng (WEEKA 32) were on hand for the celebration in Djakarta while the regime's press featured lengthy background material on Indonesia and generously covered the various compliments exchanged on the occasion by representatives of the two friendly powers. Typical of these was the Liu Shao-ch'i-Chou En-lai joint message of "warm congratulations" to Sukarno which praised Indonesia for its active support of "the just struggles of the Afro-Asian peoples against imperialism and colonialism" and referred to the "profound and militant friendship (between the two peoples) in our struggle against imperialism." Other Chicom statements on the occasion included praise for Indonesia's "momentous revolutionary drive against U.S. imperialism", for its "courageous withdrawal from the U.S.-controlled United Nations," and for its "valuable contributions to . . . the Vietnamese people's patriotic struggle agains imperialism."

Not surprisingly, in view of its content, NCNA carried large segments of President Sukarno's August 17 speech.

Comment: Unmistakable warmth and "militant" friendship permeated this year's Chicom treatment of August 17, but despite these sentiments Peking may regard Indonesia somewhat uneasily owing to: 1) various "bourgeois" aspects of Sukarno's rule and his confused ideology, 2) memories of Indonesia's treatment of its Overseas Chinese five years ago, and 3) concern that Sukarno's departure from the scene might be followed by the rise to power of the strongly nationalistic and anti-Chinese military. In the meantime, Peking will do its best to assure a pleasant honeymoon forwhat only may be a marriage of convenience. (Confidential)

B. Secret Sentiments Revealed - People's Daily Commentator on August 18 noted that "the withdrawal by the United States of its Embassy from Brazzaville is a full and consistent measure of its hositility toward the Congo (B)."

Comment: We had always assumed that Peking regarded our diplomatic establishments as centers of "imperialist intrigue and espionage." Imagine our surprise to discover that in truth it has secretly regarded our Embassy in Brazzaville as an expression of American friendship towards the Congolese. We are now expectantly waiting for Peking's benign views on our men in Hong Kong.

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

5. Another "Turncoat" Returns

William C. White, one of the twenty-one American GI's who refused repatriation after the Korean War and went to China, crossed the border into Hong Kong on August 17. White was accompanied by his Chinese wife and two children. After debriefing by the Consulate General and documentation for travel, White and his family will proceed to his home in Kansas City, Missouri.

Comment: White is one of the three non-repatriates who received an advanced education, having studied Chinese and law. He has an excellent mastery of Chinese and during his stay in China translated a number of novels and plays. His comments to us have been considerably more critical of the Chinese regime than his very guarded remarks to the press. (Confidential)

Internal

6. Chairman Mao Cures the Peasants

NCNA announced on August 14 that the Ministry of Health recently convened a National Conference on Medical Education in Rural Areas. The meeting came to the conclusion that improvement of medical standards in the countryside depended upon training and developing large numbers of rural health workers ranging in qualification from peasant part-time health personnel to commune staff doctors. Stress was also laid on the development of farm-study health schools (Unclassified)

Comment: The conference is but the most recent expression of the extensive campaign to improve rural medicine which began in early 1965 with the widely publicized dispatch of roving medical teams and "mobile hospitals" (WEEKA 10). While better health in the countryside is undoubtedly a primary goal, the campaign is shot through with very strong political implications. Central South Regional First Secretary T'ao Chu, receiving roving medical team members last July, ventured that the most important result of the teams' work was the improvement in relations between the Party and the peasants. (Radio Canton, July 20) Huang Chia-ssu, a noted surgeon and President of the Chinese Academy of Medical Science, reporting on his recent stint as a roving team director in the August 4 People's Daily noted that "before we entered a village there had been widely circulated the report that

0750
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Chairman Mao had sent the medical teams to cure the diseases of the peasants."

Each mobile hospital is fully equipped with the latest political machinery. In addition to doctors and medicines, Fukien mobile units all carry a political instructor, a Party cell, and a YCL cell. (Radio Foochow, August 14, 1965) Furthermore, dispatch of the teams appears to be predicated as much on political as medical need. Radio Canton (August 9) announced that the second group of roving teams this year had been assigned to 12 counties including Lien-hsien, Hsin-hsing and Ying Te, areas where "the socialist education campaign has just started." (See WER 33.) (Limited Official Use)

7. Notes on Youth

The following items of information on China's younger generation emerged (in some cases rather belatedly) from the mainland last week:

a. 170,000 Graduates in Class of '65 - The annual China Youth Journal editorial to graduates of institutions of higher learning, (reprinted in the August 10 People's Daily), a fairly stock piece urging readers to follow the socialist road lest they end up on the scrap-heap of history, revealed that this year 170,000 graduates would take up work posts throughout the nation. (Unclassified)

Comment: The figure consitutes a drop of over thirty thousand from last year's "more than 200,000" graduates-evidence that the first college enrollment cutbacks triggered by the collapse of the Great Leap probably were made in 1961. Last year the precentage of college-age children in China receiving a higher education was 1.3% (China Youth Journal August 13, 1964 SCMP 3288). With increased population and lower enrollments, this year's percentage should be even smaller. (Unclassified)

b. PLA Training for Chekiang University Teachers and Students - A Hangchow dispatch carried in the June 29 Shanghai Wen Wei Pao stated that 400 young teachers and students from Chekiang University during the past school term, a process that "promoted revolutionization of their minds." In the course of their stint, the students and teachers lived, trained, and marched as regular soldiers, receiving, as far as we can tell from the context of the article, no special treatment. (Limited Official Use)

0751
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: Short "comfort" visits by university students and teachers to PLA units, as well as summer vacation and school year militia training have been familiar subjects in the press, but this is our first knowledge of students and teachers training in the regular army during the normal school term. There is no indication yet that the Chekiang University experience, which appears from its size to be experimental, has been practiced in other parts of the country.

Mao Tse-tung's well-known and documented concern over university students' ideological qualifications has prompted a search for new approaches to indoctrination which has included measures as harsh as sending some off to the countryside as administrators of socialist education for periods up to a year and a half (WEEKA 53, 1964), and measures as soft as drastically curtailing extracurricular political activity on certain campuses (WEEKA 29). That the regime has been tinkering with the idea of sending university students off to boot camp is evidence both of the length to which the search has gone and of the fact that it is far from over.

c. 300,000 New Tientsin Young Pioneers Recruited in One Month - The June 20 issue of Fu Tao Yuan (Supervisor), the official organ of the Young Pioneers (a publication that slips out only occasionally) reports that the Tientsin Municipal YCL Committee, acting in accordance with the decision of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth YCL Central Committee, recently recruited 300,000 new Young Pioneers in one month. As a result "all the school children of Young Pioneer age (from 7 to 15 years of age) in the muncipality have in the main been organized." Prior to the campaign there had only been about 500,000 Young Pioneers in Tientsin, accounting for 79% of the children in the 9-15 year age group.

The recruiting drive was accompanied by criticism that the standards of the Young Pioneers were being watered down, that membership would be meaningless if everyone could join. The Party position was that the "educational" advantages of extending Young Pioneer indoctrination to all far outweighed any such drawbacks, and that an organization which was beyond the reach of everyone could not qualify as a mass organization. (Limited Official Use)

0752
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: The outlines of the Ninth YCL Second Plenary directive on the reorganization and strengthening of the Young Pioneers are gradually taking shape. The pattern which emerges from a collage of articles like the one above is: 1) in the cities, organization of the Young Pioneers remains based in the schools. The lower age limit has been reduced 2 years from 9 to 7, and emphasis has been placed on organizing everybody. 2) In the countryside emphasis is also on organizing every child between 7 and 15. Because significant portions of rural China have no schools and therefore no Young Pioneer unit, organization of the Pioneers has been transferred from the schools to the village (hence at least some of the talk about using the "administrative village" as a basic unit WEEKA 25) and placed under jurisdiction of the YCL and other standard village political organs. To provide administrative flexibility, what appear to be two new sub-divisions of the Pioneers, the Children's Communist League (for ages 7-12) and the Juvenile Communist League (for ages 12-15) have been established. (WEEKA 23) (Limited Official Use)

8. Basic Levels "Link Labor and Leisure"

The "Link Labor and Leisure" policy which was enunciated on June 21 (WEEKA 26) and whose extension to various fields of endeavor we have watched with interest (WEEKAS 29,30), reached the grass roots last week. Reports in the People's Daily on August 10 and 12 from the Shanghai Third Cotton Mill and the Hofei Lathe Works state that meetings have been cut way down and working conditions and even factory meals improved. In particular, in describing the amount of political activity that went on before the new policy went into effect, Shanghai factory officials and workers gave the impression that employees met almost as much as they worked. The Factory Deputy Party Secretary detailed the following after-hours schedule: Monday, study; Tuesday, Party and YCL activities; Wednesday and Thursday, mass activities; Friday, study; Saturday, production activities. The Textile Workshop General Party Branch Secretary related that a production blunder like the one which occurred when a worker mixed three tubes of coarse 32-count yarn with 21 count yarn once required the convening of five special meetings; the Party, the YCL, the cadres, the activists, and the masses. Now such matters are covered in 15 minutes during rest period discussions in the alley. In addition, other redundant meetings have been merged, meetings have been abolished for afternoon and night shift workers, and the general level of required attendance reduced to an average of four hours

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

every month per employee. (Unclassified)

Comment: Among other indications that China's workers are taking the Party's instructions to heart was the description given us last week by a Dutch correspondent who had recently visited a factory on the outskirts of Peking. He said that during the break scheduled for calisthenics only five employees could be seen in the yard moving in time to the rythmic bleats of the loudspeakers. The other 200 were in the cafeteria drinking tea and smoking cigarettes. (Confidential)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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0754

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SUBJECT : CHINESE COMMUNIST JOINT WEEKA - 32

REF :

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Date of Action

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Date of Dispatch

Transaction to RM/R

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Peking Demonstrates Increasing Sensitivity on "Peace Talks Fraud"
2. U.S. "Piratical Actions" Protested
3. No Editorial Comment on Singapore Secession
4. United States: Second Anniversary of Mao Statement on U.S. Racial Discrimination Treated in Low Key
5. Travelers' Notes

Internal

6. Reference to "Aid Vietnam Resist America" Campaign
7. Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yi Visit Shanghai Youths in Sinkiang
8. Honan Holds First Party Congress in Eight Years
9. Flurry of Democracy in Tibet - Peasants "Demand" Further Organization
10. Biographic Briefs

Military

11. ChiCom/GRC Sea Battle

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Drafted by: POL:BLevin,NPlatt,DAnderson,JThomas,YSNg: drb/6/12/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances: DATTLO:LtColTreadwell(in draft)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

1. Vietnam: Peking Demonstrates Increasing Sensitivity on "Peace Talks Fraud"

The President's July 28 press conference announcement regarding the despatch of an additional 50,000 troops to Vietnam and his renewed calls for a peaceful settlement touched off spirited and lengthy comment by Peking this week. The shrill tone of a People's Daily "Observer" article denouncing the Tito-Shastri talks held in Belgrade added to an impression of Peking's concern over growing isolation resulting from the regime's opposition to efforts at a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam question.

A. President's Statement on Troop Reinforcements Subject of Editorial and Government Statement - Peking followed the initial August 3 People's Daily editorial attack on the President's July 28 statements with a second editorial on August 7 and a CPR Government Statement on the same day. These latest comments were along the customary Chicom lines on Vietnam, but also appeared to be somewhat defensive, though shrilly so, on subject of peace negotiations. The Government statement's reference to the continuing victories of the Vietnamese people and their determination to fight on to victory appeared to be aimed at maintaining the rationale that the Vietnamese would be able to handle the job alone and that under present circumstances direct Chicom intervention was not required. However, the statement reaffirmed the regime's readiness to send "our men to fight" should the Vietnamese people request them.

The People's Daily editorial concentrated on the "peace fraud" tactics of the President. Peking's concern over international receptivity to the United States position on unconditional negotiations, and over efforts of even such left-wing members of the Afro-Asian group as Ghana to bring about negotiations appeared to be clearly reflected in the editorial's lame appeal that, "since new scheme of Johnson administration is so insidious and brazen, no well-intentioned country or public figure who hopes for the restoration of peace in Indo-China and wants to prevent the expansion of war should be taken in by US imperialism."

The editorial also devoted considerable space to denouncing US efforts to involve the UN in a search for peace. Standard language was used to describe the UN as a tool of US aggression and without competence to "meddle" in the Vietnamese situation.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0756

B. Belated but Vituperative Comment on Tito-Shastri Meeting - People's Daily "Observer" on August 9 condemned the August 1 joint Yugo-Indian communique on Vietnam. Observer castigated Tito and Shastri as servants of U.S. imperialism and implied that U.S.-Soviet collusion influenced the outcome of their discussions.

In the comment by Observer that the NLF should be regarded as the "sole and genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam" Peking appears to have strengthened its previous reference to the subject (WEEKA 18) by placing this latest formulation in the context of a denunciation of the joint communique's call for NLF participation in negotiations. The Chicom inference that the NLF must be the exclusive negotiating agency for the South represents a position on this point which appears more extreme than that of the DRV.

Finally, we are of the opinion that the tone of the Observer comment is hardly calculated to improve the regime's image in the Afro-Asian world with its frantic outcry against Tito-Shastri peacemaking efforts and scurrilous description of those who favor such efforts. (Confidential) (ConGenTels 167, 170, 172)

2. U.S. "Piratical Actions" Protested

In another Vietnam-related development, People's Daily Commentator on August 10 complained about "endless provocations" and "piratical attacks" by U.S. warships and planes against Chicom merchant and fishing vessels. Commentator particularly singled out as examples of US "provocations and piracy" the alleged harassment of merchant vessel "Nanhai 155", the ramming of a Lebanese ship by a U.S. submarine and the sinking by U.S. warships of a Chicom fishing vessel with the loss of all six hands. He admitted that "most of the incidents took place on the high seas near China's southeast coast" but quickly pointed out that these American "outrages" were "flagrant and crude violations of . . . international law."

Commentator linked increased U.S. naval activity against China with the Johnson Administration's preparations "to fight a local war in Vietnam and Indo-China as a whole" and concluded with the warning that "U.S. imperialism has to bear full responsibility for the serious consequences arising from its piratic actions."

0057

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: We are inclined to view the August 10 Commentator piece as a relatively restrained reaction to U.S. military activities in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, it is clear that Peking is compiling for the public record a catalogue of U.S. aggressive acts against the regime in the event justification is needed for a more active Chicom role in Vietnam. (Confidential)

3. No Editorial Comment on Singapore Secession

Peking has largely confined itself to slanted but essentially factual reportage of Singapore's withdrawal from Malaysia. Aside from coverage on Indonesian comment on the development, NCNA on August 10 reported Malaysian Prime Minister Abdul Rahman's statement on Singapore's secession with the addition of a few explanatory notes concerning Malaysia's political and economic oppression of Singapore.

Comment: While undoubtedly pleased over Singapore's nullification of Malaysia's planned seizure of the Singapore branch of the Bank of China (see WER No. 32) Peking is probably waiting on clarification of Singapore's attitude toward the British bases and its views on relations with the Chicoms before committing itself to comment on the issue. We have little doubt concerning Peking's over-all pleasure over what it probably considers to be an important weakening of "imperialist-directed" Malaysia. (Limited Official Use)

4. United States: Second Anniversary of Mao Statement on U.S. Racial Discrimination Treated in Low Key

Peking observed the Second Anniversary of Mao Tse-tung's August 8, 1963 statement on the U.S. racial situation with a low-level August 7 NCNA article entitled, "U.S. Negro Struggles in New Upsurge." The two main themes of the article were: 1) the previously expressed notion that the Negroes were increasingly turning from non-violence to violence as evidenced by the formation of armed Negro groups in the South and 2) the more recent formulation that the Negro movement and the movement opposing U.S. policy in Vietnam were "merging into a mighty current" which represented a possible stumbling block to President Johnson's "aggressive policy" in Vietnam. (Unclassified)

Comment: In sharp contrast to last year's widespread observance, no rallies have been held nor has any editorial as yet appeared commemorating the anniversary. It may be that in view

0758
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

of the success of the civil rights movement in the States and the obvious failure of American Negroes to respond to Chicom outpourings, Peking no longer feels it can make much mileage on the subject. (Unclassified)

5. Travelers Notes

A. French Minister Leaves for Home - NCNA reported that French Minister of State Andre Malraux departed August 5 after a 15-day visit to China during which he held extensive talks with Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai (WEEKAS 29 and 31). (Unclassified)

Comment: Disclaiming any specific knowledge of what went on in Peking, the local French Consul in a conversation with us has speculated that the main purpose of the mission was to seek any indication of flexibility on the part of the Chicoms. The French Consul implied that President de Gaulle does not consider his Ambassador in Peking, Lucien Paye, to have sufficient contacts or prestige to conduct hoped-for broad-ranged discussions with the Chicoms.

According to an official of the German Consulate General, while in Hong Kong Malraux gave an exclusive interview to the local AFP representative in which he presented (off the record) the view that China must move closer to the West. This supposedly would take place first with Europe and later with the U.S. (Confidential)

B. Indonesian C.P. Delegation Visits CPR - A PKI delegation led by Chairman D. N. Aidit arrived in Peking August 1 at the invitation of the CCP Central Committee. From August 3-5 the delegation held talks with Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai and other high Chinese Party leaders. On August 7, NCNA announced that a portion of the delegation headed by PKI Central Committee member Karil Supit had left for Hanoi.

Comment: NCNA reporting on the Aidit visit has been extremely sparse giving little clue as to the subjects discussed. This limited coverage plus the absence of any communique or statement marking the end of the visit lead us to speculate about the possibility of Chicom dissatisfaction with at least some aspect of Aidit's behavior--perhaps his performance in Moscow, which he visited just prior to the trip to Peking. (Confidential)

0759

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

C. Nan Han-chen Irritates Japanese - Nan Han-chen continued public attacks against the Japanese Government for allegedly placing obstacles in the way of Sino-Japanese trade (WEEKA 31). His latest sally included a denunciation of the oft-proclaimed Japanese policy of separating economics and politics and the complaint that each advance in Sino-Japanese trade had brought forth additional Japanese Government trade obstacles. (See WER 32) (Unclassified)

Comment: A member of the Japanese Consulate General has confirmed reports from Tokyo concerning Japanese Foreign Office displeasure with Nan's antics which are regarded as a violation of Japanese hospitality. Despite the resentment he may have aroused in official Japanese circles, Nan's tactics probably represent a calculated effort to assure that Japanese business circles continue pressuring the GOJ to improve the economic and political climate vis a vis Peking.

D. Cambodian Delegation Hears Reiteration of Chicom Support for Cambodia - CPR Vice-Premier Li Hsien Nien, speaking before a Cambodian economic delegation led by Cambodian Vice-Premier Son Sann (WER 32), declared on August 7 that Peking would "stand by" Cambodia "should the U.S. imperialists dare to extend the flames of their war of aggression against Vietnam to Cambodia." (Unclassified)

Comment: Although Li also referred to U.S. attempts to "instigate" Laos and Thailand to "provoke and threaten" Cambodia, the Chinese pledge of support apparently refers only to a direct U.S. attack on Cambodia - a possibility which even Peking must seriously discount. (Limited Official Use)

E. Chicom Delegation to Indonesian Independence Celebrations - NCNA announced August 7 that a National People's Congress delegation led by LI Hsueh-feng, Vice-Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, had arrived in Djakarta to attend the celebrations of the 20th Anniversary of Indonesia's independence. (Unclassified)

Comment: As Vice-Chairman of the NPC, Li is one of the sixteen logical choices to head a visit hosted by the Indonesian Parliament. (Li is also First Secretary of the North China Bureau of the CCP Central Committee.) According to Consulate General records, this is Li's first trip abroad in many years, and his choice may represent an effort to groom him for an expanded role in international and national affairs. (Limited Official Use)

0760
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

6. Reference to "Aid Vietnam Resist America" Campaign

A CNS August 10 round-up on a national industrial production for the first half of 1965 attributed an alleged increase in production to the "Aid Vietnam Resist America" campaign and the workers' intense desire to aid their Vietnamese bretheren. (See WER 32)

Comment: This is the second reference within a week to an "Aid Vietnam Resist America" campaign (WEEKA 31), but we still have not seen any particular mobilization of the populace in keeping with such a campaign. In fact, with the exception of this CNS report which is intended primarily for an external audience, there has been no further mention in internal media of an "Aid Vietnam Resist America" campaign since the original reference was made in the August 3 People's Daily editorial. (Limited Official Use)

7. Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yi Visit Shanghai Youths in Sinkiang

All Peking papers on August 11 devoted half their front pages to reprinting a long China Youth Journal report on a visit by Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi on July 5 to the Shihhotzu reclamation area of the Sinkiang Production and Construction Corps. They were accompanied by Sinkiang Party First Secretary Wang En-mao, Region Chairman Saifudin, and Military District Deputy Commander T'ao Shih-yueh. After an exchange of heart-warming pleasantries with a group of Shanghai youths stationed there, Chou inquired about their family backgrounds. He told them that the current stand and attitude of members of exploiting class families, was much more important than their class antecedents. Anyone could have a bright future who cut himself off from his family, reported his social relationships to the organization, remolded himself, and wholeheartedly served the cause of the proletariat. The youths then asked Chou to give their regards to Chairman Mao and tell him to rest assured that they, like all youths in the frontier region, were working and living well, and determined to spend their entire lives there. Chou agreed and said he would also tell their families in Shanghai to rest easy. (Unclassified)

Comment: This is to our knowledge the first time that such high ranking figures have been called upon to "comfort the troops"

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

in Sinkiang. Such special treatment, if not proof of a major morale problem in the area, can at least be taken as evidence that the size of the Shanghai youth to Sinkiang Operation has reached proportions large enough to warrant high level reminders that the youths have not been forgotten.

Chou's little speech about class background was particularly revealing, providing confirmation of a long-held impression that many of the youths sent to Sinkiang are from ideologically questionable families. The youths' professed determination to spend the rest of their lives in Sinking supports another old conjecture - that the Shanghai-Sinkiang trip is one way. We doubt that this situation is very pleasing to those caught up in it, both the youths themselves and their families back East.

The choice of Chou and Ch'en for this precedent-breaking encounter was probably based on a mixture of convenience and luck. They were passing through the area on their way back from Algiers, and Ch'en's background as Mayor of Shanghai made him an ideal man for the job. (Limited Official Use)

8. Honan Holds First Party Congress in Eight Years

Radio Chengchow (August 9, 1115 GMT) announced that the First Session of the Second Honan Provincial Party Congress was held in Chengchow from July 26 - August 5. In a meaty communique that reads like a national rather than a provincial document the province was complimented for past victories, e.g. social reform in 1957, the achievement of communization during the Great Leap in 1958, the "concentration of forces in 1961 to make adjustments in the national economy and correct shortcomings and mistakes which appeared in actual work, and the surmounting of "repeated severe natural calamities" throughout the period. Noting that the people's "mental outlook had undergone tremendous change," that the period of readjustment was over, and that a new production upsurge was in the making, the communique urged that the socialist education campaign on the basis of experience gained in "key point areas" should be pushed throughout the province a "bit at a time. . . in a spirit of uncompromising revolution."

In a long section devoted to Party rectification, the communique urged that emphasis be placed on cadres' personnel work. When concentrating on promoting revolutionary successors

0762
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

and strengthening the leadership nuclei, party workers should not only apply Mao's five criteria for selecting red heirs, but also "the cadre policy of equal stress on integrity and ability." To this end "thorough investigations of cadres should be carried out to find out all about them." In its search for new blood, the Party should promote outstanding local cadres, and "boldly choose" promising young cadres for positions of leadership "so that they may be steeled in those positions, mature, and become competent."

In addition the communique touched a number of standard bases; e.g., grain as the main link in agriculture, work-study schools as "the long term orientation for developing socialist and communist education," "quality first" in industry, strengthening of politics in trade and finance departments, and the study of Mao's works. It also muttered a string of stock Chinese Communist numerological incantations about the "four firsts," the "three-eight work style," the "five too-manys," "deviding one into two," and revealed that the congress had examined and discussed the "draft of the outline of the plan for 1965-1967" for province agriculture. (Unclassified)

Comment: In the eight years that have passed since the second session of the First Honan Party Congress, the Province has gone through two Party First Secretaries (P'an Fu-sheng and Wu Chih-p'u) and a series of natural disasters paralleled by few areas in China. While predicting National Party Congresses has been one of our less accurate exercises in the last two years, the inference we draw from the holding of this congress (the second provincial Party congress in three weeks) is that if a problem province like Honan is solid enough to have a congress, any Party organization, including the national level, should be able to do the same. (Limited Official Use)

9. Flurry of Democracy in Tibet - Peasants "Demand" Further Organization

The Radio Lhasa frequency has been active during the past week with news of People's Congress elections at both the hsien (county) and the hsiang (township) level. Among the most noteworthy of the bulletins was the announcement that Linchou Hsien had held its first People's Congress from July 19-24 (August 5, 0001 GMT). Delegates to the congress maintained that mutual aid teams, to which 94% of the hsien's peasants and herdsmen now belonged, were already inadequate to suit the development of production and deemed it essential to get further organized to

0 7 6 3
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

carry out the socialist reform of agriculture and animal husbandry. One delegate from (Tsaipin) hsiang told the congress that further organization was "the common desire" of the people in his hsiang especially since "following the 'three great education campaigns' the laboring people's socialist consciousness has been further heightened, public (capital) accumulation of the mutual aid teams has increased, and the collectivist ideology of the team members has been strengthened."

Among numerous "demands" for organization from individual hsiangs reported by Radio Lhasa was a newsletter appearing in the Tibet Daily which told how the collectivist appetites of liberated serfs from Koma Hsiang had been whetted after seven hsiang residents returned from a tour of the "interior (i.e. Han China) with glowing accounts of the collective achievements performed by the masses under Party leadership. (August 10, 0001GMT) (Uncl.)

Comment: Progress toward collectivization, socialist reform and Chinese Communist style democracy continues in Tibet, and has probably accelerated in recent months if the above broadcasts are any indication. NCNA noted on August 5 that general elections had been completed in more than ninety percent of the hsiang in the region and that hsien elections were underway. The process has been painfully slow, however. The Party expected the hsiang election process, which began in October 1962, to be 50 to 70% complete byMarch 1963 (NCNA Lhasa March 27, 1963, SCMP 2950). Moreover, since only three out of 103 counties have to our knowledge elected people's congresses, Tibet's development into a full-fledged Autonomous Region is still probably a long way off. (Unclassified)

10. Biographic Briefs

A. State Council Dismissals - At its 157th session, held on July 19, 1965, the State Council dismissed Yang Hsiu-feng, Ch'ien Tsun-jui, and Fan Ch'ang-chiang as Deputy Directors of the Cultural and Educational Office of the State Council. It also removed Ch'en Huang-mei as Vice Minister of Culture. (NCNA, August 1)

Comment: The dismissal of Yang, the former Minister of Higher Education is not surprising. He has moved into another field of government with his appointment as President of the Supreme People's Court at the last NPC in December. Ch'ien Tsun-jui has been on the skids since he was removed as a Vice Minister of Culture in September 1963. His political eclipse may have something to do with his former position as Secretary of the Sino-Soviet Friendship

0764
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Association. Fan Ch'ang-chiang's removal is a mystery. He was a noted journalist who came into prominence in the thirties as a correspondent of the Peking Ta Kung Pao, and later became a top news administrator as president of the People's Daily. Ch'en Huang-mei, the third Vice Minister of Culture to get the gate this year (WEEKA 21), is clearly another casualty of the current campaign to proletarianize mainland culture. As Director of the Ministry's Movie Bureau, he has probably been identified as a tender of such "poisonous weeds" as "February Spring," "Pei Kuo Chiang Nan," and "Lin's Store," all of which have taken a drubbing in the press over the past year.

B. New Kweichow Governor - NCNA August 1 also announced that the Third Kweichow Provincial People's Congress, during the course of its third meeting (July 26-31) had elected Li Li Governor of the Province.

Comment: The election of Li, a Kweichow Party Secretary, confirms the fact that Chou Lin has been ousted. When Chou, the former governor and Province Party First Secretary, lost his Party post to Li Ta-chang in February (WEEKA 8) there was still doubt as to whether he had also been removed from his government too.

Military

11. Chicom/GRC Sea Battle

On Friday, 6 August, Chinese Nationalist Naval Forces were attacked by Communist naval ships near the islands of Namoa and Tung Shan off the Kwangtung-Fukien coast.

The NCNA account reported that the GRC ships had intruded into fishing grounds and had ignored repeated warnings to leave.

Each side is claiming victory, but the Nationalists evidently lost the "Chien-men" a 220 ft. former US minesweeper and the "Chang-chiang" a 173 ft. patrol craft. The GRC claims the sinking of three Chicom gunboats in the action.

The Norweigan cargo-passenger liner Helios rescued four GRC seamen and brought them to Hong Kong Sunday evening. The survivors left immediately by air for Taipei. (Confidential)

Comment: The Chicom attack on the GRC vessels strikes us as showing more aggressiveness and initiative than usual. It is possible that the Chicoms feel increasingly vulnerable to ridicule

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0765

over their lack of overt action coupled with repeated threats on the subject of Vietnam, and may have sought to achieve a tougher posture by deliberately seeking out a victory over GRC forces. (ConGenTel 167, Confidential) (Confidential)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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(2)	BANGKOK	CPACPLAD	KATHMANDU	NDELHI	SEOUL	VNTIANE
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0766

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ORIGIN / ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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TO : Department of State, WASHINGTON

INFO: (See last page for distribution)

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External

1. Vietnam: Peking Continues to Draw Analogy with Korean War
2. Laos: US Accused of "New Military Venture" in Laos
3. Sino-Soviet Relations: Helsinki Peace Congress Pronounced a "Success"
4. Diplomatic Notes
5. Japan: Anti-A-H Bomb Conference Closes

Internal

6. Districts in Southwestern Kwangtung Transferred to Kwangsi
7. "Four Clearance" Style Rectification Campaign in Sinkiang

Military

8. Army Day Marked by Ho Lung Article on Democracy in PLA
9. That's My Coat, Comrade (Sir)

Outer Mongolia

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

1. Vietnam: Peking Continues to Draw Analogy with Korean War

Lo Jui-ching, speaking on the occasion of the 38th anniversary of the founding of the PLA on August 1, and a significant August 3 People's Daily editorial provided further evidence this week of the extent to which China's Korean War experience is now coloring Peking's thinking on the Vietnam conflict. However, while both pronouncements forcefully reiterate the ChiCom line that the conflict in Vietnam is proceeding toward a larger scale ground war of the Korean type, they also make clear that China's reluctance to become involved directly in the Vietnam conflict remains unchanged.

A. Lo Warns US Against "Imposing War" on China

Previous ChiCom declarations that they will not attack unless attacked were clearly expressed in Lo Jui-ching's warning that if the Americans "persist in underestimating the strength and determination of the Chinese people, impose a war on us and compel us to accept the challenge," they will find the Chinese "long well-prepared and standing in battle array." The Chinese people, he claimed, will "not only stay with you without fail to the end, but invite you to come in large numbers, the more the better." In this way, China and the "revolutionary forces of the world" were said to be able to unite for the "early uprooting of the source of war in the interests of the world's peace."

B. People's Daily Declares US "Bent on Fighting Land War in Indo-China

The August 3 People's Daily editorial concentrated on the President's July 28 press conference announcement that the US is planning to send an additional 50,000 troops to Vietnam, claiming that the US is "bent on fighting a land war in Indo-China," and virtually ignored his emphasis on repeated attempts at a peaceful settlement and US willingness to discuss proposals by both sides in unconditional talks. The bulk of the editorial was devoted to an "analysis" of seven asserted differences between the situation at the outbreak of the Korean War and the present situation in Vietnam, among which the most significant was a reference to the fact that China's "Resist US Aggression, Aid Korea" movement was launched only one year after the "liberation" of China. "Now," claimed the editorial, "the Chinese people's "Aid Vietnam, Resist

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

US Aggression' movement is being unfolded at a time when new China is fifteen years old and is more powerful than ever before." Balancing this rather ominous note, however, were the editorial's repeated expressions of confidence that the "Vietnamese people, who have more than ten years of experience of struggle against US imperialism," will eventually triumph by persisting in a continuation of the present strategy. Another indication that overt ChiCom intervention appears to be implicitly dismissed as unnecessary at present is the statement that the US is "trapped in a great people's war of thirty-one million Vietnamese people." (CONFIDENTIAL)

Comment: While Lo's remarks and the editorial provide the clearest and most forceful exposition to date of the ChiCom view that the war in Vietnam may be changing in nature from a "special war" to a local land war of the Korean type, this new development has not, in our view, substantially altered China's reluctance to become involved directly in the Vietnam conflict, and its willingness to signal this reluctance to us. The editorial's claim that the Vietnamese people have at their back 650,000,000 Chinese people is put in very general terms, and the allusion to the "Aid Vietnam, Resist US Aggression" movement notwithstanding, reports from the Mainland do not indicate any mobilization of the populace similar to the "Resist US Aggression, Aid Korea Campaign" of 1950-53. We estimate that at least for the present, the Korean War references are directed more at the external than the internal audience and are designed to provide second thoughts to American policy makers as well as further ammunition to those in the US and elsewhere who oppose US policy on Vietnam. A more immediate purpose of these latest pronouncements is, of course, to deter the build-up of US ground forces in South Vietnam. (ConGenTels 128 and 139) (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Laos: U.S. Accused of "New Military Venture" in Laos

Peking on July 30 released a People's Daily editorial which accused the U.S. of colluding with Laotian rightists and Thailand to "widen the war in Indo-China" and to "integrate South Vietnam and Laos into one theatre" in order to reverse U.S. defeats in South Vietnam. As support for its argument, the editorial referred to an alleged UPI release stating that Defense Secretary McNamara had recently drafted a plan to send fifty thousand U.S. troops "to spread to Laos the U.S. war of aggression against Vietnam."

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Also quoting the U.S. press, the editorial maintained that the purpose of the action was to set up a blockade zone south of the 17th Parallel to choke off "the people's armed forces" in South Vietnam as well as Laos. Should the U.S. plan be put into effect, warned the editorial, the war "would no longer be a Vietnam war, a Laotian war, or a war limited to Indo-China even." It concluded that the "peoples" of Indo-China had the "right" to take "all possible" countermeasures. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The attention given in this editorial and an August 3 People's Daily Commentator article on the "'Nanhai 155' incident" to alleged U.S. attempts to choke off supply routes to the "liberated areas" in Laos and South Vietnam evidently indicates ChiCom sensitivity toward possible interdiction of these routes. (ConGen Tel 116 to Dept.) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Sino-Soviet Relations: Helsinki Peace Congress Pronounced a "Success"

In a July 31 People's Daily "Observer" article Peking expressed obvious satisfaction with those aspects of the recent Helsinki World Peace Congress which dealt with Vietnam. It was alleged that the resolution on Vietnam and the general statement of the Congress were adopted "after a fierce and complicated struggle" and that it gave "expression to the common desires of the Vietnamese and all other peoples of the world." In this sense, the Congress was pronounced a "success."

"Observer" launched the expected attack on Soviet behavior at the Congress. The Soviet delegates were alleged to have been "in league" with some of the American delegates to "promote the scheme for 'peace talks' on Vietnam," and "Observer" indignantly asked, "What do the Khrushchev revisionists mean when they boil this (the Vietnamese) great, just struggle down to a question of 'peaceful coexistence'?" "To put it bluntly" was the reply, "they consider that the Vietnamese people's struggle is a disturbance to their fond dream of Soviet-American cooperation."

The article also served as a platform from which to launch yet another sharp attack on the Soviet leadership's "splittist" activities. "Observer" charged that calls by CPSU leaders for unity in the "peace movement" are actually designed to impose on the movement their "capitulationist line of currying favor with US imperialism and betraying the national liberation movement." The two lines of the peace movement, claimed the article, "are diametrically opposed to each other and are irreconcilable." (UNCLASSIFIED)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Comment: The "Observer" article is the most recent and authoritative addition to what appears to be a quickening pace of attacks on Soviet policies and leadership. (UNCLASSIFIED)

4. Diplomatic Notes

A. Burmese Leader Concludes Visit.

Ne Win departed for home August 1 after an eight-day state visit to the CPR (WEEKA 30). On the same day a joint communique was issued which by and large continued the pattern set by the Sino-Burmese joint communique signed in February 1964 in Rangoon. The following main points emerge: 1) On Vietnam, the two sides agreed that the Vietnamese people should decide their own problems "without any foreign interference" -- undoubtedly a considerably watered-down version of what Peking must have sought; 2) On the Second Afro-Asian Conference, the communique states that the conference was postponed in order to make it "a greater success" at Algiers in November, apparently a Burmese concession to Peking; 3) With regard to the UN, the two sides agreed that "necessary changes" should be made in its organization which would make it "better reflect present international realities," but, aside from Burmese expression of support for CPR membership, the document is mute on exactly what changes should be made.

A Canadian reporter based in Peking and now vacationing in Hong Kong has provided us with a sidelight indicative of the coolness which apparently prevailed during Ne Win's visit. The reporter, who attended a Burmese Embassy reception at which both Chou En-lai and Ne Win were present, stated that Chou's opening remarks were particularly sarcastic, suggesting that this was a rare occasion for Chinese officials to be invited to visit the Embassy. According to the reporter, this statement elicited an open guffaw from Ne Win. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Comment: With Ne Win's departure, the CPR has now entertained three Afro-Asian chiefs of state within a short period after the abortive Afro-Asian Conference in an apparent effort to regain its diplomatic momentum in the A-A world. However, a succession of bland speeches and communiques by Ne Win, Somalia's Osman and Uganda's Obote, far from expressing any interest in Peking's oft-mentioned "internationalist duty" to support the "Vietnamese people," have merely reaffirmed in general terms the standard

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist cliches at the same time focusing on non-alignment and on the role which Chicom economic assistance might play in the development of their own economies. It appears to us at this juncture that Chicom hard-line foreign policies may be running into stronger resistance, a good sign should the A-A Conference actually be convened in November. (Confidential)

B. French Minister Continues Visit

French Minister of State, Andre Malraux (WEEKA 30), held talks with Chou En-lai August 2 and with Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi the following day. NCNA summaries made no mention of the subjects discussed. (Unclassified)

Comment: A Western newsman returning from Peking informs us that a high degree of secrecy and strict security precautions have surrounded Malraux's visit. According to this observer, among French diplomatic officals in the CPR only the French Ambassador was aware of the visit until shortly before Malraux arrived in Peking. Althought the French have described Malraux's visit as a "vacation," we note that the Chicoms have treated him as an official visitor, noting his title as "Minister of State" and describing him as the "special envoy" of "French President General De Gaulle." (Confidential)

C. Peking Recognizes Maldive

NCNA announced thatForeign Minister Chen Yi had sent a message to Maldive congratulating the new country on its independence and extending CPR recognition. According to NCNA, the message was conveyed to the Maldivian Government by the Chicom Ambassador to Ceylon, HSIEH Ke-Hsi, when he met with Maldivian Prime Minister Ibrahim Nasir in Colombo August 3. (Unclassified)

5. Japan: Anti-A-H Bomb Conference Closes

The general meeting of the Eleventh World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs closed in Tokyo August 2 after producing the expected resolutions. One resolution sponsored by the Japanese called for strengthening of the movement for the relief of atom bomb sufferers, to which the Chicoms promptly responded with a donation of one hundred thousand Chinese yuan (roughly US$45,000).

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Perhaps more interesting than the conference itself was a speech by Nan Han-chen at an August 3 reception hosted by six Japanese trade organizations. Nan bluntly informed the group that, "Normal development of China-Japan trade was impaired because the Japanese Government adopted a policy hostile to new China following in the footsteps of US imperialism." Nan also used the occasion for an attack on the US' "dirty war" in Vietnam and the Japanese Government's "rendering service" to the US. (UNCLASS.)

Internal

6. Districts in Southwestern Kwangtung Transferred to Kwangsi

NCNA August 2, in a routine report listing administrative changes that had taken place in the Mainland during the period April 1 - June 30, noted that the following areas had been transferred from the administration of Kwangtung Province to that of Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region: Ho-pu Hsien, Ling-shan Hsien, Ch'in-chow Chuang Nationality Autonomous Hsien, Tung-hsing Multi-nationality Autonomous Hsien, and Pei-hai Municipality (better known as Pakhoi, a former treaty port). (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The change removes Kwangtung's small strip of contiguous border with North Vietnam, and may simplify the Chicom military command structure in the strategic border area. The Kwangsi Military District now has control over the entire eastern half of the Sino-DRV border and will have sole administrative control over military and civilian movements, communications, and Overseas Chinese refugee inflow from North Vietnam. In addition, Kwangsi now will have control over all the minority nationalities in the area.

This is not the first time these counties have changed hands between Kwangsi and Kwangtung. Kwangsi controlled the territory from 1951 to July 1, 1955, when it was handed back to Kwangtung. (CONFIDENTIAL)

7. "Four Clearance" Style Rectification Campaign in Sinkiang

A Russian peasant who lived in Kuldja up until June 1965 reported (OIR 2072/65) that a "criticism and self-criticism" campaign began in his former home town and the surrounding area towards the end of 1964. The campaign, which was directed, among other things, at official corruption and misappropriation of funds, was run by large numbers of Chinese cadres who came from the East especially for the purpose. The peasant heard that several officials,

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

among them a Uighur who headed a commune twenty kilometers northeast of Kuldja, had been shot for embezzling. One result of the campaign was that prostitutes, who after an absence of several years began to be seen again in 1960 or 1961, had disappeared from Kuldja's streets. These ladies, most of whom were Uighurs, had been denounced by other women at neighborhood group meetings connected with the campaign, and had been sent to labor camps for a period of "reeducation." The campaign was still going on when the peasant left Kuldja. (SECRET)

Comment: Although the label is different, the campaign described bears most of the earmarks of the "four clearance" drives going on in various areas of Han China; i.e. administration by work teams from outside the target area, and focus upon cadre corruption, and promiscuity. The penalties, however, sound much more drastic than those levied in other parts of the Mainland. Heavy fines, and degrading denunciations which sometimes resulted in cadre suicides have been reported, but not executions. While the extent of the corruption uncovered may have warranted such severe sentences, it sounds as if the regime may be using the campaign as a pretext to rid itself of minority nationality opposition elements. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Military

8. Army Day Marked by Ho Lung Article on Democracy in PLA

The 38th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army was commemorated on August 1st with the simultaneous publication in Red Flag and all Peking newspapers of a 15,000 character article by Vice Premier (and ex-Marshal) Ho Lung, entitled "The Democratic Tradition in the Chinese PLA."

Ho explained that the active implementation of Mao's concepts of political, economic, and military democracy were the secrets behind the PLA's success, distinguished the PLA from reactionary armies, and made the PLA the object of intense but unsuccessful study by other military establishments including the US and the GRC. He summarized the tradition in eight rather disjointed points:
1) Democracy in the army is not a method, but a fundamental attitude based on respect for the masses.
2) Discipline, respect for personal property, and respect for human dignity (the "three main rules of discipline and the eight points for attention") have been potent agents for unifying the army, winning over the populace, and subverting enemy forces.
3) Political and ideological education is the basis of all democracy.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

4) Officers and men are unified by sharing the necessities of daily life. Such economic democracy is the starting point for unifying the masses and tapping their initiative.
5) The exchange of ideas and criticism at all levels (military democracy) raises the army's technical level, tactical ability, and helps develop new talent from the ranks.
6) Democracy strengthens the army's discipline and raises its combat effectiveness.
7) The system of commanders' individual responsibility under the unified collective leadership of the Party Committee guarantees that democracy will be practiced consistently and the mass line adhered to in the army.
8) The practice of the three democracies developed under primitive revolutionary conditions are equally applicable and necessary in the era of modern warfare.

Ho made it clear the democratic tradition was only "perfected" after 38 years of struggle (i.e. from 1927 to the present) with bourgeois military thinkers who regarded Mao's line on Army building, the concept of Party control, and democracy within the ranks as antiquated expedients suited to revolutionary guerilla operations, but obsolete when applied to modern military establishments and weapons systems.

Ho told his readers that the movement among the civilian population to "Learn from the PLA" was not, as "imperialists, reactionaries, and modern revisionists of the Khrushchev brand" term it, an undemocratic measure designed to make the Chinese people further sacrifice personal interests and "turn the whole of China into a barracks." These "fierce slanders" were only a proof that the Party, Mao and Lin Piao were on the right track. "We have shattered their (the slanderers') delusions that as time goes by, as our economy develops and our equipment is improved, we will some day discard our old traditions bit by bit and gradually become estranged from the masses." (Unclassified)

Comment: Ho's article does not mention de-ranking in the PLA, but it is the first authoritative statement to appear since the ranks were abolished and is obviously intended to provide the ideological rationale for that move. The tone of the piece is as defensive as its very length suggests. Ho's glowing description

0775

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

of triple democracy in the army, and PLA-style democracy among the people, as well as his sensitive reaction to foreign criticism and detailed denunciations of bourgeois military thinking, lead to the impression that PLA officers may indeed have drifted away from a "revolutionary" - and classless - relationship with their men and the masses, and that bourgeois military concepts are still alive in the PLA.

Although Ho's qualifications as a theorist are exceedingly thin, history suits him well for the task of writing a commemorative article on Army Day. The date was chosen after the abortive Nanchang Insurrection in 1927 in which Ho's 20th Army provided the bulk of the insurgent force. As one of the founders of the PLA and the epitomy of the old revolutionary fighter, he is from the regime's point of view a highly suitable candidate to defend the virtues of the Maoist approach to military organization. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

9. That's My Coat, Comrade (Sir)

A Canadian journalist who lives in Peking told us last week that his hotel in the Chinese capital had recently been the scene of a meeting between PLA officers and their counterparts from the Indonesian army. He happened to be in the corridor as the conference broke up and watched with interest as the Indonesians emerged and fetched their smart tunics, all festooned with braid, ribbons, and identifying insignia from the coat rack outside the door. (It was a very hot day, and the conference had been held in shirtsleeves and - for the Chinese - undershirts.) However, when the PLA officers came to get their coats, the situation deteriorated. No one could tell whose plain rankless jacket belonged to whom. After several minutes of ill-tempered tentative fittings, with big men finding themselves wedged into small coats and smaller officers engulfed in larger ones, the group got itself sorted out and strode away, grumbling. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: Ho Lung to the contrary, de-ranking has its rankling moments. (UNCLASSIFIED)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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ARA	EUR 5	FE 8
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SEA 1	HEW 1	NSC 6

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FROM: AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: JULY 30, 1965

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 30

REF:

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Prospect of "Large Scale Local War" Discussed
2. Sino-Soviet Relations: Bucharest Congress Closes - Soviet Role in Vietnam Attacked
3. Japan: Anti-A-H Bomb Conference Focuses on Vietnam and "Cloven-Hoofed" Splitters
4. Laos: Peking Calls for End to International Control Commission
5. CPR-Mauritania Decide to Establish Diplomatic Relations
6. Visitors: Burma's Ne Win - Somalia's Osman

Internal

7. Li Tsung-jen Meets Mao
8. Hunan Holds Party Congress

Military

Negative

Outer Mongolia

Negative

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GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

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Drafted by: POL:NPlatt, DAnderson, JThomas:drb, 7/29/65.

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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1. Vietnam: Prospect of "Large Scale Local War" Discussed

Peking's concern with the steadily increasing US commitment of forces in Vietnam was expressed this week in a People's Daily "Observer" article summarized in NCNA July 22. The article, entitled "To Accelerate Escalation is to Hasten the Approach of Doom," appeared to have a three-fold purpose: 1) to warn public opinion in the US and world-wide of the Vietnam conflict's progression toward a "war of the Korean-type;" 2) to shift the blame for whatever happens away from the DRV for its subversion against the South onto the shoulders of the US for allegedly changing the nature of the war; and 3) to assert the Chinese determination to aid the DRV no matter what. In another scathing attack on the Soviet Union's role in Vietnam, Peking's Ta Kung Pao on July 26 scoffed at Moscow's "miserly aid" to Vietnam. (See Item 2.)

A. Korea-Type War Possibility Discussed - Responding to President Johnson's July 13 statement that "new and serious decisions" would be taken concerning the Vietnam conflict, "Observer" charged that "this means that the desperate US aggressors are prepared to go on the warpath to the very end despite the severe defeats they have repeatedly suffered on the battlefield." The Johnson Administration, "Observer" alleged, has found it necessary "to prepare the nation for war," and of late has made "many-sided preparations for a large-scale local war," indicating that it was prepared to "accelerate the escalation in order to extend its war of aggression against Vietnam into a Korean-type war."

B. DRV's "Right to Support Southern Compatriots" Emphasized - "Observer" claimed that, actually, the nature of the war in Vietnam had changed beginning with the Tonkin Gulf incident, and that the US' bombing of the North and the introduction of "massive ground troops" had converted "its so-called special war into an international war of aggression against the whole of Vietnam with US troops playing the main role reinforced by a handful of foreign satellite troops." US charges of "aggression from the North" were dismissed as "humbug," and "Observer" demanded, "inasmuch as the US is carrying out aggression against South Vietnam which lies thousands of miles from America , why haven't the people in the North the right to support their Southern compatriots in their resistance against the US aggression?"

Comment: The possibility of an expanded war of the Korean type appears to have entered the Chicom's thinking to a greater extent

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

recently, as witnessed by another reference to this possibility by Chen Yi in a speech at the Polish Embassy in Peking July 22. Interestingly, however, the "Observer" article nowhere mentions the possibility of the US' carrying the war to the China mainland -- a theme which only recently figured importantly in their news media. Thus, this "Observer" article appears to us largely as a psychological warfare ploy which, by its reference to a Korean-type war, is intended to stir up US and world public opinion and hence act as a deterrent to the rapidly increasing US troop build-up in South Vietnam. (Confidential) (ConGentels 86 and 91)

2. Sino-Soviet Relations - Bucharest Congress Closes - Soviet Role in Vietnam Attacked

The Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of Rumania closed in Bucharest July 23 without producing any major fireworks between the two principal antagonists, the Chinese delegation led by Teng Hsiao-ping and the Soviet delegation led by Leonid Brezhnev. Neither, however, did the Congress produce any signs of possible compromise in the Sino-Soviet polemic, with both parties adhering to well-established positions in public speeches and, we suspect, in any private meetings too. Although the Vietnam question figured prominently in the delegates' speeches, and Teng took the opportunity to reaffirm Peking's stand, the Chinese in general appeared to prefer that the main attacks on the USSR's position be made by the Japanese and the Albanians.

What Teng may in deference to the Rumaninas have left unsaid in Bucharest, Peking spelled out forcefully in a shrill new attack in the June 26 Peking Ta Kung Pao entitled "Struggle between Two Lines Over the Question of Dealing with US Imperialism." The article covers much the same ground as the more authoritative Red Flag - People's Daily article of June 14, castigating the Soviet leadership for "using hypocritical anti-imperialist phrases to deceive the people of the world" while "trying hard to mingle with the revolutionary ranks" so as to "gain breathing space and political capital."

A particular focus of the attack, however, was the Soviet role in the Vietnam conflict and what the article claimed is the Soviets' "incurable spinelessness" vis-a-vis the US. The article pointedly described Soviet "dual-faced tactics" of, on some occasions, demanding US withdrawal from Vietnam, while on other occasions, "not saying a word about it;" on one hand offering what the Ta Kung Pao sneeringly described as "miserly aid" to Vietnam, while

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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on the other, disclosing to the US "in advance" the real nature of this aid. Thus, while waving the banner of "aid to Vietnam" the USSR was described as actually earning political capital for dealing with the US "imperialists."

Comment: The Ta Kung Pao article does not add to the already extensive list of charges which have been levelled by the Chicoms at the present Soviet leadership, but we find the timing of this attack interesting, coming as it does immediately after the close of the Rumanian Party Congress. We suspect that the Chinese wanted to have the last word in this semi-official fashion in order to reiterate their stand on crucial issues affecting the unity of the world Communist movement, particularly the question of Vietnam. This exercise in Chicom firmness thus seems directed as much at Hanoi and other "fraternal countries" as at the Soviet Union itself and could in part reflect Peking's displeasure over Hanoi's acceptance of the Ghanian mission now visiting Hanoi. (Limited Official Use) (ConGentel 106)

3. Japan: Anti-A-H Bomb Conference Focuses on Vietnam and Cloven-Hoofed" Splitters

The twenty-three man Chicom delegation headed by Liu Ning-yi and Nan Han-chen which is attending the 11th World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs arrived in Tokyo July 22. Early indications that Peking's interest in the conference centered, not on the question of nuclear disarmament, but on Vietnam and China's ideological conflict with the Soviet Union were made abundantly clear in Liu Ning-yi's opening address to the conference on July 28. After a polite nod to the "correct path" followed by the anti-A-H bomb movement and a brief recitation of Peking's standard apologia for its present posture as both a burgeoning nuclear power and a leader in the anti-Atomic bomb movement, Liu announced that the conference had, "unanimously agreed that its central task shall be to support the Vietnamese people's patriotic anti-US struggle."

"The Chinese people," declared Liu, "are immovable in their determination to give the Vietnamese people resolute support in their fight until final victory," and ominously warned that, due to imperialism's "warlike nature," "the possibility of a world war, even a great nuclear war, cannot be ruled out." Continuing in this fire-eating fashion, Liu declared that, "if US imperialism dares to extend its war of aggression still further, if it dares to go so far as to infringe directly on the People's Republic of China and plant its feet of clay into the immense sea of the six

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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hundred and fifty million Chinese people, it will suffer still more ignominious, still quicker and still more thorough defeat."

Shifting his fire to the Soviets, Liu sneered at those who are "making some gestures of support for Vietnam, playing a few anti-US imperialist tunes and devising some little stunts, while at the same time they actively collaborate with US imperialism for 'peace talks', exchange information and secretly enter into collusion with US imperialism." The Soviets, charged Liu, having been frustrated in their attempts to "worm their way into" the 10th world conference, had "bought over a handful of right-wing forces and political degenerates" to organize their own schismatic meeting. Thus, in spite of their pious calls for unity, " the cloven hoof of the splitters will always remain visable." (Unclassified)

Comment: It appears to us that, following the postponement of the Second A-A Conference in Algiers, the Chinese have chosen the anti-A-H bomb conference as a major platform for pressing their views on Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet controversy. While this audience may in some ways be more amenable to Chinese control, we wonder if this blatant disregard of the original objectives of the conference might not rankle some of those Japanese leftists who are genuinely concerned with the movement. (Limited Official Use)

4. Laos: Peking Calls for End to International Control Commission

On July 25 People's Daily devoted considerable space to excerpts from a statement by the Neo Lao Haksat strongly denigrating the actions of the ICC in Laos. The statement, carried under the heading, "The International Commission in Laos Has Become an Instrument of U.S. Imperialism -- It Sould Cease its Activity," was followed by a July 26 People's Daily "Commentator" article which demanded that the ICC cease functioning in Laos. (Unclassified)

Comment: Peking's demand may be intended to secure leverage for its Pathet Lao ally in any discussion which may ensue concerning the future functioning of the ICC. Certainly from the Chicom standpoint, the more chaos in Laos the better. (Limited Official Use)

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5. CPR-Mauritania Decide to Establish Diplomatic Relations

NCNA announced on July 26 that representatives of the CPR and the Mauritanian Government had signed a communique stating that Peking and Nouakchott would establish diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors. (Unclassified)

Comment: The establishment of relations with this moderate, former French West African state is a setback for the GRC and a victory of as-yet unknown proportions for the CPR. We note, however, (Taipei's A-71) that Mauritanian President Moktar has thus far failed to sever relations with the GRC and in fact has told the GRC that he would be happy if it chose to stay. Evidence that Peking is aware of this state of affairs is contained in a People's Daily editorial July 27 hailing Sino-Mauritanian relations and stating "it goes without saying" that GRC-Mauritanian relations are now "broken off" and that GRC personnel in Mauritania lose their diplomatic status. Thus it appears likely that Mauritania, like France, will be forced to remove GRC representatives if it desires to exchange ambassadors with Peking. (Confidential)

6. Visitors: Burma's Ne Win - Somalia's Osman

Burma: Ne Win in CPR. According to NCNA, Burmese leader Ne Win received a "rousing welcome" upon his arrival in Peking July 24 on a visit as the guest of Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai. Following the usual pattern Liu hosted a banquet the same evening followed by talks the next day. On July 26 Ne Win and his party were received by Mao Tse-tung, and on July 27 the Burmese leader, accompanied by Liu and Chou, left by special plane for Shenyang, an industrial city in Northeast China. (Unclassified)

Comment: Having recently completed visits to both New Delhi and Karachi, Ne Win probably feels constrained to touch base in Peking, and would rather do it now than attend the October 1 festival in the capacity of a leader of one of Peking's tributary states. Although no communique has been published so far, the cliche-ridden banquet speeches gives the impression that Ne Win's trip is largely ceremonial.

Somali Leader Concludes Visit. Somali President Osman (WEEKA 29) concluded his visit to the CPR, holding meetings in Peking with Liu Shao-chi July 22 and Mao Tse-tung July 23. After sightseeing in Hangchow and Shanghai later in the week, Osman left

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for home July 28. The next day a short and extremely bland communque was issued stating that the two sides had held "fruitful discussions" on the implementation of the 1963 Sino-Somali economic and technical cooperation agreement and that they would work together for the success of the Second Afro-Asian Conference "to be held in Algiers." (Limited Official Use)

Internal

7. Li Tsung-jen Meets Mao

Former acting Nationalist Chinese President Li Tsung-jen, who returned to the Mainland last week after an absence of 16 years (WEEKA 29) was received on July 27 by Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Also present were Madame Li (Kuo Teh-chieh), Ch'eng Ssu-yuan (Li's old Kwangsi political crony, who is alleged to have been instrumental in arranging Li's return, and who is better known to Overseas Chinese as the father of the late movie actress Lin Dai), Peng Chen, Mr. and Mrs. Kuo Mo-jo, CCP Central Committee United Front Work Department Director Hsu Peng and others.

After an exchange of polite talk, Mao told Li frankly that compared to the past the country was somewhat stronger, but still not very powerful. It would take at least twenty or thirty years before the nation could be considered truly strong. He assured Li that any Chinese living abroad who returned would be welcomed and treated with courtesy.

After the audience the Li's and Cheng Ssu-yuan were feted at a banquet hosted by Mao and his wife Chiang Ching. (Unclassified)

Comment: So far the propaganda exploitation of Li's return has not been as intense as expected. In fact, the brief coverage of Li's meeting with Mao is the first mention of Li we have seen in either the Mainland or the Hong Kong Communist press since he arrived in Peking on July 20. The People's Daily covering the event on the 21st gave it front page treatment, but reserved pride of place for the visit of Somalia's President Osman. This apparent low-key approach coupled with Mao's politesse and sweet reason may be designed as an added inducement to Chinese living abroad who are thinking of returning home; informing them that the propaganda price of coming back to the motherland is not as high as expected. The relative lack of hoopla may also be a tacit recognition that there is little mileage left in old museum

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pieces like Li Tsung-jen. (Limited Official Use)

8. Hunan Holds Party Congress

On July 19 Radio Changsha (1145 GMT) announced that the third session of the Second Hunan Provincial CCP Congress had been held from July 1-15, attended by 447 delegates, 49 alternates and 675 observers.

The Congress, after first secretary Chang Ping-hua's platitudinous opening references to the China's "lips and teeth" relationship with North Vietnam, ritual prostrations before the "mighty correctness of Chairman Mao's scientific predictions," and satisfied statements over the success of socialist education and militia compaigns, focused its attention on the central problem; achievement of the "new soaring leap" in agriculture. In organizing the production upsurge, the congress urged cadres to "be sure to coordinate labor and rest. When making long term plans, they must take the production team as the basis, proceed from reality, and not simply chase high targets by assigning tasks at each level and making the tasks greater at each level." (See also WER 30)

Comment: The congress is the first held in the province since 1962 and the first reported in the Mainland since the Kansu Congress last August (WEEKA 35, ConGen A-148, August 18, 1964). Since 12 out of 28 major Party units responsible for electing delegates to a national congress have still not held publicized congresses during the last three years, there is apparently still much convening to be done in the provinces before a national Party gathering can be called.

Exhortations at the Hunan meeting that cadres plan realistically using the production team as the basis show that the regime is reluctant to tamper with the social and economic structure in the countryside, regardless of ideological scruples to the contrary. The production team as the basic unit of commune management is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future.

The "link labor and leisure" line has now been applied to provincial agricultural planning as well as to industrial management (WEEKA 27) and university curricula (WEEKA 29), and is likely to become a key slogan for the management of other fields of activity within the Mainland. The spread of this reasonable

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

0785

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approach gives the impression that the leadership is unwilling, for the time being at least, to whip the Chinese people into a frenzy over anything, including the war in Vietnam.

In connection with the last point, we have been struck by the lack of mention in public media of war precautions in South China cities (as noted in numerous CAS reports). While public silence on war precautions may be prompted purely by security considerations, the regime may be keeping these activities under wraps to avoid creating war fever or anxiety in other parts of the country. In its internal policies Peking seems to be girding the Chinese people for a long uphill pull (upsurge is the current word). It may also be preparing public opinion to expect a long, drawn-out effort in Vietnam as well. (Confidential)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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	BUDAPEST	KATHMANDU	RANGOON	TOKYO	**KUALA LUMPUR**
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SUBJECT : COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 29

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Li Tsung-jen Returns
2. Mainland Students Also to "Link Labor and Leisure"
3. Education Minister Discusses Faults of Half-Work, Half-Study Agricultural School System

External

4. Sino-Soviet Relations: Rumanian Party Congress Offers New Platform for Sino-Soviet Polemic
5. Vietnam: Peking Promises New Aid for Hanoi
6. Diplomatic Notes
7. Japan: ChiCom Delegation to Atom and Hydrogen Bombs Conference Departs for Tokyo

Military

Negative

Outer Mongolia

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Clearances:

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ORIGIN/ACTION

INR-10

RM/R	REP	AF
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TO : Department of State

INFO : See page 9 for distribution. COPY NO. 1 SERIES A

This document consists of 9 pages.
Copy #1 of 54 copies. Series A.

FROM : AmConGen Hong Kong DATE: July 23, 1965

SUBJECT : COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 29

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Li Tsung-jen Returns
2. Mainland Students Also to "Link Labor and Leisure"
3. Education Minister Discusses Faults of Half-Work, Half-Study Agricultural School System

External

4. Sino-Soviet Relations: Rumanian Party Congress Offers New Platform for Sino-Soviet Polemic
5. Vietnam: Peking Promises New Aid for Hanoi
6. Diplomatic Notes
7. Japan: ChiCom Delegation to Atom and Hydrogen Bombs Conference Departs for Tokyo

Military

Negative

Outer Mongolia

Negative

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

Copy No(s) 11

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Name [illegible] Date 8/27/65

SECRET

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FDRM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:MPratt:DAnderson:JThomas:mjm

Contents and Classification Approved by: John H. Holdridge

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

1. Li Tsung-jen Returns

NCNA reports that former Acting President of the Nationalist Government Li Tsung-Jen and his wife arrived at Peking airport on July 20, after 16 years of exile. They were greeted "warmly" by Premier Chou En-lai acting in his capacity as Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Peng Chen, Ho Lung, Chen Yi, Lo Jui-ching and a host of Peking's political museum pieces including ex-Emperor Henry Pu-yi, KMT Generals Tu Yu-ming, Sung Hsi-lien, and others.

In a laboriously contrived airport statement Li said he had been moved to return to the Mainland "by the fact that the entire people, guided by the wise leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao and holding high the red banner of the general line for socialist construction, have exerted determined efforts, with the result that our country has been thriving more and more and has of late successfully exploded two atom bombs in quick succession." He accused the United States of "committing a series of sordid crimes against the people of China and the world" and having stepped up its evil activities "especially since President Lyndon B. Johnson came to office." He urged his compatriots in Taiwan to return to the embrace of the motherland and unite against our "foreign enemy the United States" (his host for sixteen years).

That evening at a banquet given by Chou En-lai, Li once again expressed his shame at past misdeeds, joy at being home, and gratification at China's rapid transformation into a powerful modern state. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Li is being presented as an object lesson in the correctness of Mao's and the Party's leadership, which even a "guilty person" such as he can recognize. Peking hopes that Li will set an example for others to follow, particularly his former associates on Taiwan. The theme of "one family" of all Chinese united against the United States will also get a boost.

However, we doubt that after the propaganda extravaganza is over Li will be all that useful to Peking. He has long been out of touch with his KMT compatriots; the Taiwanese, we presume,

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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could not care less, and the new generation on the Mainland did not know who he was until he arrived. Some may be impressed that he abandoned a comfortable refuge in the United States for Communist China, but many will recognize his defection for what we assume it is; an act of an old Chinese who wants to die at home and whose statements constitute the price of admission to his country. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE) (CONGENTEL 67)

2. Mainland Students Also to "Link Labor and Leisure"

According to an article published in the July 13 China Youth Journal and carried three days later in the Kuang Ming Jih Pao the YCL Committee at Ching-hua University recently put into effect a new set of regulations designed to "guarantee that the students can have enough time for study, sleep, and rest, as well as some necessary free time at their own disposal." The article criticized "some enthusiastic cadres" for trying to make students hold lots of meetings and read large numbers of documents just to pad out their indoctrination statistics. There were also complaints about the amount of students' free time spent in militia drill. The key provisions stipulate:

1. "Ordinary students" are required to attend one political activity per week, the duration of which is not to exceed two hours. Attendance at a maximum of five events per month is not to be exceeded.

2. Meetings may not be scheduled for "ordinary students" during weekday forenoons, noontimes, afternoon training periods, or in the evenings after supper. Saturday evenings and Sundays (all day) are out too. "Activist students" may hold meetings only on afternoons when there are no classes.

3. Manual labor and militia drill must become part of the regular curriculum, and set in the following amounts; freshmen to "serve as soldiers" four to six weeks, sophomores to receive six to eight weeks on-the-job factory training, juniors and seniors to receive twelve weeks factory training in addition to "a fixed amount" of off-campus public welfare work (commune labor). No student should engage in on-campus labor for more than one month a year.

4. At least four 45-minute physical training periods should be scheduled a week.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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5. With the exception of physical training, all collective extracurricular activities must stop one or two weeks before exam period and cannot resume until after exams are over.

6. While cultural and recreational activities are freely elective, student literary societies should schedule one two-hour activity a week on Saturday afternoons. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Ching-hua students still will have plenty of extra-curricular activities, but it is clear that the reasonable line set in the June 21 People's Daily editorial "Link Labor and Leisure" is being extended from industry to the universities. (WEEKA 27) If the attitudes of Mainland students we have talked to in the past are any indication, the new regulation at Ching-hua will be received with enthusiasm. However, their enthusiasm may be tinged with puzzlement, given the regime's recent hardening of attitude towards political slackness and overemphasis on expertise among college students.

3. Education Minister Discusses Faults of Half-Work, Half-Study Agricultural School System

In the course of a tedious but authoritative "summing-up of experience" on half-work, half-study agricultural schools printed in the July 13 People's Daily, Education Minister Ho Wei provided readers with a catalogue of faults in the new system. He said that experience was lacking in determining the length of the academic year, in setting the curricula, in choosing teaching materials and in developing teaching methods. Teacher training was another problem because the "returned young intellectuals" (from the cities) who formed the bulk of the new system's teaching staff were both inexperienced, and in some cases ideologically unfit. Patient explanation, advanced training, debate, and "steeling" amongst the masses would solve all these dilemnas. Ho called upon the rural Party officials (commune and brigade secretaries) who normally double as school principals in the system to coordinate schooling requirements with production and family needs, intimating that enormous confusion and lack of planning accompanied the establishment of half-half schools in many places. Nothing in Ho's article could be taken as an indication that the half-half system was being groomed to replace full time schools. He said that both systems should exist side by side and learn from one another. (UNCLASSIFIED)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: We learned about one problem Ho forgot to mention from a young Kwangtung farmworker who recently arrived in Hong Kong (OIR 5169/65, July 9, 1965). He said that overseas Chinese dependents in his area jumped at the chance to attend the half-half middle school in the nearby town of Meihsien, not because of the educational benefits offered, but because they would only have to work half days and could relax during class period. Durned clever, these Chinese. (SECRET)

External

4. Sino-Soviet Relations: Rumanian Party Congress Offers New Platform for Sino-Soviet Polemic

As the dust settled after the Helsinki World Peace Congress imbroglio, a new and higher level Sino-Soviet confrontation began taking shape in Bucharest. On July 17 Peiping dispatched a top level delegation to the Ninth Rumanian Communist Party Congress headed by Party General Secretary and active ideological spokesman Teng Hsiao-ping and including Kang Sheng and Wu Hsiu-chuan, both of whom, like Teng, have figured importantly in the Sino-Soviet polemic. The stage was thus set for a real set-to between Teng and Brezhnev, who is heading the Soviet delegation.

The major indications thus far of the line to be adopted by the ChiComs at the Congress have consisted of Peiping's message of greetings to the Congress published in NCNA July 19 and Teng Hsiao-ping's congratulatory speech reported full text in NCNA July 20. The message of greetings praised the Rumanians for having "resolutely adhered to the socialist position" and having "defended the unity of the international Communist movement and the unity of the socialist camp by upholding Marxist-Leninist principles and norms governing relations among fraternal parties and fraternal countries." Revisionism was declared to be the "main danger" to the Communist movement, and the ChiComs renewed their pledge to struggle against it "through to the end."

In his speech, Teng used the stiletto rather than the meat-ax in making his points, but his interest in encouraging the centrifugal tendencies within the Communist movement was unmistakable. Thus, Teng praised the Rumanians for "giving priority to the active mobilization of the strength of its own people, the maximum utilization of the country's own resources and the tapping of internal

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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potentialities." Teng went on to extol China's own achievements in socialist construction. In the Sino-Soviet polemic, he went over to the offensive, claiming that China is "by no means isolated" in its struggle and stressing that only by upholding the theoretical positions of Marxism-Leninism, upholding the revolutionary principles of the 1957 declaration and the 1960 statement, and adhering to the principles guiding relations among fraternal parties and countries "is it possible to speak of genuine unity of the international Communist movement and of the socialist camp." He also pledged full Chinese aid to the "Vietnamese people" until "the U.S. aggressors are driven out of Vietnam totally, thoroughly, and completely."

Meanwhile, evidence from the International Preparatory Committee for the 9th World Youth Festival which just concluded in Helsinki indicates that the tactics employed there by the two major Communist protaganist were just as tough as at the World Peace Congress. Two July 20 NCNA articles produced one long blast against Soviet "manipulation" of the meeting, and its decision to reconsider the choice of Algiers as the site for the next world festival. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: We expect that the ChiComs have sent some of their best polemicists to Bucharest on the assumption that recent Rumanian moves to assert a greater degree of independence from the USSR, particularly as evidenced in the new draft "Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Rumania" (Bucharest's 1354 to the Department June 30), make Rumania something of an ally in Peiping's own efforts to challenge Soviet claim to leadership over the world Communist movement. Furthermore, we assume that the Chinese will endeavor to encourage other bloc CP's to follow the Rumanian CP's example in attempting to slip out from under Moscow's control, since, from the ChiCom viewpoint, disunity is an important waystation on the road to a new socialist unity based on the acceptance of their own theses. Although we doubt that the Chinese really expect other East European CP's to offer them much support in their attacks on Soviet revisionism, they must certainly have decided that their situation today is more favorable than that which prevailed when Peng Chen confronted Khrushchev at the 3rd Rumanian Party Congress in June of 1960, when the Chinese were very much in the minority. (Contel 69 to Dept.) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

5. Vietnam: Peking Promises New Aid for Hanoi

The North Vietnamese economic delegation led by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi returned to Hanoi after completing an aid seeking mission which included the USSR, China and the DPRK. In the joint press communique released by NCNA on July 17, China promised to provide "gratuitous aid to Vietnam in the form of equipment, whole sets of installations and supplies in the national defense and economic fields." (The joint communique released in Moscow July 12 said only that agreements were concluded which "provide for a supplementary assistance in addition to that which being rendered by the Soviet Union in accordance with the agreements concluded previously.") The DRV-CPR press communique was a considerably more effusive document than the DRV-USSR communique, again reiterating the alleged "lips and teeth" relationship which supposedly exists between China and the "Vietnamese people."

In other press reports this week, Peking has concentrated on alleged successes scored by the "liberation forces" of the NLF, giving prominent play to an on-the-scene report by Hsinhua correspondent Yu Tung from just outside the Danang air base. Danang was described as a "veritable powder keg." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Notwithstanding the fulsome praises heaped on the Chinese by DRV "Friendship Delegation" leader Hoang Van Hoan (WEEKA 28), the DRV has balanced its expressions of gratitude for what it termed the "wholehearted assistance" that was offered by both the USSR and the CPR. (See also WER No. 29) (UNCLASSIFIED)

Diplomatic Notes:

Uganda Prime Minister Concludes Visit - Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda, arrived back in Hong Kong July 16 after a five-day visit to the CPR. While in Peking Obote held talks with Chou En-lai and was received by both Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi. In a rather unusual procedure, Chou accompanied Obote to Canton, where the two signed a joint communique July 16. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Obote's visit, far from representing a "new chapter" in Sino-Uganda relations, as claimed by a July 18th People's Daily editorial, seems rather to have emphasized Obote's independence and relative toughness in the face of ChiCom pressure. Both Obote's

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

speeches and the joint communique reinforce this judgment. Although the Uganda leader supported withdrawal of foreign troops from Vietnam prior to negotiations, on other questions (2nd A-A Conference, United Nations), Obote clearly indicated his differences from ChiCom positions. Also, the fact that Chou apparently was forced to travel to Canton to gain Obote's signature on the joint communique possibly indicates a fair amount of disagreement behind the scenes. (ConGenTel 58) (CONFIDENTIAL)

Somali President Begins Visit - Following closely on the heels of Obote was another African leader, Somali President Aden Abdulla Osman. According to NCNA, Osman was accorded a "tumultuous" welcome ("one of the grandest welcomes Peking citizens have ever given to distinguished guests") when he arrived in Peking July 22. The same night Liu Shao-chi hosted a banquet for the Somali leader.(UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: We note that Liu's banquet speech was rather tepid by ChiCom standards and that Osman's reply, while effusive in thanks for CPR economic assistance, carefully avoided the standard denunciations dear to the hearts of ChiCom leaders and specifically expressed Somalia's support for the UN. Thus far, neither Obote's nor Osman's visits seem to have given Peking much of anything to be very happy about in support for ChiCom foreign policy objectives. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

French Minister in Peking - NCNA announced that French Minister of State, Andre Malraux, arrived in Peking July 20. The brief announcement gave no details on the purpose of Malraux's visit. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Peking may fear that any comments it makes on Malraux's visit will trigger speculation that it is in part a bid by DeGaulle to induce the CPR to negotiate on Vietnam. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Japan: ChiCom Delegation to Atom and Hydrogen Bombs Conference Departs for Tokyo

NCNA reported that a CPR delegation headed by Liu Ning-yi and Nan Han-chen left Peking July 16 by air for Tokyo to attend the 11th World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs scheduled to open July 25. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: The Japanese Consulate General informed us that the Chinese delegation is scheduled to leave Hong Kong for Japan July 22 and stated that, unlike last year when Chao An-po was denied a visa due to his outspoken criticism of Japan, this year's delegation encountered no difficulties in obtaining visas. In an unusual bit of candor, Liao Cheng-chih is reported to have told a group of Japanese newsmen in Peking that he had personally selected the Chinese delegation so as to avoid the difficulties that arose last year. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Military

Negative

Outer Mondolia

Negative

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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	BLANTYRE	DJAKARTA	MOSCOW	SAIGON	VNTIANE	7FLTTOKYO
	BUCHAREST	GENEVA	MUNICH	SEOUL	WEL'GTON	12AFMANILA
	BUDAPEST	LONDON	NDELHI	SOFIA	COMNAVPHL	
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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

49

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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A-35 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | PRIORITY HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State 1965 JUL 19 AM 7 49

INFO: See page 8 for distribution.

Action Assigned to NEA/CR

Action Taken

Date of Action

Office Symbol

Name of Officer

Direction to RM/R

FROM : AmConGen Hong Kong DATE: July 16, 1965

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 28

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Cautious Reaction to U.S. "Air Intrusion"
2. Sino-Soviet Relations: DRV "Friendship Delegation" Takes Indirect Swipe at Moscow
3. Thailand Attacked as U.S. Accomplice
4. Uganda Prime Minister Visits CPR

Internal

5. T'ao Chu's Strong Remarks on Revolutionary Opera Released in Hong Kong
6. Local Conference Calls for Establishment of Rural Political Work Structures
7. Young Peiping Intellectuals Sent to Ninghsia
8. New Shansi Province Party First Secretary Named

Military

Negative

Outer Mongolia

Negative

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

1965 JUL 19 AM 9 56 POLYFLO-PBR

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FORM A-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:NPlatt:DAnderson:JThomas:mjm

Contents and Classification Approved by: John H. Holdridge

Clearances: HK/M:DFerguson (item 5 in draft)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

External

1. Vietnam: Cautious Reaction to US "Air Intrusion" Over Yunnan

Peiping ended nearly a week of relative silence on the Vietnam scene when it announced on July 12 that four US military jets had "intruded" into China's airspace over Hokow in Yunnan Province. On other fronts Peiping's "no comment" posture continued to prevail.

US Charged With "Air Intrusion" over Yunnan

On July 11 Peiping charged that US aircraft, while on a bombing and strafing mission against the Northwest Vietnamese border town of Lao Cay, had "intruded" over Hokow, Yunnan. A "leading spokesman" for the Chinese "seriously warned" the US that "it will be entirely responsible for the serious consequences arising from all its war provocations against China," and claimed that the PLA was now "ready in full battle array." Peiping followed up this statement with July 13 editorials in the People's Daily and the Liberation Army Daily both of which were clearly intended as a warning to the US against air strikes which are uncomfortably close to the Chinese border. The message, transmitted previously through various channels, that China will not attack unless attacked appeared to be the principal point, but the Liberation Army Daily editorial also contained the threat, albeit a vague one, that the PLA is prepared to fight "on whatever scale the US attacks us."

Peiping Silent on Davies Visit to Hanoi

Despite the DRV's rather embarrassed announcement that British Labor MP Harold Davies' visit to Hanoi had "nothing to do at all" with the Commonwealth Peace Mission, Peiping has maintained a stony silence regarding the whole trip. Evidently the CPR was displeased even with Davies' limited contacts with the Fatherland Front.

Taylor Resignation Scarcely Noted

Peiping rather surprisingly limited itself to a single, predictably slanted news report of the resignation of Ambassador Taylor and his replacement by Ambassador Lodge. The report ascribed Ambassador Taylor's resignation to the failure of his "special warfare" and prominently reported US criticism of the Lodge appointment. (ConGenTel 47) (CONFIDENTIAL)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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2. Sino-Soviet Relations: DRV "Friendship Delegation" Takes Indirect Swipe at Moscow

A DRV "National Assembly Friendship Delegation" arrived in Peiping July 11 on a trip which will take them to North Korea, Outer Mongolia and the USSR in addition to China. Speaking at a banquet in the group's honor hosted by Chu Teh, delegation leader Hoang Van Hoan was effusive in his praise for ChiCom achievements in all fields including nuclear weapons. In the external field Hoang described the CPR as "the most enthusiastic and resolute comrade-in-arms of all nations fighting against imperialists headed by the US." He went on to praise the CPR for "holding high the banner of anti-revisionism to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism, push forward the revolutionary struggle in Asia, Africa and Latin America and promote the unity of the international Communist movement. On Vietnam, Hoang described China as the DRV's "closest neighbor" which, he said, was giving "the most resolute, the most powerful and the most effective support."

Comment: While Hoang's extravagant praise of the ChiComs and his gratuitous, if inferential, criticism of the Soviet stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute and the Vietnam fighting represent the less-than all-out support for the DRV in most obvious crack against the Soviets we have seen from DRV quarters for some time, we doubt that Hoang's words represent a significant shift away from its policy of balancing off Peiping and Moscow. Rather, Hoang's speech impresses us as being not much more than might be expected from a DRV emissary in a country to which the DRV owes much and which is, as Hoang said, its closest neighbor. (ConGenTel 49) (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Thailand Attacked As U.S. Accomplice

Following a spate of derogatory news articles concerning the activities of the Thai Government in Southeast Asia, the CPR on July 8 issued a People's Daily "Commentator" article which accused Thailand of aiding the U.S. by 1) providing air bases and "combatants" for the war in Vietnam; 2) repeatedly invading Cambodian territory; and 3) assisting rightwing Laotian attacks on "liberated areas" in Laos. The article stated that the Chinese Government and people "wholeheartedly support" the people of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in "taking self-defense measures" against Thailand and that the Thai people themselves, opposing U.S. "encroachments" on Thailand, were evolving a "mass struggle" against the Thai authorities. (UNCLASSIFIED)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Comment: We believe that this relatively low-key piece was triggered mainly by the recent Thai-Cambodian border incidents. The reference to CPR support for "self-defense measures" can be read as support for Sihanouk's statements on increased ChiCom military assistance as well as justification for the reported June 23 Sino-Cambodian military aid protocol, which will apparently increase the number of ChiCom military advisers in Cambodia. On a different plane, the article may also represent a further warning to Thailand that its assistance to the U.S. will result in its own entrapment in the Southeast Asian conflagration, thus conveniently providing Peiping with a rationale for future action in case Thailand fails to heed ChiCom advice. (ConGenTel 30) (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Uganda Prime Minister Visits CPR

NCNA reported that Uganda leader A.Milton Obote arrived in Canton July 11 for "a friendship visit to China as guest of Premier Chow En-lai." According to a Hong Kong news report, Obote was scheduled to return here on July 16 before heading to Japan. Rolling out the red carpet, Vice-Foreign Minister Chi Peng-Fei and Lai Ya-li (former Ambassador to Mali and now listed as Director of the Protocol Department of the CPR Foreign Ministry) journied down from Peiping to meet him on his arrival in Canton.

On July 12 Obote landed in Peiping where he was met by Chou En-lai, Chen Yi and several hundred thousand others. After the traditional airport ceremonies, Chou and Obote held talks followed by a banquet. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Neither the Chinese nor Obote have indicated the precise nature of his visit, although while in Hong Kong July 11 the Uganda leader stated that there was an agreed agenda. Likely subjects for discussion, however, include the implementation of the CPR-Uganda aid agreement. We note that Chou's banquet speech was restrained by ChiCom standards, possibly indicating heightened ChiCom attention to African sensitivities following the Afro-Asian conference debacle, and that Obote's reply was moderate both in tone and content. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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5. T'ao Chu's Strong Remarks on Revolutionary Opera Released in Hong Kong

From July 8-14, the Hong Kong Wen Wei Pao published an extraordinarily harsh, frank, and folksy speech delivered in February by Central-South Regional Secretary T'ao Chu before a group of regional theatrical luminaries. The publication of the address, in six installments and ostentatiously signed in T'ao's handwriting, was timed to coincide with the holding of the Canton Revolutionary Opera Festival which began on July 1. His message was essentially as follows (statements not in quotes are close paraphrases):

"Comrades:

"Last year we wanted to hold a modern opera festival in the Central South Region, but could find nothing of sufficiently high quality to put on...In the past I had my doubts about the fesibility of revolutionizing Peking opera... Some of the operas made the flesh crawl all over your body... the lyrics were poor, consisting simply of slogans like 'Engage in Production,' 'Further Socialism', etc." There were many other faults, too. However, we have seen from works like 'Red Lantern' how well modern revolutionary opera can be done and we must aim for this standard. Of course even 'Red Lantern Story' has its shortcomings, but it is a very moving opera. "I'm not one easily given to tears, but cried both times I saw it."

Opera and culture in general must be modernized, with much more time and effort spent on the task. So, "for the time being performances of traditional opera will not be permitted. Does that sound somewhat abrupt and rude? Well, actually people have to be forced sometimes...and at this time everyone is going to be forced to perform modern revolutionary opera"...The virtues of the revolution must be exaggerated in the operas to enhance the people's revolutionary optimism and faith in the revolution.

"Ch'in Shih-huang has been cursed down the ages for burning books and burying scholars alive. Actually, the ruling class of every dynasty in history has done the same thing to strengthen its control." Chiang Kai-shek was worse. I don't know how many revolutionary books he burned, or how

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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many revolutionary scholars he killed. "If we are working for the benefit of the great majority of people, and the benefit of the entire revolutionary class, why can't we publicize our own things?" We can, and we will. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: T'ao's dictatorial approach is in stark contrast with the last major Chinese statement on modern opera to appear in the Hong Kong press, a soothing interview on June 5, 1964 by the then Vice Minister of Culture Hsia Yen. Hsia, who has since been dismissed and is under fire for writing the script of "Lin's Shop" (see WEEKAs 21 and 23) assured overseas Chinese alarmed over the regime's designs on Peking opera that 70% of the performances held on the Mainland would continue to be traditional works. Peiping may now feel that, having exposed (it believes successfully) large numbers of Hong Kong residents to the delights of revolutionary culture at Shumchun, it can safely bare its plans to wipe out traditional forms of Chinese theater.

The authority, confidence, and honesty of the speech mark T'ao once again as one of the most powerful men in China, an official who by dint of his political commissar background, earthy approach to a wide variety of problems, and comparative youth may be slated for even higher office. His fresh, lively renditions of hackneyed Chinese Communist themes make it difficult to decide whether T'ao is the last of the first generation of Chinese leaders, or the first of the new one. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. Local Conference Calls for Establishment of Rural Political Work Structures

According to Radio Changsha (July 7, 1145 GMT) the CCP Committee of the Iyang Special District of Hunan Province "recently" held a rural political work conference in Ninghsiang County. Participants included Party committee and branch secretaries from the district, commune, and brigade levels as well as political work personnel and rural work cadres from both Iyang and Ninghsiang counties. The conferees were told that, with the socialist education campaign already unfolded in their areas the time had now come to concentrate on regular political and thought work in the countryside. To this end "Party organs at all levels should set up political structures as soon as possible, and do a good job of selecting political work personnel." Delegates were also charged to focus their efforts on running communist evening schools, newspaper reading activities, and movies and slide shows. (UNCLASSIFIED)

DECLASSIFIED
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Comment: The language of the broadcast is reminiscent of instructions given last year to Party organs in industry, communications, trade, and finance, when the Central Committee Work Departments overseeing these sectors of the economy were being reorganized along PLA lines. Although the evidence is still too flimsy to assert that the Central Committee's Rural Work Department is undergoing the same kind of shakeup, the possibility remains. Another shred of supporting evidence appeared two weeks ago in a broadcast from Radio Haikow (June 29, 2205 GMT) which mentioned that poor and lower middle peasants returning from the recent Kwangtung congress (WEEKA 25) were met by, among others, Lin Chi-hsien, Deputy Director of the Rural Political Department, (rather than the Rural Work Department). (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. Young Peiping Intellectuals Sent to Ninghsia

Radio Yinchuan (June 7 1350 GMT) and the China Youth Journal (June 8) report that the first group of educated youth left Peiping on June 5 by train and arrived on June 7 at Yinchuan to begin rural socialist construction careers in the Ninghsia Hui Autonomous Region.

Comment: In addition to sending unemployed urban school leavers to surrounding communes, it appears that each major East China city now has, or in the future will have, a particular "never-never land" to which it sends its "social youth." Shanghai and Wuhan youths go to Sinkiang (WEEKA 45, November 11, 1964), Cantonese to Hainan Island (WEEKA 22), and now, Pekingese to Ninghsia. Party planners probably reckon that the shock of being thrust into strange and difficult surroundings is less, and the process of acclimatization is easier if the youths are in the company of familiar faces and dialects. (UNCLASSIFIED)

8. New Shansi Province Party First Secretary Named

The July 2 People's Daily announced that Wei Heng had become First Secretary of the Shansi Province Party Committee. He has been Secretary of the Party Committee's Secretariat since 1957 and Governor of Shansi since 1958. His predecessor, T'ao Lu-chia was appointed Vice-Chairman of the State Economic Commission in April of this year. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Military

Negative

Outer Mongolia

Negative

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED

BAMAKO	CANBERRA	KATHMANDU	PRAGUE	(4)TAIPEI	500MIGF
(2)BANGKOK	CPACPLAD	KLUMPUR	RANGOON	TOKYO	TAIWANDEFCOM
BELGRADE	DARESSALAAM	MANILA	ROME	VIENNA	5AFJAPAN
BLANTYRE	DJAKARTA	MOSCOW	SAIGON	VNTIANE	7FLTTOKYO
BUCHAREST	GENEVA	MUNICH	SEOUL	WEL'GTON	12AFMANILA
BUDAPEST	LONDON	NDELHI	SOFIA	COMNAVPHL	
	KARACHI	PARIS	S'PORE		

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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ORIGIN/ACTION

INR-10

RM/R	REP	AF
1		5
ARA	EUR	FE
	5	6
NEA	CU	INR
4	5	
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
		12
PC	S/IL	RS/R
2	1	1
AGR	COM	FRB
2	2	
INT	LAB	TAR
	2	
TR	XMB	AIR
2		10
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	10
OSO	USIA	NSA
41	11	3
NASA	HEW	NSC
4	1	6

HOLKMAN

1965 JUL 12 AM 10 41

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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A-21 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO: See last page for distribution

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG DATE: July 9, 1965

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 27

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Da Nang attack Praised - Air Strikes Against Nam Dinh Scored
2. Sino-Soviet Relations: Peiping Girds for Future Battles
3. Afro-Asian Conference Aftermath: Heads High, Men
4. Diplomatic Notes

Internal

5. Foochow Draftsman Reports "Four Clearances" Temporarily Damped
6. Overseas Chinese Have Become "Four Clearance" Target
7. Another Film on National Capitalists Under Fire
8. Li Ta-chang Back in Szechwan; New First Secretary Appears in Kweichow

Military

Negative

Outer Mongolia

Negative

GROUP 3- Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL:NPratt/DAnderson/JThomas:drb,7/8/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

1. Vietnam: Da Nang Attack Praised - Air Strikes Against Nam Dinh Scored

Peiping this week exulted over the "stunning blow" struck by the Viet Cong against Da Nang Air Force Base, but reacted cautiously to reports of US air strikes against Nam Dinh, described as the "third largest city of North Vietnam." DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh returned to Hanoi following the postponement of the Algiers A-A Conference, making stops in both Moscow and Peiping.

A. Da Nang Mortaring Claimed a Defeat for US Strategy - The surprise Viet Cong mortar attack on Da Nang air base on July 1 was hailed in a July 3 People's Daily "Commentator" article as a "stunning blow" to the US' "ink blot strategy." The "ink blot strategy," first mentioned in a June 5 People's Daily editorial (WEEKA 23), refers to US establishment of bases along the South Vietnamese coast from which, according to "Commentator," the American forces "fondly hoped. . . . they could both attack and entrench themselves." This strategy, like any strategy adopted by the US in Vietnam, claimed the article, "is bound to be passive and would inevitably lead to failure." Every "ink blot" it was alleged, "will eventually become a graveyard of Yankee aggressors."

B. Mild Reaction to US Strikes Against Nam Dinh - Peiping's reaction to US raids against Nam Dinh and bombings north of Hanoi continued this week to be cautious and quite restrained. NCNA reported the DRV Foreign Ministry statement on July 3 and a summary of a statement issued on the Nam Dinh bombings by DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman Le Trang on July 4. Interestingly, however, the NCNA version of the Le Trang statement omitted all references to civilian casualties as a result of the first Nam Dinh strike while the Vietnam News Agency text of the interview reported 11 killed and over 60 wounded.

In a July 5 People's Daily editorial (carried only in abbreviated form in NCNA) the Chicoms appeared more intent on maintaining a posture of confident optimism than on playing up DRV claims that this was "a highly dangerous step forward in the US Government's war of 'escalation' against the DRV." Although the editorial identified Nam Dinh as the third largest city in the DRV and accused the US of "slaughtering civilians and destroying material wealth," its major thrust was the view that further US "escalation" will not bring a way out, but will only cause the US to "sink lower in the quagmire in Vietnam."

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Comment: Peiping's line on new US air strikes continues to be that the raids will only heighten the determination to resist on the part of the "Vietnamese people," who are said "not to be afraid to die;" the implication thus is that the Chicoms themselves need not play a role in the situation as it now stands. (ConGen Tels 09 and 21) (Confidential)

2. Sino-Soviet Relations: Peiping Girds for Future Battles

With several international congresses in the offing, Peiping has carried on a rather extensive sniping attack this week on the Soviet Union's "splittist" tactics. The most strident and direct of the attacks came in a July 2 statement issued by the All China Youth Federation denouncing a June 25 resolution by the permanent commission of the International Preparatory Committee of the Ninth World Festival of Youth and Students which called for a change of venue of the Ninth World Festival, originally scheduled for Algiers. This proposal, the statement charged, was a "serious step taken by the Soviet delegates to split the international youth and students movement." The statement attacked the proposal for interfering in the internal affairs of Algeria, an act which was "particularly vile" since it "brushed aside" the host country. The general assembly of the festival's preparatory committee will meet in Helsinki on July 8 and should produce some further fireworks.

NCNA July 4 carried two lengthy reports of a June 22 attack by the Japanese Communist Party in its party organ, Akahata. The JCP accused the CPSU of meddling in its internal affairs, suppressing its publications in the Soviet Union and attempting to sabotage the JCP controlled Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs by setting up the rival National Council for Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. The articles were an extensive catalog of grievances by the JCP against the CPSU.

Comment: With the World Youth Festival preparatory meeting about to convene and the World Congress of Peace, National Independence and General Disarmament scheduled to open in Helsinki July 10, we expect that the current indirect attacks on the Soviets will be followed up by stronger, more authoritative blasts against Soviet manipulation and splittist activities.

3. A-A Conference Aftermath: Heads High, Men

Peiping press coverage of events concerning the postponed Algiers Conference fell off considerably after June 29's spate of

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

rationalizations (WEEKA 26). NCNA carried without comment the rather bland communique issued by Chou En-lai, Nasser, Sukarno and Ayub Khan after the completion of their talks in Cairo. The communique gravely claimed that the postponement was "not a set-back to Afro-Asian solidarity." Chou left for home on June 30 after delivering a farewell speech at the Cairo airport which was noteworthy only for Chou's announcement that the CPR looked forward to a visit from UAR leaders "in the near future." Bolstering its own arguments along the same line, NCNA also reported Indonesian and Algerian statements to the effect that the conference would be strengthened by its postponement.

An article in the June 25th issue of Peking Review provided some comic relief this week, conjuring up images of red-faced editors solemnly eating their words. Printed only a day before the Algiers postponement, the article reiterates Chicom support for the holding of the conference on schedule and concludes with the optimistic claim that "The detractors and saboteurs of the imperialist camp can only fret and fume as the people of Asia and Africa applaud the triumphal opening of the conference they have waited for so long."

Comment: The Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao's correspondent in Algiers chose to entitle his wrap-up article "Goodbye Algiers!" He may be more prophetic than he realizes. (Unclassified)

4. Diplomatic Notes

A. Ceylonese Ambassador Leaves - Stephen Frederick de Silva, Ceylon's Ambassador to Peiping, left for home July 3 after being recalled for reassignment. (Unclassified.) On his way through Hong Kong de Silva told us that the main impression he had gathered from several years service in China was the enormous extent to which traditional and material values still motivate ordinary Chinese life. Marxist-Leninist values control only a narrow stratum at the top of Chinese Communist society. (Confidential)

B. New Chicom Ambassador to Afghanistan - NCNA reported on July 1 that Chen Feng had been appointed Ambassador to Afghanistan, replacing Hao Ting. Although Chen's background seems to be primarily in Party affairs, he has also participated in the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association and in the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. (Unclassified)

C. Two "People's Diplomacy" Groups Reorganized - NCNA announced June 30 that changes had been made in the organization

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

and leading membership of the China Peace Committee and the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity. Although the chairmen of both groups remain the same (Kuo Mo-jo and Liao Cheng-chih, respectively), each group has expanded the number of its Vice-Chairmen from 4 to 18. (Unclassified)

Comment: The changes in the two front groups have resulted in a significant infusion of new blood for both. Eleven of the eighteen new Vice-Chairmen of the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity have been drawn from outside the listed membership of the old organization, whereas seven of the China Peace Committee Vice-Chairmen are also previously unlisted. A spot check of some of the new members shows that they have considerable experience in "people-to-people" diplomacy suggesting that the new positions are functional rather than honorific. Perhaps also in a move to extract tired blood, PAO Erh-han was removed as a Vice-Chairman from both groups and LI Te-chuan from the Afro-Asian group. (Limited Official Use)

Internal

5. Foochow Draftsman Reports "Four Clearances" Temporarily Damped

A former draftsman and low-level cadre in the Foochow municipal construction bureau who arrived in Hong Kong recently reported through an intermediary that a few weeks ago, a high level cadre from the central government in Peiping had arrived in Foochow by airplane to relay confidential orders for a "temporary easing" (2548 4883) of the "four clearances" campaign against cadre corruption. The draftsman said that the Party had been alarmed by the number of cadres implicated in the campaign who had committed suicide ("twenty or more" in the Foochow area), and felt that the tough drive could be detrimental to the national unity required during a time of growing international tension over Vietnam. As a result of the Party official's call, all "four clearance" activity in the Foochow area had come to a standstill. The draftsman felt sure, however, that the damper (which he believed to be nationwide) was only temporary and would be removed after a time.

Comment: While this unevaluated report, the first of its sort we have seen, is believable, one should note that in past years political activity has always fallen off markedly during the summer as agricultural production becomes Peiping's seasonal preoccupation.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Still, the special circumstances surrounding notification of the "easement" suggests that the action, if taken, may have been for special reasons beyond the scope of purely seasonal considerations.

6. Overseas Chinese Have Become "Four Clearance" Target

The same source (Item 5) related that Overseas Chinese in the Foochow area were coming under increased pressure in the anti-corruption drive. The authorities were demanding inventories of the possessions of conspicuously well-off Overseas Chinese families and then comparing these lists with customs declarations the families had made over the past years for the importation of luxury items (radios, watches, binoculars, etc.). Missing items which the families could not account for were presumed to have been sold illegally, and heavy fines levied accordingly.

Comment: The dilemna of how to rectify and isolate the capitalist tendencies of Overseas Chinese without jeopardizing the inflow of vital remittances and investment capital from abroad has always plagued the regime. Its policies toward them have consequently varied widely between strictness and permissiveness. The above report, backed by others we have seen this year (WEEKA 5) indicates that the needle is swinging toward a stricter approach, which coincides with the current stress on "deeper and broader" socialist education. (Confidential)

7. Another Film on National Capitalists Under Fire

"City Without Night," a movie which traces the career of a Shanghai capitalist from pre-war days to the transformation of his firm into a public/private joint enterprise under the Communists has been attacked in the Ta Kung Pao, Kuang Ming Jih Pao, Kung Jen Jih Pao and the Chung Kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao since June 6. On June 30, the People's Daily took up the cudgels in a series of articles that marked the film as the regimes latest "poisonous weed" in the current campaign to rectify intellectual circles.

The film was written in 1957 by K'o Ling, a CPPCC member from Shanghai who has been active in film and literary circles since 1949. He is charged with the same crime as Hsia Yen, the former Vice Minister of Culture who wrote the script for "The Shop of the Lin Family" (based on the Mao Tun novel; WEEKA 24), i.e., beautifying and defending the capitalists, depicting the workers as weaklings, and failing to stress the irreconcileability between workers and capitalists. (Unclassified)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Comment: The fact that the last two "negative examples" presented to the Chinese public have been works accused of sympathy for the national capitalists may have a significance beyond the realm of intellectual rectification. The criticisms may presage a further crackdown on the national capitalists themselves, adding fuel to the ever-present rumors that the dividend agreement between the national capitalists and the government, which expires this year, may not be renewed. (Limited Official Use)

8. Li Ta-chang Back in Szechwan; New First Secretary Appears in Kweichow

Li Ta-chang, who was sighted in February as First Secretary of the Kweichow Province Party Committee (WEEKA 6), was back in Szechwan last week attending a militia rally listed under his old titles; Secretary of the South-west Bureau, Secretary of the Szechwan Provincial CCP Committee, and Governor of the province. (Radio Chengtu June 28, 1330 GMT.) Filling the post Li vacated is Chia Chi-yun, whom Li took with him to Kweichow from Szechwan at the time of the February shake-up (Radio Kweiyang, February 2, 1330 and 2310 GMT). Chia was among officials who attended modern opera performances in Kweiyang on July 7 (Radio Kweiyang, July 7, 1350 GMT) and was cited as being Kweichow First Secretary. (Unclassified)

Comment: It sounds as if Li Ta-chang was on some sort of trouble shooting mission in Kweichow, reminiscent of Anhwei First Secretary Tseng Hsi-sheng's brief sojourn as Shantung First Secretary after the former Shantung First Secretary Shu Tung was dismissed in late 1960 for bungling Shantung's agricultural program. Former Kweichow First Secretary Chou Lin has not been seen since December 1964. All the to-ing and fro-ing between Szechwan and Kweichow, as well as the reorganization of the Kweichow Party Committee suggests that there is, or was, something rotten in that province. Would that we knew precisely what. (Limited Official Use)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCHED

	BAMAKO	CANBERRA	KARACHI	PARIS	SOFIA	WARSAW	113AFMANILA
(2)	BANGKOK	CPACPLAD	KATHMANDU	PRAGUE	S'PORE	COMNAVPHL	
	BELGRADE	DAR'SALM	MANILA	RANGOON	(4)TAIPEI	500MIGF	
	BLANTYRE	DJAKARTA	MOSCOW	ROME	TOKYO	TAIWANDEFCOM	
	BUCHARESTGENEVA		MUNICH	SAIGON	VIENNA	5AFJAPAN	
	BUDAPEST	LONDON	NDELHI	SEOUL	VNTIANE	7FLTTOKYO	

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ORIGIN/ACTION

INR-10

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR 5	FE 6
NEA	CU 5	INR
E	P	IO 2
L	FBO	AID 12
PC 2	S/IL 1	RS/R 1
AGR 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 10
OSD 41	USIA 11	NSA 3
NSC 6	NASA 4	HEW 1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 Chicom

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AC-7/3 · INR

A-1 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

1965 JUL 5 AM 8 42

INFO: See last page for distribution

DISTRIBUTION

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: July 2, 1965

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 26

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. Regime Urges Balance Between Work and Leisure
2. T'ao Chu Elaborates on "Second Flying Leap"

External

3. Afro-Asian Conference: Smiling Through the Tears
4. Vietnam: Door Slammed on Peace Mission - No Comments on New Air Strikes
5. United Nations: Peiping Again Demands "Thorough Reorganization"
6. Taiwan: Anniversary of "Occupation" Noted: Question Linked with Asian Struggle.
7. Japan-Korea: CPR Declares it will "Never Recognize Japan-ROK Treaty

Military

Negative

Outer Mongolia

Negative

1965 JUL 6 AM 9 31

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GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12 year intervals, not automatically declassified

CONFIDENTIAL

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:NPratt/DAnderson/JThomas:drb,6/30/65

Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Regime Urges Balance Between Work and Leisure

The People's Daily lead editorial of June 21, "Link Labor and Leisure," advocated that workers in socialist enterprises be guaranteed eight hours sleep and adequate free leisure time, and attacked as "well-fed, self-seeking bureaucratism" the practice of scheduling at random long hours of "voluntary" unpaid overtime. The current production upsurge, the editorial continued, can only be maintained by carefully nurturing the enthusiasm of the masses and developing their full labor potential during regular working hours.

The same also goes for politics. The editorial charged that the efficiency and revolutionary zeal of employees in many enterprises suffers because their leisure hours are loaded "up to the neck" with "movements that drag on for hours." Political activities, while essential, must be few and to the point. Their effectiveness should be judged by how well the workers understand and implement the spirit of the political documents under study, rather than by the number of study meetings held or hours of discussion engaged in.

Furthermore, continued this amazingly sane directive, "no one should be forced to take part in any collective, cultural, recreational, or athletic activities." On the contrary, workers should be permitted to choose leisure activities according to their wishes and family circumstances, "in order to promote physical and mental health." Cadres, many of whom are "going around in circles" with the pressure of work, should ease off too, and devote more of their time to investigation and cool appraisal of their work. Superior organizations should avoid "creating trouble" for subordinate enterprises by scheduling extra missions, reports and conferences. "We must not launch large scale mass movements, hold rallies, make reports, or engage in plenary discussions for everything." The enterprises should be given authority to handle matters flexibly. (Unclassified)

Comment: During the past year, evidence of restraint and practicality in running the economy has provided a low-keyed but audible background accompaniment for the shouting over "upsurges" and "flying leaps." However, the emergence of such a strong note of sanity on the front page of the People's Daily is extraordinary, and may mean that the more moderate, pragmatic administrators in

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Peiping have won a significant round in their running battle with the ideologues. More explicitly, the editorial indicates that strong efforts will be made to avoid the psychological and physiological excesses of the Great Leap Forward, memories of which no doubt still haunt at least some members of the leadership. (See also WER 26.) (Limited Official Use)

2. T'ao Chu Elaborates on "Second Flying Leap"

Two days after the People's Daily expounded on the relationship between labor and leisure, Central-South Bureau First Secretary and Vice Premier T'ao Chu addressed the Kwangtung Congress of Poor and Lower Middle Peasants (PLMP) and Representatives of Progressive Agricultural Units in Canton (Radio Canton, June 23, 1965, 11:00GMT). He told them that the test phase of the socialist education campaign would soon be over, and would move from "trial-point counties" to other counties and suburban districts in the province. He urged the delegates to perform a "backbone" role in this great campaign to reorganize and re-educate class ranks along lines better suited to the commune system.

Relating the goals of the campaign to his recent basic level experience at Hsinho Brigade (WEEKA 24) T'ao described the next "leap" as a phenomenon that would occur in the foreseeable future. "In a few years," after all brigades in Kwangtung had, like Hsinho, strenghtened their Party branches, YCL organizations, PLMP associations, and militia units, an accomplishment which would enable them to solve their basic agricultural problems (water conservation, irrigation, green fertilizer production, etc.), then "the whole province will change qualitatively. . . and the second revolutionary flying leap will appear."

T'ao then frankly described the Kwangtung countryside as a place where there still existed uneducated children, illiterate peasants, inadequate medical facilities, supersition, and a lack of films and newspapers. He urged a "big march to the countryside" by culture, education, science, public health, and art workers, and advocated that every brigade establish a culture center, a communism evening school, and a complete primary school. Every commune must set up a health clinic (with beds for in-patients), a scientific experiment center, a livestock center, and a film and slide-show publicity squad. Who would staff these new rural orgnizations? "The county offices now have too many

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

cadres, not too few," and the surplus manpower could be transferred to the basic level, T'ao ventured.

Comment: T'ao's detailed, authoritative statement confirms many past patterns of conjecture concerning the regime's views on rural areas: the piecemeal approach to socialist education; PLMPs as the institutional agent of socialist education in the countryside; and even more basicly, the essentially backward state of rural South China even after years of "progress." He also lends weight to the impression that, whatever "leap" the regime has planned, it will probably be a comparatively gradual effort, based on reasonably thorough political and economic ground work, and carried out in the rational spirit that marks the "Link Labor and Leisure" editorial. (See Item 1.) (Limited Official Use)

External

3. A-A Conference: Smiling Through the Tears

After more than a year of preparatory meetings, high level consultations, and endless pronouncements on the historical significance of the Second Afro-Asian Conference, Communist China on June 26 tersely announced that the conference had been postponed until November 5, 1965.

Peiping then pondered the shambles of Afro-Asian "unity" for three days, following which it issued its rationalization in the form of a June 29 People's Daily editorial entitled hopefully, "Make Continued Efforts for the Success of the Second Afro-Asian Conference." In what may be an historic admission of defeat, Peiping acknowledged the obvious fact that "we and many other countries had hoped that the conference would take place as scheduled." The thrust of this editorial and of a Hsinhua article carried the same day appeared aimed at ensuring that the postponement is only that, and nothing more. The editorial thus claimed that the standing preparatory committee for the conference "only changed the date for the opening of the conference." Decisions reached at the Djakarta preparatory conference in April, 1964, and the site of the conference at Algiers thus remain unchanged. What Peiping fears was indicated by the Hsinhua article, which charged that the Indian Government had proposed a "recess" and the formation of a "provisional committee;" this, said the article, would supersede the standing committee and "practically write off all the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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decisions taken at the meeting held in Djakarta in 1964."

With rather painful logic, the editorial claimed that imperialism and its agents had hoped to sabotage the conference and "scuttle it altogether" using the June 19 Algerian Coup as a pretext. Thus, the decision to postpone the conference became "a telling blow" to imperialism. U.S. "imperialists" it concluded, will not escape the "just indictment and condemnation of the Afro-Asian peoples." (Unclassified)

Comment: Peiping's tortured explanation of the events leading to the postponement are confirmation of reports of last ditch arm twisting by the Chinese in an effort to ram the conference through on schedule. Having lost the battle, however, they are obviously turning their thoughts to November and are eager to preserve both the location (to show that A-A "unity" is unimpaired) and the machinery (which they feel they can control). If Tanzanian President Nyerere's reaction to Peiping's ham handed tactics (London's 6225 to Dept) is any indication, however, time may not be working in the Chicom's favor. (Confidential)

4. Vietnam: Door Slammed on Peace Mission - No Comment on New Air Strikes

Having given previous warning of its stance in a June 21 People's Daily "Observer" article (WEEKA 25), Peiping this week "slammed the door" on the Commonwealth Peace Mission headed by British Prime Minister Wilson. In a June 25 Foreign Ministry note delivered to the British Charge d'Affaires Ad Interim, the CPR rejected the visit, accusing the UK of "siding with the US aggressors against the Vietnamese people." Somewhat defensively, the note argued that, "by exploiting the opportunity provided by the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, the British Government is actually appropriating the name of the Commonwealth to launch a new 'peace talks' plot." The only solution to the Vietnam question, concluded the note, was for the US to "stop its aggression," withdraw all its forces from South Vietnam and let the Vietnamese people settle their own affairs.

What Peiping thus far has left unsaid on Vietnam, however, is perhaps more interesting than its pronouncements. On June 26 the Vietnam New Agency reported that a US jet had been shot down over Hanoi. On the following day VNA carried the full text of a

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

DRV Foreign Ministry statement on US "war escalation," which charged that US planes on June 25 and 26 had, "on many occasions, intruded into the air space over the vicinity of Hanoi." The People's Daily June 28 frontpaged the DRV Foreign Ministry statement, but thus far has made no comment on what Hanoi has termed "an extremely dangerous new step in the US Government's 'escalation' against the DRV."

Comment: While Peiping may yet issue a statement on the new US air strikes north of Hanoi and the allegation that US jets have entered the area of Hanoi itself, the reaction has been somewhat slow in coming, suggesting that the Chicoms may wish to consider carefully any new escalation in their war of words. (Unclassified)

5. United Nations: Peiping Again Demands "Thorough Reorganization"

In a June 26 People's Daily editorial, Peiping observed the 20th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations in characteristic fashion by denouncing it as "a tool of US imperialism" and by demanding its thorough reorganization.

The editorial, which was largely a rehash of previously made charges of US domination, was noteworthy for its strident attack on the Soviets. The "Khrushchev revisionists" were accused of having "deliberately been trying to cover up the truth" about the UN because they want it to be "a center for political transactions between the Soviet Union and the US and a tool for paving the way for Soviet-US cooperation to dominate the world."

In these circumstances, claimed the editorial, the UN has gone from bad to worse, and "first aid will certainly not do. What it requires is adequate clinical treatment - a thorough reorganization." (Unclassified)

Comment: Although the editorial did not contain earlier threats to seek a "rival, revolutionary UN," we suspect Peiping's view of "adequate clinical treatment" does not fall far short of that. Peiping's intent, however expressed, is a United Nations devoted to "anti-imperialist" objectives and controlled by the Afro-Asian states, of which it would be the leading member. (Unclassified)

6. Taiwan: Anniversary of "Occupation" Noted; Question Linked With Asian Struggle

For the first time in recent years, Peiping marked June 27 as the anniversary of the US "armed occupation of Taiwan (day on

DECLASSIFIED
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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

which President Truman sent the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait). The observance centered on a rally of 30,000 militiamen in Peiping and smaller scale activities in numerous other cities.

In contrast to Peiping's usual treatment of the Taiwan question as a purely internal matter, both the People's Daily, in an editorial dated June 27, and the local Communist Wen Wei Pao treated the observance in a broader Asian context. The People's Daily editorial charged that the US was "pressing the Chiang Kai-shek gang to carry out harassing activities in Southeast Asia and to supply the US with cannon fodder for the escalation of its aggressive war in South Vietnam." The editorial went on to say that such a strategy of "escalation" in Vietnam is "directed against China and the entire Socialist camp," and reiterated the threat, not heard too often recently, that "aggression against Vietnam means aggression against China."

The Wen Wei Pao article described the speakers at the Peiping rally as calling for various preparations such as increased production and military training so that the nation could be ready to respond "at any time" to the "Motherland's call to exert effort to liberate Taiwan, support the Vietnamese people's anti-US patriotic struggle, and defeat the American imperialists." (Unclassified)

Comment: The marking of this heretofore unobserved anniversary strikes us as indicating Peiping's desire to keep up a full head of steam against the US both in international and domestic affairs. A particular object may have been to divert domestic attention away from the Chicom set-back at Algiers. As in previous anti-US outbursts over Taiwan, the purpose of the exercise appears to be political and psychological rather than having any offensive military connotations as regards Taiwan. (ConGenTel 1960) (Limited Official Use)

7. Japan-Korea: CPR Declares it will "Never Recognize" Japan-ROK Treaty

The signing on June 22 of the ROK-Japan Basic Treaty inevitably produced a vitriolic denunciation from Peiping in the form of a June 26 government statement. Terming the treaty a "grave step taken by US imperialism in its attempt to perpetuate the division

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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of Korea and its occupation of South Korea and to enlist Japan and the Pak Jung Hui clique in the service of its policies of aggression and war," the statement declared that the CPR "will never recognize" the treaty. The government statement again raise the cry against a "Northeast Asia Military Alliance" embracing Japan, South Korea and the GRC, and claimed that the US is attempting to bring this "alliance" into the SEATO organization, thus bring "all its lackeys in Asia into a unified military system of aggression."

Comment: Peiping's call for "struggle" against the ROK-Japan talks and this denunciation of their successful conclusion can be regarded as the required finale to what Peiping has known for some time to be a futile effort. We feel, however, that behind the propaganda there may be at least some genuine concern over the possibility of some form of Northeast Asian anti-Communist alliance, which would work to Peiping's disadvantage. At the minimum, a more stable Japanese-ROK relationship cannot but be distasteful to Peiping, and we can anticipate continued Chicom efforts to stir up trouble, particularly in Japan. (Unclassified)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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	BAMAKO	CANBERRA	KATHMANDU	PRAGUE	(4)TAIPEI	500MIGF
(2)	BANGKOK	CPACPLAD	KLUMPUR	RANGOON	TOKYO	TAIWANDEFCOM
	BELGRADE	DARESSALAAM	MANILA	ROME	VIENNA	5AFJAPAN
	BLANTYRE	DJAKARTA	MOSCOW	SAIGON	VIENNA	7FLTTOKYO
	BUCHAREST	GENEVA	MUNICH	SEOUL	VNTIANE	12AFMANILA
	BUDAPEST	LONDON	NDELHI	SOFIA	WEL'GTON	
		KARACHI	PARIS	S'PORE	COMNAVPHL	

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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ORIGIN / ACTION
INR-10

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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSD	USIA	NSA
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HEW	NASA	NSC
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-7 CHICOM

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A-873 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | 1965 JUN 23 AM 8 01 | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO: See last page for distribution

RSJR-Hockman-1

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG DATE: June 25, 1965

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 25

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Peiping Pledges to Respond to "Call of Vietnamese People" - Attacks Commonwealth Peace Mission.
2. Afro-Asian Conference: Delegation Appointed; NLF Supported; Algerian Coup
3. Sino-Soviet Relations: Peiping Attacks Soviet Bid for Participation at Algiers
4. Japan-Korea: Japanese "Militarism" Again Scored

Internal

5. Indian Diplomat Describes Vietnam Attitudes and Northeast Diplomatic Tour
6. Establishment of Farmwork-Study Schools Brings Significant Increase in Kiangsi and Hunan School Attendance
7. What is an Administrative Village?

MILITARY

Negative

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically CONFIDENTIAL declassified.

1965 JUN 23 AM 9 54

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL:NPratt/DAnderson/GMetson/JThomas; drb,6/24/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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1. Vietnam: Peiping Pledges to Respond to "Call of Vietnamese People" - Attacks Commonwealth Peace Mission

The United States' steadily increasing military commitment in Vietnam coupled with mounting international pressure for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict brought new and more vitriolic responses from Peiping this week. 1) In a Foreign Ministry statement issued June 18 the CPR charged that the US had decided to widen the scope of its troops' direct participation in the war. . . . gradually replacing the puppet troops." This action, it was claimed, required all countries and peoples cherishing freedom and peace to support the "Vietnamese people" including the dispatch of volunteers. 2) The proposed Commonwealth peace mission brought a scathing attack on June 21 from People's Daily "Observer" who described the plan as the "action of a nitwit making trouble for himself." 3) The introduction by the US of B-52 heavy bombers into the conflict in South Vietnam was scoffed at in a June 19 People's Daily "Commentator" article pronouncing US air power a "paper tiger punctured long ago."

A. Peiping Pledges to Send Volunteers - The June 18 CPR Foreign Ministry statement, which was in response to the National Liberation Front's declaration that it had the right to call on "troops of the DRV and friendly countries," came as a more sharply worded and more authoritative follow-up to Peiping's initial response carried in a June 11 People's Daily editorial (Weeka 24). The Foreign Ministry statement was couched in more specific terms than the People's Daily editorial, stressing the claim that the Chinese had provided assistance "to the best of our capacity" and will continue doing so, and declaring: "we have made all preparations, and when we receive the call of the Vietnamese people, we will promptly send our volunteers to Vietnam, to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnamese armed forces and people until the US aggressors are driven out of Vietnam." However, no new Chinese Communist commitment was assumed by the statement and Peiping's intervention remained conditional on the "call of the Vietnamese people."

Although the statement repeated previous boasts of "victories of the people's armed forces" and confidently predicted that "the higher the US climbs in escalating the war, the harder will be its fall," it also struck a somewhat fatalistic note (reflecting, we believe, a sober appraisal of US determination), adding that "if the US intends to fight to the end, we will support the Vietnamese people in hitting back to the end."

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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B. Commonwealth Peace Mission Rejected - On June 21 People's Daily "Observer" described the Commonwealth peace mission proposal as a maneuver of the British Labor Government to "serve the needs of US imperialism" and an act of a "nitwit" which was "strongly opposed" by some members of the Commonwealth Conference. Scornfully, "Observer" dismissed as "fantastic" the idea that the British Commonwealth label will make the formula difficult to refuse, and peremptorily reminded the UK that "China has already banged the door in Gordon-Walker's face." Should the Labor Government care to have "another try," said the article, the door will be slammed again.

C. US Air Power Dismissed as "Paper Tiger" - Citing the Korean War as an example of the failure of US air power to affect the outcome of a "people's war," People's Daily "Commentator" argued that "no revolutionary people . . . . can be scared by bombing, however massive it may be." Claiming that the US bombings had failed to bring about unconditional discussions and that US troop reinforcements in South Vietnam had "failed to reverse the tide," "Commentator" crowed that the US "in desperation" had again turned to its "long discredited" air superiority. The Vietnamese people's reply, concluded the article, is "fight on and fight to the end." (Confidential) (ConGenTels 1921, 1928, and 1935)

2. Afro-Asian Conference: Delegation Appointed; NLF Supported; Algerian Coup

1. Liu Appoints Delegation. On June 18 NCNA reported that Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i had named Premier Chou En-lai head of the Chicom delegation to Bandung II. Foreign Minister Chen Yi was appointed deputy head of the delegation, which includes several members of the CPR Foreign Ministry dealing with Afro-Asian affairs, the deputy director of NCNA and several Chicom Ambassadors to African nations. Liao Ch'eng-chih, Chairman of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of China, is listed as chief adviser to the delegation.

A portion of the delegation headed by Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yi left Peiping for Cairo June 19, where Chou held several days of discussion with President Nasser. (Unclassified)

2. NLF Supported as "Sole Representative" of South Vietnam. Reaffirming Peiping's support for the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, People's Daily issued an editorial June 20 backing the Front's participation in the Algiers Conference "as the sole and genuine representative of South Vietnam." The editorial contended that "great changes" had taken place in Vietnam since 1955

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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(when the Saigon Government was represented at Bandung) and that the Saigon Government had "long been repudiated by the South Vietnamese people." As support for this argument the editorial produced some typically misleading figures, claiming that the Front had "established contacts with organizations or governments of 44 countries," and "a total of 449 political parties of popular organizations in 92 countries have expressed their sympathy with and support for the statement issued by the Front on March 22." (Unclassified)

3. Algerian Coup: New Government Receives CPR Support. While hesitating to extend formal recognition, Peiping moved quickly to express its support for the new Algerian Government which overthrew President Ben Bella on June 19. NCNA reports for June 19 described the coup factually and included the text of the announcement of the overthrow issued by strongman Houri Boumedienne. On June 20 NCNA announced that Boumedienne had received CPR ambassador Tseng Tao, who conveyed Peiping's support for the new regime. The report added that Tseng had also expressed China's support for the convening of the A-A Conference at the scheduled time. (Unclassified)

Comment: Peiping's quick support for the new regime indicates its concern that nothing should stand in the way of the speedy holding of the Algiers Conference. We suspect that the Chicoms must be distressed lest the Commonwealth nations' appeal for a postponement upset their carefully laid plans. (Confidential)

3. Sino-Soviet Relations: Peiping Rejects Soviet Participation at Algiers

In a carefully worded June 18 People's Daily "Observer" article, Peiping moved to check Soviet efforts to attend the Second Afro-Asian Conference by reaffirming the argument that the USSR is not and never was an Asian country. While the virulent context of the attack clearly linked it to the Sino-Soviet dispute, the editorial piously maintained that its position was a matter of "principle" and in no way related to the polemics. "Observer" rejected all Soviet claims for participation in the conference and stated that the question was one in which the CPR would not compromise, regardless of the effects on Bandung II (ConGenTel 1920). "Observer" strongly criticized the USSR for allegedly threatening to "retaliate" against those who failed to support Soviet participation and described Soviet attempts to enter the conference as placing a "time bomb" on the convening of the meeting.

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Comment: The fact that the Chicoms felt it necessary to carry into the open the fight against Soviet participation indicates Peiping's concern that the Soviets may be gaining ground on this issue. However, this open threat to wreak the conference over this issue may backfire. An Indian diplomat stationed in Peiping has informed us that Subandrio's trip to Canton in May was for the purpose of discussing tactics on the admission of Malaysia and the USSR. In response to Chou En-lai's demand that Indonesia not withdraw from the conference should Malaysia be admitted, Subandrio was alleged to have made the same request regarding the USSR's participation. (Confidential)

4. Japan-Korea: Japanese "Militarism" Again Scored

In a June 19 People's Daily editorial, Peiping again denounced the Japan-ROK talks, ascribing them to US desires to "rig up a Northeast Asia military bloc to serve as a prop to the shaky Southeast Asia military situation," and to Japanese dreams of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The editorial contained the usual exhortations to the peoples of Asia to "fight to the end" to defeat the talks, and in one of the bluntest statements on the subject we have seen thus far, it charged that the revelation of "Operation Three Arrows" (Weekas No. 8 and 7) had disclosed Japanese "militarists'" plans to "re-invade not only Korea but also China."

Comment: Peiping has contented itself with low-key needling of the Sato Government since the last spate of attacks in late February and early March. The June 19 editorial, however, indicates that Chinese displeasure over a Japan-ROK rapprochement remains as strong as ever. (Unclassified)

Internal

5. Indian Diplomat Describes Vietnam Attitudes and Northeast Diplomatic Tour

In the course of a recent conversation with Consulate General Officers, Second Secretary of the Indian Embassy in Peiping B. M. Oza made the following observations:

A. Internal Attitudes Toward Vietnam - Residents' committee political cadres are defining each action taken by the United States in Vietnam as being "one step closer to war with China," requiring a commensurate increase in the preparedness of the Chinese

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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population. Oza felt that street level study committee participants are buying this line.

B. The Northeast Diplomatic Tour - The spring diplomatic tour to the major Northeastern cities was lavishly prepared and scheduled so tightly that participants had little time to themselves. Inter-city travel was by special train and accomplished at night, allowing precious little view of the countryside. Oza was surprised at how much industrial capacity was still idle (in some factories 50%) and somewhat taken aback at the haphazard, unsafe construction of industrial buildings, which compared unfavorably with Indian standards.

Taking advantage of the afternoon nap period to visit bookstores in the cities he toured, Oza was interested to discover that purchase of publications was not restricted, as in Peiping. Furthermore, with the exception of Mao's works, provincial bookshops totally lacked the political treatises, polemics, and translations of Khrushchev's writings that flood store shelves in the capital. Most titles he noticed dealt with technical, agricultural, and birth control subjects.

Oza concluded that despite the frustrations of minutely organized group touring, the diplomats were shown a great deal and were satisfied with the trip.

Comment: Oza's description of the tour gives the impression of a tighter control than was exercised during last fall's diplomatic trip to county centers in Canton Province (Weeka 49, Dec. 4, 1964), a difference which may have been prompted by Peiping's sensitivity over the strategic importance of the industrial Northeast. (Confidential)

6. Establishment of Farmwork-Study Schools Brings Significant Increase Kiangsi and Hunan School Attendance

Radio Nanchang (9 June, 1100GMT) linked the expansion of Kiangsi's half farmwork-half study schools with the claimed increased percentage of children of school age attending school from 59% in 1963 to 75% in 1964; "in some counties" 90% of the children of poor and lower middle peasants are attending schools.

Radio Changsha (11 June, 1145GMT) reporting a provincial conference on half farmwork-half study schools, made the similar claim

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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that in Hunan 18% more children of school age have been attending school since Hunan started to run half farmwork-half study primary schools "on a big scale" in August 1964. The Hunan conference echoed the national conference of farm-study schools, which was held in March and April (first discussed in a May 30 People's Daily editorial) in calling for a broadening and deepening of the system, and the experimental establishment of technical schools and labor universities at state farms, forestry farms, livestock farms, and reclamation areas. (Unclassified)

Comment: The regime is obviously enthusiastic over the results to date of its program to expand educational opportunities while strengthening the ideologically desireable connection between study and labor. An Education Ministry official in a recent conversation with a Canadian correspondent even went so far as to prophesy that the entire Chinese educational system would be half-work half-study before two five year plans had elapsed. However, whether such expansive predictions will be borne out is far from certain, especially where technical schools are concerned. Indeed, the paucity of press lineage about half-factory work half-study schools in recent months suggests that these more complex counterparts to the half-farmwork half-study institutions may be having growing pains.

7. What is an Administrative Village?

NCNA Sian reported on June 2 that Communist Children's League organizations had been set up throughout Hsihsiang Hsien, Shensi, "with the administrative village (hsing cheng ts'un) as the unit."

Comment: This and other isolated mainland press references to "administrative villages" being used as the basis for youth organization activities have lead to speculation that a new organ of basic level government has been established in the countryside, a step which marks the final dismantling of the rural commune. While not at all clear as to the meaning of the new term, we would hesitate to erect such an enormous conjectural edifice on such a tiny mound of evidence. Until new references prove otherwise, we are inclined to define the administrative village as a functional unit established to enable small "natural villages" (tsz jan ts'un) to share political and possibly administrative services which their size would not

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Authority NND 939503
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justify on an individual basis. So far, such units would not appear to have any organic connection with production, either at the brigade or the team level.

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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(2)	BANGKOK	CPACPLAD	KLUMPUR	RANGOON	TOKYO	TAIWANDEFCOM
	BELGRADE	DARESSALAAM	MANILA	ROME	VIENNA	5AFJAPAN
	BLANTYRE	DJAKARTA	MOSCOW	SAIGON	VNTIANE	7FLTTOKYO
	BUCHAREST	GENEVA	MUNICH	SEOUL	WARSAW	13AFMANILA
	BUDAPEST	LONDON	NDELHI	SOFIA	WEL'GTON	
		KARACHI	PARIS	S'PORE	COMNAVPHL	

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ORIGIN ACTION

INR-10

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-856	CONFIDENTIAL	AIR POUCH
NO.		HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State 1965 JUN 21 AM 7 32

INFO: (See last page for distribution)

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: June 18, 1965

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 24

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Peiping Warns on Direct Use of US Combat Troops
2. Sino-Soviet Relations - Peiping Shows Concern Over Soviet Tactics in Vietnam
3. Afro-Asia: Chou Returns; Chi Peng Fei Continues Trip

Internal

4. Peiping Counters Rumors of Mao's Ill Health with Recent Photos
5. T'ao Chu Predicts a "Second Revolutionary Flying Leap" in Countryside
6. Hu Yao-pang is First Secretary, Shensi Provincial CCP

MILITARY

Negative

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL: HIsham, DAnderson, GMetson, JThomas:drb, 6/17/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

1. Vietnam: Peiping Warns on Direct Use of US Combat Troops

After front-paging on the June 10 People's Daily the National Liberation Front's "warning" to the US that it "is entitled to call, when necessary, for volunteers. . . . if the US Government takes upon itself the right to order American troops to take part in the fighting in South Vietnam," Peiping the following day published a People's Daily editorial which declared that the "new US action" had "given China greater right to back up the Vietnamese people." The dissolution of the Quat Government and the return of power to the military was characterized by Peiping as a new "coup," while Chicom press media, relying heavily on western news agency reports, hammered away at the dual themes of Washington's "gloom" and the ever greater Viet Cong "victories." Finally, as if to remind the West of its stand on "unconditional discussions," a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman issued a statement on June 11 denouncing the June 3 British White Paper on an international conference on Cambodia as "a new trap of 'peace negotiations'."

A. "Direct Combat Action by US Troops" Scored - The NLF's warning that, should US troops take a direct part in the Vietnam war, it would be entitled, when necessary, to call for "volunteers from the armies of North Vietnam and of friendly countries to go south to oppose US aggression," drew a prompt but fairly indefinite pledge of support from Peiping. The June 11 People's Daily editorial, like the June 1 "observer" article (WEEKA), charged that the recent increase in US troop strength was "open preparation for a Korea-type, localized war" and had "given the lie" to US claims that the mission of those forces was to safeguard US installations. The Johnson Administration had realized, the editorial claimed, that the South Vietnamese "puppet" troops were "no good" and had thus been forced to "use Americans to fight South Vietnamese." However, the editorial scoffed, "Americans are even more chicken-hearted, more afraid to die, than the South Vietnamese puppet soldiers." The editorial concluded that this "new US action has given North Vietnam greater right to support the South in every way, given China greater right to back up the Vietnamese people, and given greater right to all friendly countries to dispatch volunteers at any time, as the South Vietnam National Liberation Front requires, to join in the fighting against US imperialism."

B. Saigon "Coup" Derided - Peiping press, noting the Quat Government's handover of power to the military, described the event as "the twelfth coup in the last 18 months." In a June 13 article, People's Daily "Commentator" chortled that the Quat Government had been described recently by Defense Secretary McNamara as the most

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

stable in recent years, and asked, "where is this 'most stable' government now?" US desires to preserve an independent South Vietnam were scoffed at with the charge that the GVN is "just a pack of dogs which cannot live in peace even for a single day without the crack of the whip of their master, Maxwell Taylor."

C. US Alleged to be Approaching "Total Collapse" in Face of Viet Cong Victories - Throughout Peiping's press coverage of the war in Vietnam this week has run the theme of US "political isolation" and the imminent "total collapse of its efforts." US and West European news agency reports as well as grossly exaggerated claims by the South Vietnam Liberation Press Agency were utilized to draw a picture of US/GVN forces more and more confined to control only of Saigon and a few major cities and bases along the coast. On June 15 People's Daily carried excerpts from St. Louis Post Dispatch Correspondent Richard Dudman under the heading "US Defeat is Foregone Conclusion."

D. British White Paper Attacked as "Nauseatingly Hypocritical" - In a June 11 Foreign Ministry statement, Peiping attacked the Labor Government's position on Indo-China as a whole and specifically denounced its proposals for an international conference on Cambodia as "a bait for continuing to induce the Vietnamese people to surrender." This "change of heart" by the British was laid to "the fact that Johnson's peace hoax has suffered one setback after another," requiring London to "render more service to US imperialism." The Labor Government's "clumsy trick" of pointing out Cambodia and China's switch concerning the representative for South Vietnam was answered by arguing that, if conditions had changed permitting the British to accept the conference, then conditions in South Vietnam too had changed and the NLF now "politically represents the will and wishes of all the South Vietnamese people" while "the Saigon puppets have become mere toys in the pocket of the US Government."

Comment: The June 11 People's Daily editorial does not seem to us to be so grave a warning as the June 1 "Observer" article; nevertheless it does represent another step in the escalation of warnings coming out of Peiping in response to the deepening of the actual US commitment. The current stress, however, on SVN "Liberation Army" victories and the fact that offers of assistance are still modified by the phrase "if necessary" tends to indicate that Peiping does not yet view the situation as requiring "friendly countries" to "dispatch volunteers" in the near future. (Confidential) (ConGenTel 1880)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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2. Sino-Soviet Relations - Peiping Shows Concern Over Soviet Tactics in Vietnam

In a new and significantly timed joint Red Flag - People's Daily article June 14, Peiping expressed its profound antagonism toward the post-Khrushchev Soviet leaders, describing them as practicing a "more covert, cunning, and dangerous brand of revisionism" than the "stupid and disreputable" Khrushchev. The article is a major new document in the increasingly bitter polemical war and is particularly significant as an indication of a) the corrosive effect of Vietnam developments on Sino-Soviet relations; b) Chinese Communist concern that "soft" Soviet tactics, particularly in pressing for unity among Communists over Vietnam, may have complicated Peiping's mission of combating the CPSU line both within the CCP and among parties abroad; c) Peiping's underlying apprehension over the possible impact of the new Soviet tactics on Hanoi's position.

On Vietnam, the article amplified previous Chicom charges made early in May that Soviet aid to Vietnam was designed to make political capital in order to bargain with the US and lead to peace talks. The article claimed that the Soviets, while making "gestures" of aid to Vietnam, "have divulged their aid plans to the Americans in advance" and have been busy in Washington, London and Paris trying to bring about peace negotiations in a "pain-staking effort to find a way out" for the US.

For the first time the article posed the question confronting the CCP today in terms of "whether to carry the struggle against Khrushchev revisionism through to the end or whether to stop half way." The article read as a rebuttal to those voices -- both within the CCP itself as well as in foreign CP's -- who may have advocated a conciliatory course for the CCP under the present complicated circumstances, arguing that the CCP must take "exactly opposite" tactics from those of the CPSU and must continue its "triumphant pursuit," not permitting the Soviets to "gain breathing space, recuperate, and accumulate capital for redoubled efforts in pushing revisionism." Although the Soviets, it is charged, are using every possible means to "blur the dividing line" between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism, the CCP must be able to deal with both tough and soft tactics, must "dare to resist all their pressure and must refuse to be misled by any of their fine words." The article makes a special effort, unusual in this throughly dogmatic series of polemics, to refute what it terms "unprincipled flexibility" which would create "ambiguity and confusion" on fundamental differences of principle between the CCP and the Khrushchev revisionists. "If we were to abandon our principled

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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stand and accommodate ourselves or yield to Khrushchev revisionists," declared the article, this would lead to a chain of evils, and would be a "grave historical mistake" for which the international proletariat "would never forgive us."

Comment: Without reading too much into this article, it appears to us in some respects to be a manifestation of the dialogue between Peiping and Hanoi over the extent to which the Soviets can be relied upon to support DRV interests. Much of the article seems designed to warn Hanoi against becoming too dependent on the USSR and to deflect any DRV suggestions that the anti-Soviet polemics do not help the common anti-US cause. Although the Chinese profess boundless confidence in their ultimate victory over the CPSU line and tactics, the fact that they still feel compelled to argue violently against this "bankrupt" deviation suggests a lurking apprehension that Hanoi, on the firing line, may not prove able under all circumstances to withstand the combined US-Soviet pressure toward a negotiated settlement on terms short of a US removal from South Vietnam. (Confidential) (ConGenTel 1898)

3. Afro-Asia: Chou Returns; Chi Peng Fei Continues Trip

Dashing speculation of an extended African tour prior to the Algiers Conference, Premier Chou En-lai returned to Peiping June 10 after his visits to Pakistan and Tanzania. On the way home Chou stopped over briefly in Cairo and Addis Ababa for talks with UAR and Ethiopian leaders.

On June 10 a People's Daily editorial assessed the results of Chou's trip to Tanzania. Describing Tanzania as "now a shining banner of national liberation in East Africa," the editorial claimed that Chou's visit had raised Sino-Tanzanian relations to a "new height." The editorial contended that the visit had strenghthened Afro-Asian solidarity and that the two countries had agreed to take steps to make the Algiers Conference a success.

Meanwhile, Chi Peng Fei, CPR Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs (WEEKA 22) continued his West African tour in an apparent attempt to secure more support for CPR positions at Algiers. In the Congo (B) Chi was received by President Massamba-Debat June 11 before departing June 13 for the Central African Republic. In Bangui, where Chi apparently was a self-invited guest, he received a rather cool reception and shortened his planned three day stay, returning to Brazzaville June 15. (Confidential)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Comment: An Indian diplomat based in Peiping cites East African diplomats as stating that Chou's itinerary was flexible and that he was prepared to accept invitations from Kenya, Uganda or other African states. A Kenyan diplomat in Peiping, however, told the source that his government was firmly opposed to receiving Chou at this time, and would have extended an invitation only under heavy pressure from the Chinese. (Confidential)

Internal

4. Peiping Counters Rumors of Mao's Ill Health with Recent Photos

As if in direct response to rumors of Mao's ill health, June 12 People's Daily and Hong Kong Wen Wei Pao printed a photograph of Mao seated in an armchair receiving, in an apparently jovial mood, Arudji Kartawinata, Speaker of the Indonesian National Assembly, and his wife. The following day Wen Wei Pao printed another picture of a far frailer and more serious looking Mao, standing rather rigidly between the Indonesians, who held each of his arms in a strong grip. (ConGenTel 1891.) Wen Wei Pao quoted the Indonesian Speaker as saying that during the hour and a quarter meeting he had with Mao on June 10, Mao was ruddy-faced and in excellent health. Mao was "very happy, laughing and chatting at ease, making quips one after the other, and fully stimulating." The Indonesian asserted that this show was something that a "person not in excellent health couldn't carry off." (Limited Official Use)

Comment: While allowances must be made for Indonesian ebullience, it would appear that Mao has not suffered any marked physical decline in recent months, and that he is still in fairly good shape for a man in his seventies. Certainly rumors of his grave illness seem premature. (ConGenTel 1878) (Limited Official Use)

5. T'ao Chu Predicts A "Second Revolutionary Flying Leap" in Countryside

The association of the current "production upsurge" with 1958's Great Leap Forward, would seem to have emerged more fully, since it has been invoked in a speech by no less a figure than Vice Premier T'ao Chu, First Secretary of the Central South Bureau and frequent bellwether for new trends. According to Radio Canton, T'ao, who has been "staying at a point" in Hua hsien (near the base of the Liuchow Peninsula) (8 June, 2245GMT), held a forum of chairman of the brigade associations of poor and

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

lower-middle peasants at which he commented on the success of the socialist education campaign in "greatly improving the thinking and work styles of the cadres." This success, T'ao said, "will inevitably result in a second revolutionary flying leap in the countryside" and a "completely new situation will emerge which will drive revolution and construction onward towards great victories" (14 June, 2245GMT). Chao Tzu-yang, First Secretary of Kwangtung, after citing the "perfect correctness" of T'ao's speech, also identified the socialist education campaign as the motivating factor and drew the parallel with the 1958 Great Leap Forward campaign more clearly: "When the Party led the peasants to take the road of collectivisation, the first flying leap in the countryside was achieved. Now the Party is leading the peasants to conduct the socialist education campaign. This will inevitably bring about another revolutionary flying leap in the countryside."

Whatever the imagery, the intent of the "Great Leap Forward"--the idea of Great Leap Forward has never been repudiated and still remains one of the Three Red Banners, it is the implementation of the Leap that has been attacked--seems to have changed from the rambunctious mass movements of 1958. This has most recently been indicated in a speech by Fu Sheng-yuan, Deputy Director of the Political Department of the Hunan Provincial Agricultural Capital Construction Headquarters to the second Hunan Provincial Congress of representatives of progressive collectives and producers in agricultural capital construction: "The prologue to a new battle will be staged next winter and spring. A new, still greater state of leaping forward will very soon be here." But then Fu pointed out that after mobilizing the workers ideologically the principle to be followed in water conservancy construction is "concentrate on small projects, coordinate large, medium-sized and small projects," and that mass movements must be coordinated with "scientific analysis" (Radio Changsha, 15 June,1145GMT).

Comment: One doubts that the organizational lessons of the crisis engendered by the Great Leap Forward have not been taken into account. Although the idea of an impetuous transmogrification of China remains attractive to the old revolutionary leadership, such leaping as is done in the next year or so is likely to be of a more coordinated character. The forthcoming Leap Forward as indicated by Fu, next winter and spring, is timed to commence with the implementation of new Five Year Plan. (Unclassified)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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6. Hu Yao-pang is First Secretary, Shensi Provincial CCP

June 14 Radio Sian (0040GMT) identified Hu Yao-pang, former head of the YCL, as First Secretary of the Shensi Provincial CCP Committee. (Unclassified)

Comment: Hu was first identified as Third Secretary of the Northwest Regional Bureau and Acting First Secretary of Shensi in February of this year (WEEKA 6). He was brought in to replace Chang Te-sheng, who died in March (WEEKA 10). Hu has now been confirmed in his post, which indicates, contrary to some speculations, that he has not fallen from favor. His successor in the YCL has as yet still not been identified, a curious omission in view of all the organizational activity which is going on among the youth as present (WEEKA 23). (Unclassified)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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	BAMAKO	CANBERRA	KATHMANDU	PRAGUE	(4)TAIPEI	500MIGF
(2)	BANGKOK	CPACPLAD	KLUMPUR	RANGOON	TOKYO	TAIWANDEFCOM
	BELGRADE	DARESSALAAM	MANILA	ROME	VIENNA	5AFJAPAN
	BLANTYRE	DJAKARTA	MOSCOW	SAIGON	VNTIANE	7FLTTOKYO
	BUCHAREST	GENEVA	MUNICH	SEOUL	WARSAW	13AFMANILA
	BUDAPEST	LONDON	NDELHI	SOFIA	W'NGTON	
		KARACHI	PARIS	S'PORE	COMNAVPHL	

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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ACTION		
INR-10		
RM/R 1	REP	AF 3
ARA	EUR 5	FE 4
NEA 4	CU 5	INR
E	P 1	IO 2
6/PM 1	S/AH 1	AIO 12
5/5 S/S 1	RS/R-Hockman 1	2
AGR 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 10
OSD 41	USIA 11	NSA 3
HEW 1	NSC 6	

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1965 JUN 14 AM 8 10

TO : Department of State

INFO: See last page

STATE ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG DATE: June 11, 1965

SUBJECT : COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 23

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Peiping Reaffirms Support for DRV, Confidence in Viet Cong Tactics
2. Chou En-lai in Tanzania Takes Harsh Anti-US Line
3. Bandung II - Chinese and Algerians Consult

Internal

4. Work by Mao Tun Criticized
5. Two New Youth Organizations Provide Wider Indoctrination

Military

6. PLA "Democracy" Described as National Model

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Drafted by: POL:HIsham,DAnderson,GMetson,JThomas:MT Contents and Classification Approved by: Lt.Col.Treadwell POL:JHoldridge

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

1. Vietnam: Peiping Reaffirms Support for DRV, Confidence in VietCong Tactics

While Chou En-lai sought to rally African support for anti-US, aid South Vietnam measures (see Item 2), Liu Shao-chi this week reaffirmed China's determination to give "utmost support to the fraternal Vietnamese people in their just struggle against US aggression." Liu's words were addressed to visiting Lao Dong Party Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi, a Deputy Premier and Chairman of the Industry Board under the Premier's office. (In Moscow, Nghi met Kosygin June 8.)

Another Chinese pledge of support, employing a suggestive new phrase, came at the "Second Conference of the International Trade Union Committee of Solidarity with the Workers and People of Vietnam Against US Imperialist Aggression" held this week in Hanoi. Chief Chinese delegate Kang Yung-ho altered previous Chicom pledges of support for the "Vietnamese people" when he stated that China is "ready to send volunteers" (chih yuan jen yuan)as opposed to previous offers of "our own people" (jen yuan). Kang claimed that "this attitude of ours is unyielding. We support them whether or not US imperialism will bomb our territory." (ConGenTel 1863)

Yang also attacked Soviet policies on Vietnam (though not mentioning the USSR by name) as obscuring the "crucial point" in solving the Vietnam problem, i.e. complete withdrawal of US forces, and separating this demand from their call for a cessation of US bombing of the North. He scoffed at arguments that the US was too "rich" to need to colonize South Vietnam, implying that some delegates had put forward this view. Kang assured the conference that "fears that the Vietnamese people may not withstand American pressure are completely uncalled for." The Soviet delegate Gusseinov (whose speech was carried in VNA but not NCNA) made no rebuttal to these gibes but stressed the concrete measures of Soviet support for the DRV including the Soviet trade unions' gift of 800,000 rubles for purchase of trucks, medical supplies, textiles.

At the same time, in a June 5 People's Daily editorial, Peiping depicted the US as being forced into a "passive position" by Viet Cong offensives launched in May, and scoffed at the "ink blot" scheme of establishing US military bases along the coast at five locations. The editorial exulted over the "impotence" of the US in the face of the Viet Cong's "superb art in tactical command," which involved skillful ambushes and closely coordinated operations of regular troops, local forces, and militia. As to the "ink blot" scheme (Peiping's first comment on this alleged tactic), the editorial described it as both defensive (providing an escape to the sea in case of defeat, avoiding another Dienbienphu) and offensive (releasing ARVN troops by gradually widening the defense circle). Ink blot scheme or no, concluded the editorial, US

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0836

forces were panic stricken, because they were attacked "whether they dig in or come out into the open."

No editorial comment has appeared thus far on President Johnson's June 6 speech calling on Communist leaders to "reason together," but a June 8 NCNA despatch presented selected passages accompanied by the usual critical asides, directed also at Secretary Rusk's speech the same day. (Limited Official Use)

2. Chou En-lai in Tanzania Takes Harsh Anti-US Line

Following a brief and apparently hastily arranged stopover in Pakistan, Chou En-lai arrived in Tanzania June 4 for a five day visit marked by Chou's harsh attacks on the US and his optimistic appraisal of revolutionary prospects in Africa. In his major speech, June 5, in Dar es Salaam, Chou (with characteristic hyperbole) described Africa as "awakened, militant, and advanced" and forecast an "exceedingly favorable situation for revolution." He lashed the United States as the source of all evils and portrayed it as a "cornered dog" increasingly revealing its true nature, "more ruthless than Hitlerite Fascism." The main thrust of Chou's presentation, of course, was directed at Vietnam, and he urged all peoples to give "all out support and assistance to the Vietnamese people who are fighting heroically," particularly since the US had embarked on an "adventurous road of war provocations" in Vietnam.

Comment: From here it is hard to judge the impact within Tanzania of Chou's speeches and of his visit generally, although Nyerere responded to Chou in a flattering and often obsequious vein. In some neighboring African states, such as Kenya, however, the reaction has been sharply critical, and this extreme, venemous, and arrogant Chinese line - which will probably be pursued at Algiers - may alienate other African leaders. We note that the CPR-Tanzanian communique, though referring generally to support for "the Vietnamese people" and condemning the bombing of the DRV, did not name the US specifically and on the whole represented no great advance over the communique signed in February 1965, after Nyerere's visit. (Limited Official Use)

3. Bandung II - Chinese and Algerians Consult

Mohamed Yazid, Algerian roving ambassador for the Second A-A Conference, arrived in Peiping June 4 for meetings with CPR leaders. Yazid had talks with Chen Yi and was received by Liu Shao-chi, whom he gave a letter from President Ben Bella. (Unclassified)

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Comment: This is Yazid's second recent meeting with Chicom leaders, his first being with Chou En-lai during the latter's stopover in Pakistan. (Unclassified)

Among Yazid's preoccupations are probably such divisive issues as the renewed Soviet bid for a place at the conference and the admission of Malaysia. If Chou's conduct in Africa and Peng Chen's May 25 speech at Djakarta are any guide, Yazid will find no disposition in Peiping for compromise on these issues. (Limited Official Use)

Internal

4. Work by Mao Tun Criticized

Noted Chinese author and former Minister of Culture Mao Tun has been obliquely implicated in a sharp attack on a film based on one of his early works. The script of the film, The Shop of the Lin Family, was written by one of Mao Tun's colleagues in the Ministry of Culture, who was recently dropped as Vice Minister (Weeka 21), Mao Tun having been removed in December. People's Daily May 29 commented that the film script was "loyal to the thought of the original work," but that its thought erred in showing a "boundlessly sympathetic attitude" towards the bankruptcy of a small shop proprietor who is exploited by other capitalists and who has good relations with his employees. The May 29 Kuang-ming Jih-pao, explained that the national capitalists are an exploiting class "which hoped and still hopes to develop capitalism... therefore we must not think that they too 'suffered' in the past like the working class." (Unclassified)

Comment: It would appear that Mao Tun, though out of office, is not to be allowed an honorable repose but will have to serve as a target in the campaign for re-educating the younger generation in the new standards of class struggle. The singling out as a political target of this former symbol of accommodation between Communism and the literary arts, however, should lead to an even greater degree of sterility in Chinese Communist literary output. As an example of the trend, Lao She (another well-known literary light under the Communists and author of "Rickshaw Boy") told a Japanese reporter in Tokyo recently that he has written nothing at all of consequence in the last several years because of "health" reasons. In other words, it's healthier not to write. (Unclassified)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

5. Two New Youth Organizations Provide Wider Indoctrination

As called for by the second plenary session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Young Communist League (Weeka 18), two new organizations roughly parallel to the present Young Pioneers are being set up on a trial basis.

The two new organizations are a) the Children's Communist League, for ages seven to twelve, and b) the Juvenile Communist League, for ages twelve to fifteen. The Young Pioneers have followed suit and lowered their age of entry to seven.

While the Young Pioneers (reckoned in one source at over 50 million) have been established principally in the cities and are linked with schools, the new organizations aim to penetrate the countryside, which still lags far behind in terms of indoctrination. Activities are scaled according to age group and appear to be much the same as in the Young Pioneers, notably encouragement of revolutionary thinking, struggling against bad elements, and vigilance against sabotage by class enemies. (Unclassified)

Comment: The variations in structure and terminology of the Leagues and Young Pioneers indicate that the regime is experimenting with different ways of increasing its organizational control over the coming generations. There appear to be no basic differences between the purposes of the Leagues and the Pioneers, but the new framework provides a more discriminating framework for indoctrination on a broader plane. (Unclassified)

Military

6. PLA "Democracy" Described as National Model.

In the aftermath of the elimination of military titles, and as part of the continuing campaign to "learn from the PLA," a June 8 People's Daily editorial described in more explicit terms than usual the PLA's "democratic tradition," particularly with respect to relationships between officers, men and cadres. Within the rigid restrictions of "democratic centralism" requiring absolute discipline to follow the policy issued from the Communist Party leadership, the PLA's democratic revolutionary tradition is billed as the practice of "triple democracy": political, economic and military democracy. Political democracy embraces the "rights" of soldiers to oppose "unhealthy trends" and actions "contrary to Party policy," to criticize superiors or go over their heads through "proper" party channels, and to participate in nominating or discharging basic level cadres. In their turn, cadres must

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

submit to supervision by the soldiers. (The implementation of this system has been institutionalized through the party branches and committees which have been strengthened since 1960 and extended throughout the PLA to basic level organizations.)

Economic democracy embraces the management of kitchens, mess halls and food procurement in each company by soldiers elected for that purpose.

Military democracy in training and combat means that the men teach one another, discuss how a mission is to be accomplished and criticize its execution. (Unclassified)

Comment: The furtherance of the campaign to learn from the PLA is continued extension of the socialist education program with emphasis on developing a general sense of participation in the political process and close identification between the people and cadres.

This description of the PLA's "democratic tradition" provides some insight into the workings of a system with functional rank structure, and raises questions about its impact upon decision making and rapid reaction in combat. In essence the command and control system, which "successfully" integrated democracy and military efficiency, continues as followed during revolutionary days--and of course is hailed as one of MAO's great contributions to military science. It is a formal statement of policy which has been in effect at least since 1960 which has included consistent efforts toward closer relations between officers and men and strengthening of the party committees to insure discipline to the party policy and to develop a sense of participation by men in making decisions. (Limited Official Use)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge,
Chief, Political Section

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(2)	BANGKOK	CPACPLAD	KLUMPUR	RANGOON	TOKYO	TAIWANDEFCOM
	BAMAKO	DARESSALAAM	MANILA	ROME	VIENNA	5AFJAPAN
	BELGRADE	DJAKARTA	MOSCOW	SAIGON	VNTIANE	7FLTTOKYO
	BLANTYRE	GENEVA	MUNICH	SEOUL	WARSAW	13AFMANILA
	BUCHAREST	LONDON	NDELHI	SOFIA	W'NGTON	
	BUDAPEST	KARACHI	PARIS	S'PORE	COMNAVPHL	

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ORIGIN/ACTION		
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RM/R 1	RSE/AC 1	AF
ARA	EUR 3	FE 16.
NEA	CU 5	INR
E	P 1	IO. 2
L 3	SCI 4	AID 12
S/IL 1	S/P 1	D/PM 1
AGR 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2.	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 10
OSD 41	USIA 11	NSA 3
PC 2	HEW 1	NSC 6

NIC-1
NASA-4
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16 Page 8

1965 JUN 7 AM 11 08

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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NO.		HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO: BANGKOK KARACHI NDELHI S'PORE W'NGTON 5AFJAPAN
CANBERRA KATHMANDU RANGOON TAIPEI COMNAVPHL 7FLTTOKYO
CPACPLAD KLUMPUR SAIGON TOKYO 500MIGF 13AFMANILA
DJAKARTA MANILA SEOUL VNTIANE TAIWANDEFCOM

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: June 4, 1965

SUBJECT : COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 22

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: New Warning to US Issued.
2. Sino-Soviet Relations
3. Increased Official Travel Linked with Algiers Conference

Internal

4. Mao's Absence From Scene Sparks Rumors of Illness
5. Canton Unemployed Youth Sent to Hainan
6. China's Atom Bomb Film Disappointing

Military

7. Swimming Program for the PLA

OUTER MONGOLIA
Negative

Action Assigned to: RSE/AC
Action Taken:
Date of Action: 6/17/65
Action Office Symbol:
Action Officer:

Group 1 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

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FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL:HIshan, DAnderson, GMetson, JThomas, LtColTreadwell, drb:6/3/65 POL: Woleysteen

Contents and Classification Approved by:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

CONFIDENTIAL

External

1. Vietnam: New Warning to US Issued.

In an important June 1 People's Daily "Observer" article, Peiping issued a stern new warning to the United States concerning its actions in Vietnam. The article, entitled "The Dramatic Change",was pegged on Secretary Rusk's May 26 press conference statement that "there has been no dramatic change" in the Vietnam situation, although the article served primarily as a means of postulating Peiping's views on the present and probable future course of the war in Vietnam. Among the major themes emerging were: 1) Peiping's view that the pace of the war is quickening, and that the US "in all likelihood will escalate the war of aggression in Vietnam to a Korea-type, localized war;" 2) since the US is bombing North Vietnam, the 17th parallel "ceases to exist" and the DRV "ceases to be restricted" in its support of the Viet Cong; and 3) US military actions in Southeast Asia constitute an increasingly serious threat to China' security and "the Chinese people are all the more entitled to take every additional measure necessary."

A. US Accused of Planning to Spread War to Southeast Asia and China - To bear out the charge that the US was dramatically escalating the war, "Observer" listed large US troop reinforcements which reportedly might increase to the 500,000 man level, the use of Seventh Fleet ships to bombard Viet Cong positions, "scorched earth offensives" by US troops based at Da Nang and Chu Lai, the introduction of additional allied forces, more frequent bombing north of the 20th parallel, harassing of the Hanoi suburbs, and threatening to bomb communications links between the DRV and China. Declaring that the US "is turning the entire region into one battleground where it moves as it wishes," and asserting that "Washington has already given broad hints that American Generals are not afraid to fight a war on the Asian mainland," the article demanded rhetorically, "Does it not show that the Johnson Administration is preparing to spread the war in Indochina to the rest of Southeast Asia, and even to China?"

B) 17th Parallel "Ceases to Exist" - "Observer" described as "absurd wishful thinking" what it claimed was Washington's "fond hope that the 17th parallel can be made a line barring the people in North Vietnam from supporting their compatriots in the South." The article argued that US bombing of the North "day and night" had given the North the right to "aid their fellow-countrymen," and in fact, the DRV has "always had this right."

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

C) "Threat to China's Security" Stressed - Citing recent press reports that China was massing troops on the Sino-Vietnamese border, "Observer" claimed that this was a pretext for escalating the war. The article claimed that the United States "would like China to look on with folded arms" while it "threatened China's security in an increasingly serious manner," and defiantly retorted that it was "all the more entitled to take every additional measure necessary." The article concluded that China is fully aware of the "accelerated aggressive dispositions of US imperialism in Vietnam" and/is determined to "fight on to the end to drive the US aggressors out of Vietnam."

Foreign Minister Chen Yi adopted an equally adamant, if less bellicose tone in an interview granted to K. S. Karol, a correspondent of the French journal Nouvelle Observateur (and also of the New Statesmen, which carried the interview May 28, including an additional pointed question on the conflict between Chinese espousal of peaceful coexistance and support for all revolutionary movements, which NCNA omitted). Chen stated that he thought the Vietnamese people were "perfectly capable, by relying on their own forces, of driving the American aggressors out of their territory" and were ready to struggle until the next generation if necessary. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: The "Observer" article strikes us as an indication of a significant progression of Chinese Communist concern that developments in Vietnam threaten a more direct Chinese involvement. It attempts to warn the US against further pursuit of its present course in Vietnam by raising in more ominous terms than before the prospect of a "Korea type, localized war" in which regular DRV military units could justifiably intervene in the South irrespective of the 17th parallel and by declaring that the Chicoms will not only refuse to slacken existing support for the DRV and the Viet Cong, but will "take every additional measure necessary" as a result of the increasingly severe US threats to China's security. Thus, while the "Observer" article does not telegraph specific Chicom intentions, it seems to us to be a serious as opposed to a propagandistic statement which demonstrates actual concern as well as an unflinching resolve in the face of mounting dangers in Vietnam. (Confidential) (ConGenTel 1836)

2. Sino-Soviet Relations

Two Chinese leaders, Peng Chen and Chen Yi, responded this week with sharp negatives to suggestions emanating from Moscow (e.g. Kosygin-Eaton interview, Pravda May 27 editorial) that some

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

form of Sino-Soviet concerted action on Vietnam against the United States was necessary and possible at this juncture. In Djakarta, on May 25, speaking on the occasion of the PKI's 45th anniversary, Peng Chen launched a bitter diatribe against the Khrushchev revisionists ("wretches and monsters") and declared that "unity with revolutionaries (i.e. the CCP) is out of the question if one (i.e. the CPSU) opposes revolution." Peng scored the "ardent flirtation" of Soviets and Americans who were like "a pair of lovebirds that even clubbing cannot separate." (The CCP, of course, has long specialized in this form of clubbing.)

Chen Yi, giving an interview of undisclosed date to the Nouvelle Observateur (and New Statesman) correspondent K. S. Karol, declared that concerted action was possible only on the basis of a "common understanding of the aggressors and common determination to fight them." That, by definition, ruled out the Khrushchev revisionists. (See also item 1.)

At the same time, Peiping's bitterness over strengthened Soviet-Indian relations in the wake of the Shastri visit emerged from a May 27 People's Daily "Observer" article blasting Soviet leaders for praising Shastri whom "Observer" described as "a rare anti-China cavalier as well as Washington's pet." But neither dollars nor rubles could save these "political duds," huffed "Observer" and present Soviet leaders would come to "no better end than Khrushchev." (Unclassified)

Comment: It is both ironic and characteristic of Chinese tactics that these renewed Chinese attacks on the Soviets should occur concurrently with reports of activization of SAM sites near Hanoi. The Chinese have charged that Soviet aid to the DRV is not rendered for genuine proletarian internationalist motives but is to gain political capital and make a bargain with the US to sell out "the fundamental interests of the Vietnamese people." Their own stronger language about taking additional measures to support the DRV and Viet Cong (item 1) appears in part designed to outbid the Soviets in the competition for leverage with Hanoi. (Limited Official Use)

3. Increased Official Travel Linked with Algiers Conference

A. Chou Takes to the Trail Again. - In what may well be the start of an extensive trip, leading to Algiers in late June, Premier Chou En-lai left for Rawalpindi June 2. After a 24-hour stopover and talks with Pakistani leaders he is scheduled to visit Tanzania for several days possibly June 3-6. Although the ConGen

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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has received no confirmation of this, an AFP report from Cairo states that Chou will be visiting the UAR in the near future to open the new Peiping-Baghdad-Cairo air link. Adding to speculation regarding Chou's African travels were NCNA reports regarding recent visits to Conakry and Bamako by Chi Peng-fei, CPR Vice-Foreign Minister. NCNA gave no summaries of Chi's talks with Guinean and Malian leaders, but it is possible that he is acting as advance man for Chou's visit. (Limited Official Use)

B. Subandrio in Canton. - Indonesian First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio arrived in Canton May 28 for a twelve-hour discussion with Chou En-lai, Chen Yi and other CPR officials. Interviewed at Canton airport after the talks, Subandrio described them as centering on the struggle against "imperialism" and on the second Afro-Asian Conference. Later in Djakarta, Njoto, a member of the Indonesian delegation, declared that "the necessary preparations" had been made "to isolate Malaysia totally from the coming Afro-Asian conference." Presumably, the two sides also discussed possible strategy in the event that Malaysia is nevertheless seated at the conference as well as general strategy to be pursued in order to achieve CPR-Indonesian objectives at Algiers. (Limited Official Use)

C) Speaker of Indonesian Parliament in Peiping. - Indonesia's close ties with the CPR were emphasized by NCNA's relatively heavy coverage of a visit by Arudji Kartawinata, speaker of the Indonesian Parliament. Chu Teh, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, greated Arudji at the airport May 30 and hosted a banquet in his honor the same night. On June 1 a rally was held in Peiping to celebrate growing CPR-Indonesian solidarity. (Unclassified)

Internal

4. Mao's Absence from Scene Sparks Rumors of Illness

Hong Kong papers carried stories datelined Peiping and London May 30 which reported rumors allegedly originating in Moscow to the effect that Mao was seriously ill. Principal ground for this speculation was his failure to appear on May Day. Peiping promptly denied the rumor: according to a May 31 Tokyo despatch, Kyodo's Peiping correspondent, Reizo Yamada, quoted Liao Ch'eng-chih's comment that, "Chairman Mao is in excellent health. I just met him yesterday." Kyodo also quoted "authoritative sources" as saying that Mao had attended the May 30 meeting of the Standing Committee of the NPC (although press reports of the meeting failed to report his presence). (Unclassified)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Comment: Whatever their source, these rumors have little to support them. In recent years Mao has not appeared on May Day and he has taken a vacation in the spring. It is true that this year he has been absent from the news longer and has received fewer visitors. Last year between March 31 and April 28 he appeared once in Peiping, to receive E. F. Hill, and met four delegations elsewhere. This year Mao has not appeared in Peiping since a March 14 meeting with Wilcox and Hill, and except for issuing several statements, his only known activity was meeting Aly Sabri, UAR Presidential Advisor, in April, date and place unclear. (Limited Official Use)

5. Canton Unemployed Youth Sent to Hainan

Radio Canton has been broadcasting stories during the past week about groups of "street youths" (unemployed youths) being sent to Hainan, in groups numbering as many as five hundred, to work in tea plantations and farms growing tropical produce. Street campaigns consisting of "labor reserve lectures" have urged unemployed youths to apply for work in Hainan. Rallies are being held in movie theaters, (in at least two occasions addressed by a vice-mayor and at least once attended by the mayor of Canton), in which unemployed youth and their parents are exhorted to "take big strides forward on the revolutionary road" and go to work in this "treasure island." (Unclassified)

Comment: The dispatch of Canton's unemployed youths to this strategic island, which contains a sizeable percentage of ethnic minorities in its population, parallels the similar colonization of Sinkiang with "social youth" from Shanghai. In both cases a frontier area is made more dependable by increasing the percentage of Hans in it, while at the same time production potential is increased by augmenting manpower and the burden of unemployed mouths is reduced in the metropolitan area. Unemployed workers have been sent to Hainan in the past, but this is the first time we have noted transfer of unemployed urban youth to the island. Unemployed youth is a particularly serious problem in Canton where there is a significant population reduced to making a living by its wits, always in an undesirable and sometimes in an illegal manner. Given Hainan's reputation as a place of exile under former regimes, it is unlikely that propaganda about a "treasure island" will produce large numbers of genuine volunteers. (Limited Official Use)

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6. China's Atom Bomb Film Disappointing

A black-and-white newsreel showing China's first atom bomb test was opened to packed houses in Hong Kong May 27 (WEEKA 19). The section dealing with the bomb may have lasted one minute, and was divided approximately evenly between shots showing the rise and expansion of the mushroom cloud and shots showing a loose formation of uniformed persons leaping up and down on a bak or dune, applauding the explosion. (Unclassified)

Comment: The film showing in Hong Kong is a much cut version of what is being shown on the Mainland. According to Canadian correspondent Mark Gayn, the version he recently saw in Peiping was in color, lasted an estimated eight minutes, and showed the conveying of instruments to the test site, erection of tents to protect the instruments, and installation of instruments for telemetering the blast. Parenthetically, Mr Gayn wondered if satisfactory measuring could be done with instruments protected only by tents or set on the open ground. (Limited Official Use)

Military

7. Swimming Program for the PLA.

On May 14 a notice issued jointly by the Physical Culture and Sports Commission, the General Staff Department of the PLA, and the Communist Youth League called for "efforts to enable servicemen and civilians, and particularly youths and children to learn to swim." The notice stressed the military value of swimming for developing the will to overcome adversity. Implementing instructions by the PLA's General Staff and Political Departments, following up on last year's training programs, pointed out that all troops, young people and militiamen must swim "to overcome the water barrier and achieve freedom of movement for troops in watery regions." An editorial in the Liberation Army News commented that the intensified training would better prepare troops for "supporting Vietnam and defending world peace."

Comment: The development of a swimming capability will obviously enhance the tactical mobility of the infantry and small units and add to the overall mobility of the PLA which lacks bridging equipment. However, the program probably has no special significance relating to Chicom intentions toward Vietnam. The stress is probably more directly related to a general physical conditioning program for the whole population, based on Chairman Mao's conception of the health value of swimming.

For the Consul General:
William Gleysteen,
Acting Chief, Political Section

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS:

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ORIGIN: ACTION

INR-10

RM/R	REP	AF
1		5
ARA	EUR	FE
	6	6
NEA	CU	INR
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ORM	P	SCA
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L	FBO	AID
		12
PC	S/IL	R'm/AC
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AGR	COM	FRB
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INT	LAB	TAR
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TR	XMB	AIR
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	10
OSO	USIA	NSA
41	11	3
NSC		HEW
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 27 CHICOM

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A-809 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH

Group 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified. Department of State

TO :

INFO: BANGKOK KARACHI NDELHI S'PORE W'NGTON 5AFJAPAN
CANBERRA KATHMANDU RANGOON TAIPEI COMNAVPHL 7FLTTOKYO
CPACPLAD KLUMPUR SAIGON TOKYO 500MIGF 13AFMANILA
DJAKARTA MANILA SEOUL VNTIANE TAIWANDEFCOM

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: May 28, 1965

SUBJECT : COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 21

REF Please pass post on page 6 (16)

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Resumption of Air Strikes Denounced
2. Sino-Soviet Relations: Shastri Visit Scored, Another Khrushchev Volume Published, PKI Praised for Anti-Revisionism
3. Cambodia: Peiping Praises Sihanouk Anti-US Speech
4. India: Protest Over Sino-Pakistani Border Agreement Rejected.

Internal

5. New Vice Ministers of Culture
6. Ninth Party Congress Rumored for this Autumn

Military

7. System of Military Ranks Abolished in PLA

OUTER MONGOLIA
Negative

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL DAnderson, GMetson, JThomas, drb, 5/27/65 | Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:HDsham

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

External

1. Vietnam: Resumption of Air Strikes Denounced

Using its own brand of perverse logic, Peiping has denounced US bombings of North Vietnam as "war blackmail," decried the cessation of the bombings as "war blackmail," and now views the resumption of the bombing as "war blackmail." A May 20 People's Daily editorial and a CPR Foreign Ministry statement the following day both appeared concerned with the possible political effect abroad of the cessation of the raids, and argued strenuously against being deceived by the move. Said the Foreign Ministry statement: The US "thought that people would be tearfully grateful when it suspended its bombings and that it could bring about negotiations;" this was, of course, "wishful thinking."

The editorial described the cessation of the bombings as a "trick" played by US propagandists in a "very clumsy way," and fumbling its metaphor, claimed that the Johnson Administration "threw overboard its fig leaf" in less than a week and was now planning a further escalation of the war. The Foreign Ministry statement claimed that these new, and "particularly unbridled" air strikes are also doomed to meet with "still stronger counter-blows," and warned that "the Vietnamese people are prepared, and the Chinese people are too." (Unclassified)

Comment: Following the spate of defiant pledges to support Vietnam whether or not the US bombs China (Weeka 20) Peiping's commentary on the Vietnam situation has dropped off somewhat. (Uncl)

2. Sino-Soviet Relations: Shastri Visit Scored, Another Khrushchev Volume Published, PKI Praised for Anti-Revisionism

Although Peiping made no direct comment on Indian Prime Minister Shastri's visit to the USSR, two acerbic May 21 NCNA reports on the visit revealed the extent of Chinese irritation. NCNA maintained that the new Soviet leaders, "who inherited the mantle of Khrushchev," were "vigorously fostering the Indian ruling group and allying with India against China." The two countries' leaders, it protested, "were as thick as members of the same family."

Both NCNA reports revealed ChiCom sensitivity concerning the USSR-Indian joint-communique's reference to peaceful coexistence, the need for complete disarmament, the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the desirability of strengthening the United Nations.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

One article noted the communique's demand for a cessation of US bombing of the DRV, but pointed out there was no demand for a withdrawal of US troops, and concluded that the two countries' leaders were "trying to contribute to Lyndon Johnson's hoax of 'suspension of bombings' and his fraudulent 'unconditional discussions' offer." Pervading the articles, moreover, was the impression that the Chinese were particularly concerned about what went on behind the scenes. NCNA darkly pointed out that Indian press "did not bother to conceal the fact" that Prime Minister Shastri "had acted as a political go-between for the United States over the questions of Vietnam and of nuclear non-proliferation and had been engaged in behind-the-scenes maneuvers in Moscow."

In a brief announcement May 20, the publication of volume six of Khrushchev's works was reported. This volume covers from January to June of 1957 and contains eighty of Khrushchev's speeches, reports,letters and cables. Like its predecessors, it runs to 340,000 characters, but this time the usual scathing introductory note was not separately released by NCNA.

The PKI's forty-fifth anniversary served to demonstrate Chinese approval for the PKI's strongly anti-revisionist positions, and a message from Mao and the despatch of Peng Chen dignified the occasion. NCNA carried Aidit's speech branding modern revisionism as "the most dangerous opportunism" and printed the PKI's resolution on modern revisionism being more dangerous without Khrushchev than with him because it was more cunning and hypocritical. (Unclassified)

3. Cambodia: Peiping Praises Sihanouk Anti-US Speech.

Prince Sihanouk's frenetically anti-American May 17 speech at the Cambodian National Assembly was promptly reported by NCNA at some length and praised both editorially and officially. A People's Daily editorial on May 20 acclaimed the Cambodian leader for (1) promising to "carry through to the end" the struggle against US imperialism, (2) describing the US Government as the successor to Nazism and (3) advocating that U.N. headquarters be moved from the "racist" US to Geneva or elsewhere, and that other countries refuse aid and break diplomatic ties with the US.

Chou En-lai further expressed the CPR's gratitude for Sihanouk's speech in an extremely warm May 21 telegram. The telegram referred to Sihanouk's contention that the imperialist

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

powers might attempt to spread the flames of war to Cambodia and in the week's least exciting phrase, warned that, in this case, "The Chinese people absolutely will not stand idly by." (Unclassified)

4. India: Protest Over Sino-Pakistani Border Agreement Rejected.

In a CPR Foreign Ministry note dated May 20, Peiping "categorically rejected" Indian protest notes regarding the signing of the Sino-Pakistani border protocol, dismissed India's claim that China and Pakistan have no common border, and stated that the CPR and Pakistan, being independent countries, had every right to conclude the agreement. India's protests, it was charged, resulted not from any Sino-Pakistani wrongdoing but from the "anti-China policy" of the Indian Government. Because India had adopted a "great-power chauvinist" policy which served imperialism and undermined Asian-African solidarity, it was now trying to prevent others from coming to peaceful agreements. In one of the lamer retorts on record, the CPR note concluded, "Should the Indian Government continue to haggle over the China-Pakistan boundary question, the Chinese Government will pay no more attention." (Unclassified)

Internal

5. New Vice Ministers of Culture

Recent appointments and dismissals of Vice Ministers of Culture (NCNA, May 6) continue the emphasis on culture as a tool of indoctrination that appeared when chief propagandist Lu Ting-yi replaced noted author Shen Yen-ping (Mao Tun) as Minister of Culture. The new Vice Ministers are Hsiao Wang-tung, Shih Hsi-min, Chao Hsin-ch'u, Yen Chin-sheng, and Liu Pai-yu. Of the five new Vice Ministers, only Liu appears to have been a creative writer in his own right, but in recent years he has been active mostly in organizational, front, and foreign cultural relations work. He wrote "Militant Socialist Literature" (Hung Ch'i, October 1, 1964, SCMM 441) in which he called for up-beat "revolutionary" literature portraying Lei Fengs and Li Shuang-shuangs for the edification of China's "completely new people" who are "capable of fulfilling the revolution."

Two of the others appear to be generals, of whom one has Political Department background, one was a Vice Governor and Provincial Party Secretary, and one has been a provincial director of propaganda. (Unclassified)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

COMMENT: The appointees may be counted on to root out any remaining belles lettres tendencies and carry out the Party's policy of restricting cultural forms to those which emphasize class struggle and stimulate "heroism," especially on the production front. The two Vice Ministers who were dropped, Hsia Yen and Ch'i Yen-ming, may have been too closely associated with the older literature. Hsia was a noted playwright and Ch'i was a pre-war professor. (Unclassified)

6. Ninth Party Congress Rumored for This Autumn.

A European diplomat stationed in Peiping informed us during a visit to Hong Kong that according to rumors heard from a number of Chinese sources the long overdue Ninth Party Congress will be held this autumn. (Confidential)

COMMENT: A Party Congress, which is supposed to be held every five years, was last held in September 1956. It would be logical to hold such a Congress in conjunction with formulation of the new five-year plan, and the developments in the anti-revisionist campaign against the CPSU could well be doctrinally formalized at the Congress. (Limited Official Use)

Military

7. System of Military Ranks Abolished in PLA.

The Standing Committee of the NPC announced a decision to abolish the current system of military ranks in the PLA. In implementation the State Council announced the abolition of the present hat insignia, epaulettes and collar badges which show military rank, the various branch insignia and uniforms and appurtenances which distinguished rank and service. All members of the PLA will now wear a new red star hat insignia and a red collar badge. The step was taken, according to the Council's statement, "in order that the revolutionary spirit and glorious tradition of the CPLA--a great army led by the great Chinese Communist Party and guarded by the great MAO Tse-tung's thinking--should have full expression and in order that there should be identity between the three services and between officers and men."

An editorial in the Liberation Army Daily discussing the step says that "the unity between officers and men, between

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

higher and lower levels and between the army and it's people is a fine tradition inherent in our army." The editorial comments on the revolutionary war and the Korean war which were fought successfully with no system of military ranks, which shows that the absence of rank does not affect command in war or combined military actions, and goes on to say, "Our army is a highly centralized and unified fighting collective which possesses a strict organizational discipline. This unity and discipline are based on the high political consciousness of the cadres and fighters. The lower levels submit to the higher levels and the fighters respect the cadres; this is done consciously by every soldier for the needs of the revolution and does not depend on the operation of military ranks or grades." (Unclassified)

COMMENT: It can not yet be established how far the elimination of rank will proceed. The measure explicity does away with outward symbols of distinction, and other reports have given some indications of a reduction in pay for ranks above Captain, but apparently distinction by position will persist.

Clearly, this step is a further extension of the "socialist education" program to ensure revolutionary enthusiasm within the PLA and among the coming generation of leaders. But, additionally, it probably is a continuation of current psychological preparations to make the "people's army ready for the "people's" war.

The impact of the abolition of symbols of rank on the "professionals," who were ostensibly buried with the dismissal of PENG Te-huai, will be interesting to consider. Chief of Staff LO Jui-ch'ing's reference to an opposition "bourgeois military line" in his speech to the Third NPC suggested that they remain as a problem. (Confidential) (ConGenTel ,1801)

For the Consul General:

William Gleysteen,
Acting Chief, Political Section

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ORIGIN ACTION

INR-10

RM/R	REP	AF
1	1	5

ARA	EUR	FE
	5	6
NEA	CU	INR
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L	FBO	AID
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S/IC 1	S/P 1	D/PM 1
AGR	COM	FRB
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INT	LAB	TAR
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TR	XMB	AIR
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	10
OSO	USIA	NSA
41	11	3
PC 2	HEW 1	NSC 6

NASA-4
ACDA-14
16-page 7

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

17

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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AIR POUCH
HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State [illegible] 07

INFO: BANGKOK KARACHI NDELHI S'PORE W'NGTON 5AFJAPAN
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DJAKARTA MANILA SEOUL VNTIANE TAIWANDEFCOM

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: May 21, 1965

SUBJECT : COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 20

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Peiping Reaffirms Unbudging Policy on Vietnam, Defies US "Threats"
2. Second Nuclear Test Played in Low Key
3. Rallies on Dominican Crisis Conclude; Role of UN, USSR Attacked
4. AAPSO Conference in Ghana; Mixed Success for Peiping
5. Turkey: Peiping Evidences Interest in Relations

Internal

6. Changes Continue in Southwest Personnel

OUTER MONGOLIA
Negative

MILITARY
Negative

RFE/CD

Void

Date of Issue: 5/25/65

Action Office: FE/EC

Name of Officer: [illegible]

Direction to RM/R: CONFIDENTIAL

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: POL:HIsham,DAnderson,GMetson,JThomas:drb, 5/20/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

1965 MAY 24 PM 1 32
SECRET-PBR

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

1. Peiping Reaffirms Unbudging Policy on Vietnam, Defies US "Threats"

Peiping this week was at pains to reassert its hard line on Vietnam, as if to dispel any notions that recent US actions and statements were inducing changes in Chinese and DRV positions, by 1) vowing to continue to support the "Vietnamese people . . . whether you (US) bomb China or not;" and 2) denouncing as a "concoction" an April 29 "Foreign Report" in the London Economist which speculated that the ChiComs might be prepared for concessions. In further efforts to discredit the US position on Vietnam, Peiping published two scurrilous attacks on President Johnson entitled, "Johnson Doctrine is Neo-Hitlerism" and "Johnson the Driveller."

A) Possibility of US Bombing China Discussed

Beginning with an interview by Chou En-lai in Algiers during his recent trip, Peiping has discussed more forthrightly the possibility that US extension of the war in Vietnam could eventually involve the mainland of China. This point was discussed in the bluntest terms thus far, however, in a May 12 People's Daily "Observer" article commenting on Secretary Rusk's May 3 "Town Meeting of the World" interview which claimed that US warnings on "sanctuary" mean that "should China come to the aid of Vietnam, the US would bomb China." To this "Observer" responded "in the most unequivocal terms" that the Chinese will support the Vietnamese people "whether you bomb China or not."

Similarly, Peiping responded to President Johnson's May 13 speech with a People's Daily "Commentator" article charging that the real purpose of the speech was "to find a solution to the Vietnam question by threatening the Chinese people." "Commentator" claimed that the President's speech made it "all too clear" that he is attempting "to create a pretext to spread the war flames to China so as to force this country to stop supporting the Vietnamese people's anti-US patriotic struggle." Defiantly, "Commentator" replied that "we support not only the revolution in Vietnam, but revolution in any part of the world." Peiping also carried excerpts from the May 16 Nhan Dan editorial condemning the speech as a maneuver aimed at preparing for "still more brazen and aggressive acts," a preposterous proposal to give the DRV dollars if it would "sell out" South Vietnam, and a "contemptible trick" to split the socialist countries by accusing China of seeking to dominate Asia.

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B) Opposition to Negotiations Reaffirmed

The May 18 "Observer" article also attacked Secretary Rusk for "virtually saying with cynical candor that the US would cease bombing attacks at once if the other party expressed willingness to enter negotiations," charging that this was tantamount to asking the DRV to admit that the "piratical bombing of the North is perfectly justified and that the people in North Vietnam are totally wrong in supporting their fellow countrymen in the South." "Observer" asked, "Would anyone with national self-respect, would any sovereign state which is determined to safeguard its national rights, ever think of accepting such monstrously humiliating conditions?"

Peiping's sensitivity regarding the firmness of its own stand on negotiations was amply illustrated in a May 17 People's Daily "Commentator" article refuting an April 29 "Foreign Report" article published in the London Economist. The Economist article was a rather far-fetched piece which alleged that the ChiComs had conveyed a message to Washington through Japanese semi-official sources that it was prepared to make "concessions within its powers" and that they felt able to persuade their allies to drop their preconditions for negotiations. Peiping indignantly challenged the British "slander experts" to scrutinise its statements "under any microscope" to find anything resembling their "blather," and tore into the Labor Government as a "volunteer political pimp for Johnson's unconditional discussions hoax."

C) Further Attacks on US Administration

Attempting to capitalize on public opposition to US policies in Vietnam, Peiping continued to focus its attacks on the President and what it termed the "dismal failures" of his policies in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. The so-called "Johnson Doctrine" of resistence to Communist expansion was described as "American fascism more reactionary than Hitlerism" and a People's Daily article on May 14 compared the President to one of his predecessors, McKinley, and present US policies to those in 1898. The only difference between the two Presidents, the article claimed, is that President Johnson was "born at the wrong time and has been active at the wrong time." The article claimed that Vietnam now takes up three-fourths of the President's time and now there is the Dominican Republic. In mock sympathy the article concluded, "Ah! The pity of it. For a US President, the age of 'sound sleep' is gone forever."

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Comment: The thrust of major Peiping statements this week continued to be directed against any form of negotiations on Vietnam under present circumstances and seemed designed to make clear to all concerned that the Chinese were prepared to support the DRV in full awareness of the possible consequences to China's own security. While we continue to believe that the ChiComs wish to avoid direct conflict with the US if this seems possible without compromising Communist interests, they may now feel that the present course of US military actions in South Vietnam and against the DRV might in time require some form of Chinese involvement which would place mainland air bases and communications facilities in jeopardy. Thus, by a posture of being prepared for the most difficult of contingencies, the Chinese are serving notice of their willingness to accept the consequences, and at the same time, may feel that by speaking out they might be able to deter the US from further escalating the war. (Confidential) (ConGenTels 1761, 1754, and 1733)

2. Second Nuclear Test Played in Low Key

In a relatively brief press communique, Peiping on May 14 announced the detonation of its second nuclear device "over its western areas." The announcement, although characterizing the event as "another important achievement of the Chinese people" and a "great victory for Mao Tse-tung's thinking," had a markedly defensive tone, maintaining that "China is conducting necessary nuclear tests within defined limits. . . for the purpose of coping with (US) nuclear blackmail . . . and for the purpose of abolishing all nuclear weapons." Finally, the communique repeated last October's assurances that China is developing nuclear weapons "solely for defensive purposes" and "will never be the first to use nuclear weapons."

One interesting difference between the October 16 and the May 14 communiques is the latter's prominent reference to the role played by the People's Liberation Army in the second test. By extending "warm congratulations" to "all the commanders and fighters of the PLA who took part in this test," Peiping is evidently seeking to underscore the military inplications of its second test.

NCNA press reports on international reaction to the second atomic blast have been skimpy by comparison with the October explosion, and by and large have been confined to China's Asian Communist friends and African "freedom fighters." There has

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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been no editorial fanfare hailing the success.

Comment: Peiping's low-key treatment of its second nuclear test suggests that, although determined to press ahead with nuclear weapons development to the limit of its resources, it has misgivings about international reaction, particularly among Afro-Asian states. (Confidential) (ConGenTel 1740)

3. Rallies on Dominican Crisis Concluded; Role of UN, USSR Attacked

Ritualistic nation-wide protest demonstrations over US intervention in the Dominican Republic (900,000 demonstrators reportedly paraded in Peiping during the period May 12-14), drew to a close this week as Peiping centered its fire more explicitly on the role played by the UN and the Soviet Union. Declaring that the UN's actions in the Dominican situation had proved the UN was a US "tool, pure and simple," a People's Daily editorial May 18 declared that the whole affair demonstrated that the United Nations "never protects the small countries, never takes up the cudgels for victims of aggression, and never can safeguard world peace and international security." Thorough reorganization was the only solution .

As to the Soviet Union, the editorial declared that the actions of Fedorenko, Soviet UN representative, revealed that "the Soviet authorities' support for the anti-imperialist struggles of the peoples is sham, not genuine." Fedorenko was taxed with having failed to press the Soviet resolution on withdrawal of US troops and having endorsed a resolution on sending a fact-finding mission to the crisis area. (Unclassified)

4. AAPSO Conference in Ghana; Mixed Success for Peiping

Judging from Chinese Communist press attention to the resolutions of the fourth AAPSO Conference in Winneba, Ghana, May 9-16, and more specifically from a NCNA correspondent's review of the proceedings and a Peiping Ta Kung Pao editorial, it appears that the Chinese experienced only partial success, and that the position of the Soviet Union, backed by the Indian delegation, was effective in countering some of the more extreme or radical Chinese demands. In particular, the final resolution on Vietnam, the general declaration, and the general political resolution, while sharply anti-American in tone and content, fell short of meeting ChiCom delegate Liao Cheng-chih's

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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May 11 demand for launching a worldwide campaign to drive the US out of Vietnam, strongly condemning the "towering crimes" of the US, denouncing unconditional peace talks as a fraud designed to "sell out" the interests of the Vietnamese people, and declaring support for the March 22 statement of the NLF. Neither the general declaration nor the political resolution focused attention upon Vietnam or US policies therein to the extent the Chinese must have desired; and the resolution on Vietnam contained a curiously worded formula on volunteers which appeared to be a compromise between the Soviet and Chinese declarations of support, for the dispatch of volunteers "if needed" and upon the request of the NLF (the Chinese position) or the DRV (the Soviet position).

Moreover, the very intensity of Peiping's attack upon the "schemes" of the Soviet delegation attested to the latter's effectiveness in countering Chinese plans. The NCNA castigated (either explicitly or by unmistakable implication) the Soviets for trying to introduce the appeal on Vietnam by the 17 non-aligned nations, accusing China of having undermined the union of the people of the Cameroons (introducing a "Cameroonian resident in Moscow" for that purpose), attempting to gain support for Soviet participation in the forthcoming Algiers A-A conference, disputing the credentials of the "lawful" delegation from Ceylon, supporting the entrance of Malaysia, and trying to place Afro-Asian trade union, youth and women's organizations under Soviet influence. In brief, the struggle between the line of "solidarity to oppose imperialism" and that of "split and capitulation" dominated the conference from beginning to end.

Nevertheless, the Chinese did succeed in getting language casting peaceful coexistence in the narrow framework of "imperialist non-interference and non-intervention;" in any other conditions, it was held to be meaningless and could only hinder national liberation struggles.

In sum, Winneba in May seemed an opening round for Algiers in July, and the Chinese clearly were mobilizing their heavy artillery for the next engagement. (Limited Official Use)

5. Turkey: Peiping Evidences Interest in Relations

On May 18 NCNA released excerpts from a "recent" interview granted by Chou En-lai to four Turkish journalists in Peiping. Chou stated that he had heard recently that Turkish Government leaders and public opinion had expressed the desire to develop relations with China, and said that this indicated respect for

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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"reality" and for the interests of Asian solidarity. He welcomed these indications. Chou also stated that he saw "good prospects" forthe development of economic and cultural links between the two countries.

Comment: This is the first recent official reference to the possibility of establishing relations with Turkey, and the release of the interview suggests the Chinese wish to generate further support in Turkey for the move. (Unclassified)

Internal

6. Changes Continue in Southwest Personnel

Radio Chengtu on May 17 (1330 GMT), for the first time identified Liao Chih-kao as First Secretary of the Szechuan Provincial Committee of the CCP, Kuo Lin-hsiang as Commissar of the Chengtu Military Region, and Ch'en Kang as Secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the CCP (Unclassified)

Comment: Liao and Kuo have assumed the provincial and military regional functions of CCP-CC Southwest Bureau First Secretary Li Ching-ch'uan, presumably freeing him to devote more of his time to national affairs. Li was made a Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee at the Third NPC (Weeka 1). This move parallels T'ao Chu's relinquishment of his position as First Secretary of Kwangtung (Weeka 11). The change, therefore, does not indicate a downgrading of Li. There are now no regional bureau chiefs who are concurrently provincial party chiefs.

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

Department Please Pass:

BAMAKO	DAR ES SALAAM	PARIS
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BUDAPEST	MUNICH	VIENNA
		WARSAW

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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ORIGIN/ACTION

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OSD	USIA	NSA
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 Chicom

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A-763 (NO.) | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH (HANDLING INDICATOR)

Group 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

TO : Department of State

INFO: BANGKOK KARACHI NDELHI S'PORE W'NGTON 5AFJAPAN
CANBERRA KATMANDU RANGOON TAIPEI COMNAVPHL 7FLTTOKYO
CPACPLAD KLUMPUR SAIGON TOKYO 500 MIGF 13 AFMANILA
DJAKARTA MANILA SEOUL VNTIANE TAIWANDEFCOM

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: MAY 14, 1965

TO Posts listed 7 (16)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 19

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Peiping Voices Fear of New "Munich" Over Vietnam
2. Vietnam: Radhakrishnan Proposal Attacked - People Over Weapons Stressed
3. Sino-Soviet Relations: Student Suppression Issue Flogged Again
4. Dominican Republic: Propaganda Campaign Gets into High Gear After Slow Start

Internal

5. PLA Air Force Commander Dies
6. Film of Chinese Nuclear Explosion to be Shown in Hong Kong

OUTER MONGOLIA
Negative
MILITARY
Negative

1965 MAY 19 PM 2 41 CONFFLO-PBR

1965 MAY 19 PM 1 24 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Action to AFE/OD Noted
Date of action May 21
Action Office RFE/AC
Name of Officer
Direction to RM/R file

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: HIsham POL:DAnderson,GMetson,JThomas:drb, 5/13/65 Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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External

1. Peiping Voices Fear of New "Munich" Over Vietnam

The 20th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany served as a timely occasion for Peiping to: lecture the Soviets (though without naming them directly) against "plotting another Munich" over Vietnam; label the United States as a "more dangerous and insidious" enemy than Nazi Germany, although beset by greater military disadvantages, such as overextended forces and "pampered soldiers far inferior to Hitler's Fascist Army"; emphasize China's preparedness to deal with a US "attack" on any scale; and reaffirm Peiping's determiniation to continue support for the "Vietnamese people" whether or not the US were to "bomb China and enlarge the war."

These were the principal themes of two lengthy articles in People's Daily, May 9 and Red Flag, May 10, the latter signed by PLA Chief of Staff, Lo Jui-Ching.

Of particular interest, in connection with Peiping's warnings against another "Munich" allegedly being plotted in unspecified quarters (Brezhnev and Kosygin were all but directly identified as the Chamberlain and Daladier of our times), were discussions in both articles of the possibilities of negotiating with "imperialists." While conceding that such negotiations were "perfectly permissible and even necessary" so long as the "basic interests of the people" were not violated (the two Geneva agreements were cited as examples), People's Daily insisted that:

1. It is impossible to gain through talks what is not won on the battlefield, and
2. Even when certain agreements were reached, "imperialists never keep their word and may tear up agreements at any time."

Both articles scored those who would make concessions to the "aggressor" and pinned their hopes for preventing war on such negotiations.

Comment: This discussion provided new evidence of marked Chinese sensitivity on the whole negotiations question. These articles, together with other recent Chinese animadversions against Soviet policy in Vietnam (WEEKA No. 18), suggest continuing Chinese disquiet over the course of developments in South Vietnam, particularly since the April 10-17 DRV-Soviet

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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consultations and in the light of continuing US military buildup. With respect to the Soviet role, Lu Ting-yi's speech in East Berlin, for example, reflected discomfiture over the political leverage Moscow might gain from Soviet military deliveries to the DRV: "In speaking of aid, we should first of all thank the Vietnamese people for their aid to us... . Our aid to Vietnam is something incumbent upon us, not something to be bragged about." And People's Daily felt constrained to emphasize once again Peiping's refusal to submit to the CPSU line of "Soviet-US cooperation for the domination of the world." All this renewed stridency and tedious length pointed rather to an underlying lack of confidence than to that lofty assurance of "inevitable victory" which these articles were designed to convey. (Congentels 1716, 1726) (Confidential)

2. Vietnam: Radhakrishnan Proposal Attacked - People Over Weapons Stressed

Indian President Radhakrishnan's April 24 proposal for a mutual cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and the establishment of an Afro-Asian force to police and maintain the border between North and South Vietnam was attacked in an uninspired People's Daily "Observer" article May 9. In language reminiscent of its recent denunciation of the seventeen-nation appeal for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam question (WEEKA No. 17), "Observer" described the Indian proposal as "a new plot to use the Afro-Asian countries to serve the US aggression against Vietnam" and "absolve the US from its crimes of aggression and undermine the Vietnamese people's struggle." Since the Indian ICC representative had never done anything to check the US "violation and sabotage of the Geneva Agreements or its extension of the war in Vietnam," "Observer" demanded, what right had India to "impose its views on the Vietnam question?" The article made no attempt to argue against the proposal on its merits; clearly Peiping hoped the proposal would quietly expire.

Marking the eleventh anniversary of the victory of the Viet Minh forces at Dien Bien Phu, People's Daily published a May 7 editorial again taking up the cudgels for Mao's theory that it is men and not weapons that decide wars. Maintaining that the "ghostly shadow of the complete rout suffered by the French colonialist army at Dien Bien Phu" was creeping up on the US, the editorial claimed that relative strengths of the two

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

opposing forces cannot be judged "simply by the quality of weapons." In support of this argument the editorial again referred to the US "problem of a shortage of troops" spread along "an extensive front." Apparently unconvinced by its own claim concerning the US' relative weakness, the editorial then argued that, in any case, the situation can be altered, and by correct leadership and persistent struggle the "imperialists' superiority will...be turned into inferiority." This principle, claimed the editorial, is understood by neither the imperialists nor the modern revisionists. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: While remaining vigorously opposed to any proposals for a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam question, Peiping is beginning to sound more and more concerned that not only the imperialists and the modern revisionists, but perhaps the DRV as well, fails to understand the principle of reliance on "politically conscious masses." (Limited Official Use)

3. Sino-Soviet Relations: Student Suppression Issue Flogged Again

Apparently for want of a better concrete issue with which to castigate the Soviets concerning their Vietnam policy, NCNA on May 5 released a CPR Foreign Ministry note (which it said was delivered to the Soviet Embassy in Peiping April 13) protesting the USSR's refusal to readmit the four injured Chinese students who returned to Peiping amidst great fanfare following the March 4 Moscow demonstrations against US actions in Vietnam (WEEKAS No. 10 and 11). Having made a snappy recovery from their "serious wounds," the students were apparently ready to return to their studies, but on March 30 the Soviet Foreign Ministry informed the Chicom Embassy in Moscow that they had been expelled for having "wilfully discontinued their study and violated school discipline."

The protest note concluded that the USSR was "afraid" to readmit the students, fearing exposure of the "outrages" committed in suppressing the demonstration and desiring to intimidate other students and thus prevent them from similar actions in the future. The editorial charged that the Soviet Government's "perverted" actions had exposed its "sham solidarity and sham anti-imperialism," and "advised" the USSR to "admit its own error and apologize to the students." Only in this way, said the editorial, could the Soviet Union "return to the path of genuine solidarity and struggle against US imperialism."

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

CONFIDENTIAL

Meanwhile, in Leningrad, Vietnamese students appeared quite unintimidated by the March 4 imbroglio and attempted, according to NCNA, to stage a protest against US "imperialism" on April 3. A lengthy May 6 article described in lurid detail the Soviet authorities' "suppression" of this demonstration, including tearing up the students' placards and trampling underfoot the DRV flag. Russian women shed "tears of sympathy" for the female students as they were "savagely dragged...into the police vans." The article concluded that the Soviet Union's actions belied its offers of "practical support" for the "Vietnamese people."

By way of proof of their allegations, the Chicoms also published on May 6 the full text of a protest letter sent to Pravda on March 14 by twelve Vietnamese students who were involved in the Moscow March 4 incident. The letter, allegedly rebutting a March 13 letter by employees of a branch of the State Bank, denied charges of "hooliganism" and demanded that Pravda publish a correction of the "falsehoods" contained in the letter from the bank employees. The NCNA article noted that, besides Pravda, Hsinhua's Moscow office and the Vietnam News Agency had received copies of the students' letter.

Comment: The publication of both the articles and the Foreign Ministry protest note nearly one month after the events suggests that Peiping has been storing ammunition for its attacks on Soviet support for the DRV in anticipation of its relatively weak position in terms of the "practical" Soviet support it now derides. To the best of our knowledge, the Vietnam News Agency has reported none of this material, and the DRV cannot be happy over Peiping's publication of the Vietnamese students' letter. (Limited Official Use)

4. Dominican Republic: Propaganda Campaign Gets into High Gear After Slow Start

Peiping cranked up its propaganda machinery, and after some initial hesitation, on May 12 got its Dominican campaign into high gear with (1) the issuance of a statement by Mao Tse-tung; (2) a People's Daily Commentator article and (3) a mass rally attended by 100,000 in Peiping.

Mao Statement: This discourse, similar in style to his dictum on the Congo issued in 1964, is crammed with revolutionary cliches and offers nothing new regarding Peiping's view of the Dominican situation.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

P.D. Commentator Article: The article derides what it terms "President Johnson's excuses for US aggression against the Dominican Republic."

Mass Rally: The rally, which was attended by most high Government and Party leaders with the exception of Mao, was treated to a strident anti-American diatribe by Peng Chen, Political Bureau member and Mayor of Peiping. Drawing from a theme included in CPR statements on the 20th anniversary of the war against fascism, Peng stated that "The Johnson Doctrine is a refurbished version of Hitlerism; it is US fascism, which is more reactionary than Hitlerism." In an anti-Soviet thrust, he maintained that "The armed intervention in the Dominican Republic by the Johnson Administration once again proves that the nature of US imperialism will never change. The Johnson, Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations are jackals from the same lair; indeed, the Johnson Administration is even worse than the other three."

Comment: Peiping's reaction to the Dominican situation, rather restrained at first, now seems to be picking up momentum and if previous patterns are followed, we may expect several more days of "solidarity" demonstrations.

Internal

5. PLA Air Force Commander Dies

Air Force General Liu Ya-lou, a member of the CCP Central Committee and the National Defense Council, Vice Minister of National Defense and Commander of the PLA Air Force, died in Shanghai on May 7 at the age of fifty-five of a "serious illness" which "failed to respond to medical treatment" (NCNA, May 7). Liu, who has been commander of the Air Force since its inception, was reappointed to the National Defense Council by the Third NPC in January of this year, but appears to have been inactive since October 29, 1964 when he attended a reception for Pakistan Air Commodore Nur Khan. Previous to that date he appeared frequently, so it would seem that he became incapacitated in November. His reappointment to the National Defense Council emphasizes the ritual nature of some of the appointments of the Third NPC (K'o Ch'ing-shih was appointed a Vice Minister by that Congress).

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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CCP-CC Vice Chairman and Defense Minister Lin Piao, who was chairman of the funeral committee, went to the Peiping airport on May 8 to meet Liu's remains and officiated at the funeral on May 11. These appearances taken together with his move from Shanghai (WEEKA No. 16) probably indicate that Lin's health has in fact improved. (Limited Official Use)

6. Film of Chinese Nuclear Explosion to be Shown in Hong Kong

A documentary color film entitled Successful Explosion of Our First Atomic Bomb was released for showings during the May Day celebrations. Audience reaction was reportedly enraptured. The film reportedly shows transportation of equipment and instruments to the test site, the explosion and mushroom cloud, as well as political events, including Chou En-lai's announcement of the explosion and a militia parade in Peiping. Advertisements in the Hong Kong press indicate that the film will be shown here soon. (Unclassified)

Comment: In Hong Kong the film on the atomic explosion will be shown together with the revolutionary opera, Red Lantern Tale, which will appear after the current showing of a film on T'ai Shan and the main Confucian temple/comes there to an end, probably in two weeks. ConGen officers will view the film. (Limited Official Use)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POL 54(18)

DATE: 30 April 65 MSG NO.: A-728 TYPE: airgram

FROM: H.K TO: State

SUBJECT: weeka #17

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ✓ OTHER: _____

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

✓ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

_____ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

[redacted]

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ORIGIN/ACTION

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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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A-711 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

1965 APR 23 PM 4 33

TO : Department of State

INFO: BANGKOK KARACHI NDELHI S'PORE W'NGTON 7FLTTOKYO
CANBERRA KATMANDU RANGOON TAIPEI COMNAVPHL TAIWANDEFCOM
ORM-1 CPACPLAD KLUMPUR SAIGON TOKYO SOCMILGP 13AFMANILA
DJAKARTA MANILA SEOUL VNTIANE 5AFJAPAN

PASS (16) LISTED P-7

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: April 23, 1965

SUBJECT : COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 16

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Peiping Counters Soviet Offer of Volunteers - Broadens Call for "Popular Support" for Vietnamese People's Struggle"
2. Afro-Asian Affairs:Bandung Anniversary Observed - Peaceful Coexistence Theme Notably Absent
3. Thailand: More Support for Anti-Thanom Movement
4. Brazil: Chinese Deportees Arrive in Geneva

Internal

5. K'o Ch'ing-shih Obsequies Observed in Peiping and Shanghai
6. Lin Piao Makes Second Appearance
7. More "China Youth" Fallout
8. T'an Cheng Formally Dropped as Vice Minister of Defense

OUTER MONGOLIA
Negative
MILITARY
Negative

1965 APR 30 PM 5 38

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: POL:DAnderson,GMetson,JThomas:drb, 4/22/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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1. Vietnam: Peiping Counters Soviet Offer of Volunteers - Broadens Call for "Popular Support" for Vietnamese People's Struggle"

Peiping this week 1) reiterated its offer to "send its own men / or "people" to fight together with the Vietnamese people" in an apparent effort to counter the Soviet pledge contained in the April 18 DRV-USSR joint communique; 2) attempted to project an image of an ever broadening base of "popular support" for the "Vietnamese people's struggle;" and 3) reiterated its stand against negotiations, again curtly refusing British proposals for a visit to China by former Foreign Secretary Gordon-Walker.

1) New Pledge to "Fight Together With Vietnamese People"

Although Peiping has thus far made no mention of the DRV-USSR joint communique which was released April 18 following high level discussions in Moscow by Soviet leaders and the DRV delegation headed by Le Duan, (the DRV delegation arrived in Peiping April 18) it responded swiftly with an April 20 resolution by the NPC Standing Committee calling on the Chinese people a) to open a massive study campaign on the basis of recent DRV and Chicom statements on Vietnam; b) to work harder / and to use "actual deeds" to support the Vietnamese people; and c) "to make full preparations to send their own people to fight together with the Vietnamese people and drive out the US aggressors in the event that US imperialism continues to escalate its war of aggression and the Vietnamese people need them." The reference to sending "people" parallels the Soviet pledge, contained in the joint communique, that "should the US increase its aggression against the DRV, when necessary and when requested by the Government of the DRV, the Soviet Government would allow Soviet citizens to go to Vietnam." It is noteworthy, however, that the Chinese statement is basically the same as Peiping's response to the March 22 SVN National Liberation Front appeal, wherein the regime said it was prepared to send its "men" at any time that the Vietnamese people requested them, and is thus equally cautious in giving an unequivocal Chinese commitment.

2) Increased Emphasis on "Popular Opposition to US Aggression in Vietnam."

Elsewhere this week pledges of China's support for the "people's struggle" in Vietnam, while strident, generally tapered off into rather general statements on "the rising tide of popular opposition" to US policies in Vietnam. Thus, Peng Chen, addressing a 10,000 person rally celebrating the 10th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, claimed that the "Chinese people are willing to take

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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emergency action to force the aggressors to get out of Vietnam" and "will go a step forward in supporting them (the Vietnamese) according to their needs," but the emphasis of the speech, however, was on the duty of "all Asian-African countries and peoples" and "all countries and people that love peace and uphold justice." It appears that, in the context of the 10th anniversary of the Bandung Conference (See Item 2), Peiping is attempting to expand what heretofore has been an "international socialist duty" to support the "Vietnamese people" into an Afro-Asian "duty" as well. On other fronts, both NCNA and VNA have given considerable prominance to demonstrations opposing US policy in Vietnam held in the United States and elsewhere, such as the Washington student demonstration and the protest by " scores of peace marchers" in Johnson City, Texas. In this connection, the NPC Standing Committee resolution cited above also called for public opinion around the world to mobilize in support of the "Vietnamese people's struggle against US imperialist aggression" suggesting that the Chinese are now engaged in a major effort to bring about such a mobilization.

Comment: Both the DRV-USSR joint communique and the NPC Standing Committee resolution, while again raising the spectre of "volunteers" or "sending our own people" to Vietnam, are carefully hedged, requiring an increase in "aggression" by the United States and a judgment as to the necessity of such assistance. Regarding the mobilization of world opinion against the US actions in Vietnam, we feel that Peiping has Bandung II very much in mind as a good forum to stir up such opinion. (Confidential)

2. Afro-Asian Affairs: Bandung Anniversary Observed - Peaceful Coexistence Theme Notably Absent

Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi arrived in Djakarta April 16 to attend the Tenth Anniversary celebration of the first Bandung Conference. An April 18 People's Daily editorial hailing the opening of the meeting was entitled "Hold Still Higher the Bandung Banner of Unity in Opposition to Imperialism" and set the tone of Peiping's views on Afro-Asian solidarity. In the entire lengthy editorial the words "peaceful coexistence" - formerly the essence of the "Bandung spirit" - appear not once, and the only reference to the ten "Bandung principles" was the rather embarrassed expression of hope that this conference would make the principles "more concrete." Just what Peiping meant by this was made abundantly clear by the rest of the editorial which was a diatribe against US "imperialism" in every part of the globe.

Comment: This meeting, which appears to be hewing closely to the Peiping line on every issue from Vietnam to the Congo, will afford

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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a high level view of the tactics which the Chicoms and their followers will probably adopt at the second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers. (Limited Official Use)

3. Thailand: More Support for Anti-Thanom Movement

Lt. Col. Phayom Chulanont, described by NCNA as the "representative abroad of the Thailand Patriotic Front," arrived in Peiping April 17 from Kunming. Among those present at the airport were the recently arrived "liaison representative" of the Thailand Independence Movement, Mon Kon Nanakon, and the acting head of the NLF permanent delegation in Peiping, Nguyen Minh Phuong, as well as Liao Ch'eng-chih.

Speaking at a banquest in honor of Phayom on April 19, Liao Ch'eng-chih welcomed his arrival in China which he said was accomplished after "breaking through many obstacles." Liao stated that "support for the Thai people's struggle against US imperialism was an inescapable responsibility of the Chinese people." In reply Col. Phayom described the necessity of carrying out a struggle against the Thanom Government and the US through use of a "patriotic front." (Unclassified)

Comment: The arrival of a second Thai delegation in Peiping reemphasizes the Chicoms' interest in Thailand and makes more explicit than ever their view that Thailand is high on their list of targets for subversion. (Limited Official Use)

4. Brazil: Chinese Deportees Arrive in Geneva

In what we hope will be the last chapter to this story, the nine Chinese "trade personnel and newsmen" who were deported from Brazil on April 17 were welcomed by CPR Embassy and Consulate officials April 18 during a stopover in Geneva on the way home. The night before, the group had been greeted by officials of the Pakistani Embassy when its plane stopped over in Lisbon. NCNA, following previous lines taken in this case, maintained that the group was the "victim" of a "frame-up" engineered by US imperialists and Brazilian reactionaries.

A statement issued by the group in Geneva alleged that it had obtained its freedom as a result of "the spirited protests of the Chinese people and government and the powerful solidarity of the people of all countries in the world who uphold justice."

The group now heads for Peiping, where presumably a big welcome is in store.

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Internal

5. K'o Ch'ing-shih Obsequies Observed in Peiping and Shanghai

K'o Ch'ing-shih, Politburo member, First Secretary of the East China Bureau of the CCP-CC, and Mayor of Shanghai, who died in Chengtu on April 9 (WEEKA 15), was given a full panoply of funeral honors. Before the cremation in Chengtu last respects were paid by Chu Te, Tung Pi-wu, Ho Lung and a host of other dignitaries. The plane carrying his ashes was met at Peiping Airport by senior-most CCP figures including Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, P'eng Chen, Li Hsien-nien, and Lu Ting-i. K'o's funeral committee was headed by Liu Shao-ch'i and included Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, Chen Yun, and a mixed bag. Fifty thousand people in Peiping and "tens of thousands" of people in Shanghai visited his urn or funeral exhibit, and the funeral, which was held in Peiping on April 13, was attended by 13,000. Liu Shao-ch'i officiated and Teng Hsiao-p'ing gave an uninspired funeral oration, heard by Chou En-lai, P'eng Chen, etc. In Shanghai a memorial service was attended by Lin Piao, T'an Chen-lin, Liu Ning-i and twelve thousand others.

Press coverage in the People's Daily was also extravagant. The announcement of K'o's death and membership of the funeral committee was set in a black bordered box and took up most of three columns on the front page. The next two days contained little but a quatrain written by Chu Te in K'o's honor, but on April 13, 14 and 15 about half the second page was devoted to photos, stories about the ceremonies, condolences from foreign governments and parties, and an elegy by T'ao Chu.

Comment: The prodigious expenditure of time on the part of the entire CCP high command in deference to K'o Ching-shih is probably due to the fact that K'o represents the highest-ranking member of the Old Guard to depart Mao Tse-tung's earthly paradise for redder pastures. Undoubtedly each one of the diminishing band of brothers present at the rites asked himself "who's next?" (Limited Official Use)

6. Lin Piao Makes Second Appearance

Minister of Defense and CCP Politburo member Lin Piao attended memorial services for K'o Ch'ing-shih (see Item 5) in Shanghai on April 14 (Unclassified)

Comment: This is the second appearance for Lin this year (WEEKA 12).

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However, rather than being indicative of any recovery of health, judging from the way that both of Lin's recent appearances have been in Shanghai, and that he did not attend the big show in Peiping, we assume he is simply too fragile to circulate. (Unclassified)

7. More "China Youth" Fallout

Canadian correspondent Charles Taylor, who is presently visiting Hong Kong from Peiping,has stuck to the story he filed concerning alleged pro-KMT propaganda contained in a painting displayed on the back cover of China Youth issue number 24 (WEEKAS 10,13) by insisting that whether or not anti-regime characters were actually present in the painting's brushwork, senior cadres in Peiping had thought they could discern them and had gone into a flap. Taylor, who does not know Chinese himself, states that his informant took the matter quite seriously. The flap, he averred, was heightened by his dispatch which the regime found "embarrassing." In an apparent effort to squelch rumors of the painting's subversiveness, the painting was reproduced in the Peiping Daily last week as a good example of revolutionary art, but without other comment, thereby indicating the regime's concern in showing that all is really well. (Limited Official Use)

In the meantime, a Hong Kong newspaper has criticized the GRC for altering the characters "Kai-shek" to "Tsung-t'ung" (President) in its publication of the painting, thereby vitiating a "genuine" piece of anti-Communist propaganda. This argument turns on a point of Chinese politesse according to which a distinguished person is always referred to by title. (Limited Official Use)

8. T'an Cheng Formally Dropped as Vice Minister of Defense

Senior General T'an Cheng, a member of the CCP-CC, was formally dismissed from his post as a Vice Minister of National Defense at the 154th meeting of the State Council, which was held on March 27 (NCNA, April 11). This was the last of the three high posts he formerly held, the others having been Secretary of the CCP Secretariat and Director of the General Political Department of the PLA. (Unclassified)

Comment: T'an's power, with the loss of the vice ministerial post which he has held nominally since 1954, would now seem to have completely destroyed, since his membership in the Central Committee appears purely vestigial. The attrition of Tan's power commenced in 1961, which apparently was the last time he appeared as Director of the General Political Department of the PLA. Hsiao Hua, who

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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as Deputy Director appeared frequently from 1961 on, was finally appointed Director of the General Political Department in September 1964, having apparently been exercising the real power long before (WEEKA 39). It was speculated that T'an had been involved in Defense Minister P'eng Te-huai's "pro-Russian faction." Whatever T'an's relationships to P'eng were, in September 1959, at the same time that P'eng was dismissed, T'an was reappointed Vice Minister of Defense. Later, in September 1962, T'an was removed from the Central Secretariat of the CCP together with a P'eng protege, Senior General Huang K'o-ch'eng, who had been dismissed from positions as Chief of the General Staff and a Vice Minister of Defense at the same time that P'eng was dismissed. T'an has appeared since that time. Some of his last appearances wearing his vice ministerial hat were in July 1963 when he appeared at the airport to see off and welcome back Teng Hsiao-p'ing's delegation to Moscow. It is not clear whether T'an's recent dismissal is due to lingering "P'eng-ist" tendencies, but in view of the time-lapse it may be speculated that he has been guilty of still other errors of thinking in this time of ideological tightening-up. It is also possible that he has simply been removed for being dead wood. (Limited Official Use)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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BUDAPEST	MUNICH	VIENNA
		WARSAW

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ORIGIN/ACTION

INR-10

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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A-700 (NO.) | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH (HANDLING INDICATOR)

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.

TO : Department of State

INFO: BANGKOK KARACHI NDELHI S'PORE W'NGTON 7FLTTOKYO
CANBERRA KATMANDU RANGOON TAIPEI COMNAVPHL TAIWANDEFCOM
CPACPLAD K.LUMPUR SAIGON TOKYO 500MIGF 13AFMANILA
DJAKARTA MANILA SEOUL VNTIANE 5AFJAPAN

PASS (16) LISTED P-7

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG DATE: April 16, 1965

SUBJECT : COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 15

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Peiping Sees "Swindle" in President's Proposals; Rebuffs Two Prospective Mediators.
2. Restrained Treatment of US-Chicom Air Engagement over Hainan
3. Japan: Peiping Renews Attack on Sato Government
4. Travel Notes

Internal

5. Another Veteran Leader Dies
6. Party Permits Custom of Revering Graves of Relatives

OUTER MONGOLIA
Negative

MILITARY
Negative

RFE/LR Noted 4/22 RFE/LR

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL:HIsham,DAnderson,GMetson:drb, 4/15/65. JThomas

Contents and Classification Approved by: JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

External

1. Vietnam: Peiping Sees "Swindle" in President's Proposals; Rebuffs Two Prospective Mediators

Peiping's first authoritative response to President Johnson's April 7 Johns Hopkins speech came on April 11 in a People's Daily "Observer" article which 1)denounced the President's call for unconditional discussions as "a swindle pure and simple;" 2) termed the President's proposal for a development program for Southeast Asia "a gross insult to the great people of Vietnam;" and 3) described the President's references to China as "war threats" designed to "make the Chinese people stop supporting the revolutionary struggles of the Vietnamese and other peoples." This was followed up by a People's Daily editorial on April 13 which limited itself to rather generalized claims of US "failure" in Vietnam and allegations that any US "peace hoax" will be foiled. Peiping's contempt for attempts by UN Secretary General U Thant and former UK Foreign Secretary Gordon-Walker to explore possibilities of settlement was made abundantly clear in an April 12 People's Daily editorial entitled "U Thant is Knocking at the Wrong Door," and by a Foreign Ministry note of April 12 coldly rejecting a UK proposal for a visit by a "special representative."

A. Johnson Proposals a "Big Swindle" - People's Daily "Observer" attacked the President's proposals for unconditional discussions as actually having raised three "preposterous conditions," namely: 1) the call for an "independent Vietnam -- securely guaranteed" was denounced as a "ruling out of the reunification of Vietnam and flouting of the Geneva Agreements;" 2) the demand that South Vietnam must enjoy "freedom from attack" was twisted into a demand that "the South Vietnamese people must stop their just struggle against the US and their lackeys;" and 3) the statement that the US "will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement" was interpreted as meaning that the US intends to "remain in domination over South Vietnam." In reply to these alleged "conditions" "Observer" repeated the NLF's March 22 statement that "all negotiations with the US imperialists at this moment are utterly useless" unless the US completely withdraws from Vietnam.

B. SEA Development Program Denounced - The "Observer" article angrily denounced the President's proposal for a massive development scheme in Southeast Asia, claiming that "in fact, Johnson was saying all you Asians are poor beggars . . . Asians, give up your revolution!" Peiping's denunciation was mild, however, by

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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comparison with Nhan Dan's vitriolic editorial denunciation of the proposal on April 11. The editorial, entitled "Dark Brain in the White House," scoffed at the "stinking bait" offered by the President and calculated that he was asking Southeast Asians to sell out their countries for ten dollars per person.

C. CPR Solidarity with Vietnam Reaffirmed

The "Observer" article noted that the President's speech had "repeatedly mentioned China by name" and charged that he intended to carry out "war threats" to make the Chinese people stop supporting the Vietnamese people. China and Vietnam, it was claimed, are "neighbors interdependent like the lips and the teeth" and the Chinese people, unlike some "national egoists who see only what is under their noses," (i.e. the CPSU leaders) will "fight shoulder to shoulder" with the Vietnamese to the end.

D. U Thant Mediation Unacceptable

Meanwhile, the United Nations and its Secretary General, U Thant, were bluntly told that China would oppose any moves to introduce the UN into the search for a Vietnam settlement. A People's Daily editorial of April 12, noting that U Thant had recently indicated a desire to go to China to explore the possibilities of a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam question, snapped that, if U Thant was undertaking this activity in the capacity of UN Secretary General, he could "spare himself this trouble." The United Nations "has never observed justice on the Vietnam question," the editorial charged, could have no say whatsoever concerning a settlement of the South Vietnam question, and no exception would be made for anybody.

F. Gordon-Walker Unwelcome in Peiping

On April 12 the Chicom Foreign Ministry replied to a UK proposal to send Patrick Gordon-Walker as special representative to Peiping to discuss the Vietnam problem with a note flatly stating that in view of British policy on Vietnam it would be "inconvenient and unwelcome" to receive such a representative. By supporting US "aggression" in Vietnam the UK had "completely violated the principles of the 1954 Geneva Agreements," the note claimed, and had "abandoned" its duties as Co-chairman. The note's terseness and lack of supporting rationale for the turndown suggested Peiping was aware that refusing even to discuss peace would be difficult to explain to foreign opinion.

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Comment: Peiping's denunciation of the President's April 7 speech was a fairly predictable variant on its pet "counter-revolutionary dual tactics" theme that "peaceful negotiations" as put forward by the US are a complete fraud designed to lure the Vietnamese people into ceasing their struggle at a time when the US is losing the war in the South. The attack on the President's call for an independent Vietnam on the grounds that it would rule out efforts for reunification, however, represents a new tack and one which is at variance with the plank in the NLF's program of an "independent, neutral" South Vietnam, a demand that Peiping has hitherto consistently supported. (Confidential) (Congentel 1563)

2. Restrained Treatment of US-Chicom Air Engagement over Hainan

In a brief announcement April 9, Peiping claimed that eight US aircraft had entered China's territorial airspace over Hainan Island, and that, after Chinese planes took off to meet them, the US planes had fled "in panic," one of the US planes being hit by a guided missile fired by another US plane in the confusion. There was no mention of US claims that one MIG had been shot down. On April 11 a People's Daily editorial denouncing this "flagrantly aggressive act," alleged that US official denials of the intrusion were "full of loopholes and contradictions," and that the US "must bear the full serious consequences of its military provocations." The editorial claimed that "the existence of the criminal evidence of one US plane, hit by another, falling into the area of Hainan is iron reality, from which the aggressors are unable to escape." The editorial stressed the "fright and panic" of the US aircraft when Chinese planes took off to meet them. The April 13 People's Daily carried photographs of an US-made auxiliary fuel tank and fragments of a "Sparrow" missile which supposedly fell on Hainan some 45 kilometers from the coast.

Comment: Peiping has chosen to treat this "provocation" - the first time US and Chinese aircraft have been directly engaged in hostilities since the Korean War - in a relatively restrained manner, suggesting that the Chinese Communists, while using the incident to embellish the picture of US bellicosity, also wish to convey the impression that they can cope with US air intrusions, and that the US is afraid of tangling with the Chicom air force. (Confidential) (Congentel1569)

3. Japan: Peiping Renews Attack on Sato Government

A PD Commentator article on April 8 renewed Peiping's attacks on the Sato Government, accusing it of trying to sabotage the "positive results" which had been achieved in Sino-Japanese relations over the years. Terming the Sato Government "downright

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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reactionary, undisguisedly pro-America and blatantly hostile to China," Commentator said that the "trade by memorandum" agreement (the Liao-Takasaki Agreement) was "in danger of being wrecked."

In a Peoples Daily editorial the previous day the Chicoms strongly criticized the ROK-Japan agreement and repeated Chinese charges that the agreement was engineered by the U.S. and would result in a "dual colony" managed by U.S. imperialists and Japanese monopolists. The April 8 editorial alleged that Japan hoped to make profits through a Far Eastern war started by the U.S. As an example that this was already happening, Commentator claimed that 92% of the napalm bombs dropped by U.S. planes in Vietnam were manufactured by Japanese enterprises.

Comment: The successful conclusion of the Japan-ROK talks and Peiping's cancellation of the Hitachi ship contract due to Japan's continued adherence to the "Yoshida letter" produced the expected denunciations. Their relatively restrained tone, however, suggests that, while desiring to keep up the pressure on the Sato Government, they do not feel that a repetition of the unrestrained abuse poured out in October of last year and again in February of this year would be profitable at this time. Peiping's line amounts to: "You are heading for trouble, but there is still time to change your ways." (Limited Official Use)

4. Travel Notes

UAR: Hussein Zulfacar Sabry, Adviser for Foreign Affairs to President Nasser, had talks with Chen Yi April 7 and was received by Chou En-lai on April 9 and 10 and by Liu Shao-Chi April 10. NCNA summaries listed no specific purpose for his visit, but likely topics for the high level discussions between Sabry and Chen Yi include the Afro-Asian Conference and the Arab-Israeli confrontation.

Africa: The NPC delegation headed by Liu Ning-yi completed its tour of Africa, visiting the Congo (Brazzaville) April 2-5, and Ghana (April 5-9), before departing for Cairo April 9. The group returned home April 13. During various speeches Liu limited himself to expressions of common opposition of the Chinese and African peoples to imperialism and hope that the second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers would "carry on the Bandung spirit." The whole trip appears to have been a fairly low-key affair.

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Internal

5. Another Veteran Leader Dies

East China Regional Bureau Chief K'o Ch'ing-shih, 63, who (along with his counterpart in the South China Bureau, T'ao Chu) was elected Vice Premier of the State Council at the last NPC (WEEKA 1), died April 9 in Ch'engtu of a serious illness.

K'o's prestige in the Party is illustrated by the description of him in his obituary as "Comrade Mao Tse-tung's close comrade in arms." His funeral committee was headed by Liu Shao-ch'i and included Mao and 82 others, the funeral itself was attended by Liu, Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and thirteen thousand others, with Teng making the memorial speech. K'o held the following positions at the time of death: member of the CCP-CC, member of the CC Politburo, Vice Premier of the State Council, First Secretary of the CCP-CC East China Bureau, First Political Commissar of the Nanking Military District, First Secretary of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee, and Mayor of Shanghai. (Unclassified)

Comment: K'o had seldom appeared since February 1964, being represented on most formal occasions by a deputy, and the British representative in Shanghai was told K'o suffered from a serious illness. One of K'o's last ceremonial functions was in March when he was named Chairman of Shao Shih-p'ing's funeral committee (WEEKA 13), though he did not attend the funeral. K'o's elevation to the position of Vice Premier in December 1964 led to speculation that he had at least partially recovered from his illness, but he apparently did not have time to exercise his new functions, and it would seem that the honor was a personal accolade granted in pursuance of the Party's policy of drawing the regional bureau chiefs into increased activity in the national arena. K'o's death, which must have been expected by the Party, points up the singularity of the trust reposed in T'ao Chu, who now is the only regional bureau chief who is also a Vice Premier, and thus the main beneficiary of the decision to give the regional chiefs national roles. (Limited Official Use)

6. Party Permits Custom of Revering Graves of Relatives

A relatively tolerant official attitude toward the Chinese custom of worshipping at graves of relatives during the Ching Ming festival emerged from the letters column of the People's Daily March 31. In many places, said the editors, the masses

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

organized activities to "revere the graves of revolutionary martyrs, and conduct education in revolutionary traditions;" this was a favorable thing, even though some people might "express superstitious thinking or other incorrect thinking." Quoting Mao's statement that "it is not necessary for others to meddle too early in getting rid of bodhisatvas," the editors pointed out that the Party "does not adopt the incorrect method of churlish interference and prohibition." Therefore, "we not only approve of the activities revering the graves of revolutionary martyrs during Ching Ming, but also do not oppose the masses sweeping the graves of their relatives." (Unclassified)

Comment: This column was obviously inserted to warn over-zealous cadres and youth organization members from causing unnecessary irritation by trying to interfere with this custom. Nevertheless, one activity which previously was common at Ching Ming, sweeping the untended graves of unrelated persons of the same surname, is evidently still not approved. (Unclassified)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

Department Please Pass:

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		MOSCOW

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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ORIGIN: ACTION

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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSO	USIA	NSA
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-687 NO. | CONFIDENTIAL | AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: BANGKOK KARACHI NDELHI S'PORE W'NGTON 7FLTTOKYO
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CPACPLAD K.LUMPUR SAIGON TOKYO 500MIGF TAIWANDEFCOM
DJAKARTA MANILA SEOUL VNTIANE 5AFJAPAN

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: April 9m 1965

SUBJECT : COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 14

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Extravagant New Victory Claims - UK's Role Attacked
2. Chou En-lai on UN, Afro-Asian Tactics
3. Tanzania: "Revolution in Africa" - Sedition - But by Whom?
4. United States: US "Pilotless Reconnaissance Plane" on Display in Peiping

Internal

5. Kwangtung "Four Clearances" Campaign Reaches Masses, Punishments Meeted
6. New Round of Conferences in Peiping

1965 APR 12 AM 10 56

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FORM DS-323 14-62

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Drafted by: POL:HIsham,DAnderson,GMetson:drb 4/8/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

1. Vietnam: Extravagant New Victory Claims - UK's Role Attacked

A. New DRV "Victories"

Peiping's coverage of South Vietnam this week incongruously combined braggadocio over alleged DRV victories, new charges of US atrocities in the South, emphasis on alleged gloom among US officials and commentators, and - most significant of all - a sharp attack upon the British Government's behavior as Geneva Co-Chairman. In Cairo, Chou En-lai reiterated the pledge to send men to fight in South Vietnam if requested and reaffirmed demands for complete US withdrawal from the South as condition for any settlement.

The most extravagant of many "great victory" claims to appear this week was a report, originating with the "South Vietnam Liberation Press Agency" and carried without comment by NCNA, that "one hundred and sixty-eight American aggressors, including one of the General rank, were killed" in the bomb explosion at the US Embassy in Saigon. Somewhat more accurately, the report stated that forty-nine were injured. With the increased intensity of US strikes, the DRV's claims of aircraft downed have jumped sharply, reaching a total of 103 planes between August 5, 1964 (the Tonkin Gulf incident) and April 1, 1965. In addition, on April 3 and 4 alone Hanoi claimed a total of 57 planes shot down. Hailing this "great victory," the People's Daily, in an April 5 editorial linked the DRV's "successes" with its own claims of two US pilotless planes downed this week (see Item 4) and concluded that "the struggle of the Vietnamese people is our struggle." The meticulous recording of US aircraft allegedly shot down is becoming as much a fixture of ChiCom propaganda as the issuance of "serious warnings".

B. First Blood by DRV Air Force Held to Disprove US Air Superiority

Commenting upon the first engagement of DRV fighters with US aircraft on April 3, Peiping Ta Kung Pao editorially exulted over this "severe punishment," without specifying how many US aircraft had been shot down in the engagement, exclaiming, "Alas, US air superiority!" Even the Americans themselves, declared the paper, now had to admit that their planes were "no good." NCNA embroidered the theme of a "panic-stricken" US by carrying a melodramatic VNA account of the DRV pilots clenching their teeth and firing all guns as the US pilots tried in vain to escape and "save their skins."

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C. US Atrocities Charged

Peiping's cries of outrage at US use of "noxious gases" tapered off considerably this week, and on a much lower level the protest shifted to the use of napalm to set fire to a Viet Cong stronghold in the Boi Loi area. An April 3 People's Daily Commentary condemning the "fire attack" charged that "US imperialism has outdone the Nazi Hitlerites in cruelty and barbarity with its bloody crimes against the 14 million South Vietnamese people."

D. Apprehensive US Public Opinion

Illustrating US popular "dismay" and "gloom" at the course of events in South Vietnam, NCNA on March 31 reported a Nhan Dan editorial which claimed that "tens of thousands of American people . . . went to the streets to demand that the US administration end its war of aggression in South Vietnam." NCNA also reported Administration leaders' briefings of the House Foreign Affairs Sub-committee and US Mayors as an attempt to "defy popular demand," and cited articles from the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor as proof of US "popular concern" at the "failure" of US policy in Vietnam.

E. UK Lashed Over Geneva Co-Chairman Duties

A People's Daily Commentator article on April 5 directly attacked Britain's Labor Government for its support of US policies, charging that it had "sunk to the level of a dishonorable accomplice in US aggression against Vietnam and is serving as the pitiable junior partner of US imperialism." Having taken this course, Commentator warned, the Labor Government "is incapacitating itself for work as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference." (Limited Official Use)

2. Chou En-lai on UN, Afro-Asian Tactics

During his brief stopover in Cairo Premier Chou En-lai was interviewed by the Editor-in-Chief of the Middle East News Agency on April 2. In addition to reiterating China's position on Vietnam (Item 1), Chou also touched on the United Nations and the Second Afro-Asian Conference scheduled for Algiers in June.

Chou claimed that the struggle to have the UN "correct its mistakes and to have it thoroughly reorganized is developing day by day," and he perhaps provided the clearest hint to date as to China's motives in advocating the setting up of a "revolutionary" United Nations. Chou said that China's call "helps to

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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strengthen the right of Asian and African countries to have their say in the United Nations, helps their struggle for exposing the United Nations and demanding the correction of its mistakes and its thorough reorganization." Thus Chou cast the Chinese proposal as a means of leverage for Afro-Asian members rather than the less plausible threat to establish a "rival" UN at any early date.

Speaking on the subject of the Second Afro-Asian Conference, Chou revealed China's view that, "The non-alignment policy of peace and neutrality pursued by the Asian and African countries is in fact pointed at US imperialism." He explained that, since World War II, the United States has been "whipping up aggressive military blocs and military alliances for the purpose of controlling its allies." Thus, he explained, although there are "different peculiarities" between the Afro-Asian solidarity group and the genuinely non-aligned, "their spearheads are directed against imperialism and old and new colonialism headed by the United States."

Comment: Chou's tactical modification of the line on the United Nations follows other indications that Peiping realized it had gone out on a limb with its call for a rival UN (Congentel1201). His effort to draw the non-aligned bloc closer to the Afro-Asian bloc in common opposition to the US forecasts Chinese tactics at Bandung II (Limited Official Use)

3. Tanzania: "Revolution in Africa" - Sedition - But by Whom?

The appearance in East Africa of a new periodical, "Revolution in Africa," with an Albanian imprint produced cries of "foul" from Peiping this week. NCNA on April 5 reported an April 1 Embassy statement issued in Dar Es Salaam which claimed that the periodical's articles "wantonly distort China's policy towards Africa" and which denounced the publication as an "out-and-out forgery and a scheme for "sowing discord and undermining relations between China and various countries of Africa." In a separate article April 5, NCNA relied on Tanzanian press reports in the Nationalist and Uhuru, press organs of the ruling Tanu Party, to point the finger of guilt at the United States. The Tanzanian Standard, described as a "British owned paper in the capital," was also denounced for reprinting articles from the periodical and for editorially demanding government action against this type of seditious literature. (Limited Official Use)

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4. United States: US "Pilotless Reconnaissance Plane" on Display in Peiping

Amid claims that PLA units had brought down two US "pilotless high-altitude reconnaissance military planes" this week, Peiping put on public display at the Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution a similar aircraft which was allegedly brought down January 2 of this year over Central-south China. Banners proclaimed that the US "paper Tiger" was being beaten and trounced everywhere. Foreign diplomats and journalists were invited to see the wreckage, which, based on a photograph appearing in the April 2 People's Daily, appeared to be reasonably intact. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: By chance a British diplomat visiting Peiping from London was among those permitted to view the display on opening day, and somewhat to his discomforture was photographed as he inspected the markings, which established the aircraft's manufacture in the United States. (Limited Official Use)

Internal

5. Kwangtung "Four Clearances" Campaign Reaches Masses, Punishments Meeted

As appropriate in Mao's utopia, the "four clearances" campaign has been divided into two, a first stage "small four clearances" campaign against cadres, and a second stage "big four clearances" campaign against workers. A remarkably detailed report (FCH-5289, CONFIDENTIAL) on eight Kwangtung "four clearances" campaigns at the hsien, factory, hardware manufacturing association (possibly handicraft enterprise-type cooperative/collective organizations), and street committee levels indicates that the second stage has been reached, with workers undergoing criticism both of the self-criticism variety and criticism from fellow workers. The items to be cleared varied from campaign to campaign, but once defined remained the same for both cadres and workers. In each campaign the main target was embezzlement, perhaps due to the ubiquity of this crime among cadres during China's recent difficult years. As a result the workers in one factory were indifferent to the campaign since they had no opportunity to embezzle. However, in a hardware manufacturing association two persons, presumably employees rather than cadres, were sent up for embezzlement. Other reactions ranged from fear among some

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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workers, who knew that every time there was a campaign there were victims, to blase dissembling on the part of a Canton black-marketeer who averred that all his street committee were so familiar with past campaigns that they knew how to act to keep out of trouble.

Punishments are being dealt out to both cadre and workers in cases severe enough to merit them, indicating, perhaps, that the last stage of the socialist education campaign has been reached (WEEKA 43). Punishments appear more severe than expected in an "educational" campaign: two years' hard labor reform for embezzlement of over two thousand yuan, whereas for two thousand or below the offender merely has to make restitution. This compares with six to twelve months hard labor reform for speculation and six months for attempted escape to Hong Kong or Macao. Although workers were punished too, the real pressure was placed upon the cadre. In one street committee level campaign in Canton, three cadres committed suicide. (See also WEEKAS 53, 4, 6 and 8) (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. New Round of Conferences in Peiping

Top Party and Government leaders Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, P'eng Chen, and Li Hsien-nien held an afternoon reception on April 3 (NCNA) in Peiping for participants in various conferences and other activities currently being held, including: conferences called "by various ministries," the Chinese Navy, the "current session" of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League, the State Economic Commission, and the Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries.

Comment: This is the usual time of year for such conferences, and the fruits of their decisions will become known only gradually, if at all. (Unclassified)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Lead

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ACTION		
INR-10		
RM/R 1	REP	AF
ARA	EUR 5	FE 6
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	P	IO 2
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PC 2	RMAC 1	S/EL 1
AGR 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 10
OSD 41	USIA 11	NSA 3
		NSC 6

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: April 2, 1965

SUBJECT : COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 13

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Peiping Makes Conditional Pledge to Send Men to South Vietnam - Links Security of Vietnam with that of China
2. Sino-Soviet Relations: New Attacks on Soviet Policies toward UN Peace-keeping Force, Vietnam
3. Chou En-lai, Chen Yi Continue Travels
4. Thailand: "Liaison Representative" of Thai Independence Movement in Peiping

Internal

5. Chicoms rebuff Allegation "China Youth" Hoaxed, Rebuke Correspondent
6. Personnel Changes

OUTER MONGOLIA
Negative

MILITARY
Negative

1965 APR 5 AM 10 40

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: POL:HIsham/DAnderson/GMetson:drb, 4/1/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JHHoldridge

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

I. Vietnam: Peiping Makes Conditional Pledge to Send Men to South Vietnam - Links Security of Vietnam with that of China

In a significant hardening of its posture toward the war in South Vietnam, Peiping offered to send arms and, if requested, "men" in response to a March 22 statement of the South Vietnam Front for National Liberation which 1) proclaimed readiness to receive weapons and war materials from other countries; 2) threatened, if the US continued to commit combat troops and expand the war, to "call on the peoples of various countries to send youth and armymen" to South Vietnam; and 3) declared that, if need be, the "sons and daughters of South Vietnam who have regrouped to the North" would be recalled for action in the South.

At the same time, Peiping media exploited international reactions of dismay to the disclosure that gas had been used in South Vietnam and reported the violation of air space over Hainan by five US military aircraft on March 29, occasioning the 371st "serious warning." Peiping also charged that two US fighter planes had strafed a Chinese fishing boat "on the high seas" March 29; Chinese authorities concerned were following the "flagrant attacks" with close attention. This was the first time Peiping has charged direct US hostile action against Chinese personnel since the bombing of the ChiCom economic and cultural mission in Khang Khay, Laos, in April 1964.

Peiping's response to the NLF appeal came in a March 25 People's Daily editorial asserting the Chinese people would "join with the peoples of the whole world in sending all necessary material aid, including arms and all other war materials" to the South Vietnamese people. More dramatically, the editorial declared the Chinese people were ready to "send our own men, whenever the South Vietnamese people want them, to fight together with the South Vietnamese people to annihilate the US aggressors." Chen Yi reaffirmed both statements in a March 28 reply to the DRV Foreign Minister's letter of March 22, as did Chou En-lai in a speech at Tirana March 29.

Both the Chen Yi letter and a March 29 People's Daily editorial posited the most direct relationship thus far made between China's security and a Viet Cong victory, including the expulsion of the US from South Vietnam. People's Daily, for example, asserted that "only by throwing the US aggressors out of South Vietnam. . . can the peace and security of China be assured," and predicted that, following US "armed occupation" of South Vietnam and its "aggression" against the DRV, "its next step will be aggression against China." Chen Yi's letter declared that "China and Vietnam are closely related like lips and teeth and share each other's security and danger." The lips and teeth formulation had been used before, but only in the context of North Vietnam.

The effects of the Viet Cong bombing of the US Embassy in Saigon were gloatingly described in NCNA articles, and the bombing was termed by the Peiping March 31 Ta Kung Pao commentator a "fitting punishment meted out by the South Vietnamese people to the US aggressors" proving that "not an inch of land" was safe for the US.

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As to the theme of a possible settlement, the People's Daily singled out this aspect of President Johnson's March 25 statement and ridiculed his pledge to go anywhere and meet with anyone in search of an honorable peace.

Comment: Continued US air attacks on the DRV, which is no longer a safe sanctuary, challenge the validity of Chicom premises on the risks of conducting wars of "national liberation" and have caused China a loss of face. The attacks and evident US determination may have imposed a sense of impending danger to China itself, while President Johnson's references to honorable settlement have elicited strong counter-arguments. In any event, Peiping's escalation of the deterrent war of words has increasingly committed its prestige to the successful outcome of the war in South Vietnam. (Congentels 1459, 1476, 1985) (Confidential)

2. Sino-Soviet Relations: New Attacks on Soviet Policies toward UN Peace-keeping Force, Vietnam.

Soviet UN delegate Fedorenko's March 26 statements before the first meeting of the UN Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations in which he indicated Soviet willingness to participate in the establishment of a United Nations Force drew a swift Chinese response. A March 28 NCNA article pointedly described Fedorenko as "renewing the proposal put forward by Khrushchev," and noted that Fedorenko's suggestion that the UN force should not include forces from countries which are permanent members of the Security Council "accords with the view expressed by late US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles." Peiping's extreme sensitivity on the subject of prospective UN intervention in South Vietnam was again demonstrated by NCNA's comment that Fedorenko, "with ulterior motives," had associated the situation in Indo-China with the UN peace-keeping operations.

Having fired its own opening blast in the renewed war of polemics in a March 22 Red Flag-People's Daily editorial (Weeka 12), Peiping followed up with a lengthy summary of a parallel article from the Albanian Zeri I Popullit on March 25. The Albanian article denounced violently "the false posture of the revisionist Soviet leadership" regarding "the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people," and attacked Kosygin's indication that the invitation to President Johnson to visit the USSR was still valid which it said came "at the very moment when bombs of the US imperialists were being dropped on the territory of socialist Vietnam." The article claimed that this amounts to saying, "You Americans, do what you like in Vietnam! Don't pay any heed to what we revisionists are forced by demagogy to utter against the Johnson Administration and US imperialism." (Unclassified)

Chou En-lai's March 29 speech at Tirana (see item 3) betrayed continued Chinese suspicion that the USSR would appease the US over Vietnam, and he spoke darkly of "deliberate betrayal" of the interests of the South Vietnamese people were one to "insist" that the latter be subdued by US "bayonets and bombs." Convening the Moscow CP meeting had strategically helped the US, Chou charged, "no matter how much empty verbiage the successors of Khrushchev pour out about solidarity against imperialism." (Unclassified)

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3. Chou En-lai, Chen Yi Continue Travels

Premier Chou En-lai, after attending the funeral of Georghiu-Dej in Bucharest, visited Tirana from March 27-30 where he renewed China's pledge to send men to South Vietnam if requested and sharply attacked the modern revisionist policies of Khrushchev's successors. He then proceeded to Algiers for talks with Ben Bella, presumably centered on the forthcoming Second Afro-Asian Conference and aid to the Congolese rebels.

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Chen Yi arrived in Katmandu March 30 to begin the last stop of his three-country Asian tour. In Afghanistan and Pakistan he concluded boundary protocols and agreements on cultural cooperation. In Kabul he also concluded an agreement on economic and technical cooperation.

Comment: The only new political element added by Chen Yi's visits appeared to be the reported Chinese request that the Paks act as intermediaries with the Turks in exploring the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations.

The harshness of attacks on Soviet policies made by Chou, Shehu, and Hoxha indicated that plans had been coordinated for new actions on the "anti-revisionist" front. (Limited Official Use)

4. Thailand: "Liaison Representative" of Thai Independence Movement in Peiping

NCNA March 27 reported that Mon Kon Nanakon, the "liaison representative" of the Thailand Independence Movement, was welcomed at a banquet on March 26 hosted by Liao Cheng-chih, Chairman of the Chinese Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Mon Kon Nanakon was reported to have arrived in Peiping March 24.

Comment: Although the article did not clarify the status of the "liaison representative," this may mark the opening of a permanent office in Peiping similar to the permanent delegation of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation. The Chinese Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee is one of the two "people's" organizations to which the NLF delegation is "accredited." (Congentel 1475) (Limited Official Use)

Internal

5. ChiComs Rebuff Allegation "China Youth" Hoaxed, Rebuke Correspondent

A member of the Indian Commission in Hong Kong informed us that according to a report he received from Peiping, Canadian journalist Charles Taylor, who was the source of a report that the picture on the back cover of the No. 24 issue of China Youth contained anti-Communist propaganda (WEEKA 10) and that all copies of the issue had been recalled, was called in by the Foreign Ministry and rebuked for disseminating false information. He was informed that his story was untrue, that the magazine containing the picture had not been withdrawn, and was told to stop spreading anti-regime propaganda. (Confidential)

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Comment: A Canadian Trade Commission source here confirmed the report that Taylor had been rebuked and informed a ConGen officer that Taylor was sticking by his story. The Canadian source did not believe the Chinese would go to the extent of asking Taylor to leave Peiping, in part out of respect for the strict Canadian application of reciprocity.

As indicated in WEEKA 10, and in spite of Taylor's insistence, it seems improbable that Taylor's report has any validity. Nevertheless, the Communists' interest have shown sensitivity over the publicity given the affair. The Hong Kong March 30 Wen Wei Pao announced that the exhibit which includes this painting is presently being shown in Canton, has been shown in Peiping and Shanghai, and will be shown in Wuhan. The Wen Wei Pao pointedly mentions the picture which is the subject of Taylor's report by title and artist, and notes the fact that it appeared in China Youth. (Confidential)

6. Personnel Changes

1. Hsu Ping, also known as Hsing Hsi-p'ing, Alternate Member, CCP-CC, was identified as CCP-CC United Front Work Department Director in the March 26 NCNA (Unclassified)

Comment: This tends to confirm WEEKA 2 speculation that Li Wei-han, who formerly occupied this position, might have been relieved of his Party posts at the same time he was removed as Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and Vice Chairman of the CPPCC, evidently for his shortcomings in carrying out efforts to bring recalcitrant elements such as the intellectuals more solidly behind the regime. It appears that Li has not been mentioned in the press since it announced that he was elected to the NPC from Sinkiang. (Limited Official Use)

Hsu has been serving as a Deputy Director of the United Front Work Department and was elected Vice Chairman of the CPPCC National Committee at the end of the 4th CPPCC First Session in January. (Unclassified)

2. Shao Shih-p'ing, Alternate Member CCP-CC, member of the CCP-CC East China Bureau, Secretary of the Secretariat of CCP Kiangsi Provincial Committee, Governor of Kiangsi, aged 66, died on March 24 of illness. (Unclassified)

Comment: The old guard may never surrender, but it does die. (Unclassified)

3. Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, was identified in Radio Lhasa broadcast (March 25, 1155 GMT) as Acting Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region Preparatory Committee.

Comment: Ngapo Ngawang Jigme replaces the disgraced Panchen Lama in this post, which is not unexpected since he is now, by attrition, the top puppet in Tibet. (Unclassified)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ORIGIN ACTION		
INR-10		
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ARA	EUR 5	FE 6
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AGR 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 10
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TO : Department of State 1965 MAR 29 AM 8 00

Dept. Pass Addressees on page 6.

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FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG DATE: Mar 26, 1965

SUBJECT : COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 12

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Sino-Soviet Relations: Peiping Declares Ideological War on CPSU Leaders
2. Vietnam: New Denunciations of Peaceful Negotiations - Direct Attacks on Soviets
3. Palestine: Liberation Organization to Establish Mission in Peiping
4. United States: Peiping Draws Propaganda Capital from US Racial Violence
5. Travel Notes: Syria, Africa, Chen Yi Trip, Rumania

Internal

6. Defected GRC Intelligence Chief Appointed to Kwangtung Province CPPCC
7. Lin Piao Makes Rare Appearance in Shanghai
8. Kwangtung Party First Secretary Criticizes Youths
9. Confessions of a Backsliding Tax-collector Saved by Mao

OUTER MONGOLIA
Negative

MILITARY
Negative

Action Assigned RFE/6D
Action Taken noted
Date of Action March 31, 1965
Action Office Cmsgs INR/REE/PC
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Clearances:

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

1. Sino-Soviet Relations: Peiping Declares Ideological War on CPSU Leaders

Peiping's anticipated denunciation of the March 1-5 Moscow meeting of 19 Communist parties, in the form of a 12,000 character Red-Flag - People's Daily March 22 editorial, went beyond scoffing at the "gloomy and forlorn" meeting itself to project a 10,000 year war of words against "Khrushchev revisionism." "If nine thousand years are not enough to complete the refutation, then we shall take ten thousand."

Peiping also forecast intensified efforts to establish pro-Peiping factions among left-wing groups, and to legitimize these groups as "Marxist-Leninist" parties, noting self-critically that "we have not given enough support to the revolutionary left in some countries and henceforth must greatly intensify our endeavors in this respect."

As to relations with the post-Khrushchev leaders, Peiping set down terms for the CPSU's unconditional ideological surrender, including an admission that it had erred in convening the Moscow meeting, pursuing policies of "Khrushchevism, great power chauvinism, and splittism" and adhering to the decisions of the CPSU 20th and 22nd Party Conferences. In brief, the CPSU must admit that "all its words and deeds" against China, Albania, the Japanese Communist Party and others are all "wrong."

Comment: The new Soviet leaders, branded now as "monsters of all kinds" doomed for destruction just as inevitably as was Khrushchev, may as well resign themselves to a long, venomous, and exhausting fight. (Congentels 1450, 1455), (Limited Official Use)

2. Vietnam: New Denunciations of Peaceful Negotiations - Direct Attacks on Soviets

Continuing US air strikes against the DRV this week received rather scant notice by Peiping press media as the ChiComs directed their heavy propaganda artillery against any efforts to reach a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. The Yugoslav proposal for talks "without preconditions" came in for the heaviest censure in a March 22 People's Daily "Observer" article which, while ostensibly based on a March 18 commentary in Nhan Dan, was even more caustic than the Nhan Dan article, describing how, when "the bigwigs in Washington longed for a helping hand," "the Tito clique jumped at the opportunity and came forward hastily to serve its US masters." US statements that any peaceful settlement would depend upon the DRV ceasing to molest its neighbors were denounced as "out and out Hitlerite war blackmail." People's Daily demanded, "What 'peaceful negotiations' are there to talk about in the face of the increasingly ferocious aggressive war by the US?"

A People's Daily editorial of March 22, striking in its similarity to the editorial of March 17 (WEEKA 11), hailed the DRV's "new victory" against US air strikes on March 19 and 21, and declared that it is "wishful thinking" for the US to think that it can "bomb its way out of defeat in Vietnam." If the US is waiting for a sign that "the Vietnamese people" will stop fighting, claimed the editorial, there is about as much chance of that as there is of "the sun rising from the West."

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Having resumed the Sino-Soviet polemic with a vengeance (See Item 1), Peiping, for the first time explicitly attacked Soviet policies regarding Vietnam, charging that the Soviet leaders "are trying to gain political capital for their dealings with the US imperialists and to carry out plots for 'peace talks', in a futile attempt to extinguish the revolutionary struggle of the South Vietnamese people against US imperialism and its lackeys."

Although Peiping concentrated its heaviest attacks on the subject of peaceful negotiations, it noted the arrival on March 16 of the first group of ROK troops with a low-key People's Daily Commentary March 18. Claiming that the US' days in Vietnam are numbered, commentator rhetorically asked, "Since this is the fate of the master, how can its stooges fare any better?" The article concluded that "the Johnson Administration has gone further down the path of fighting a Korean-type war." Also noted, but without comment, was an American news agency report that US planes used in the March 15 air strikes against the DRV took off from Thailand. The local Communist Ta Kung Pao of March 22, basing its commentary on the same report, ominously charged that, "the US is obviously trying to spread the flame of war into a larger area and drag Thailand in." Since the US has declared that there will be no "sanctuaries" it asked, "how can they expect to find sanctuaries in another country?"

Comment: Peiping's concern over the current demands for negotiations was further elaborated to make specific that which, until now, had been only implied, namely that the Soviets are one of the principal "plotters" for a peaceful settlement. (NCNA pointedly reported Gromyko's comment that the US and the DRV would be the states principally concerned in any decision about convening an international conference.) In the process, US strikes against the DRV have been downplayed, and the ChiComs have continued their vociferous claims that, so long as a single US soldier remains in South Vietnam, the struggle will continue.

3. Palestine Liberation Organization to Establish Mission in Peiping

A delegation of the "Palestine Liberation Organization" headed by "President" Ahmed Shukairy, headed for the hinterland after signing a joint statement providing, most importantly, for the establishment of a mission in Peiping "to strengthen mutual cooperation." The statement covered the Palestine question ("sheer aggression on the part of Zionism supported by imperialism with the United States at its head") United Nations reorganization, and peaceful coexistence (implicitly ruled out for Israel as a "product of the imperialist policy of aggression."). The two parties agreed to work for the success of the Second Afro-Asian Conference. (Unclassified)

Comment: A permanent mission of the "Palestine Liberation Organization" in Peiping could be the channel for more direct Chinese support to anti-Israeli operations in the Middle East, though its initial effect will probably be more psychological than real. Palestine "President" Shukairy, in a press conference following the signing, claimed that the joint statement was an "historic document" extending "revolutionary recognition" to the Palestine Liberation Organization. (Limited Official Use)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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4. United States: Peiping Draws Propaganda Capital from US Racial Violence

Mounting racial tension in Alabama has been moderately exploited this week to illustrate the so-called "sham" nature of the Civil Rights Act and of President Johnson's efforts to guarantee voting rights for all citizens.

People's Daily Commentator, in a March 17 article, charged that Federal appeals to respect law and order were merely part of the President's "dual tactics" of "peaceful deception" and "violent suppression." Commentator claimed that "when the whole state apparatus of the United States is in the hands of the representatives of monopoly capital, the law and the court are but an instrument of the ruling class;" therefore, "those in power would have no benevolence for them (the Negroes) even if they should fall on their knees and beg for it." The only solution, claimed Commentator, is "to stand up and wrest back their freedom by relentless struggle."

An interesting sidelight to the extensive coverage given to the racial violence in Alabama has been the juxtaposition in both the People's Daily and the local Communist press of photographs of demonstrations in the US and the Moscow riots in front of the US Embassy. Militiamen in Moscow or state troopers in Selma - for Peiping, it's all the same.

5. Travel Notes

Syria: Completing a rather low-key visit to Peiping, Syrian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Muraywid and a twelve-member "friendship delegation" left Peiping for visits to Southern Chinese cities on March 22 after signing a Cultural Cooperation Agreement on March 18.

Africa: The NPC delegation headed by Liu Ning-yi continued its tour of Africa, departing Conakry on March 20 after talks with President Sekou Toure and President of the Guinean National Assembly, Leon Maka. Currently in Bamako, they next visit Bangui and Brazzaville.

Chen Yi Trip: Vice-Premier Chen Yi left Peiping March 19 to begin his Asian tour which will take him to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nepal. (Unclassified)

Rumania: Chou En lai sped off to Bucharest to mourn Georghiu-Dej. For Chou it was the second contact with Eastern European leaders since his Moscow conversations last November.

Internal

6. Defected GRC Intelligence Chief Appointed to Kwangtung Province CPPCC

Communist papers in Hong Kong on March 24 announced that Ch'eng Yi-ming had been appointed a member of the Third Kwangtung Province Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on March 20 by its Standing Committee. (Unclassified)

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Comment: Ch'eng who defected to Canton on December 13 was in charge of the GRC's intelligence operation based in Macau and was the highest ranking defector to the Communists in recent years. His new post, devoid of power, handsomely supplements his earlier reward of JMP 100,000, the highest ever given to a defector. (Limited Official Use)

7. Lin Piao Makes Rare Appearance in Shanghai

Long absent from the public eye, Defense Minister Lin Piao attended a presentation of the Peiping opera Red Light Story (NCNA March 23). (Unclassified)

Comment: Lin Piao is frequently mentioned as being elected to a position or giving instructions but this is one of the very few public appearances he has made in recent years. (Unclassified)

8. Kwangtung Party First Secretary Criticizes Youths

The new First Secretary of the Kwangtung CCP Provincial Committee (WEEKA 11), Chao Tzu-yang, lecturing a forum of youths, bemoaned the lack of ideals among some youths who "want only to have good food to eat and nice clothes to wear now and do not take thought for the future." "The hearts of some are not in it, and they are not really willing to stay in the countryside." This contrasts with a "good youth," who "must have the ideal of building up the new socialist countryside." It would seem that even retired servicemen lacked the revolutionary elan required: "Do not lie on a ready-made bed of roses. This applies particularly to young demobilized servicemen who have undergone steeling in the army. They especially must bring to the countryside the fine workstyle of the army and take the lead in building up a new countryside." (Unclassified)

Comment: This is one of the franker statements of the attitudes of that segment of youths who pine for return to the cities and pose the biggest problems for the Party. It is rare indeed to see any suggestion that retired servicemen are not rushing about doing their utmost to build a socialist countryside. (Unclassified)

9. Confessions of a Backsliding Tax-collector Saved by Mao

The campaign against enjoyment of leisure, e.g., non-ideological "small talk", tea drinking, and undisciplined relaxation, was reflected in three letters published in March 5 Nan-fang Jih-pao. Particularly poignant was the confession of a college graduate assigned to a tax bureau in the Tienpai hsien, Kwangtung Province. Disappointed at such a lowly assignment, he assuaged his grief with watching basketball games and movies. "As I continued playing around, work became a torture to me." He stayed out so late that he had to climb over the wall to get back into his quarters. He slipped into "antagonism against the authorities." He was clearly on the skids, morally. Finally, however, he saw the light, thanks to reading the works of the Chairman, he gained a good work report and "peace of mind", and concluded that henceforth he must strive to be a 'rustfree cog'." (Unclassified)

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Comment: The spirit of crawling self-abnegation found in this confession is the attitude the Party wishes to infuse into the coming generation. Like others in the press, this "confession" seems too pat, however, to be credible. (Unclassified)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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ACTION

INR-10

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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSD	USIA	NSA
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

22 AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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TO : DEPARTMENT

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PBR 16 Please

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: March 19, 1965

SUBJECT : COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 11

REF BAMAKO-1 BELGRADE-1 BLANTYRE-1 BUCHAREST-1 BUDAPEST-1 DARES SALAAM-1 GENEVA-1 LONDON-1 MUNICH-1 PARIS-1 PRAGUE-1 ROME-1 SOFIA-1 VIENNA-1 WARSAW-1 MOSCOW-1

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Peiping's Comment on Marine Landings Deprecates Military Significance of Move
2. Sino-Soviet Relations: Soviets Lashed over "Suppression" of Moscow Demonstration
3. Thailand: Thailand Linked More Closely with War in Indo-China
4. Chen Yi to Visit Three Asian Countries
5. Syria: Syrian Friendship Delegation Visits Peiping

Internal

6. Shanghai Official Attacked for "Anti-Party"Views on Films.
7. T'ao Chu Drops Kwangtung Provincial Post; Recent Elevation Probable Cause
8. Party Cadres Criticized For Erroneous Tactics Toward Youth
9. "Red Flag" Becomes a Monthly?
10. Lei Feng Rides Again, But Softly

OUTER MONGOLIA
Negative

MILITARY
Negative

RFE/OD

Action Taken

Date of Action 3/25

Action Officer Symbol RFE/AS

Name of Officer Wilkinson

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: POL:HIsham/DAnderson/GMetson:drb, 3/18/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: EXEC:OVArmstrong

Clearances:

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

1. Vietnam: Peiping's Comment on Marine Landings Deprecates Military Significance of Move

In Peiping's first authoritative reaction to the landing of two US Marine battalions in South Vietnam, a March 12 government statement seemed designed primarily to 1) bolster Peiping's arguments against any negotiated settlement short of complete US withdrawal from South Vietnam and, 2) disparage the military significance of this US move or subsequent infusions of US combat units. Taking up the US statement that "political channels are still open," Peiping asserted that the only "channel" is the complete withdrawal of US forces with "not a single soldier . . . . allowed to remain," and argued that the introduction of US Marines into South Vietnam has "further blocked the way to a political settlement of the Vietnam question."

Although the statement charged that "the US has embarked on the path of a war of the Korean type, willy nilly," it did not make veiled allusions to prospective Chinese intervention such as contained in the February 13 government statement and earlier commentaries. Instead, it argued that the introduction of Marines will "educate" the South Vietnamese people by "negative example" and will result in their taking up arms on an even wider scale and waging a "life and death struggle against the US aggressors." The more troops the Americans send in, the statement claimed, "the longer will be their death rolls." Arguing further that the dispatch of Marines proved that US "special warfare" tactics had failed, the statement noted that American forces were sent because Da Nang is "not safe," nor were other US bases such as Pleiku, Bien Hoa, or indeed any village, town, forest or road. This rationale would be useful, in the event of additional arrivals of US combat forces, to enable Peiping to limit its response to non-military measures on the grounds that such US actions would be foredoomed anyway and hence would not call for Chinese military moves to support the DRV.

Even when taking up US press statements that the US would not respect "sanctuary" and would engage in "hot pursuit," the Chicom statement avoids the bellicose tone which characterized its pronouncements after the February 7-8 strikes, and asserts that the US threat to "bomb China" can never frighten the well-prepared Chinese people who have "never built their security on US benevolence." Shifting to a second line of reasoning, the statement argues that "anyhow, you have just so much armed strength at your disposal . . . you may act in your way and we will act in our way . . . the course of the war will not follow your subjective wishes."

Peiping's concern over increasing efforts to reach a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam question were evident this week in NCNA reports of Indian and Yugoslav efforts in this field. Claiming that the Shastri Government had "cleared" the US of responsibility for "aggression on the DRV," an NCNA despatch reported that the Indian authorities were seeking to act as go-between between the US and the USSR in order to convene a new Geneva Conference on Vietnam while, at the same time, they "deliberately avoided stating that the Vietnam issue could be settled only when the US stopped its armed intervention and aggression in Vietnam and immediately withdrew all its arms and aggressive troops from South Vietnam." Tito's demand for negotiations "without prerequisites from any party" was greeted with equal scorn, with NCNA reports describing Yugoslav "slanders"

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0 9 0 3

against China's role in the Vietnam question while Tito was at the same time receiving a "pat on the shoulder" from President Johnson for his negotiation proposals. (Confidential)

Comment: In taking the foregoing line in the government statement, Peiping increasingly appears tacitly to have recognized that the language of threat has not only proven ineffective to deter US strikes against the North, but that the frequent raising of the spectre of a larger war might heighten international efforts to arrange negotiations on terms that do not include Chicom demands for complete US withdrawal. (ConGenTel 1401) (Confidential)

2. Sino-Soviet Relations: Soviets Lashed over "Suppression" of Moscow Demonstration

With the return to Peiping of the four Chinese students injured by Soviet policemen in the March 4 demonstrations before the United States Embassy in Moscow, Chinese Communist propaganda exploitation of Soviet handling of this affair went in to high gear. The students themselves were welcomed as martyrs to the cause of proletarian solidarity with Vietnam and they were solicitously escorted from the aircraft to the hospital for medical treatment at the hands of "leading Chinese specialists," who issued a detailed medical diagnosis of the allegedly grave nature of their injuries. In the hospital the students were visited by several Chinese leaders including Vice Premier Lu Ting-yi (who, significantly, is also Chairman of the CCP Cental Committee's Propaganda Department) and Kuo Mo-jo, as well as the DRV Ambassador.

Chinese Communist propaganda treatment of the affair, however, continued to subordinate the issue of alleged Soviet police brutality towards Asian students engaged in a "legitimate" protest to the broader indictments of Soviet policy on Vietnam and of Soviet efforts at "peaceful coexistence" with the United States. A scathing March 15 People's Daily Commentator article bluntly accused the Soviet Government of being "subservient" to the United States and "placing itself under its thumb" while "treating as an enemy those staunchly anti-imperialist young Asian and Latin American students." The article contrasted the Soviet Government's condemnations of the United States bombings of North Vietnam with its alleged "fear of offending" the United States, and professed shock that such an event could have taken place in the "first socialist country." "There would be nothing strange if such an event had taken place in Czarist Russia, in old China under the rule of the Kuomintang, or in the United States or its vassal states."

Keeping up the pace of its assault, Peiping on March 16 published another note to the Soviet Government rejecting the Soviet note of March 12 and again insisting that the Soviet Government admit its "mistake" and apologize to the students from various countries who took part in the demonstration. Further developing the theme that Soviet conduct constituted an affront to the revolutionary cause, the note described in harrowing detail alleged persecution of the injured Chinese in Soviet hospitals and asserted, "This would be unthinkable in all revolutionary anti-imperialist countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and elsewhere, but it did happen in the Soviet Union." (Unclassified)

Comment: In making a major issue of Soviet handling of this affair, Peiping is not only trying to discredit Soviet policy in Vietnam (the local Communist press has been warning against Soviet sell-out of DRV interests, Cuban style), but also

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

CONFIDENTIAL

could be laying the groundwork for further attacks upon the credentials of the Soviet Government to speak for the Afro-Asian world, with particular relation to the Soviet bid to attend the forthcoming Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Algiers in June. In addition, these charges of Soviet mistreatment of Chinese, which are even stronger than those launched against the Soviets in mid-1963, may be designed to signal the rejection of Soviet efforts to restore state to state relations as suggested by Kosygin's February 27 reference to increasing economic and cultural relations (ConGentel 1405) (Limited Official Use)

3. Thailand: Thailand Linked More Closely with War in Indo-China

On March 11 NCNA carried a long, extremely inflammatory statement issued by the "Thailand Independence Movement" on February 15 and allegedly broadcast over the "Voice of the Thai People" March 5. The statement denounced the Thanom Government for preparing a "war of aggression in this region," claimed that "the flames of war" would be brought to Thailand, and, in an unusually militant language, alleged that, "If US imperialism is allowed to expand the war . . . . and invade North Vietnam across the 17th parallel . . . and if the traitorous and dictatorial Thanom Government is allowed to collude with it in putting into operation its plan for the escalation of the war, then the other party has every right to fight beyond its own territory in order to defend itself and resist aggression." Under these circumstances, the statement charged, the war could not be confined to Vietnam alone, and "the conflagration would spread and no doubt burn as far as our own territory."

In a March 15 report under the heading "Senior US Official Advocates Intensified Aggression Against Thailand," NCNA quoted extensively from Deputy Assistant Secretary Green's March 14 speech on counter-insurgency measures in the Northeast. The article interpreted these measures as evidence that the US was "stretching its claws into Thailand."

Comment: Peiping has been using the "Thailand Independence Movement" more frequently in recent months to give the impression of an ascendant revolutionary movement threatening the US flank. This is the most explicit allusion to possible DRV counter-strikes beyond its borders eventually involving Thailand.

4. Chen Yi to Visit Three Asian Countries

NCNA March 15 formally announced that Foreign Minister Chen Yi would visit Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nepal and would sign boundary protocols with both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although the announcements did not specify dates for Chen Yi's visits, it has been reported that he will be in Afghanistan March 23-25, Pakistan March 25-30, and begin his visit to Nepal on March 30. (Limited Official Use)

Comment: An economic delegation has already preceded Chen Yi to Afghanistan, but it seems unlikely that the Foreign Minister will be directly involved in discussions concerning the currently pending loans to Afghanistan and Pakistan. (Limited Official Use)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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5. Syria: Syrian Friendship Delegation Visits Peiping

A twelve-member "friendship" delegation headed by Syrian Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Muraywid arrived in Peiping March 15 where they were greeted by Foreign Minister Chen Yi, Minister of Culture Lu Ting-yi and a crowd (piddling by Chicom standards) of two thousand people. At a banquet in his honor given on the evening of his arrival, Dr. Muaraywid, according to NCNA, praised China's stand on "the Arab cause, particularly on the question of Palestine," and described the US as the biggest imperialist nation, working hand in glovewith Israel. "The fight between the Arab countries and Israel is in fact a fight between the Arab people and world imperialism," he said, "it is by no means a fight between Arabs and Jews, as it is described by the imperialists." Speaking for the Chinese, Chen Yi delivered a pep talk on the anti-imperialist struggle and expressed China's willingness to work jointly with Syrian and other Afro-Asian countries for the success of the Second Afro-Asian Conference. (Unclassified)

Internal

6. Shanghai Official Attacked for "Anti-Party" Views on Films.

Ch'u Pai-yin, Deputy Director of the Shanghai Municipal Cinema Bureau and a member of the Shanghai Municipal CPPCC Committee, has been severely criticized for his anti-party theories about drama. Recent articles (published in Tien-ying I-shu(Motion Picture Art) and reprinted in the March 9 and 10 Kuang-ming Daily), accuse Ch'u of attempting "to kill socialist motion pictures at one blow," and demanding the elimination of the Party's leadership in order to "drag motion pictures from the road of socialism." It seems Ch'u satirized as "Three gods" the three basic ingredients of Party control over culture, namely: 1) "The God of Theme" -- the Party's designation of themes to beused by playwrights; 2) "The God of Conflict" -- the Party's demand that class struggle be injected into all films; and 3) "The God of Structure" -- the dull politically-motivated format imposed upon film producers. According to the article these heretical views were compounded by Ch'u's "total rejection of the revolutionary tradition of socialist motion pictures," Ch'u's desire to imitate Western and "modern revisionist" films "in order to bring about a comeback of capitalism in thefield of motion pictures," and his contention that an artist should express his true feelings instead of depicting the stereotyped worker soldier and peasant heroes demanded by the Party. Ch'u's theories are cited as an example of the "adverse current against the Party's direction in literature during the past fifteen years." (Unclassified)

Comment: Ch'u's crimes of unorthodoxy are similar to those of the now reviled Senior Party official Yang Hsien-chen (WEEKA 39) and it is possible that like Yang he will be used as a fresh "negative example" in the Party's relentless drive against proclivities toward individualism or subjectivism within both the Party and intellectuals. There is no room in Communist China for "ars gratia artis." (Unclassified)

7. T'ao Chu Drops Kwangtung Provincial Post; Recent Elevation Probable Cause

Chao Tzu-yang has been identified as First Secretary of the Kwangtung CCP Provincial Committee, a position heretofore held by T'ao Chu(Radio Canton, March 13, 2300GMT). Chao has been Second Secretary of the Kwangtung CCP Provincial

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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CONFIDENTIAL

Committee since at least 1962, and as recently as January 31, 1965 was identified in that position.

T'ao Chu was still identified as Kwangtung First Secretary on February 1, but from February 10 on he has been listed only in the broadest function of First Secretary of the Central South Bureau. T'ao's relinquishment of his provincial post would seem to indicate that he will be devoting more of his time to his more important duties, such as his new position as Vice Premier of the State Council (WEEKA 1). (ConGenTel 1407) (Confidential)

8. Party Cadres Criticized for Erroneous Tactics Toward Youth

The Central Committee of the Young Communist League convened a youth work symposium attended by directors of Youth Work Departments of municipal YCL Committees from Shanghai, Peiping, Shenyang, Chungking, Harbin, Wuhan, and Tientsin (Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao, March 8). The meetings, which were held in Peiping from February 22 to March 1, sounded the usual themes of emulation of the PLA, raising the red banner of Mao's thinking, continuation of class struggle, etc., but also criticized the unhelpful attitudes of cadres towards youth: "Some comrades only look at the shortcomings of young people without seeing their good side. As a result, they only passively criticize the youth instead of actively developing their enthusiasm....and this is wrong."

Comment: Urban youth, especially the unemployed "social youth," have been a constant source of concern to the Party and presumably a target of YCL activists. It is understandable that friction would arise between the cadres and the youth and that due to the intractibility of the problem the cadres would find it hard to see the "good side" of youth.

9. "Red Flag" Becomes a Monthly?

The second issue of the 1965 Red Flag, the Party's bi-weekly theoretical journal, hit the stands recently datelined February 27, more than a month after the first issue, dated January 6. In the past Red Flag has sometimes appeared late and upon occasions combined issues have been published, labelled, for example, 5 & 6, so that the appearance of a fortnightly has been maintained. This time, however, there was no explanation of the delay; perhaps the editors have been otherwise occupied on the Sino-Soviet polemical front. (Unclassified)

10. Lei Feng Rides Again, But Softly

The second anniversary (March 1) of Mao's call to emulate Lei Feng was dutifully observed from Shantung to Sinkiang, from Kirin to Kweichow, wherever the east wind blows. Celebrants viewed the new film, Lei Feng, attended meetings and heard speeches, which emphasized that "while we learn from Lei Feng, we must first learn his ardent way of studying Chairman Mao's works and his way of making use of Mao Tse-tung's thinking in a practical way." The tone of the meetings was markedly less vigorous than those held last year, leading one to conclude that old Lei Fengs never die, they simply fade away. New revolutionary folk heroes are now coming along to fill Lei Feng's exemplary role, including a soldier in the Kunming Military District who volunteered to help fight a forest

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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fire, and in running around organizing the efforts of his comrades became so blinded by the glare that he fell into a dark 30-foot ravine, "thereby sacrificing his valuable life." We wonder if the lesson imprinted by this episode in the minds of the hero's follow-soldiers wasn't the old military (and non-revolutionary) one of "never volunteer."

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

Department Please Pass:

BAMAKO	DARES SALAAM	PRAGUE
BELGRADE	GENEVA	ROME
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		MOSCOW

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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ACTION Info-10

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GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12 year intervals. Not automatically declassified.

TO : DEPARTMENT

INFO: BAMAKO BUDAPEST GENEVA MANILA PRAGUE S'PORE VNTIANE 5AFJAPAN
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BUCHAREST DJAKARTA LONDON PARIS SEOUL VIENNA 500MTGP

FROM : AmConsul HONG KONG

DATE: March 12, 1965

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 10

REF :

1965 MAR 15 AM 10 12 CLASSIFICATION

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Peiping's Reaction to March 2 Strikes, Marine Landing Avoids Note of Crisis
2. Sino-Soviet Relations: Soviets Attacked over Handling of Anti-US Demonstrations in Moscow
3. Pakistan: Ayub Departs Peiping - Joint Communique Released
4. Africa: Renewed Activity in Former French West Africa
5. Cambodia: Peiping Treats Indo-Chinese People's Conference with Reserve

Internal

6. Annual Trade Union Chairmen Conference
7. Northwest Regional Bureau Second Secretary Dies
8. Mobile Medical Teams to Increase Medical Services While Indoctrinating Doctors
9. "China Youth" Hoaxed?

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

MILITARY

Negative

1965 MAR 15 PM 3 20

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Drafted by: POL:HIsham/DAnderson/GMetson:drb, mjm ; 3/11/65 Contents and Classification Approved by: EXEC:OVArmstrong

Clearances:

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Peiping's Reaction to March 2 Strikes, Marine Landing Avoids Note of Crisis.

Commenting on the March 2 US-GVN air strikes against Xom Dang and Quang Khe, a March 4 People's Daily editorial and a government statement the following day described the attacks as "on an unprecedented scale" and an "extremely serious war provocation," but claimed that the DRV forces had delivered the attackers a "sound thrashing" and had achieved a "brilliant victory." Both documents singled out for particularly heavy censure US statements indicating that the most recent strikes were not simply retaliation for specific Viet Cong actions, but that they are directed against continuing aggression from across the 17th parallel. The US White Paper was also castigated in this context, with the editorial declaring that it represented an "attempt to perpetuate and legalize aggressive attacks on DRV."

The People's Daily editorial vaguely hinted at the possibility of DRV retaliatory action with the claim that the US views the conflict as freeing it to "bomb anyplace at will" while mistakenly assuming that "others should never strike back." To this "gangster's logic" the editorial retorted with a Confucian saying, "It is discourteous not to give after receiving." This hint of retaliation, however, was absent from the government statement, which echoed the theme of the February 10 People's Daily editorial and derided "meagre" US military power which "can cow nobody." The government statement argued that US air power, which allegedly has proved ineffective in South Vietnam and Laos, could be no more effective against North Vietnam, and asserted, "What you can do at most is to turn Northern Vietnam into another South Vietnam, and Indo-China or even all of Southeast Asia into a second Korea. You have proved no match for the fourteen million people in Southern Vietnam, not to say the entire Vietnamese people."

The government statement for the first time touched on the question of the introduction of US ground forces into South Vietnam, asking rhetorically, "What can the United States do even though she may send in all her ground forces, not to say only air and naval forces?" The statement confidently predicted that,"They may come in, but they won't be able to get out. The defeat of the US imperialists is a foregone conclusion."

Consistent with the foregoing line of disparaging the effectiveness of increased US military commitments, NCNA March 7 reported the landing of two battalions of US Marines to protect the security of Da Nang with the comment that, "The US Government knows that an increase of a few thousand Marines cannot intimidate the South Vietnamese people and twenty to thirty thousand US troops can in no way retrieve the United States from its desperate predicament on the South Vietnam battlefield." The Peiping press has thus far carried no editorial comment on the landing of the Marines, though it has published the North Vietnamese protest to the ICC.

Comment: Despite the description of the strikes as the largest in scale so far, and despite the recognition that the strikes were not merely retaliatory in nature but would be continued, neither the editorial nor the government

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

statement gave the impression of trying to heighten the crisis atmosphere. Both continued to stress, as did the February 13 government statement, that the South Vietnamese people are capable of gaining final victory and of dealing more telling blows to the US "aggressors." For its part, the CPR is alleged to be "prepared" in unspecified ways to assist the DRV to "defeat the US aggressors."

With the possible exception of the vague allusions to retaliation contained in the editorial, neither document reverted to the bellicose themes contained in the February 13 government statement implying the possibility of a wider war and DRV strikes across the 17th parallel. One explanation for this lower key treatment may be that Peiping feels that a further heightening of the crisis atmosphere might add to pressure for negotiation on terms which it again denounced in the government statement, charging that what US calls "honorable peace negotiations is nothing but an attempt to make the Vietnamese people stop fighting and tolerate continued US aggression." In addition, Peiping may have omitted these references in order to bring its position more in line with Hanoi, which has sidestepped the question of what the DRV's response to the attacks might be. (ConGenTel 1336) (Confidential)

2. Sino-Soviet Relations: Soviets Attacked over Handling of Anti-US Demonstrations in Moscow.

The Chinese carried on their brisk campaign against what they have termed "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev," timed to coincide with the Moscow "consultative" meeting of 19 Communist parties, in several ways including a) the release of a volume containing 10 polemical articles against CPSU policies (designed to help, according to the preface, readers distinguish Khrushchevism without Khrushchev and thus carry on the "struggle against modern revisionism to the very end"), b) the publication of a long anti-CPSU Akahata article dated February 26 on March 10, the day the communique of the Moscow meeting was released, and c) most immediate of all, the polemical exploitation of Soviet handling of a violent anti-US demonstration by Asians in Moscow March 4.

Peiping was swift to leap upon the resort to force by Soviet militia and troops to control a mob of some 2000 Asians attacking the US Embassy in Moscow in protest over the March 2 air strikes (see item 1), and the press March 6-7 was filled with photographs of militia wielding their truncheons against Asians, lurid accounts of the "brutal repression" of this "legitimate" demonstration by the Soviet authorities, the text of a vehement protest by Chinese Communist Ambassador Pan Tzu-li, and a strident message of protest by the Chinese Students' Association. The Chinese Communist propaganda line went beyond professions of shock at the brutality of Soviet police and against nine Chinese injured in the melee, six of whom were allegedly evicted from the Botkin Hospital "for political reasons." The main thrust of the propaganda was that this whole affair illustrated the hypocrisy of Soviet assurances of support for North Vietnam; and to make the point unmistakable, Peiping papers carried the text of the Soviet statement criticizing the March 2 strikes along with reports of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko apologizing to Ambassador Kohler over the Moscow incident. A Peiping Ta Kung Pao headline summed up, "Look,

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

what is said is one thing, what is done is another." For the first time, Chinese in Peiping staged a protest demonstration outside the Soviet Embassy.

Comment: The Chinese reaction to Soviet actions taken against Chinese citizens in the USSR was the sharpest since Peiping's spate of charges in the late summer of 1963 when Chinese students were expelled from the USSR and a Peiping-Moscow train turned around at the frontier in the dispute over the right of Chinese to disseminate anti-CPSU tracts in the USSR. More broadly, Peiping's exploitation of the affair (one of the rare "spontaneous" demonstrations in Moscow that really ended up as spontaneous) made clearer than ever how the Sino-Soviet conflict has become additionally embittered as a result of Soviet policy on Vietnam. (Congentels 1335, 1348) (Confidential)

3. Pakistan: Ayub Departs Peiping - Joint Communique Released.

Pakistan President Ayub Khan departed Peiping March 7 for Hangchow and Shanghai accompanied by Premier Chou En-lai and Vice Premier and Madam Chen Yi. Prior to Ayub's departure from Peiping the two Foreign Ministers, Chen Yi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, signed a joint communique which:

a) noted with pleasure the completion of the boundary demarcation and reported that the boundary protocol will be signed "shortly" in Pakistan by the two Foreign Ministers;

b) expressed the view that an agreement on cultural cooperation between the two countries "should be signed as soon as possible;"

c) stated that a summit conference to discuss the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons is necessary, and expressed the two parties' opposition to the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Indian Ocean;

d) held that the continuance of the Sino-Indian border dispute is contrary to the interests of the Chinese and the Indian people and expressed the hope that the dispute could be settled by peaceful means (a condemnation of exploiting this type of dispute by engaging in "big-nation chauvinism, intimidation of neighbors and arms expansion" was clearly aimed at the Indians);

e) asserted that the United Nations should "reorganize itself in order to better reflect the balance of forces in the world and the present international realities";

f) noted with concern the continued Kashmir dispute and reaffirmed the desire of both sides that the dispute be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir.

In addition, Ayub reaffirmed his support for "the immediate restoration" of the CPR's "legitimate rights" in the United Nations and all its organs and opposed all schemes for creating two Chinas. Ayub also extended an invitation to Liu Shao-chi to visit Pakistan "at a mutually convenient time" which Liu accepted.

Finally, the joint communique identified colonialism and racial discrimination as obstacles to world peace which must be completely eradicated; played up the Chicom line of economic self-reliance; and, in regard to the forthcoming second Afro-Asian Conference, reaffirmed the two parties' support for the principle of reaching unanimity through consultation which was agreed upon at the Djakarta preparatory meeting in April.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
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A People's Daily editorial of March 9 hailing the "fruitful" visit of the Pakistan President, described the visit and the resulting communique as a "new milestone" in Sino-Pak relations. In typical Chicom fashion, the editorial, basing itself on the joint communique, embroidered the anti-imperialist and colonialist themes to expand upon themes that were notably absent from the communique itself, such as a denunciation of the US' "war of aggression" in Indo-China and a far more explicit attack on India.

Comment: While the joint communique gives the appearance of unanimity on all major issues, and the whole visit has been played by the Chinese press in an atmosphere of warmth and friendship, the disparity between NCNA reports on the visit and western press despatches from Peiping indicates the existence of several major policy differences. For example, although Reuters reported Ayub's March 5 rally speech as calling for "peace with honor to all interested parties" in Vietnam and settlement through peaceful negotiations, NCNA expunged these comments altogether, while prominently reporting the militant remarks of Peng Chen, the other principal rally speaker. Nevertheless, as indicated by the line taken in March 9 PD editorial, the joint communique's endorsement of many important Chicom propaganda themes provides the Chinese with potent ammunition for use in its anti-US psychological warfare campaign. (Congentel 1358), (Confidential)

4. Africa: Renewed Activity in Former French West Africa.

Peiping's special interest in the former French colonial areas of West Africa was expressed again with the announcement on March 8 that a delegation of the National People's Congress headed by NPC Standing Committee Vice-Chairman Liu Ning-yi departed for a junket which will include Guinea, Mali, the Central African Republic and Congo (Brazzaville). Deputy head of the nine-member delegation is Wang Ping, and the Secretary-General is Lien Kuan, Deputy Secretary of the NPC Standing Committee and an experienced glad-hander in Peiping's people-to-people circuit. (Unclassified)

Comment: The omission of Dahomey from the itinerary is interesting and probably reflects the still rather delicate Chicom position there. (Limited Official Use)

Burundi: NCNA on March 3 reported from Nairobi that the Burundi Government and ruling Uprona Party had issued a joint statement on the question of diplomatic relations with Communist China. According to the NCNA report, the statement claimed that the assassination of former Prime Minister Ngendandumwe had given Burundi's slanderers an opportunity to spread "calumnies and tendentious statements" about the foreign policies of the government and the party. These unfortunate events caused confusion in the country, the statement continued, and it was during this confusion that the decision to suspend relations with China was taken. The report, quoting from the statement, concluded, "As soon as the political situation of our country is cleared up, the Government of Burundi will consider favorably the resumption of diplomatic relations with People's China." (Unclassified)

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Authority NND 939503
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5. Cambodia: Peiping Treats Indo-Chinese People's Conference with Reserve.

After sending glowing greetings from Chou En-lai and seven national organizations on February 24 followed by a February 25 People's Daily editorial wishing the conference success, Peiping once again experienced the unpredictability of Prince Sihanouk when he unceremoniously postponed the meeting until March 1. Peiping has reported the conference in somewhat gingerly fashion, even though Sihanouk appears to have been forced to alter his original, rather moderate position in favor of a more explicitly anti-American one. The March 2 air strikes against the DRV, which resulted in an extraordinary session of the conference and a March 4 message to Ho Chi Minh, have also pushed the conference along lines viewed favorably by Peiping. NCNA March 11 reported the closing of the conference and the adoption of five separate and apparently varying resolutions, but no editorial comment has thus far appeared. (Unclassified)

Internal

6. Annual Trade Union Chairmen Conference

March 4 NCNA announced that the All-China Federation of Trade Unions had "recently" convened a conference of all provincial, municipal, and autonomous region trade union chairmen to discuss trade union work for the current year. Tasks stressed at the conference included the usual emphasis on political themes: study of Mao's thinking and its implementation; socialist education; and increasing political work in schools, clubs, and dormitories. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: This meeting parallels the Fifth Session of the Eighth Executive Committee of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions which was held at the beginning of 1964 and was quite similar in tone, as well as the recent work conferences of financial, commercial, industrial, and communications enterprises under the aegis of the respective political work departments of the CCP Central Committee. It seems clear that Peiping is presently engaged in laying down its 1965 political and economic tasks for major elements of the economic structure. (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. Northwest Regional Bureau Second Secretary Dies

March 5 NCNA announced the death on March 4 due to illness of Alternate Central Committee member Chang Te-sheng, 56, in Sian. Chang, who would rank approximately in the third level of the top leadership, concurrently held the posts of Second Secretary of the Northwest Regional Bureau, First Secretary of the Shensi CCP Provincial Committee, and First Political Commissioner of the PLA Shensi Province Military Region. The Funeral Committee was headed by CCP Central Committee member and Northwest CCP Regional Bureau First Secretary Liu Lan-t'ao; on the Committee were such luminaries as General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Marshal Ho Lung. Everyone from Chairman Mao on down sent wreaths but Liu Lan-t'ao and Northwest Regional Bureau Third Secretary and Acting Shensi Province First Secretary Hu Yao-pang were the highest ranking persons who attended the funeral, which was held February 6.

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The posthumous announcement of Chang's illness explains his failure to make a public appearance since May 1, 1964. Hu Yao-pang can now be positively identified as the Northwest Regional Bureau Third Secretary on the basis of characters published; to date, Hu is also identified as the First Secretary of the Young Communist League (WEEKA 6), and would be a likely choice to take Chang's place in both the regional and provincial posts. (UNCLASSIFIED)

8. Mobile Medical Teams to Increase Medical Services While Indoctrinating Doctors

Teams of urban medical personnel (specialists in both Western and Chinese medicine) are systematically assigned to rural mobile medical teams "in the same way that government cadres take part in productive labor" stated an editorial in the 13 February Chien Kang Pao (Health News). Quite apart from the medical significance of this move (the teams are to provide training as well as practice medicine) there is a broader political purpose; as a February 26 People's Daily editorial declared, the measure would "promote the revolutionization of medical workers" since by living with the poor and lower middle peasants urban medical workers would "gain a profound understanding of rural conditions and obtain lessons in class struggle." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The technique of sending task forces from the center to implement central directives and themselves be remoulded ideologically has been frequently employed in the past year, e.g. with respect to the "four clearances" drive among cadres. The knowledge that a tour in the countryside hangs over his head should be enough to keep the Chinese doctor from expressing any bourgeois individualism. (UNCLASSIFIED)

9. "China Youth" Hoaxed?

Canadian journalist Charles Taylor, now stationed in Peiping, titillated Hong Kong and got good play in the local press with a report that the back cover of the No. 24 issue of China Youth (published December 16, 1964) displayed a reproduction of a painting which contained anti-Communist propaganda, and that senior cadres in Peiping were infuriated as a result. The painting, entitled "Where you lead I will follow", depicts young people marching valiantly to the countryside with red banners raised high, but in the background of the painting one of the three red banners is seen to have fallen, thereby supposedly indicating to cognoscenti that the great leap forward had failed. In the foreground, it is alleged, the brushstrokes representing wheat or pampas grass actually conceal the slogans "Long live Chiang Kai-shek" and "Kill the Communist Party". Taylor's report added that the authorities had called back all copies of the offending issue which they could get their hands on.

Comment: We are among those fortunate enough to possess a copy of the issue, and a microscopic examination of the picture does show a red dot in the background vaguely resembling a flag on the ground. On the writing however,

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

one can imagine a character here or there, especially if the painting is turned on its side or upside down, but it would require a genius with first class honours in Rorschach to make any connected sense out of the brushwork. The question of whether or not the strokes do look enough like characters to inflame the suspicions of hyper-sensitive security types we leave to others more expert than ourselves. (UNCLASSIFIED)

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

MILITARY

Negative.

For the Deputy Principal Officer:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0 9 1 6

[redacted]/ACTION		
INR-10		
RM/R 1	REP	AID 5
ARA 4	EUR 5	FE 4
NEA 4	CU 5	INR
E	P 1	IO 2
L	FBO	AIO 12
	S/P 1	
AGR 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 2-01	NAVY 10
OSO 24	USIA 11	NSA 3
	AEC 1	NSC 6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

AE

POL E-1 CHICOM

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A-600	CONFIDENTIAL	AIR POUCH
NO.		HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : BAMAKO CANBERRA KATMANDU NDELHI SEOUL VIENTIANE 7FLTTOKYO
BANGKOK CPACPLAD KLUMPUR PARIS S'PORE WARSAW USTAIWANDEFCOM
BELGRADE DSALAAM LONDON PRAGUE SOFIA WELLINGTON 13AFMANILA
BLANTYRE DJAKARTA MANILA RANGOON TAIPEI COMNAVPHIL
BUCHAREST GENEVA MOSCOW ROME TOKYO 500MIGPJAPAN
BUDAPEST KARACHI MUNICH SAIGON VIENNA 5AFJAPAN

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: March 5, 1965

SUBJECT : COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 9

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Proposals for "Honorable" Settlement Scored as "Blackmail"
2. Sino-Soviet Relations: New Attacks on CPSU Timed for Moscow CP Meeting
3. United Nations: Peace-Keeping Operations Assailed
4. Pakistan: Ayub Khan Arrives in Peiping
5. Japan-Korea-ROK-Japan Basic Treaty Denounced
6. Afro-Asian Economic Seminar Concludes on Militant Note

Internal

7. Political Work Conferences for Industry and Commerce
8. KMT Soldiers Defect to Yunnan
9. Six Veteran Vice Ministers Dismissed
10. How Red is the Face of the People's Daily

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

MILITARY

1. Military Affairs Conference

1965 MAR 8 PM 12 29

COPYFLO-PBR

Action Assigned to

Action Taken

Date of Action

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year invervals. Not automatically declassified.

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FORM DS-323

Drafted by: POL:HIsham/DAnderson/GMetson:drb/mjm: 3/4/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: EXEC:OVArmstrong

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Proposals for "Honorable" Settlement Scored as "Blackmail."

In a significant March 1 People's Daily editorial Peiping elaborated and made more explicit its opposition, first expressed in a February 19 People's Daily editorial, to alleged US efforts to "get at the conference table what it could not get on the battlefield." The March 1 editorial centered its objections on what it characterized as US efforts, through escalation and threats of further expansion of hostilities, to "save face" and scare people into finding a way for it to "beat an honorable retreat." The editorial linked a) the direct use of US bombers in strikes at the Viet Cong, b) an alleged McNamara statement that US combat aircraft, weapons and forces would be used in South Vietnam whenever necessary, and c) purported US/GVN plans for further air strikes against the DRV with Secretary Rusk's February 25 statement on the conditions for negotiations, describing these actions as "outright war blackmail" and "downright hooliganism." "No socialist country," it declared, should succumb to this. (The further air strikes materialized on March 2, but as this is written there has been no response from Peiping other than to carry prominently on March 3 Hanoi's statements claiming "victory," with nine aircraft allegedly shot down, and denouncing the US White Paper as "null and void.")

The editorial singled out two passages from the Secretary's February 25 press conference, that "political channels have been and are open" and that if Hanoi's assault upon South Vietnam's safety, territorial integrity, and independence is "relieved and removed, then things can begin to move." (It characteristically distorted the Secretary's references to Hanoi's aggression into "attacks by the South Vietnamese peoples armed forces.") The editorial claimed these words were proof that the US is seeking "to capitalize on certain people's fear of a world war and the proposals for peace talks advanced by various people with a variety of motives to compel the Vietnamese people to give up their just struggle and subject themselves to the savage US aggression." However, it charged, it is the US who is the aggressor, not the Vietnamese, and the US must withdraw its armed forces from South Vietnam. Once this is done, it concluded, "the South Vietnamese people will be able to settle their own problems." "Otherwise, anything that is given the outward appearance of fair play would mean nothing less than conniving at US aggression, conceding to it, giving it a breathing spell and falling victim to its wiles of a delayed attack."

Peiping has thus far limited its response to the US White Paper to February 28 and March 1 NCNA reports describing it as "packed with slanders and lies" designed to "check the surging revolutionary struggle of the SVN people" and to serve as a pretext for extending the "aggressive war."

Comment: The editiorial is the sharpest expression thus far of acute Chicom distrust of, and opposition to, all of the various proposals for a South Vietnam settlement now being put forward, even from countries such as Cambodia which have warm relations with Peiping. Peiping's scarcely veiled thrusts at the Soviets (see Item 2) are noteworthy. (Congentel 1303), (Confidential)

2. Sino-Soviet Relations: New Attacks on CPSU Timed for Moscow CP Meeting.

Although Peiping has thus far refrained from direct comment on the March 1 Moscow conference, it made clear its contempt for the proceedings by releasing on

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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the eve of the meeting a series of articles accusing the CPSU of carrying out "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" and "anti-China agitation among the Soviet people" while "hypocritically professing to strengthen solidarity and seeking to end public debate."

On February 26 NCNA announced the publication of volume three of Khrushchev's works and reprinted the volume's editorial note which explains that the purpose of resuming the publication of this "flood of putrid verbosity" (which it said will eventually fill 30 volumes) is because "the sinister spirit of Khrushchev has not departed and there are larger or smaller groups of people in the world, in the Soviet Union and even here in China, who believe in Khrushchev revisionism." Declaring that "the struggle against Khrushchev revisionism can not by any means stop," the editorial note made clear Peiping's intention, whatever efforts Moscow may make to muffle the dispute, to continue the struggle "to the end" against revisionism, which "does not owe its origin and growth to any individual." The editorial thus elevated the "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" thesis, first set forth in the November 21, 1964 Red Flag editorial "Why Khrushchev Fell," into an explicit and integral part of its long range ideological offensive against the CPSU's post-Stalin internal and external policies.

NCNA articles on February 27-28 continued the attack, describing a spate of "anti-China" materials being recommended for study in the Soviet Union through Party publications at the central and union republic level and especially through the recently published book edited by CPSU CC Secretary Ponomarev. In commenting on Ponomarev's book, entitled "International Revolutionary Movement of the Working Class," an NCNA Moscow despatch of March 1 asserted that the book reveals the "hypocrisy" of those who "while talking about reinforcing solidarity, actually deepen the split" and who "while talking about ending public debate, intensify anti-China agitation." The article concluded that the book constituted additional proof that "Khrushchev's downfall merely means a change of signboard."

Comment: In tone as well as in timing these new attacks on Soviet policies developed during the Khrushchev era seem designed a) to caution the Chinese people and Communist everywhere against drawing erroneous ideological conclusions from any semblance of improvement in Sino-Soviet relations that may be an outgrowth of Soviet overtures, e.g., Kosygin's February 26 television address; and b) to advise the Soviet and other Communist Party leaders that the Chinese Communists do not intend to be inhibited from pressing anti-revisionist polemics by any considerations of preserving a semblance of unity in the face of the Vietnam crisis. In fact, the Chinese Communist appear to be at pains to emphasize both at home and abroad that the fundamental issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute are unsolved and will remain so notwithstanding any soothing words from Moscow or appeals for unity, however related to the international situation, which may emerge from the Moscow meeting. (Congentels 1295 and 1206), (Confidential)

3. United Nations: Peace-Keeping Operations Assailed

In a February 25 front-page editorial entitled "Look, What Has Become of the United Nations," People's Daily heaped scorn on the 19th UNGA and condemned its decision to set up a special committee to study peace-keeping

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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operations. The editorial charged that the establishment of the UN special committee was a "vicious scheme of the US to promote neo-colonialism," and caustically noted that the Soviet delegate spoke in favor of the US plan. It pointed out that in July, 1964, Khrushchev sent a memorandum to the UN Secretary General proposing a UN force, and remarked, "It is difficult to see any essential difference between the Soviet proposal and the US plan." The editorial concluded that the establishment of the special committee for peace-keeping operations meant that the UN "will be reduced still more to a US tool for aggression," and predicted that "the day when the US-controlled UN permanent force is established will also be the day when the death-knell tolls for the United Nations."

The Afro-Asian Economic Seminar which ended in Algiers February 28 also offered the Chinese a platform from which to launch attacks on the United Nations. On the final day the Chinese delegation lodged a protest against the attendance at the seminar as observer of M. Josephe-Gholl, representative of the UN Economic Commission for Africa. The protest described the UN as "a tool of the US imperialists for promoting neo-colonialism," and charged that Josephe-Gholl's attendance at the seminar had "created a bad precedent" in that it "runs completely counter to the noble cause of the Afro-Asian people." The general declaration of the seminar specifically stated that "its work, in its entirety, comes exclusively within the framework of the Afro-Asian-Latin American people's solidarity movement and that it has no relation whatsoever with the United Nations and all its specialized agencies." This statement was followed immediately by the claim that the United States was using the United Nations "for the pursuit of its neo-colonialist policy of aggression, subversion, exploitation and control of our countries in the political, military and economic fields."

Comment: The final declaration of the Algiers seminar provides an indication of the type of anti-UN line that the Chinese may attempt to impose on the June Afro-Asian Conference. In this connection, however, it is noteworthy that the joint statement apparently did not contain any reference to the need for a "thorough remolding" of the UN, as if the Chinese are currently treading lightly on this issue. (Limited Official Use)

4. Pakistan: Ayub Khan Arrives in Peiping.

Escorted by eight Chinese jet fighters, Pakistan President Ayub Khan's plane arrived in Peiping March 2 where Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai and the usual crowd of "hundreds of thousands of people of all walks of life" were on hand to greet him. That evening Ayub was guest of honor at a state banquet hosted by Liu at which both sides exchanged stock tributes to friendship and solidarity. Liu applauded Ayub's "resolute and wise measures" to promote Pak-CPR friendship, and specifically praised Pakistan's opposition to "the two-Chinas scheme," although he did not make the usual corollary claim of Pakistani support for the restoration of "China's legitimate rights in the United Nations." Liu sounded somewhat defensive when he asserted that Chinese Communist friendship for Pakistan was "by no means a matter of expediency" but was a "long term policy" based on "correct principles;" neither side, he said, "considers itself superior to the other, seeks benefit at the expense of the other, adopts a

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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truculent attitude toward the other, or imposes its views on the other." Ayub did not echo this theme. (Unclassified)

5. Japan-Korea: ROK-Japan Basic Treaty Denounced.

Peiping coupled fresh outcries against the ROK-Japan Basic Treaty this week with renewed chargesthat the US was trying to set up a "Northeast Asia Military Alliance." A February 27 Foreign Ministry statement described the treaty as "a serious move taken by the US imperialists to step up their fostering of Japanese militarism for its comeback on the Korean peninsula," and charged that the ROK-Japan talks were an important link in the US' "sinister plot of making Asians fight Asians."

A People's Daily editorial of February 28, aimed more explicitly at the Koreans, claimed that the treaty would result "in still greater difficulties" for the peaceful reunification of Korea. Half of Korea, it predicted, would be reduced to "a colony under the double rule of US imperialism and the Japanese monopolies." Both the Foreign Ministry statement and the editorial alluded to the recent disclosure of "Operation Three Arrows" as proof of Japanese militarist designs on South Korea.

On March 1 Peiping staged an anti-treaty rally of 10,000 people attended by Teng Hsiao-ping, Chen Yi, Kang Sheng and Liu Ning-yi. Kuo Mo-jo, the principal speaker, again raised the spectre of a new "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" under Sato's aegis.

Comment: Peiping's vigorous denunciation of the ROK-Japan Treaty is an indication of the strong Chinese Communist discomfiture over the prospect of rapprochement between Seoul and Tokyo, particularly at this time. (Unclassified)

6. Afro-Asian Economic Seminar Concludes on Militant Note

The Afro-Asian Economic Seminar, in addition to its jibes at the United Nations (See Item 3), produced a final declaration which:

1) Called for the intensification of the national liberation struggle by supplying the liberation movements with aid, arms,equipment, finances, and the "formation of military cadres," as well as by taking steps to "implement economic boycott and sever diplomatic relations with the metropolitan countries;"

2) As part of efforts to achieve complete economic independence, to "reconsider foreign debts;"

3) To widen the scope of solidarity of the Afro-Asian peoples with the Latin American people and particularly with the Cuban people; and

4) In general, to adopt a militant left-wing program of economic development and cooperation.

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Comment: If, as indicated in Embassy Algiers' 2016 to the Department, the conference adjourned unceremoniously and without adopting the four committee reports drafted by the seminar, this may indicate that there was substantial disagreement over some of the more strident positions advocated by Peiping-led militants. The inclusion of the above points in the final declaration, however, is an indication of the militant course which the Chicoms and their supporters are seeking to impose upon the "national liberation struggle." (Limited Official Use)

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Internal

7. Political Work Conferences for Industry and Commerce

Between February 9 and 23 the State Economic Commission and the Industry and Communications Political Work Department of the CCP Central Committee jointly convened a National Political Work Conference and a National Work Conference for Industrial and Communications Departments in Peiping. Vice Minister Po I-Po presided over the meetings attended by officials from industrial and communications ministries and Party officials from political work departments of various levels from the CCP/CC regional bureaus down to municipalities.

The National Political Work Conference for Finance and Trade Departments, held in Tientsin "recently" (NCNA February 27), was convened by the Finance and Trade Political Work Department of the CCP Central Committee, presided over by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, and attended by Party officials from Finance and Trade Political Work Departments of the CCP/CC regional bureaus and political work officials of the finance and trade ministries and departments of the State Council.

Reports on both the industrial and commercial conferences noted that political work was to be emphasized and that the establishment of political work departments should be continued. (See WER)

Comment:

These are the first national conferences of the new political work departments which were promulgated at a series of similar meetings held during the first half of last year (WEEKAS 15, 16, 18, and 24). Comments made at both this year's industrial and commercial conferences concerning the necessity of further establishment of political work departments indicate that the network is not yet complete. Although apparently widespread, political work departments have received little publicity over the past year, and the publicity given these conferences is less than that given the founding conferences last year. Perhaps the Chinese Communists are still feeling their way on how best to employ the new units. (Limited Official Use)

8. KMT Soldiers Defect to Yunnan

February 27 NCNA reported that forty officers and men "who fled beyond the Chinese border of Yunnan Province" had returned and given themselves up "from last October to January of this year". The report alleged that the defectors returned because of the CPR's "lenient policy" and the defectors' unwillingness to serve as "cannon fodder for U.S. imperialism and the Chiang Kai-shek gang." Those who brought weapons were given monetary awards.

Comment:

There has been a series of statements giving figures of captures in action of GRC personnel on the east coast of China (WEEKA 5) and occasional

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reports of single instances of defection, but this item appears to be the first report with the flavor of a periodic wrap-up from Yunnan. The report did not specify whether the defectors had been operating in Burma, Laos, or Thailand and, if the report is more than mere propaganda, the number may have included persons from all those areas. (Unclassified)

9. Six Veteran Vice Ministers Dismissed

February 24 NCNA announced that the State Council at its February 15 plenary meeting approved the dismissal of the Deputy Secretary General to the State Council, Chao Shou-kung; five Vice Ministers, including Shen P'ing (Finance), Nieh Hung-chun (Food), Wei Chen-wu (Agriculture), Li Chung-yi (Textile Industry), and Mao Ch'i-hua (Labor); and one other official Chu Kuang, Vice Chairman of the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

Comment:

Most of the persons on the list (for other personnel changes at this meeting see WER) have long been connected with economic affairs. The Vice Ministers have held their posts since at least 1961, and some of them for ten years. None of the Vice Ministers have appeared in public since the middle of 1964. It would appear that the dismissals of the Vice Ministers reflected the routine attrition of aging officials.

10. How Red is the Face of the People's Daily

A vermilion faced People's Daily took the whole of page five on March 1 to admit that it had been caught with its ideology down on December 28, 1961 when it praised Li Hui-niang, a "newly edited" k'un chü (classical Chinese opera as distinguished from popular Peip'ing opera) adapted by Meng Ch'ao (an otherwise unknown entity) from the Ming Dynasty ghost tale, Red Plum Story. At that time the PD had found Li Hui-niang "shining amidst the hundred flowers of the garden, truly a fresh red plum", "saturated with poetry, completely literary", and "exciting". However, the PD has now discovered the red plum to be an "anti-Party anti-socialist poisonous weed" using "stale words and vulgar music" to present "the reactionary philosophy that struggle in life is not necessary and that strength comes only after death, and to spread gloomy, negative sentiments and self-indulgent extreme individualism". Worse, the "so-called political character" of the play is such as to provide an "outlet for dissatisfactions with reality through the characters in the play" and even "incite the overthrown exploiting class to conduct a struggle for revenge against socialism". How the PD (and a host of other papers too) could have missed such egregious and grisly flaws as those catalogued above is only hinted at by a note in the summary that this "re-criticism" of Li Hui-niang causes one to "advance a step in realizing that literary criticism work and other work are the same" and both require the guidance of Mao and the Party. "If ever at any time or in any work the instructions of Comrade Mao Tse-tung should be forgotten, then that would be committing a grave error."

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Comment:

This humorless drubbing of a four-year old drama revue shows the seriousness with which the regime views the content of such fare as k'un chü. The attacks are a part of Peiping's efforts to "revolutionize" the traditional arts, otherwise manifested by such displays as the 1964 Festival of Peking Opera on Contemporary Themes held in Peiping June to July 1964 (WEEKAS 24, 32). Li Hui-niang and its unfortunate author have joined the ranks of favored targets of the regime on a par with Early Spring in February. Another critic who had praised Li Hui-niang, Fan Hsing, recanted in a February 18 People's Daily article entitled "My 'there is no harm in ghosts theory' is wrong". When even the august Party organ, the People's Daily, must publish a retraction, the dimmest intelligence will perceive that when it comes to politics you just can't be too careful.

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

MILITARY

1. Military Affairs Conference

A NCNA news release of 22 February referred to a conference on military affairs of the People's Liberation Army. No details have been given on the membership or agenda of the conference. (Unclassified)

Comment:

The terminology used in referring to the conference as one on military affairs is curious. This, of course, is the normal reason of conferences, and in past years items of interest have eminated from them such as disciplinary regulations and frank discussions of training problems. However, in the past the titles of the conferences and their probable membership have been more specific, e.g., "All PLA Political Work Conference" and the "Rear Services Cadres Training Conference." The term applied here may indicate a broader review of all aspects of military strategy and force development than has been common previously. (Limited Official Use)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

Contributor:
ARMLO:Col.J.Treadwell

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POL 54 (19)

DATE: 26 Feb. 65 MSG NO.: A-575 TYPE: airgram

FROM: Hong Kong TO: State

SUBJECT: weka #8

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ✓ OTHER: _____

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

✓ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

_____ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

[redacted]

0926

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

ORIGIN ACTION

INR-10

NMR 1	RPBR 1	CAF 5
APA	EUR 5	FE 6
NEA	CU 5	INR
E	P 1	IO 2
L 3	FRD	AID 12
S/IC 1	S/P 1	
AGR 1	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TR 2	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 10
OSD 24	USIA 11	NSA 3
IRC 2	NEW 1	USIA 6

1965 FEB 21 PM 3 17

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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A-561 (NO.)

CONFIDENTIAL (HANDLING INDICATOR)

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals. Not automatically declassified.

TO : DEPARTMENT

INFO: BAMAKO BUDAPEST GENEVA MANILA PRAGUE S'PORE VNTIANE 5AFJAPAN
BANGKOK CANBERRA KARACHI MOSCOW RANGOON SOFIA WARSAW 7FLTTOKYO
BELGRADE CPACPLAD KATMANDU MUNICH ROME TAIPEI W'NGTON TAIWANDEFCOM
BLANTYRE D.SALAAM K.LUMPUR NDELHI SAIGON TOKYO COMNAVPHL 13AFMANILA
BUCHAREST DJAKARTA LONDON PARIS SEOUL VIENNA 500MIGP

FROM AmConsul HONG KONG

DATE: February 19, 1965

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 7

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Vehement Reaction to Latest US Air Strikes; DRV Counter-Blows at SVN Implied
2. Sino-Soviet Relations: Treaty Anniversary Marked by Continued Signs of Conflict
3. UNITED NATIONS: De Gaulle's Criticism's Endorsed, End of US "Domination" Again Demanded
4. Japan: Renewed Attacks on Sato's Policies
5. Thailand: Continued Interest in Thai Independence Movement
6. Africa: Nyerere Begins Visit

Internal

7. "Indignation" over US Air Strikes Sweeps Nation
8. Collectivization of Draft Animals in Tibet

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

MILITARY

Negative

CONFIDENTIAL

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: POL:HIsham/NPlatt/DMAnderson/GMetson:jm

Contents and Classification Approved by: Oscar V. Armstrong

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

POLITICAL

External

1. Vietnam: Vehement Reaction to Latest US Air Strikes; DRV Counter-Blows at SVN Implied

The February 11 strikes by US and SVN aircraft against the DRV have produced new, and even more vehement, responses from Peiping in the form of a second government statement on February 13 and two more People's Daily editorials on February 12 and 14. From these statements has emerged a further elaboration of the Chinese propaganda line on Vietnam which a) while more bellicose in tone, does not make more precise previous Chinese pledges of support; and b) asserts, more threateningly, that the DRV has gained the "right to strike back" at South Vietnam and that the demarcation line has been "broken" by US actions.

A) No New Commitment by Peiping - US Forces Ridiculed - The February 13 government statement increased considerably the bellicose tone of Chinese Communist statements during the present crisis, but still appeared careful not to commit Peiping to any specific, overt response. Although it reverted to the more general formulation that "aggression against the DRV by the US is aggression against China," as opposed to the term "invasion" used previously, (WEEKA No. 6) it defined the latest strikes as "war provocations," Moreover, emphasis was still not upon possible unilateral action by the Chinese government and people, but more broadly upon "all the peoples of the world opposing US imperialism and all the peoples in the Socialist camp." The February 14 People's Daily editorial used a similar formulation.

Throughout the present crisis, Peiping has emphasized that the US is attempting to "frighten people" with its "meagre forces" in the area. The February 14 People's Daily editorial continued this line, referring to the US "poor show of force" put up in the Taiwan Straits crisis and in the Tonkin Gulf incident. The editorial goes on to claim that US will not get away with it "should you really dare to have a try," possibly suggesting that the most recent "show of force" in the form of the air strikes does not really constitute a "try" and that graver punishment, whatever form it may take, is still contingent on future US action against the DRV.

B) Peiping Claims DRV "Right" to "Hit Back" at SVN - The February 13 government statement and the following day's People's Daily editorial both stressed the new point that, as a result of US-SVN actions against the DRV, the latter had gained "the right to hit back at these (SVN) puppets." The government statement declared that the DRV had "secured the right to take the initiative in dealing counterblows to SVN puppets." In both cases, this claim was coupled with the allegation (perhaps the most threatening feature of the Communist response) that "the line of demarcation between South and North Vietnam / i.e. the 17th parallel/ is thus broken and the war in Indo-China is extended." The statement also asked if the US wanted the "lesson" of the Korean War repeated in Indo-China. In contrast, Nhan Dan and other North Vietmanese press stories carried by NCNA indicate that the DRV is stressing the "failure" of US attacks and the "heroic defense" conducted by the DRV, and has not taken up Peiping's line concerning its "right" to strike at SVN. (CONFIDENTIAL)

DECLASSIFIED
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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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COMMENT: The February 13 statement implied that a) attacks on US installations will continue, b) the DRV for its part is justified in ignoring the 17th parallel and taking any action it wishes to support the VietCong, and c) the fighting might intensify to Korean War scale and extend to other countries in Indo-China. Altogether the statement appeared to be a psychological warfare ploy to put a facade of power upon what has hitherto been a rather equivocal Chinese position and to raise the spectre of a wider conflict unless the US ceases its air strikes. (ConGenTels 1211, 1202, 1172, 1172, 1153) (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Sino-Soviet Relations: Treaty Anniversary Marked by Continued Signs of Conflict

Celebrations of the 15th anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty were given major prominence in Communist China, including: an exchange of messages between the Chinese and Soviet leaders, publication of a People's Daily editorial, the despatch of a respectably senior official to head the Chinese Friendship delegation (Education Minister Ho Wei), attendance by Chou En-lai, Peng Chen, Chen Yi, and alternate Politburo member Lu Ting-yi at the Soviet Embassy reception, and the holding of commemorative but modest-sized rallies in Peiping and other cities. Although the Chinese would have every reason to stress fidelity to the alliance and to present a united front to the greatest extent possible in the face of critical developments in Southeast Asia (granting Kosygin's audience with Mao was already a step to this end), it was nonetheless remarkable how pronounced an anti-Soviet animus permeated all the Chinese speeches and official statements, and how openly the Chinese Communists tried to pressure the Soviets into a tougher posture vis-a-vis the US.

A) The messages exchanged between Chinese and Soviet leaders, for example, stressed entirely different aspects of the treaty, the Soviets calling it a "pillar of peace" and avoiding reference to its original anti-US purpose, and the Chinese casting it exclusively as an instrument for opposing more vigorously the US in South Vietnam and worldwide.

B) In his speech at the February 15 Soviet Embassy reception, Chen Yi specified that the further development and "tempering" of the Sino-Soviet alliance was dependent upon "concrete action against US imperialism and its followers." In Chen's view, the US hoped that the Sino-Soviet treaty would become a scrap of paper and therefore should be answered with concrete action, which the US understands. In addition, Chen specifically disputed, though without mentioning the Soviets directly, the view that the US had become "sensible" and that peaceful coexistence with an "aggressive" US was feasible, at the same time calling for world-wide opposition to the US as an "urgent task" for which all socialist countries must extend all-out support as a matter of "bounden internationalist duty."

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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C) The February 14 People's Daily editorial, even more blatantly polemical, underscored a) the unchanging nature of US imperialism, logically destined to "make trouble until its doom," which far from becoming wise "as some people hope," has become "more desperate in pushing its policies of war and aggression;" b) the doctrinal correctness of the "general line" of the Communist movement as proposed in the June 1963 CCP letter (a particularly sore point with the Soviets, who sought to respond with their July 1963 "Open Letter"); c) a set of five conditions for Bloc countries to follow, including adherence to the "Marxist-Leninist line" in domestic and foreign policies, consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship, carrying the revolution through to the end economically, politically, and ideologically, and strengthening the unity of the camp on a basis of Marxism-Leninism. The editorial makes clear, as did the message of the leadership, that the onus for improving relations rests on the CPSU, since the Chinese government and people have "always" been true to the Sino-Soviet treaty; notwithstanding current "shadows" over Sino-Soviet relations, declared the editorial, China and the Soviet Union would unite against the enemy on a basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism "independently of the will of anybody." (ConGenTels 1176, 1212) (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. United Nations: DeGaulle's Criticisms Endorsed, End of US "Domination" Again Demanded

Taking as a point of departure General De Gaulle's February 4 press conference, without however addressing itself to his proposal for a five-power summit meeting including Communist China to discuss reorganization of the UN, a People's Daily Observer article February 5 endorsed his criticisms of the UN and the international monetary system as reflecting "realistic and objective judgements of major international problems." Associating De Gaulle's criticisms of the UN with Sukarno's 1960 proposal for UN reorganization and with Chou En-lai's more recent remarks urging thorough UN reorganization and suggesting a revolutionary UN might be set up, the article brought Chou's proposal more in line with other proposals to reorganize the UN and, in effect, withdrew from the exposed position in which Peiping had been placed by the rival UN idea.

Nevertheless, the editorial set forth in even more categorical terms than before Communist China's insistence that what it called US "domination and manipulation" must be stopped: "Either the UN corrects its mistakes and is thoroughly reorganized in accordance with the desires of the people, or it continues to submit to the domination of the US and thereby commits suicide; there is no other way out."

Meanwhile, the Albanian UN delegation's demand for restoring "regular proceedings of the General Assembly" and ending "the abnormal situation" and "paralysis" in the UN, was reported by NCNA February 17, The Albanian chief delegate's speech, as reported in NCNA, emphasized that his motion to resume normal work in the General Assembly (thus breaking the tacit moratorium on voting which has postponed confrontation over the Article 19 issue) was designed to block "US manipulation." His remarks seemed timed to take advantage of the crises in South Vietnam and the Congo. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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COMMENT: The People's Daily article did not clarify the important point of whether or not the Chinese Communists would now enter the UN if they were voted in on their terms. Judging from the intransigent tone of the Observer article, they might instead demand that the UN be reorganized to rid it of alleged US domination before they would come in. In any case, Peiping seems to have realized that the threat to set up a separate, rival UN may not be the best means to advancing its ends. (ConGenTel 1201) (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Japan: Renewed Attacks on Sato's Policies

Returning to its attacks on the Sato government, a People's Daily "Commentator" article February 12 vehemently demanded the cancellation of the "Yoshida letter. The letter in question was written by former Prime Minister Yoshida during his visit to Taiwan last May, and, according to NCNA, it pledged that Export-Import Bank facilities would not be utilized in sales to Communist China. The Sato government's decision to abide by this letter, said "Commentator," indicates that not only is Japan being led by the nose by the US, but it has decided to subject itself to the command of the "Chiang Kai-shek bandits." The article concluded darkly that the reason for Sato's present policy of obstructing Sino-Japanese trade is that "the Japanese militarist forces are not reconciled to their defeat in China and have all along been waiting for an opportunity to seize the Chinese territory of Taiwan." "Commentator" warned, "Whatever tricks you may play in your attempt to seize the Chinese territory of Taiwan, the Chinese people will absolutely not tolerate them."

On February 14, in three lengthy articles, Peiping reported Japanese Socialist Diet member Haruo Okada's revelation of a "top secret Japanese plan for joint military operations with the United States in an aggressive war against China and Korea and for the reconstruction of a militarist structure here at home." As yet there has been no direct comment by Peiping on "Operation Three Arrows," as the plan is said to be called. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: Peiping's displeasure over the Japanese government's refusal to allow Export-Import Bank financing of the vinylon plant deal was to be expected, but the "Commentator" article's direct linking of the Sato government's re-affirmation of Yoshida's commitment and Japanese militarist designs on Taiwan is a good example of the heavy-handed tactics which we expect will continue until Peiping sees some wavering on the part of the Japanese. The Okada revelations will provide Peiping with further opportunities to tar the Sato government with the militarist brush. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. Thailand: Continued Interest in Thai Independence Movement

NCNA on February 15 reported the New Year's message of the Thailand Independence Movement broadcast by the Voice of the Thai People on January 25. The message denied government claims that the past year had been a prosperous one, and claimed that, on the contrary, "it was a year of depression and defeat." The message asserted that the movement in a little over one month since its founding "had won enthusiastic support and praise from the patriotic

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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countrymen." In another article the same day NCNA reported a meeting in Penang from February 10-12 of Malaysian Minister of Interior Ismail and Thai Vice Minister of Defense Thawee Chullasapya "to plot joint suppression of the Malaysian National Liberation Army active in the border area."

Former Thai Prime Minister Pridi Bhanomyong, now a long-term resident of China, turned up at the DRV Consulate General in Canton, according to an NCNA release of February 11. Pridi and his family were reported to have called on the Consul General to express "great indignation" at US attacks on the DRV. (UNCLASSIFIED)

6. AFRICA: Nyerere Begins Visit

Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, his wife, and a party of nine, arrived in Shanghai February 16 to begin a "friendly visit" at the invitation of Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai. Nyerere was welcomed in Shanghai by Vice-Mayor Tsao Ti-chun and a number of local political and military figures as well as a crowd of "thousands of local residents." Advance man A.M. Babu and CPR Vice Foreign Minister Chao Kuan-hua came down from Peiping for the occasion. The next day he arrived in Peiping to be met by "hundreds of thousands" of people and feted at a banquet that night at which Liu Shao-chi was host. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: All signs point to a full-scale, red carpet treatment for Nyerere's visit. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Internal

7. "Indignation" over US Air Strikes Sweeps Nation

The seasonal lull in internal political developments that normally accompanies Chinese New Year (Spring Festival) was extended for several days this year by the fact that most of Communist China's newsmakers, as well as a large proportion of the urban population, were out in the street demonstrating against the United States. Between February 8 and 12, NCNA (never famous for the accuracy of its crowd estimate) counted a total of eleven million chanting soldiers, peasants, factory workers, university professors, militiamen, and housewives who flooded the squares in virtually every major mainland city to shout dutiful support for their Vietnamese brothers, and pour stereotyped abuse on the American "air pirates." The high point of the week was an 800,000-man extravaganza in Peiping's T'ien An Men Square, glittering with gay balloons and colorful placards, presided over by a benign, smiling Chairman Mao and applauding balconies full of top Party and government dignitaries,

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Stirring pictures studded the national press: T'ao Chu, Chen Yi, Ou Meng-chueh, and other Central South Regional Party Bureau leaders striding through the streets of Canton waving their fists; open air "cultural presentations" featuring staunch North Vietnamese heroes beating up mock US imperialist villains; a gaggle of tame flag-waving Buddhists in Peiping protesting the raids on North Vietnam; a touching scene of CPPCC oldsters like Kao Chung-min, Yang Ming-hsuan, and Huang Yen-pei tottering with their canes down a Peiping street under portraits of Mao and Lenin; and countless shots of militia men brandishing rifles and shouting at the tops of their lungs. Obviously, a rousing good time was had by all. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: Seeing as how much the same color characterizes observances of gala days such as May 1, it appears that the Chinese are in danger of blurring the distinction between their "hate" rallies and their festivals. (UNCLASSIFIED)

8. Collectivization of Draft Animals in Tibet

The poor serfs and slaves of one Tibetan hsien have established their "political supremacy" by sequestering the draft animals of well-to-do serfs. On February 6, Radio Lhasa (1155 GMT) reported that at a Congress of Poor Serfs and Slaves held in Yüchi Hsiang, Pomi Hsien, rich and middle serfs were criticized for not putting all their labor forces into mutual aid teams when they joined them. After the Congress a "rectification" of mutual aid teams was conducted and the system of workpoints for plough oxen, a principal form of "labor force" withheld from the mutual aid team, was "adjusted." The adjustment consisted of placing all plough oxen under the "unified allocation" of the team and assigning a specific number of workpoints for their services. These workpoints are to depend, however, on the quality of the work performed. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: This formula puts new teeth into the regime's drive to collectivize Tibet by converting the mutual aid teams into permanent organizations, since it will enable the mutual aid team rather than the animal owner to control and allocate a major source of power. On the other hand, an unanticipated problem may crop up here as it did elsewhere in China, namely that when responsibility was removed from one individual and placed on several there was no clear-cut assignment of responsibility and many animals died. Hitherto well-to-do peasant households which had both surplus labor and animals had been able to avoid the rigors of the collective life by deputizing some members of the household to partial cooperation with the mutual aid teams, while other members stayed free to earn extra income on the outside by drayage or trading (WEEKA 4). Removal of these animals from their control will tend to cut down on these outside opportunities, and at the same time tie the erstwhile free members to the mutual aid team, since it is presumably these persons who will have to ensure the quality of the work performed by the animals. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

MILITARY

Negative

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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AIRGRAM

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FROM: AmConsul HONG KONG

DATE: February 5, 1965

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 5

REF :

POLITICAL

External

1. Indonesia: Subandrio Concludes Peiping Mission
2. Burundi: Peiping Protests Embassy's Expulsion, Accuses US of PM's Murder
3. Vietnam: Continued Protests Against US-SVN "Intrusions"
4. Sino-Soviet Relations: Silence on Kosygin Visit to Hanoi; March 1 Meeting Again Censured
5. Chinese Communist Coyness on Military Commitments
6. Philippines: Peiping Seizes on Anti-US Demonstrations
7. Brazil: Nine Arrested Chinese Once More in the News

Internal

8. All-China Youth and Students Federations Meet in Peiping
9. Attitudes of Overseas Chinese Residing in Mainland Severely Criticized
10. Peiping Sums Up Results of Latest GRC Raids

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

MILITARY

Negative

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323

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Drafted by: POL:HIsham/NPlatt/DMAnderson/GMetson:jm

Contents and Classification Approved by: Oscar V. Armstrong

Clearances:

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POLITICAL

External

1. Indonesia: Subandrio Concludes Peiping Mission

The three day visit to Peiping of Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, accompanied by his 40-man delegation of senior military and economic officials, concluded January 28 amid continued declarations of "militant friendship" and Chinese press claims that the relationship between the two countries had entered a "new, still higher phase." Little in the January 28 joint statement, however, indicated how the discussions might affect Chinese Communist plans in support of confrontation or increased military assistance. As forecast, new agreements (still unpublished) on credits and on trade were signed, and the decision was made to expand maritime communications. Chou En-lai and Chen Yi are to visit Djakarta in April for the tenth anniversary of the Bandung Conference.

A) Confrontation - The joint statement recapitulated Chou En-lai's pronouncements made in his January 24 speech (WEEKA 4) deprecating the military forces of the US and the UK in the area, and linking "confrontation" with the war in Vietnam ("aggressive activities" in both areas were allegedly being conducted "in support of each other"). On Chinese support for Indonesia, the statement reiterated Chou's pledge not to "stand idly by" should US and Britain "dare to impose a war on the Indonesian people." It mentioned, though not in the direct context of confrontation, that "friendly contacts in the military field" would be increased. A People's Daily editorial issued on January 30, although more sarcastically abusive of Malaysia and the US/UK forces, added nothing to Chou's commitment.

B) United Nations - Chinese support for Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations was vociferous to the point of suggesting that a rival "revolutionary" UN should be established (WEEKA 4). Subandrio on the other hand, did not echo this theme, as if reluctant to foreclose his country's eventual return, and since leaving Peiping he has publicly denied that Indonesia was supporting a rival UN. Moreover, the joint statement, while demanding that the UN "correct its mistakes and be thoroughly reorganized," did not refer in any way to the theme of a rival UN. The January 30 People's Daily editorial, however, stressed the idea and, in refutation of Ambassador Adlai Stevenson's January 26 speech on the importance of the UN as a peace-keeping organization, snapped testily, "One just cannot help telling him, shut up, enough of your nonsense." (CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMENT: While Peiping joint statements are typically not very enlightening documents, this one seemed particularly anti-climatic following the more sensational speeches by Chou En-lai, Lo Jui-ching, and Chen Yi. It is always hazardous, however, to judge the results of such a visit by the public pronouncements, and perhaps the simple fact of the size and composition of the Indonesian delegation is the best indicator of the importance Djakarta attaches to its relations with Peiping. With that caveat, it is possible to speculate from public statements that, 1) Peiping may well have pressed a more militant line vis-a-vis the United Nations than Djakarta, and such restraint as was to be found in the joint statement on this issue was at the latter's insistence; 2)to whatever extent Chinese military support for "confrontation" was discussed, Peiping did not appear to have made any major commitment. (ConGenTel 1079) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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2. Burundi: Peiping Protests Embassy's Expulsion, Accuses US of PM's Murder

On January 30 NCNA announced that the Burundi government had "temporarily suspended" relations with the CPR and had given its Embassy personnel two days within which to depart the country. An indignant Chinese protest note denounced Burundi's action as being "in serious violation of international law" but added that if in the future Burundi wished to resume relations, the CPR would give this "sympathetic consideration."

On the following day a CPR Foreign Ministry statement charged that the Burundi government's action resulted from its "submission to the pressures of the US and Belgian imperialists," and implied US involvement in the assassination of Prime Minister Ngendandumwe by pointing out that the murderer was an employee of the US Embassy in Bujumbura. The Foreign Ministry statement claimed that the CPR had every reason to ask the Burundi authorities to revoke their demand for the Embassy's withdrawal, but loftily said it had decided to withdraw, lest the government of Burundi be placed in a "difficult position."

The full measure of Chinese Communist discomfiture emerged in a February 2 People's Daily editorial which flatly charged that the US Embassy was the "real culprit in this murder case" and that it evidently hoped to "sow discord among the nationalities in Burundi and whip up an anti-China campaign." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

COMMENT: The sudden loss of their base of operations in Burundi, just when Congolese rebel activities seemed to be gaining ground with support from neighboring African countries, appears to represent a major setback for the Chinese Communist subversive effort in Central Africa. The Chinese have tried to put the most dignified face possible on the situation, and at the same time, with less finesse, have invoked the American "devil" to rationalize the setback, evidently in hopes that a change of government might permit an orderly return. (ConGenTel 1099) (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Vietnam: Continued Protests Against US-SVN "Intrusions"

Peiping's only direct comment on the situation in Indo-China this week came in the form of a January 30 letter from Chen Yi to DRV Foreign Minister Xuan Thuy replying to the latter's January 22 protest against US bombings in Laos. Chen Yi, noting that the CPR has already made its attitude "unequivocally clear" by its statement of January 20, ticked off a long list of US "military provocations" in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, particularly the recent decision by South Korea to send what Chen called "troops" to South Vietnam. Chen Yi concluded with the assertion that the "Chinese government and people always side with the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia," and again demanded that the Geneva co-chairmen "live up in earnest" to their responsibilities.

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In NCNA news coverage, Peiping continued its attacks on US efforts to "expand the war" in Vietnam, claiming in an article from Hanoi that an alleged shelling of Con Co Island by "US and Saigon puppet warships" was the twentieth such instance since the August 3-5 Tonkin Gulf incidents. Assistant Secretary Bundy's January 23 speech was also cited at length as further indication of "US aggressive intentions" in Indo-China.

Peiping has yet to comment editorially on the January 27 coup in Saigon, but it provided a lengthy "backgrounder" on what was described as "the eight coups d'etat....launched by US puppets in South Vietnam since November 1963." Clearly, Peiping viewed the cycle of coups as irreversible. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. Sino-Soviet Relations: Silence on Kosygin Visit to Hanoi; March 1 Meeting Again Censured

Peiping has thus far remained silent on Hanoi's surprise announcement January 31 that Soviet premier Kosygin, accompanied by ranking experts in ideological affairs, civil aviation, foreign affairs, air defense, and foreign economic aid, would "soon" visit the DRV at the latter's invitation. (From Moscow it has been announced Kosygin would depart February 4, presumably via Peiping) The Chinese are likely to see the visit as an effort to 1) back up renewed Soviet pledges to the DRV's security interests made since November; 2) reaffirm direct Soviet interest in the outcome of the Indo-Chinese crisis; 3) strengthen the hand of the moderate faction within the DRV Politburo; and 4) reduce Hanoi's dependence on Chinese political, military, and economic aid. (ConGenTel 1097)

Peiping meanwhile pursued its attacks on the "schismatic" March 1 preparatory meeting in Moscow, disseminating materials of the Japanese CP (a long January 21 Akahata editorial recapitulating objections to the "completely unjustifiable, unilateral" meeting and urging instead prior bilateral consultations), and the pro-Peiping wing of the Australian CP (a November article in Australian Communist stressing an "ideological, political, and organizational break" with revisionism). As another sign of possible separatist organizational planning going on in Peiping, Alternate Politburo Member Kang Sheng had a "friendly talk" January 31 with Calo Vincenzo, of the Italian "Long Live Leninism" group.

Attesting to the coldness of state-state relations, the death of long-ailing former CPSU Presidium member Kozlov was laconically noted in NCNA with no mention of formal condolences (contrasting with Hanoi's expression of "profound grief" - VNA February 3).

NCNA also reported the recent US-Soviet talks on continued scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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5. Chinese Communist Coyness on Military Commitments

Indian Charge in Peiping Mehta (who transited Hong Kong recently enroute to Peiping from leave and consultations in India) gave Consulate General officers an anecdote illustrating how cautious the Chinese Communists are in assuming military commitments - in public, at least. At a diplomatic reception given by the Kenyan Ambassador to Peiping in honor of "Kenyatta Day," which fell on October 20 (just four days after the CCNE), the Kenyan Ambassador took it upon himself to add to his previously prepared speech a few congratulatory remarks about the Chinese accomplishment. The Ambassador included the gratuitous statement that he felt sure the Chinese would make their new bomb available to any African nation which needed it "in defense of peace." These remarks raised no particular stir among the foreign diplomats present, but when the NCNA version of the Ambassador's speech appeared, the diplomats noticed that the reference to Peiping's bomb being made available to the African nations was missing - this despite the fact that the additional portion of the speech had been appended in printed form to the previously prepared text. In light of this episode, Mehta commented that he was sure the Chinese would not assume any military commitment which was not directly identifiable with Communist China's national interest. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. Philippines: Peiping Seizes on Anti-US Demonstrations

Seizing upon the student demonstrations before the US Embassy in Manila, People's Daily Commentator in a January 27 article described the Philippines as "a roaring volcano" and the Philippine people as shouting "Yankees, get out!" In the light of the new demonstrations, Commentator found the US efforts to "enlist Filipino mercenaries" for its war of aggression in South Vietnam were "ludicrous and somewhat pitiable."

NCNA on January 26 also provided background material for its readers on "unequal treaties imposed by the US on the Philippines." The article mentioned the Parity Rights Amendment to the Philippine Constitution, the US-Philippine Trade Agreement, the Laurel-Langley Agreement, and the US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement. Under this last agreement the US was credited with having "virtually occupied all places of strategic importance in the Philippines."(UNCL)

COMMENT: Peiping is closely watching anti-American manifestations in the Philippines, seeking to exaggerate their scope and represent sentiment for treaty revision as a wholesale, nation-wide demand for the complete removal of the US presence. If this kind of unrest and agitation continues, the Chinese may be expected to broaden their propaganda exploitation thereof. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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7. Brazil: Nine Arrested Chinese Once More in the News

The arrival in Peiping of an international lawyers' group (otherwise unidentified) and the receipt of Brazilian defense attorney Sobral Pinto's argument before the court have provided new material fof Chinese efforts to "expose" the arrest and conviction of nine Chinese "businessmen and newsmen" as a case of political persecution by the Brazilian government, joined by the GRC, in order to curry favor with the US and smear the CPR. Wives of the prisoners arrived last week in Brazil, according to NCNA; their statements would also be useful.

On January 31 the international group of lawyers denounced the "illegal" verdict brought by the military tribunal, and demanded that the Brazilian authorities promptly grant entry visas so that they might attend the hearing in Brazil; should this request be refused, this trial would be "indeed a dark one." The statement urged worldwide protests against the "illegal sentence" and agitation for the acquittal of the nine Chinese. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: Judging from Peiping's persistence in drawing international attention to the affair, the Chinese feel they have a strong case and can muster further support, including that from foreign commercial organizations obligated to China. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Internal

8. All-China Youth and Students Federations Meet in Peiping

The All-China Youth Federation and the All-China Students' Federation held simultaneous sessions in Peiping between January 15 and 27, according to NCNA January 30. During the sessions, the participants from both organizations were received by Chairman Mao Tse-tung (identified on this occasion as "The Great Leader of All Nationalities of China and Most Respected and Beloved Teacher of the Chinese Young People and Students"), CPR Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i, Premier Chou En-lai, Party Secretary Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and other ranking leaders.

In the course of the conference, participants:

a) heard a speech by Politburo Member P'eng Chen which scored the imperialists, reactionaries, and modern revisionists while predicting the victory of the socialist revolution (only a brief summary was given);
b) discussed Chou En-lai's Government Work Report to the NPC, and vowed to play an even bigger role in socialist construction;
c) extolled Mao's thought as "the mighty weapon for promoting proletarian ideology....and as the fundamental guarantee for the revolutionization of Chinese youth."

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Echoing the line taken at the Ninth Young Communist League Congress in June, participants recognized the need for the youth of the nation to maintain a clear class stand in the face of enemy efforts to bring about the "peaceful evolution" of the younger generation into tools of the bourgeoisie, and vowed to continue waging a tit-for-tat struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism.

At the sessions, Wang Wei was elected Chairman of the Youth Federation, and Wu Shao-tsu Chairman of the Students' Federation. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: The support of the regime's highest leaders for this tedious set of mass youth organization gatherings is a further indication of the Party's oft-reiterated concern over the ideology of Mao's heirs. More immediately, it attests to P'eng Chen's authority and versatility as a regime spokesman. During the past seven months, in addition to the report mentioned above, Peng has given important statements or addresses at: the Revolutionary Peiping Opera Festival, a meeting of the Peiping CCP, the rally welcoming the president of Mali, the PLA General Political Department Conference, the Soviet Embassy reception on November 7, and an anti-US rally protesting the Stanleyville rescue operation.

Wang Wei, the new Chairman of the Youth Federation, is an experienced and probably elderly youth specialist who has been a member of the YCL Secretariat since 1959. Wu Shao-tsu is not mentioned in our files, and could conceivably be one of these much talked of, but so far excessively scarce revolutionary successors. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

9. Attitudes of Overseas Chinese Residing in Mainland Severely Criticized

"Although an absolute majority of returned Overseas Chinese are patriotic, most of them are unfamiliar with or ideologically unprepared for the socialist revolution," warned an editorial in the most recent issue of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Journal (No. 6, December 1964). Some Overseas Chinese "center their interests around the individual, one-sidedly asking the State for special considerations or for personal freedoms which are detrimental to the collective interest." Some individuals "even openly violate state policies and laws," while others "indulge themselves only in the pursuit of enjoyment, envy or hanker after the bourgeois way of life; they yearn for capitalism, dislike rural life and manual labor, and wreck discipline." Returned Overseas Chinese students' attitudes toward school entrance and employment are marked by unwillingness to go to the countryside, antipathy toward manual labor, and a tendency to value expertise over "redness." The editorial cautioned that resident Overseas Chinese must "rebel" against their "landlord, rich peasant, and bourgeois families" and "remold themselves through class struggle." (UNCL)

COMMENT: The editorial is the sharpest criticism of resident Overseas Chinese outlook and behavior to appear for at least a year, and represents another facet of the Party's strong dissatisfaction with United Front operations reflected in the Fourth Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) last December. (See WEEKA 2) However, the rectification of resident

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Overseas Chinese will require delicate handling: if the regime makes life too difficult for Overseas Chinese who have returned to the motherland, they may try to leave, taking with them whatever skills and expertise they may have brought, and more pointedly, negating an important source of future investment capital. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

10. Peiping Sums Up Results of Latest GRC Raids

In another of its periodic roundups issued about every six months (WEEKA 27, 1964), the Ministry of Public Security on February 1 claimed that in seven raids since July 1964 on the coastal areas of Kwangtung, Fukien, Chekiang, and Kiangsu, the GRC had lost eight vessels and 196 men (twenty-eight killed and one hundred and sixty eight captured). By way of comparison, the November 1963-June 1964 figures were 74 GRC casualties.

A People's Daily editorial, as is usual in such cases, maintained that the latest series of raids were a "component part" of the US "scheme to spread aggression and intensify tensions" in Southeast Asia, and proclaimed that the Chinese people could never be cowed by such efforts at "encirclement." The editorial's tone of bravado seemed more pronounced than in the past, perhaps reflecting unease over the stationing of the first Polaris submarine in the Pacific, to which the editorial referred. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative.

MILITARY

Negative.

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0 9 4 4

AIRGRAM

This document consists of 7 pages. Copy No. 1 of 74. Series A.

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A-514 SECRET AIR PRIORITY

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COPY NO. 10 SERIES A

FROM: AmConsul HONG KONG

January 29, 1965

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA: Weekly Economic Review No. 4

REF: Communist China CERP, Section C, Item 3

Table of Contents

1. A Note on Scientific/Technical Frustrations
2. Summary of 1964 Crop Estimates
3. Chinese Purchases - Real and Purported
4. The Value of Hong Kong
5. Canadian Grain Sales
6. Not-Terribly-Meaningful Claims Department
7. Private Trees Still OK
8. Travelers

FEB 2 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. A Note on Scientific/Technical Frustrations

The Chinese seem engaged in a hodgepodge campaign to promote the scientific advances which Chou En-lai described as a precondition for progress at the recent National People's Congress. The People's Daily (January 22), for example, devoted its first page and a half to praise of Shanghai workers who built a 12,000-ton press by a mixture of Mao's thought, hard work, and scientific application. A day later the paper struck a more practical note in an editorial asking how China could be modernized without more scientific improvement especially in technically backward enterprises. Specifically, the PD complained of scientific advances which were not implemented in actual production, and of plants which wastefully insisted on relying exclusively on their own efforts toward modernization disregarding the function of scientific organs. A parallel tendency toward absolute self reliance has been attacked in provincial broadcasts praising plants which have developed cooperative schemes of inter-factory specialization.

SECRET

SECRET - GROUP 1, Excluded from atuomatic downgrading and declassification

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Drafted by: POL:WHGleysteen:MAbramowitz:TSBrooks:eac 1-28-65

Contents and Classification Approved by: EXEC:OVArmstrong

Clearances: FAS:JWenmohs: (Item 2)
ECON: HBardach: (Item 4)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0945

Like the exposition of better, cheaper, and more socialist design work recently serialized in the PD (WER 2), the common theme of these disparate discussions is awareness of the extent to which China's industry is handicapped by scientific/technical inadequacies. The awareness has not so far been matched by public appearance of a coherent, systematic plan to alleviate the bottleneck. From what can be deduced, however, the basic approach seems fairly sound and involves such measures as the training of scientists and technicians, the encouragement of specialization, as well as the import of some model plants and technology from abroad. But impatience and frustration also seem to stimulate temptations toward short cuts - symbolized by industrial heroes who advance toward modernity with little more than good intentions and a copy of Mao's collected works. Just how much confusion and damage result from this tendency toward gimmickery is hard to measure. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. Summary of 1964 Crop Estimates

The following are the Agricultural Officer's current estimates for production of certain major crops in China during 1964:

Crop	Production (1000 MT) 1953/57 Average	1963	1964	1964 Production as Percent of 1963	1964 Production as Percent of 1953/57 Average
Rice	77,870	78,400	82,000	105	105
Wheat	22,610	21,800	23,100	106	102
Misc. Grain	52,190	54,600	55,100	101	106
Potatoes*	19,260	24,300	22,500	93	117
Total Grain	171,930	179,100	182,700	102	106
Cotton (lint)	1,368	1,020	1,250	123	91
Soybeans	9,655	7,800	8,600	110	89
Peanuts	2,674	1,900	2,290	121	86
Cottonseed	2,737	2,040	2,500	123	91
Rapeseed	911	540	660	122	72
Sesame	373	240	310	129	83

* potatoes converted to grain equivalent by ratio of 4 to 1.

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

COMMENT: The total grain estimate of 183 million tons in 1964 reflects the Agricultural Officer's conclusion, which we share, that adverse weather conditions during the season were not so severe as to prevent a modest 2 percent increase over 1963's total output. The figures do not, however, fully reflect a parallel conclusion that 1964 grain production surpassed that of 1957 which we are now inclined to estimate at some 175-180 million tons as opposed to the (7 year-old "preliminary") CPR claim of 185 million tons. In the absence of sufficient data to justify any formal downward revision of pre-1958 claims, we think it probably better in the meantime to use the average of 1953/57 CPR claims as a yardstick. (UNCLASSIFIED)

3. Chinese Purchases - Real and Purported

a. Vinylon Plant - After a long delay while they tried to solve the question of financing, the Japanese Government approved the sale of a second vinylon plant to China. The approval, however, was not entirely pleasing to the Nichibo Company, seller of the plant or to proponents of Sino-Japanese trade since it was accompanied by a Government decision not to permit Government financing directly or indirectly either for Nichibo or other major exports to China. The cost of the plant is US $26.5 million and the contract calls for 25 percent down, the balance in 5 equal annual installments from delivery date at six percent interest. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

COMMENT: Financing for the second plant is being arranged by a consortium of private banks. The refusal to permit some sort of Government financing is of no economic concern to the Chinese, since the extra interest burden, an estimated US $2.8 million will be borne by the Nichibo Company and not added to the contracted amount. However, the refusal to permit government financing will probably be interpreted as another obeisance of the Sato Government to Washington and an "artificial" impediment to Sino-Japanese trade. A member of the Okazaki mission (Okuba) passing through Hong Kong expressed both surprise and bitterness at the Government's decision.

We wonder whether the Japanese Government will actually stay aloof from some form of indirect financing. Embassy Tokyo sees "strong indications" of a Central Bank role in an indirect fashion providing some financing (Tokyo's 153 to Dept.). Another case for the Japanese Government is coming up with the planned sale to China by Hitachi of a cargo ship for some US $3.6 million. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. Austrian steel plants - According to information obtained by Embassy Vienna (A-610, December 31, 1964) the large nationalized Austrian enterprise VOeEST informed the Austrian Ministry of Trade that it "intends to conclude" a contract in January or March, 1965 for the sale to China of two completed LD steel plants and a dolomite stone factory. The price is US $48.3 million (FOB) and delivery is estimated at about two years after contract date. Five-year credits are provided.(CONFIDENTIAL)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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COMMENT: Austrian intent is not necessarily the Chinese intent, and we have some doubts that a sale is so imminently in the offing. The Chinese have been dickering for some time with Western European steel makers including the Austrians and we have heard previous reports, albeit not as well documented, of Chinese intent to purchase steel making facilities. On the other hand, while new steel facilities do not receive the highest priority at the present time, new steel mills in 1967/68 would make good sense for an enlargement of capacity and at the very least for more efficient production. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. The Value of Hong Kong

Two sets of statistics again underscore the economic importance of Hong Kong to Communist China:

a) Trade - Chinese exports to Hong Kong for 1964 reached US $346 million, 32 percent above the level of 1963. Exports in December 1964 rose to an all-time monthly high of US $42 million, a 25 percent jump over November and 38 percent over December of 1963. Hong Kong exports to China remained negligible at US $2.3 million and re-exports US $8.2 million. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: The trade figures tend to blur Hong Kong's role as an entrepot for Chinese goods, since perhaps as much as one third of Chinese imports to Hong Kong are re-exported. Even taking this into account Hong Kong remains mainland China's biggest non-Communist market, and from all indications the Chinese trade offensive in Hong Kong shows every sign of increasing. Communist marketing efforts in the past year have picked up significantly. New, and in one case impressive, retail facilities have opened up. The number of Chinese economic officials in Hong Kong has grown, and the volume of advertising of Chinese goods has significantly increased. (UNCLASSIFIED)

b) Chinese Earnings from Hong Kong - Two recent CAS reports (FCH 5206 and 5222, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM) provide considerable data for making an estimate of China's total earnings from Hong Kong. Total earnings (exchange received by Chinese controlled banking institutions minus ChiCom payments to Hong Kong) were US $490-500 million compared to US $380-390 million in 1963. An estimated US $100-120 million of total earnings was provided from overseas remittances from Chinese living outside China and the earnings of CPR enterprises in Hong Kong. It is also estimated that the Chinese purchased the equivalent of US $445-455 million in sterling compared to US $412 million in 1963. (SECRET)

COMMENT: There are problems with the statistics which we are trying to clarify (e.g., the difference in 1964 between exchange received by the banks and trade earnings and remittances). However, the figures are still more than sufficient to show the general level of earnings and the high rate of increase, mostly from the rapid rise in trade. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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5. Canadian Grain Sale.

After more than three weeks of negotiations China agreed to purchase 670,000-735,000 tons of Canadian wheat including a small quantity of durum for delivery during the first half of 1965. The price was approximately US $48 million with the credit terms the same as for previous sales - 25 percent down for each shipment, the balance in eighteen months. The agreement is the fourth under the long-term agreement (August 1963-July 1966) and brings total Chinese purchases to almost three million tons - the minimum required under the agreement. A small portion (50,000-100,000 tons) will be shipped from Atlantic ports, presumably for Albania.

While the Canadian sale was being ironed out, snags appeared in Sino-French negotiations for a long term wheat agreement and the talks were broken off. Reportedly, they will not resume until July 1965. We have heard two reasons for the suspension - a dispute over prices and/or French refusal to commit themselves to any wheat prices after the Common Market's unified wheat price comes into effect. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: Upon arrival in Hong Kong the Canadians evinced much pessimism about the prospects of selling more than 300,000 to 400,000 tons to the Chinese. After the negotiations Canadian Wheat Board Chairman W.C. McNamara pronounced that he was highly satisfied with the agreement and that the Chinese showed considerable interest in Canadian wheat.

The Canadian sale brings contracted grain deliveries (Australia, Canada, and Argentina) for 1965 to 2.5-2.6 million tons, slightly less than the amount contracted for at this time in 1964.

The suspension of the French negotiations may be followed by China's turning to Mexico and Argentine sources for grain. Interestingly, China's Latin American grain expert is now in Hong Kong. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. Not-Terribly-Meaningful Claims Department

NCNA (January 26) noted briefly that China overfulfilled its 1964 national targets for procurement of grain, cotton, edible vegetable oil, tobacco, hemp, and hogs by 2 to more than 30 percent as of mid January. A not quite comparable NCNA claim (December 25) stated that the value of grain, cotton, oils, hemp, pigs, cattle, fowl, eggs, sugar, vegetables, tobacco, dried fruit, medicinal herbs, wool, and fish purchased in 1964 increased variously between 5 and 56 percent over 1963. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: Apart from contributing to impressions of expanding production and procurement in 1964, these claims are not helpful. We assume the increase in grain procurement was in the lower end of NCNA's percentage scale. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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7. Private Trees Still OK

A People's Daily editorial on forestry (December 15) called on Party committees at various levels to leave concrete operational questions to forestry departments, and instead concentrate on ideology, policy , planning, work quality and the like. The committees' main concern, PD concluded, should be the problem of ownership. Here the task was to fix ownership of wasteland, swamps, etc., as between communes and their component brigades and teams. At the same time, individual peasants should be bestirred to plant trees around their houses, under the principle that "whoever plants trees will own them." In this way commune members could ease their fuel problems, provide wood for small articles, and increase their incomes. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: The policy of"the tree planter is the proprietor" in afforestration goes back at least as far as a February 2, 1962 PD editorial, and was reaffirmed in a PD editorial of February 12, 1963. By directing party committees to concern themselves with clarifying ~~mk~~ unit ownership of land for tree-planting, and by continuing to urge peasants to plant trees for personal use and profit, the regime pragmatically recognizes that trees in the ground are of far greater importance than correct thoughts for remedying the countryside's shortage of wood and for effecting improved soil conservation. The new stress on leadership by party committees suggests that collective planting and follow-through care have not been going too well, owing perhaps to reluctance on the part of brigade and team leaders to devote much managerial effort to an activity that offers no quick return in consumable or marketable products. (UNCLASSIFIED)

8. Travelers

For the past few weeks Peiping has received important Western businessmen and trade leaders. Dr. Francesco Manzella of the Italian Institute of External Trade (ECI) is currently in Peiping to help work out the final arrangements for the exchange of trade missions between the two countries. His visit follows that of Dr. Niutta, a Vice President of ENI, firm noted for its dealing with Communist countries and which through one of its subsidiaries has already sold the Chinese US $7-9 million worth of petroleum refining equipment. All Japan Airways Chairman and principal Japanese Supervisor of the Liao-Takasaki agreement, K. Okazaki, escorted three officials who will open up the Takasaki trade office. Backtracking a few months, we have just heard of an official of the Kommerz Bank of Frankfurt who was invited to the Canton Fair and subsequently found himself invited to Peiping for the British Exhibition, where he was repeatedly told that West German machinery sales would improve if German firms ran a similar exhibition. Finally we note that Norway's first commercial representative in Communist China, Hans Meinich, a Chinese speaker, has arrived

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in Peiping with the prime task, it appears, of fostering the interests in China of SAS, his former employer. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

POUCH: ALGIERS, BANGKOK, BELGRADE, BERN, BRUSSELS, BONN, BUENOS AIRES, BUCHAREST, CAIRO, CANBERRA, DJAKARTA, GENEVA, THE HAGUE, KARACHI, KATHMANDU, KOBE OSAKA, KUALA LUMPUR, LONDON, MANILA, MEXICO CITY, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, OTTAWA, PARIS, PHNOM PENH, RANGOON, RIO DE JANEIRO, ROME, SAIGON, SAPPORO, SEOUL, SINGAPORE, STOCKHOLM, TAIPEI, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, WARSAW, WELLINGTON, CINCPACAF, CINCPAC POLAD, CMDr5AF, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, COMNAVPHIL, COMTHFLT, 500th MI GROUP, 13th AF CLARK FIELD, USTAIWANDEFCOM.

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SUBJECT: weeka 4

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POL 54 (22)

DATE: 22 Jan. 65 MSG NO.: A-496 TYPE: airgram

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FROM AmConsul HONG KONG

DATE: January 15, 1965

SUBJECT COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 2

REF

POLITICAL

External

1. UN: Peiping Formally Backs Indonesian Withdrawal, Urges "Remoulding" of UN
2. Vietnam: Peiping Greets Binh Gia Victory, Warns against Despatch of ROK Troops to SVN
3. Sino-Soviet Relations: Oblique Attacks on Soviet Policies toward UN, US
4. US: Edgar Snow Received by Mao Tse-tung

Internal

5. CPPCC Closes Amid Signs of Party Dissatisfaction with United Front Operations
6. Chief Procurator, President of Supreme People's Court, Report to NPC
7. KMT Defector Ch'eng Yi-ming Writes Taiwan Friends

MILITARY

1. PLA Air Successes over the Mainland

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

REF/UD

Noted

1/20/66

REF/ACN

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FORM DS-323
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Drafted by: POL:HIsham:NPlatt:DMAnderson:jm

Contents and Classification Approved by: Oscar V. Armstrong

Clearances:

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

POLITICAL

External

1. UN: Peiping Formally Backs Indonesian Withdrawal, Urges "Remoulding" of UN

Peiping's support for Indonesian withdrawal from the United Nations, already expressed in a January 6 People's Daily editorial (WEEKA 1), assumed a more authoritative and far-reaching cast with the appearance on January 10 of a government statement and a second People's Daily editorial. Both documents seemed to bear Mao Tse-tung's personal imprint, including, in one instance, the use of a graphically scatological term to describe what the Security Council's action in seating Malaysia had done to Indonesia. These two pronouncements went beyond the expression of resounding approval for Indonesia's "perfectly just and right" action and called for the "reappraisal" and the "thorough remoulding" of the UN. Although the nature of the remoulding was not specified, the editorial's vehement attack on what it called this "docile instrument" under US "control" where the US "bullies and oppresses people," this "dirty stock exchange of international politics in the grip of a few big powers," left no doubt that Peiping would not be satisfied with a conventional, piecemeal reorganization, but envisions as a long-term goal radical surgery by which Western influence would be drastically reduced and that of the Afro-Asian nations commensurately expanded.

By Peiping's definition, the UN as presently constituted cannot be an effective organization to safeguard the peace because, as the editorial put it, "safeguarding peace in the last analysis is a question of struggle against imperialism, and especially against US imperialism." Peace can be defended, therefore, not by relying on the UN but by "getting rid of its intervention;" hence, Sukarno's action deserves praise as helping to liquidate "blind faith" in the UN and proving that the "backside of this tiger" (pure Mao) can be touched by those who place the proper value on "self-reliance" and "standing up and holding the ground." (CONF)

COMMENT: So cavalier and hostile an attitude toward the UN ("...by no means something sacred and inviolable, without it we can live on very well all the same," asserted the January 10 statement) raised the question whether Peiping had increased its terms for UN entry to include "remoulding." In this connection, a Hong Kong Communist Wen Wei Pao Commentary of January 12, replying to "some people" who wondered whether in light of its support for Indonesia's action China was no longer demanding the restoration of its lawful rights in the UN, said: "China's lawful rights will have true value and significance only after the thorough reorganization of the UN." Although ambiguously phrased, and carrying less authority than a Peiping-originated statement, the commentary permitted the inference that the Chinese would prefer waiting until the UN has been "remoulded" to associating with the UN as presently constituted.

In any event, the more immediate prospect seemed to be for Peiping's continued support of Indonesian confrontation and the further development of the Peiping-Djakarta entente, one tangible manifestation of which was the inauguration on January 6 of direct air service between the CPR and Indonesia (via Phnomh Penh). Liu Shao-chi, welcoming a visiting Indonesian minister (Iskandar) January 12, lauded Sukarno's policy of "national self-reliance" (a pet Chinese expression), and said that the "Chinese people would consider it a great honor if they could make some contribution to Indonesia's self-reliance." Further measures of economic assistance seemed in the offing; i.e. the Chinese may have to subsidize Sukarno's confrontation to a larger degree than before. (ConGenTels 966 and 974) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

2. Vietnam: Peiping Greets Binh Gia Victory, Warns against Despatch of ROK Troops to SVN

Peiping's only direct comment on the fighting in Vietnam this week came as a January 6 People's Daily editorial paid tribute to the Binh Gia "victory" which was described as a "smartly conducted, tough (and with a bow to Mao Tse-tung), pitched battle of annihilation." Expressing big-brotherly approval of the operation, the editorial proclaimed that, "Initiative on the battlefield is now wholly in the hands of the people's forces in South Vietnam....The US and its puppet gang always find themselves on the defensive and reduced to utter passivity." Reflecting the fact that Binh Gia was the first battle in which a battalion-sized, uniformed VC troop unit had engaged ARVN forces in essentially conventional warfare for so long a period (four days), the editorial claimed that the Viet Cong "have now grown into a formidable liberation army." Nevertheless, the editorial concluded with the warning that this did not mean an end to US efforts "to expand the war to retrieve its defeats in South Vietnam."

As one form which Peiping evidently expected such a US effort to expand the war might take, Seoul's reported decision on January 8 to send 2000 ROK troops to South Vietnam was strongly censured in a January 13 Chinese government statement. The statement called the decision a "grave move" by the US to "wreck the Geneva agreements and expand the war," and implied that if the troops were sent the CPR would take some counteraction of an unspecified nature. According to the statement, if the US, in disregard of the warnings of the governments of the DRV and the DPRK (carried earlier by NCNA), "continues to prosecute its scheme for expanding its aggressive war in South Vietnam and even internationalizes that war, the Chinese government and people will have to give further consideration to the duties incumbent upon them for the defense of peace in this area." A January 13 letter from Chen Yi to DRV Foreign Minister Xuan Thuy called for the "frustration of this scheme with firmness," and on the same day Chen Yi also wrote to the UK and the USSR, as Geneva co-chairmen, together with other participating nations, urging them to take immediate "effective measures and action" to stop the US "scheme." (CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMENT: No specific actions are indicated or new commitments are undertaken in this statement, but its serious language is designed to block a move which Peiping probably feels is less significant militarily than politically, insofar as it would broaden participation in the SVN fighting to include Asians from outside Vietnam and might lead other countries to follow suit. (ConGenTel 980) (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Sino-Soviet Relations: Oblique Attacks on Soviet Policies toward UN, US

Peiping made a two-fold, though oblique, attack upon Soviet foreign policies and assumptions this week. It strongly defended Indonesian withdrawal from the UN, a decision which the Soviet Ambassador in Djakarta reportedly had tried to change, and refuted "some people who say that despite its many deficiencies and imperfections, the UN is the sole institution in the world permitting cooperation of all countries and that efforts should therefore be made to strengthen it, while withdrawal from the UN is wrong in all circumstances." (See Item 1)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Moreover, notwithstanding current Soviet trouble-making over Article 19's application, Peiping's reaffirmation of the thesis that the UN is "manipulated" by the US, its call to "liquidate blind faith" in the United Nations, and its hope that Indonesia's action might lead to the end of "power diplomacy of the US and a few other big powers" were all thrusts seemingly directed almost as much at the Soviet Union as at the United States and other Western states. Sukarno's action, and the vigorous Chinese support for it, seemed certain to accentuate old quarrels and rivalries between Peiping and Moscow, both anxious to gain paramount influence among the "new emerging forces."

The second line of attack occurred over President Johnson's State of the Union message, which a January 11 People's Daily "Observer" article criticized less for its content than in terms of "some people's" approving reaction to it. Thus: "It is unimaginable that / the US/ would give up its aggressive scheme for world hegemony in the face of difficulties....These people / who 'take Johnson's nebulous words of peace seriously and hope that he will turn his words into action'/ are attempting to lead the people of the world astray....Johnson might be able to pull the wool over the eyes of certain persons, but he can never deceive the revolutionary people of the world."

"Observer" reported the President's reference to the search for "peaceful understandings" with the Soviet Union which could lessen the danger to freedom, but it did not mention his allusion to a possible visit by Soviet leaders to the United States. Such a visit would certainly be seen in Peiping as further evidence that what it calls a "policy of Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" is being actively pursued by the new regime. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. US: Edgar Snow Received by Mao Tse-tung

On January 9 NCNA briefly noted that American author Edgar Snow had been received by Mao Tse-tung. Thus far during his rather lengthy stay in China, Snow has appeared in the press on four occasions. Other personalities with whom he has had interviews include Chou En-lai and Soong Ching-ling. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Internal

5. CPPCC Closes Amid Signs of Party Dissatisfaction with United Front Operations

A. Kuo Mo-jo Delivers Work Report - The First Session of the Fourth National Committee of theChinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) closed in Peiping on January 5, after meeting for 16 days. The key document of the session was Vice Chairman Kuo Mo-jo's Standing Committee Work Report, which, amid appeals for increased solidarity with the Chinese Communist Party and descriptions of the favorable internal and external situation, provided strong hints of Party dissatisfaction with United Front operations. Kuo told delegates that the CPPCC "must not be allowed to become an organization which serves the bourgeoisie or a place flooded with bourgeois thinking...work style...or ways of life." He accused some members of having advocated compromise in the international struggles against imperialists, reactionaries, and modern revisionists, and reduction of support for world revolutionary struggles (sloganized as "The Three Compromises and One Reduction" - San Ho Yi Shao). Kuo scored other critics

0957

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

who had pushed for the extension of private plots, free markets, and privately-run enterprises and for fixing agricultural output quotas on the basis of individual household units rather than in terms of collective teams (sloganized as "The Three Freedoms and One Fixture" - San Tzu Yi Pao). Still others had "harbored such erroneous and reactionary ideas as refusing to carry on remoulding." Reiterating Chou En-lai's fear of the "creation of new bourgeois elements," Kuo accused CPPCC committees and work groups of slackness in ideological remoulding and proletarian education, and complained that bourgeois elements had been allowed to "inundate some cultural and recreational activities." Such shortcomings must be corrected in the future, Kuo concluded. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

B. New CPPCC Vice Chairmen Elected - (a) Scapegoats - A possible reflection of the Party's displeasure with the past workings of the United Front was the dismissal of CCP Central Committee United Front Work Department Director Li Wei-han as a Vice Chairman of the CPPCC Standing Committee. His removal from the Standing Committee (he was also dropped as a NPC Vice Chairman - see WEEKA 1) could well mean that he has lost his Party post as well. From now on the day-to-day working link between the Party and the CPPCC will be provided by the new Secretary General of the Standing Committee, P'ing Chieh-san, a Deputy Director of the CC United Front Work Department.

Another possible sign of disapproval, this time in the realm of minority affairs (which the regime has characterized recently as fraught with subversion and an "extremely sharp and complicated class struggle"-WEEKA 49 et seq) was the removal of Pao Erh-han (Burhan), long one of Peiping's leading domesticated Uighurs, as a Vice Chairman.

(b) Rewards - Among the 15 new Vice Chairmen of the Standing Committee, Party Northwest Regional Bureau Chief Liu Lan T'ao and his opposite number from the Northeast Bureau, Sung Jen-ch'iung are the most significant additions. With their election, all six of the Regional Party Chiefs have now been accorded the honor of high NPC, State Council, or CPPCC office (see WEEKA 1). Other new Vice Chairmen whose election can be regarded as a reward are Central Committee Member Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, Alternate Central Committee Member and Kwangsi Party First Secretary Wei Kuo-ch'ing, KMT Revolutionary Committee Vice Chairman Tsai T'ing-k'ai, Minister of Water Conservancy and Electric Power Fu Tso-yi, Minister of Light Industry Li Ch'u-ch'en, Minister of Aquatic Products Hus Te-heng, and China Democratic League Vice Chairmen Ma Hsu-lun, and Lao Ch'ung-min.

(c) Consolation Prizes - Several of the New Vice Chairmanships can be regarded as consolation prizes granted to persons who lost out in the NPC sweepstakes. Among the recipients are former Vice Premier Teng Tzu-hui, former Minister of Culture Shen Yen-ping (Mao Tun), Ex-President of the Supreme People's Court Hsieh Chueh-tsai, (whose job was taken by Yang Hsiu-feng, the former Minister of Higher Education), Ex-Minister of Public Health Li Te-ch'uan, and Ex-Railways Minister Teng T'ai-yuan.

(d) Other Dismissals - The other dismissed Vice Chairmen, Kuo Mo-jo, K'ang Sheng, Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, and Ho Hsiang-ning all have comfortable perches as NPC Vice Chairmen. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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COMMENT: While the CPPCC has long ceased to have any significant governmental role, the Party's treatment of and attitude toward this organization is indicative of its approach to important non-Party segments of the Chinese population. It is obvious from the concern voiced in both Chou En-lai's (WEEKA 1) and Kuo Mo-jo's Work Reports that despite repeated efforts to "remould" these elements, they are still refusing to embrace those tenets of Mao and the Party's teaching that do not conform to their own concepts of individual and national self-interest. If Chou himself can be believed, stronger doses of socialist education are in store for these "people in the middle." Chou also made it clear, however, that the dosage would be administered with care, for while the Party is committed to remoulding the bourgeoisie and eliminating it as a class, it cannot afford to alienate individual class members whose skills and experience are still much in demand. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. Chief Procurator, President of Supreme People's Court, Report to NPC

NCNA reported on December 31 that Chief Procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate Chang Ting-cheng, and outgoing President of the Supreme People's Court Hsieh Chueh-tsai delivered reports on the work of their respective departments to the December 26 plenary session of the NPC. According to the first summaries of the NPC judicial reports published in seven years, Chang told delegates that the "people's democratic dictatorship is more consolidated than ever." During the last 11 months of 1964 the number of counter-revolutionary cases had decreased 34 percent over the same period in 1963, while criminal cases had fallen 20 percent to the lowest number since the founding of the CPR. Lest his triumphant statement seem a contradiction of the current unending class struggle line, Chang hastened to add that "repeated class struggle would continue to exist.... during the entire period of socialist society."

Chang told delegates that over the past few years procurator organizations had improved their work by avoiding the once common practice of staying in the office and deciding all cases strictly according to the letter of the law. Instead, the procurators were going out among the people, collecting evidence at the scenes of crimes, studying motives and mitigating curcumstances. During the first half of 1964, the procuratorates in 24 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions sent 83 work teams to the basic level to investigate, sum up experiences, and guide work. In the course of their work the procuratorates at the various levels had found that:

1. Cases are best handled in close conjunction with class struggle. The investigation and prosecution of typical offenses provide effective negative examples in the education of the masses, and should be played up "in a big way."

2. Wherever possible the masses should be encouraged to do their own legal work, exposing and informing on criminals in their midst, criticizing and struggling face-to-face with obdurate wrongdoers who refuse to plead guilty after repeated trials and investigations. Participation in the legal process increases the masses' confidence in their role as class reformers.

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

3. By relying on the masses, procuratorates are better able to coordinate their functions smoothly with the courts and public security agencies.

In his report on the Court, Hsieh Chueh-tsai reiterated the efficacy of reliance on the masses, and stated that the courts had found the use of mass rallies as forums for pronouncing sentence a particularly effective means of frightening class enemies and strengthening mass enthusiasm for struggle. During the past several years the regular courts had come to rely more and more on people's courts and reconciliation committees (essentially amateur mass judicial bodies) for assistance in the handling of civil cases. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: Comparison of these summaries with their most recent predecessors (delivered to the NPC on July 1, 1957), shows that neither the role nor the operations of the Procuratorate and the Courts have changed significantly in the intervening years. The Procuratorate remains both the watchdog of and the prosecutor for the government bureaucracy and the judiciary, while the Courts remain primarily a punitive and propaganda weapon in the hands of the regime. The close connection between the themes of these judicial reports and the other government work reports are further evidence of the organic link between the Chinese Communist judicial system and Party policy.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the reports is the mere fact of their publication. While not as informative as the full texts which came out in 1957, they contain more information than the regime has been willing to disclose on the subject in years and constitute an additional expression of the confident line taken at the NPC this year (see WEEKA 1). (UNCLASSIFIED)

7. KMT Defector Ch'eng Yi-ming Writes Taiwan Friends

On January 2, Ch'eng Yi-ming, the KMT Macao Intelligence Chief who defected in Canton last December (WEEKA 52), wrote an open letter to "old friends and colleagues among KMT military and government personnel," pointing out the hopelessness of the situation in Taiwan, the prosperity in the mainland, and the leniency of the Communist government. He called on one and all to defect. Meanwhile, in an undated China News Service interview in Peiping which was given a big play in the Hong Kong Communist press on January 7, Ch'eng said that the Chinese Communist Nuclear Explosion and the successful remoulding of P'u Yi, the last Manchu Emperor, were the main inspirations in his decision to defect. Ch'eng and his wife returned to Canton on New Year's Eve. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: The content of most of Ch'eng's letter is exactly the same as previous defectors' open letters to Taiwan, a fact which may dull some of its impact. The importance which he ascribes the CCNE in his decision to defect is part of an entirely predictable ChiCom effort to exploit the drop in KMT morale which has occurred as a result of the test. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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MILITARY

1. PLA Air Successes over the Mainland

In recent weeks the Chinese have claimed three successes in shooting down planes over the mainland. On December 18 an air unit of the PLA Navy was credited with downing a National RF-101 reconnaissance plane near the coast over the East China Sea. The pilot who had bailed out of the plane was captured by "militiamen" in a fishing junk. On January 2 an Air Force unit was commended for shooting down "an intruding pilotless high-altitude reconnaissance military plane of US imperialism" over Central-South China. On January 10 another Air Force unit was credited with shooting down a U-2. This is the fourth U-2 plane lost over China. The Nationalists claim that the plane suffered a mechanical failure during its flight. (UNCLASSIFIED)

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative.

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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TO : DEPARTMENT

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FROM : AmConsul HONG KONG

DATE : January 8, 1965

SUBJECT : COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 1

REF :

POLITICAL

Internal

1. NPC Closes - Premier Chou's Work Report Sounds Dominant Note of Optimism
2. NPC Elections and Appointments - Old Wine in New Bottles

External

3. Peiping Supports Indonesia's Withdrawal from UN
4. Southeast Asia: Peiping Renews "Expanded War" Protests - Avoids New Commitments
5. Sino-Soviet Relations
6. United States: Further Protests against Polaris Submarine "Daniel Boone"
7. India: Peiping Steps Up Anti-Indian Press Attacks

MILITARY

1. Analysis of Military Speeches to NPC

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM DS-323 4-62

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Drafted by: POL:NPlatt/DMAnderson:jm 1/7/65

Contents and Classification Approved by: Oscar V. Armstrong

Clearances:

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

INTERNAL

1. NPC Closes - Premier Chou's Work Report Sounds Dominant Note of Optimism

The First Session of the Third NPC ended on January 4 after two weeks of plenary and committee sessions (see WEEKAS 52 and 53). By far the most important document to emerge from the gathering - the final communique and subsequent editorials added little - was Chou En-lai's Government Work Report, a long summary of which was published by NCNA on December 31. In addition to announcing that the Third Five-Year Plan would commence in 1966 and making a series of economic claims and prognostications (see WER 1), Chou made the following points of internal political significance (ConGenTel 922):

1. Intensified Class Struggle and Rectification - The Premier left no doubt that the current militant use of class struggle and socialist education in an effort to rouse the masses would intensify, and cited familiar boilerplate themes ("Learn from the PLA," "Compare, Learn, Catch Up, and Help," "Study Mao's Works," etc.) designed to "carry the revolution through to the end." He specified the "imperative need" for "revolutionization (i.e. rectification) of leading Party and Government organs and cadres at all levels, streamlining of staffs, reduction of paperwork, etc. as a key factor in putting "politics in command." "We are convinced," he added rather defensively, "that following the successful unfolding of the present socialist education movement there will be a new upsurge not only of socialist education but also of socialist production."

2. Leadership Sensitivity to Criticism - Chou bitterly attacked critics who during the difficulties of 1959-62 advocated the extension of private plots, free markets, "reversal of previous correct decisions," liquidation of international, anti-imperialist, revisionist struggle, and conveyed the impression that criticism during that period was of a wide variety and rose to quite a high level. For the present and the future, Chou reiterated the leadership's oft-expressed ambivalence; i.e. that in spite of a strong Marxist-Leninist Party, powerful PLA, the support of 95% of the population, and the wisdom of Chairman Mao, "it is entirely wrong to underestimate the danger" of a restoration of capitalism whose "sinister winds blow frequently into Socialist countries."

3. Intellectuals Raised in Hierarchy of Class Enemies - Chou warned delegates to guard against new bourgeois elements, intellectuals, and exploiters who are being "ceaselessly created in society, Party, government, culture, education, and always attempting to find protection in leading organizations." His specific references to aberrant concepts under attack on the mainland now (Yang Hsien-chen's "Unite Two Into One," Chou Ku-ch'eng's "Spirit of the Age," and Shao Ch'uan-lin's demands to portray "people in the middle"), left no doubt that this campaign is far from over.

4. Minority Areas Still Trouble Spots - While the Premier claimed that the broad masses of the minority nationalities support the Chinese Communist program, he scored the "few members of the upper strata" obstinately opposing social reform, provoking conflict, and "ganging up with imperialists and modern revisionists to launch armed rebellion." As examples, Chou cited the "traitorous counterrevolutionary armed rebellion at Ining (Kuldja) Sinkiang" in 1962 (his use of the term "rebellion" significantly giving the incident more of an internal interpretation than Peiping has previously been willing to render) and resistance

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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by the Dalai and Panchen Lamas in Tibet. He dissolved the mystery connected with the Panchen's removal as an NPC delegate explaining that the Tibetan Preparatory Committee had fired him as Acting Chairman for leading a clique of former serf-owners engaged in "anti-people" activities. He would remain a committee member, however, in hopes that he would "turn over a new leaf." (The Panchen encouraged these hopes by appearing before the NPC plenary session on January 2 to make a "preliminary review of his anti-people, anti-fatherland, and anti-socialist activities." Nevertheless, his demotion leaves the regime without a "front" for its activities who possesses any real stature.)

5. "Peaceful Transformation" Threatens Members of "United Front" - In a renewed emphasis on United Front activities (a stress echoed in the NPC Communique and January 5 People's Daily editorial) Chou assured delegates and CPPCC observers that Party and State would continue "peacefully" to regard contradictions between the National bourgeoisie and the proletariat as "among the people" and not "between the enemy and ourselves." "Long-term coexistence" and "mutual supervision" amongst the Communist and Democratic Parties would continue. However, although the "bourgeoisie as a class must be eliminated, individuals belonging to it have a bright future," provided, Chou added, "they are willing to remold themselves." (Chou is trying to accomplish the difficult task of assuring and encouraging members of society to whose liquidation as a class the regime is ideologically committed, but whose skills and experience are still badly needed.)

6. Part-Work, Part-Study Schools Cautiously Termed Wave of Future - Chou explained national education policy as promulgated by Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i as a reform "for a number of years" of the existing full-time school system, at the same time establishing experimental part-work, part-study institutions with a view that "such schools point the direction of the long-term development of Socialist-Communist education." (Chou seemed to go out of his way to list Liu Shao-ch'i as the originator of this far-reaching new development in education, toward which the regime appears to be moving cautiously.)

7. Revolutionary Successors Not Mentioned - While many of the programs Chou outlined are designed to deal with the regime's concern over the ideological qualifications of the younger generation, he failed to make a specific reference to the successors problem. The explanation probably lies in official reluctance to broach this delicate subject in a non-Party forum. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

COMMENT: Our main impression of Chou's report in particular and the First Session of the Third NPC in general is one of heightened Chinese Communist optimism over the regime's political and economic prospects both at home and abroad. This tone of optimism is particularly marked in comparison with last year's NPC, but observable even when compared with 1964 October 1 statements. The mere fact that the regime is willing to release such a detailed, candid summary of Chou's report as well as summaries of many other reports made to the session suggests that the CPR is less defensive and more bullish about the future.

We were also struck by; a) the absence of any distinctly new policies, and b) within the framework of Marxism-Leninism and Mao's thought, the note of realism and restraint struck by Chou in discussing means to implement ideologically motivated plans. The total weight of Chou's report as well as the remainder of the NPC reportage suggests that the Chinese Communists now believe they have evolved a workable program which will carry them toward their goals provided they exercise intelligence, determination, and energy in following it. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

2. NPC Elections and Appointments - Old Wine in New Bottles

1. CPR Leadership - As announced in lists published on January 3, CPR Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i, Vice Chairman Sung Ch'ing-ling and Tung Pi-wu, and Premier Chou En-lai, as well as the bulk of the other officers retained their old posts, putting an end to speculation that any major shifts in the top leadership might be in the offing.

2. Vice Premiers - The reappointment of Ch'en Yun as Vice Premier is intriguing, because this once-prominent economic figure and Party Vice Chairman has been in political limbo since at least 1960, probably for outspoken opposition to the Great Leap. His reappointment could indicate his partial rehabilitation and return to policy-making councils, and also constitute a gesture to reconcile other Great Leap critics to present policies, i.e. "If Ch'en can stomach them, why shouldn't you?" His reappointment could also result from a simple decision to refrain from formally purging so eminent an old Communist.

Among the new Vice Premiers, CCP Central Committee Central-South Regional Bureau First Secretary T'ao Chu and his counterpart in the East China Bureau, K'o Chi'ng-shih, are the most noteworthy additions. These appointments reflect the stature of both men and recognize the importance of the regional bureaus, which have been established since the last election of governmental officers by the NPC in 1959. The removal of Teng Tzu-hui as Vice Premier appears to be a continuation of his loss of power in the government agricultural policy sphere since the beginning of 1962, and a reflection of what appears to be his diminishing stature in the Party. The dismissal of former State Council Secretary General Hsi Chung-hsun, not seen since September 1962 and rumored to be in disgrace for a variety of deviations, both political and sexual, comes as no surprise. Hsi obviously blotted his copy book, but we doubt that his ouster is indicative of any real "anti-Party activity."

3. NPC Standing Committee Vice Chairmen - While the number of Vice Chairmen expanded to 19 (previous number 15), the new group maintains the former rough 50-50 balance between high-powered CCP men and faithful minority and democratic figureheads. Of nine new Vice Chairmen, Party North China Regional Bureau First Secretary Li Hsueh-feng, his counterpart from the South-West Bureau and also Politburo Member Li Ching-ch'uan, Alternate Politburo Member K'ang Sheng, Central Committee Member and All China Trade Union Federation Chairman Liu Ning-yi, and Military Affairs Committee Member Marshal Hsu Hsiang-chien, add considerable Party muscle to the line-up, while Tibet Preparatory Committee Vice Governor Ngapo Ngawang Jigme emerges as the regime's leading new tame (but much less well known) Tibetan in place of the fallen Dalai and Panchen Lamas. China Democratic League Chairman Yang Ming-hsuan, one of his CDL Vice Chairmen Chou Chien-jen, and KMT Revolutionary Committee Vice Chairman Chang Chih-chung add window dressing.

0965

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Liu Ning-yi's appointment as Secretary General of the NPC Standing Committee replacing P'eng Chen (who remains a Vice Chairman) is a definite step up for Liu and is probably intended to free P'eng for greater Party responsibilities. Li Wei-han's dismissal as Vice Chairman is a mystery. Our files show that he was very active up through October in all his capacities, including Director of the Central Committee's United Front Work Department and Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (another post he lost this January), and provide no hint that he might be in bad grace.

4. Ministers - Among the new ministers, Party Propaganda Chief Lu Ting-yi's concurrent appointment as Minister of Culture, replacing non-Party author Shen Yen-ping (aka Mao Tun), boosts the Culture Ministry to a position of importance in line with the regime's nationwide efforts this year to purify all intellectual and cultural output. It is also a tacit admission that in Chinese Communist Society culture and propaganda are synonymous. Former Education Vice Minister Chiang Nan-hsiang's background as a YCL Secretariat member as well as a tough Tsinghua University Chairman may suit him especially well as the new Minister of Higher Education to administer the recently intensified efforts to rectify China's college youth.

5. Ministries - Of the apparently new Seventh and Eighth Machine Building Ministries, the Seventh, headed by Lieutenant General Wang Ping-chang, former Air Force Chief of Staff, would appear to be connected with the aviation industry, while the Eighth appears to be simply a new name for the former Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building Industry. (CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMENT: The most striking pattern to emerge is the bestowal of the accolade of high government office to four out of six Party regional bureau chiefs. While the rewards add little to the recipient's real power, especially Politburo Members K'o Ch'ing-shih and Li Ching-chuan, the regionally-oriented T'ao Chu and Li Hsueh-feng stand to benefit from a strategic position in the Central Government. For T'ao especially, a Vice Premiership moves him onto the national stage and nearer the Politburo position that his increasing prominence would merit.

The search for "revolutionary successors" reveals little fresh blood. Most "comers" on the list, notably three of the four Regional Party Chiefs honored, are in their late fifties or early sixties. Any one phrase chosen to characterize the changes in the line-up would have to be "Old Wine in New Bottles." Of the top appointees, all are members of the "in group" as it stood before. (ConGenTel 934) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

External

3. Peiping Supports Indonesia's Withdrawal from UN

The first public ChiCom editorial reaction to the Indonesian withdrawal from the UN came on January 6, 1965 in the form of a People's Daily editorial voicing "firm support" for "this righteous measure." The editorial described the seating of Malaysia in the UN Security Council as an "undisguised act of provocation and hostility to Indonesia," and claimed that the US was using this means "to vilify and threaten Indonesia in a more flagrant manner."

After denouncing the UN as being under the thumb of the US, the editorial, in language remarkable for an aspiring member, described the UN as an "imperialist instrument of aggression, an infamous organ in the service of old and new colonialism, and a vile place for a few powers to share the spoils." The US is described as "infuriated" by the Indonesian withdrawal, while by its action Indonesia is claimed to have "asserted its independence and sovereignty."

The editorial continued with the allegation that "US and British imperialism" was stepping up the armed threat in the vicinity of Indonesia, and concluded with the warning that, "should US and British imperialism launch armed provocations against Indonesia," it will be rebuffed by the Indonesians with support of "other Asian peoples and all other peace-loving countries and peoples in the world." (CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMENT: While we had expected the ChiCom statement of support for Indonesia in its opposition to Malaysia's assumption of a Security Council seat, we had not assumed that the ChiComs would be happy about Indonesia's actually withdrawing from the UN. We had supposed that they were counting on Indonesia to be the most influential exponent for admission of the ChiComs to the UN on their own terms. But this unrestrained denunciation of the UN hardly fits the picture of a nation hopeful of admission in the relatively near future - which Communist China has given some recent indications of being. Evidently they have concluded it is more important in the long run to encourage Indonesia to burn its bridges and go further down the road of confrontation. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Southeast Asia: Peiping Renews "Expanded War" Protests - Avoids New Committments

On December 31 ChiCom Foreign Minister Chen Yi dispatched separate messages to DRV Foreign Minister Xuan Thuy and Neo Lao Haksat leader Prince Souphanouvong condemning US "imperialism" in collusion with its "puppets" in South Vietnam and Laotian "rightwing elements" for plotting to expand the war in Indo-China. Both messages, however, avoided any specific commitment of Chinese support, and, on the contrary, seemed to lay heavy stress on the view that these US moves would be repulsed by "the peoples of Indo-China and all Southeast Asia." The closest Chen Yi came to a specific reference to Chinese support was in the last sentence of his message to Souphanouvong in which he said, "The 650-million Chinese people will always firmly stand by the Laotian people and give them all-out support and assistance."

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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The People's Daily in a January 2 editorial "condemned severely" US' "maneuvres" to "extend the war in South Vietnam to central and lower Laos." The editorial listed a series of steps which it said the US was taking to extend the war: 1) trying to create a "pretext" for new steps by "spreading the lie" about the presence of the troops of the DRV in Laos; 2) blocking the road to a peaceful settlement by "wrecking" the Paris tripartite talks and bombing "liberated areas" in Laos; and 3) "ganging up" with the Laotian "rightists" and South Vietnamese "puppets" for "new, massive military operations." The editorial concluded, however, with the conviction that "the people of Indo-China are powerful enough to smash any US military adventure." (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Sino-Soviet Relations

The small portion of Chou En-lai's Work Report to the National People's Congress devoted to international affairs served largely as a reminder of Peiping's preoccupation with Afro-Asian affairs and its complete intransigence on such questions as admission to the United Nations and Sino-US relations. Chou's published reference to Sino-Soviet relations was noteworthy, however, first for its very brief nature, and secondly for the absence of references to modern revisionism and its stress on the positive aspects of Peiping's desire for socialist unity. While noting that, "through no fault of our own," relationships between the two Parties had been "impaired" and had "run into difficulties," Chou affirmed that the Chinese " continue to set store by unity and as far as possible we maintain normal intercourse" with the USSR. Finally, Chou confirmed Moscow reports that it was the Chinese who had taken the initiative in proposing to send a high-level Party and government delegation to Moscow for the October Revolution anniversary.

Just as Chou avoided specific jibes at the Soviets in his NPC speech, the Soviet reply to Chou's October 17 nuclear summit proposal sent by Premier Kosygin on December 28, and released by NCNA on January 1, adopted a positive tone and concluded with a declaration of "complete agreement with and support" for the Chinese proposal. Particularly interesting was the lack of reference to the tripartite test ban treaty. (CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMENT: Although there appears to be no abatement of open conflict at lower Party levels, such as at the International Union of Students' Eighth Congress held recently in Sofia (WEEKA 51), both sides have thus far maintained a proper, although not friendly, attitude at the higher State levels, thus avoiding a degeneration of the dialogue into vehement, wide-ranging, and personal attacks characteristic of the last phase of the Khrushchev period. Embassy Moscow's description of the Soviet leadership's "above-the-battle" posture (EmbTel 1955 to Dept), might equally be applied to Chou's attitude in his NPC speech. Further indications of the direction of Sino-Soviet state relations may be gleaned from the trade talks which will begin in Moscow in the near future. (CONFIDENTIAL)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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6. United States: Further Protests Against Polaris Submarine "Daniel Boone"

Peiping followed up the December 29 government statement protesting the entry into the Western Pacific of the Polaris submarine "Daniel Boone" with a People's Daily editorial on December 31. The editorial followed the general line set by the government statement, denouncing the US' action as "a despicable act of nuclear blackmail" aimed at the establishment of a "nuclear ring around China."

The editorial was perhaps the best indication to date of Peiping's effort to present itself as a full-blown nuclear power. It alleged that these "open acts of nuclear war preparations" were undertaken on the pretext of "confronting China's nuclear strength," and scoffed, "This is preposterous." China wants nuclear weapons, claimed the editorial, only for self-defense, and "having possessed them, the Chinese government has not taken them to the doorsteps of the US, much less has it used them to threaten any Asian country."

NCNA also carried reports of protests from Cambodia and North Vietnam in what will no doubt be a series of similar denunciations from friendly governments or organizations in Asia. All these protests do not, in our opinion, cover up the fact that the Chinese are basically disturbed over this further deployment of US power on their doorstep. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. India: Peiping Steps Up Anti-Indian Press Attacks

Purportedly replying to an Indian government note of August 5 (apparently never published), the CPR Foreign Ministry on December 30 released a summary of its note in refutation which was handed to the Indian Embassy in Peiping on December 28. The note, which is a catalogue of Peiping's complaints for the past six months, attacks India's charges that CPR denunciations of Indian participation in a "two Chinas plot" are interference in the internal affairs of India. Also denounced as "slanderous allegations" were India's repeated protests against Chinese intrusions on Indian territory. The note renewed the Chinese claim (also raised in Chou En-lai's speech to the NPC) that India now occupies 90,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory south of the McMahon Line in the Eastern Sector and 2,000 square kilometers in the Middle Sector.

On December 29 and 30 NCNA continued its vilification of Indian policies with reports on the "Joint Nuclear Shield" plan and Indian collaboration with the "Chiang gang" and the Dalai Lama, "a Tibetan rebel leader." (UNCLASSIFIED)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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MILITARY

1. Analysis of Military Speeches to NPC

Chou En-lai, Senior General Lo Jui-ching, and Marshal Ho Lung, in addresses to the first session of the Third NPC, all praised the advancement in "revolutionization and modernization of the PLA under the banner of Mao Tse-tung's thinking."

Marshal Ho Lung applauded the revolutionary spirit, tradition, and working style of the PLA and summarized its current condition as follows: "We have now not only a long-tempered, strong ground force, but a comparatively powerful air force and a sizeable navy. Besides a mighty main force, we have a powerful people's militia force of many millions. Not only have we greatly strengthened the arms and equipment of the army and the people's militia, but we also successfully exploded our first atom bomb, designed and manufactured by ourselves."

General Lo Jui-ching, Chief of the General Staff Department, reviewed the programs which the PLA has followed in applying Mao's military thinking and gave attribution for them to Lin Piao. These programs include 1) propagandizing by the use of living examples, 2) perserverence in the "4-Firsts," 3) developing the "3-8" work style, and 4) expanding the campaign for "4-Good" companies. He concluded that the political and military qualities of the army have improved as well as its technical equipment. He saw fit, also, to give an account of a struggle to implement Mao's line in opposition to a bourgeois military line. (CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMENT: As a review of PLA progress since the last NPC and a statement of current defense posture, the addresses present nothing startling or new. However, the following themes are notworthy: 1) the strength of the repetitious admonitions of faith in the correct Mao military line, and curious references to an opposition "revisionist" military line. The opposition to Mao's military polity which resulted in Lin Piao becoming Minister of Defense is well documented. What is not known is the extent to which opposition to Mao's policy persists. Perhaps the references are meant merely to provide continuity in coverage from the 1959 NPC; or perhaps the references are indication that there still is a military group which opposes the political orientation of Mao's line; 2) the confident, but not boastful, tone of the situation estimates. Implied in the content of the talks is a satisfaction in the development of the munitions industry, in the results of various morale-building and indoctrination campaigns, in the progress of military training to make the PLA combat-ready, and in the increasing capacity of the militia.

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative.

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

CONTRIBUTOR: ARMLO/ColTreadwell

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. IN 54 (23)

DATE: 31 Dec '64 MSG NO.: A-438 TYPE: AIRGRAM

FROM: Hong Kong TO: State

SUBJECT: Weeka 53

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : See Page 10
None Shown

GROUP-3 - Downgraded at 12 year intervals

FROM : AmConsul HONG KONG

DATE: December 24, 1964

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

POLITICAL

INTERNAL

1. NPC Opens - No Mention of Five Year Plan
2. Friction Between Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-ping?
3. KMT Macau Intelligence Chief Defects
4. People's Daily Attacks Bogus Communists Among Political Instructors
5. TIBET: Dalai Scourged: Panchen Spurned

EXTERNAL

6. VIETNAM: Peiping Expresses Strong Support for National Liberation Front
7. Visit to China by Dr. Rosen Cancelled "For the Time Being"
8. THAILAND: Further Signs of Chicom Support for Anti Thanom Movement

MILITARY

Negative

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

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POLITICAL

Internal

1. NPC Opens - No Mention of Five Year Plan

The First Session of the Third National People's Congress convened in Peiping on December 21, attended by 2836 deputies including Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Soong Ch'ing-ling, Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and P'eng Chen. Chou En-lai presented the Government Work Report. NPC Standing Committee Vice Chairman P'eng Chen told delegates at a December 20th Preparatory Meeting that in addition to Chen's report the NPC agenda this year would include:

a. Approval of the principal targets set in the 1965 economic plan, and preliminary arrangement of the 1965 state budget.

b. Election of CPR Chairman; NPC Standing Committee Chairman, Vice Chairman and members; President of the Supreme People's Court; Procurator General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate.

c. Decision on the appointment of Premier of the State Council; Vice Premiers, Secretary General, Ministers, and Chairman of the Commissions; Vice Chairmen and members of the National Defense Council; Chairman and members of the Nationalities Committee and Bills Committee of the Third NPC.

In addition, the First Session of the National Committee of the Fourth Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) opened on December 10. Vice Chairman Kuo Mo-jo delivered the work report. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: While the evidence is admittedly slim, exclusive stress on the economic goals and budget for 1965 alone seems to infer that Communist China will not launch a Third Five Year Plan next year. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

CORRECTION - A check of the complete Third NPC delegate list issued on December 12 shows that Lieutenant General Ch'iu Ch'uang-ch'eng, Minister of the Fifth Machine Building Industry and Chang Lin-chih, Minister of Coal Industry, reported dropped from NPC rolls in Weekas 45 and 44 respectively, have both showed up as delegates from provinces other than those from which they were originally elected to the Second NPC. This year Ch'iu is a delegate from Hunan, while Wang was elected in Hopeh. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0 9 7 3

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2. Friction Between Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-ping?

Toronto Globe and Mail correspondent Charles Taylor, now vacationing in Hong Kong after a stint in Peiping, has told ConGen officers of a story which is currently receiving fairly wide circulation in the Chinese Communist capital (and apparently receiving some credence) to the effect that considerable friction developed between CPR Premier Chou En-lai and Secretary of the CCP Central Committee's General Secretariat Teng Hsiao-ping following Chou's tour of African nations last Spring. According to the story, Teng Hsiao-ping used his appointment as Acting Premier during Chou's absence to remove some of Chou's appointees from key jobs in the governmental structure and to insert his own protegees into these jobs. When Chou En-lai touched down in Kunming on his way back and found out what had happened, the story goes, he sent an ultimatum to Peiping saying that he would refuse to return to Peiping until the status quo ante had been restored, but would remain in Kunming--which he did for two weeks before embarking on the Pakistan-Ceylon-Burma phase of his tour. Ultimately Chou had his way, and returned to Peiping for a lavish welcome at the airport in which the VIPs present included Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi, not to mention Teng Hsiao-ping. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Comment: While it would be tempting to assume from the above story that two of the most senior Chinese Communist leaders are indulging in hatchet work against one another, we feel that it would be unwise to read into it any serious differences within the top leadership. We have been unable to find any corroboration of personnel shifts away from and then back to any one job from among the lists of appointments and dismissals made by the State Council during Teng Hsiao-ping's tenure as Acting Premier. On the other hand, there were at least a few external signs of less-than-full rapport between Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-ping during the period of Chou's African tour (ConGen's A-967, May 22, 1964), and the Peiping story could be an outward manifestation if not the real explanation. Interestingly enough, a Chicom propaganda film which ConGen officers saw on Chou's welcome home at the Peiping airport showed that when Mao and the other dignitaries advanced to shake Chou's hand, Teng Hsiao-ping accomplished the difficult feat of making the hand-shake without turning his head to look at Chou. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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0974

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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3. KMT Macau Intelligence Chief Defects

NCNA December 16 reports that Major General Ch'eng Yi-ming, KMT Chief of Intelligence in Macau, defected in Canton on December 13 bringing with him a wireless set, codes, documents, hand guns, explosives, fuses, and "poison needles for assasination purposes." According to the report, Ch'eng had been working in KMT special services for 31 years and had been in charge of Mainland sabotage activities launched from Macau since 1950.

In a December 16 welcoming statement aimed at all potential defectors, Kwangtung Vice-Governor Lin Li-ming gave Ch'eng the standard assurances that all would be forgiven and appropriate rewards and job arrangements made, regardless of how heinous his past crimes had been. Arriving in Peiping on December 17, Ch'eng met with Vice Minister of Public Security Yang Ch'i-ch'ing on the 18th and was presented with a reward of JMP 100,000 (the largest JMP cash award ever granted a defector). To newsmen at a press conference later that day, Ch'eng expressed his thanks for the reward and promised to remould himself.

While Peiping papers have limited their coverage so far to a short article on the front page of the December 17 People's Daily, the Hong Kong Communist press has gloated over the defection, citing Ch'eng's action as proof that KMT officials "see no future in following the US-Chiang clique and yearn to return to the motherland." The editorials stress that the United States' days in Taiwan are numbered and that now is the time for all mainlanders on Taiwan, including Chiang Kai-shek, to think about returning home.

Timing its announcement to take advantage of Ch'eng's defection, NCNA reported on December 17 that another defector, Ch'en Tsu-wei, a technician of Air Asia in Taiwan, arrived in Canton on December 4, via Hong Kong. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Ch'eng Yi-ming is the highest ranking defector in years. Whatever the actual circumstances that may have triggered Ch'eng's flight, his action is likely to be further exploited by the Chicoms as graphic evidence of the drop in KMT morale since the Chinese Communist nuclear explosion. Peiping's generous reward to Ch'eng is the ideal way to drive the point home to the KMT audience that if a saboteur like Ch'eng, who is the worst type of KMT criminal in Communist eyes, receives such treatment, no one need fear reprisal upon return. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

4. People's Daily Attacks Bogus Communists Among Political Instructors

An authoritative December 17 People's Daily commentator article, "Fully Develop the Combat Role of Political Theory Instruction" expresses

0975

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

concern over the fact that bourgeois and revisionist elements among Communist China's thirty to forty thousand school and university political theory instructors are trying to "drag the nation's youth down the road of non-revolution and counter revolution." Class enemies who had always opposed the addition of political theory to school curricula have succeeded in influencing wavering, imperfectly reformed pedagogues, thereby turning academic institutions into "violent" class battlefields. As a result, the fight to win over the younger generation will be long and protracted, with the issue still very much in doubt.

According to People's Daily, particularly dangerous are those instructors who, while mouthing support for Marxism-Leninism and Mao's thought, take advantage of young people's inexperience in class struggle poisoning them with revisionist doctrine. Also harmful are well intentioned but pedantic instructors whose dry,lackadaisical, unrealistic teaching methods fail to inspire students, giving bourgeois thoughts a chance to creep in. In addition, students' ideologies are also being corroded by "backward families, backward teachers...old forces in society and the feudal and capitalist cultural legacy."

The solution to the problem, the article concludes, lies in arming political instructors with the thought of Mao and sending them down to the countryside to participate in the "three great revolutionary movements. " (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: This attack on political theory instructors is a logical extension of the campaign to train revolutionary successors (Weeka 32) and the purge of Yang Hsien-chen (ConGen A-204). The attention paid to those who hide opposition or apathy beneath an orthodox veneer echoes an emphasis on "phoney Marxism" which has marked every major pronouncement on the threat of revisionism within China since the Red Flag-People's Daily Ninth Commentary. The regime clearly recognizes lip-service to the Maoist cause as a serious threat to "carrying the revolution through to the end," particularly if it is not combated by those designated to help train the heirs to the revolution. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. TIBET: Dalai Scourged: Panchen Spurned

On December 18 the State Council, during its December 17 plenary meeting, dismissed the Dalai Lama from his post as Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region on the grounds that he had separated himself from the "motherland and people" and had become a "traitor" and an "incorrigible running dog of imperialism and foreign reactionaries." The dismissal is a symbolic gesture of condemnation since the Dalai Lama has not concerned himself with the post

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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since he fled to India in 1959. Rounding out Peiping's actions against him, when the list of Tibetan delegates to the National People's Congress (NPC) was published in the People's Daily December 13, it was revealed that the Dalai Lama and his sister (but not her husband) had been dropped from the list of delegates.

More suprisingly, the Panchen Lama, who has been the Acting Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region in the absence of the Dalai Lama, as well as his right hand man Chan-tung Chi-chin-mei, have both been dropped from the list of delegates to the NPC. To be sure, the Panchen Lama has not been wholly disgraced since he was reappointed to the Fourth National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee.

However, a priestly presence at the NPC was maintained by retaining the Living Buddha of Chamdo, P'a-pa'la Cho-lieh-lang-chieh, listed as number 14 on the list of 24 delegates in a variant form of his name, P'a-pa'la Ke-lieh-lang-chieh. He is a Vice Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region and one of the highest ranking Buddhist figures in Tibet, perhaps second only to the Panchen Lama, with whom he made a propaganda tour of China in 1959-1960 to peddle the Chicom line on the Tibetan revolution. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: The exclusion of the Panchen Lama from the NPC indicates that he has lost his utility to his masters, perhaps either because he has lost face among his countrymen, or for reasons hinted at in the December 13 NCNA dispatch on the Tibet dispatch on the Tibet Autonomous Region Preparatory Committee which alluded to "act of sabotage and schemes for restoration by a tiny handful of the reactionary serf-owners under the cover of religion." (UNCLASSIFIED)

EXTERNAL

6. VIETNAM: Peiping Expresses Strong Support for National Liberation Front

Peiping's celebrations of the fourth anniversary of the SVN National Liberation Front's establishment on December 20 provided a number of new and significant statements by the Chinese leadership. Insofar as we are able to compare Peiping's treatment with Hanoi's on the basis of VNA broadcasts monitored here, it would appear that Chinese support for and influence in the NFL is continuing to grow and that the DRV leadership may not be pleased with this development.

A. Peiping's celebrations of the NLF anniversary seemed designed to strengthen the Front's claim to be the legitimate representative of the South Viernamese people, and included a) a message from Premier Chou En-lai to Nguyen Huu Tho, President of the NLF Presidium, saluting the NLF on behalf of the CPR Government as the

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

CONFIDENTIAL

"glorious standard bearer and illustrious leader" of the South Vietnamese people; b) the attendance by Chou and Chen Yi at the December 19 reception given by the NLF permanent delegation in Peiping at which Chen Yi made the strongest Chicom statement of support for the NLF to date (see para 3 below); c) a People's Daily editorial entitled "A Great People, A Radiant Banner" which lavished praise on the NLF; and finally, d) the prominent reporting of the NLF communique summing up its gains to date. Hanoi's observance of the anniversary, so far as we can tell, has been more restrained.

B. NCNA and VNA coverage of the NLF's Peiping reception show interesting divergencies. The detailed NCNA report described the NLF as the "organizer and leader of the victorious revolutionary struggle of the South Vietnamese people" and quoted Acting Head of the NLF's Peiping Office, Nguyen Minh Phuong's claim that the NLF was expanding daily and had formed "basic level units" in both the countryside and the cities. VNA's much briefer account omitted these statements.

C. More important, the NCNA but not the VNA account of the reception quoted Chen Yi as saying that the NLF "has now become the genuine representative of the 14 million South Vietnamese people, and the South Vietnam question can be settled only through negotiations without outside interference and in accordance with the program of the NLF and the desire of the South Vietnamese people. There is no other way out." (italics added)

D. Commemorative editorials by both People's Daily and Nhan Dan on December 20 offer additional points of contrast. Nhan Dan played down the contribution of the NLF, praising its "completely correct and creative line of resistance," while stressing the importance of the DRV as a base for support of the struggle in the South, asserting the need for "close relations in the strategic tasks of the two zones." On the other hand, People's Daily describes the establishment of the NLF as a "major turning point in the history of the South Vietnamese people's liberation struggle," and depicts victory as almost within reach, the small and weak guerrillas of four years ago having been transformed into a strong popular armed force.

E. Perhaps the most concrete indication of a divergence of views was the NLF's own statement released by South Vietnam Liberation Radio December 18 and carried by NCNA on December 20. (So far as we can determine, VNA has not carried this statement at all.) The statement characterized reunification with the North as the "ultimate goal" to

CONFIDENTIAL

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

CONFIDENTIAL

be achieved "step by step" and "in a reasonable manner...on the principle of negotiations and agreement between the two zones of Vietnam without coercion of one side by the other." (italics added) The immediately following sentence adds: "So long as these objections are not yet achieved, the South Vietnamese would rather sacrifice all than be enslaved and (will) resolutely fight till final victory." (CONFIDENTIAL)

Comment: This Chicom build-up of the NLF as an independent entity not controlled by the DRV could, of course, be an elaborate Peiping-Hanoi ploy designed a) to attract increased support for the NLF among the South Vietnamese people on the grounds that a Communist victory would not automatically lead to a DRV take-over, but would necessitate NLF-DRV "negotiations" in which some modicum of special status for South Vietnam might be preserved; and b) to undercut the logic of any extension of fighting in Vietnam to the DRV on the grounds that the strength of the Communist forces in South Vietnam is not derived from the North, but from South Vietnam itself. On the other hand, the discrepancies between Chicom and DRV coverage of the NLF anniversary are sto striking as to suggest that something more is involved. As sheer speculation, the ConGen offers the thought that Chicoms may now feel that a negotiated settlement of the fighting in South Vietnam which they formerly opposed (ConGenTel 1466, Feb. 12, 1964) may now be much more likely, and that by building up the NLF they can serve their own ends by playing on possible Hanoi-NLF differences. (If the Chicoms are indeed willing to accept negotiations, we would view this as a post-Tonkin Gulf development wherein they are seeking to avoid a real test of strength with the US which their commitment to "fight shoulder to shoulder" with the DRV in the event that the war is carried to the North might entail..) (CONFIDENTIAL)

7. Visit to China by Dr. Rosen Cancelled "For the Time Being"

On December NCNA announced that the Chinese Medical Association had abruptly withdrawn the invitation to visit China which had been extended to Dr. Samuel Rosen, New York ear surgeon, to enable him to demonstrate his operating techniques in Peiping. The Medical Association's message to Dr. Rosen pinned the withdrawal of the invitation on the United States State Department's "intolerable statement which created an unpleasant atmosphere detrimental to your visit." The message denounced as an "outright lie" the US statement that it was the Department's policy to endorse passports for travel to China when such travel was for humanitarian reasons or was in the national interest, and concluded that "in order that science and friendship may not be besmirched by the US Government's policy of hostility towards China," the Association "cannot but regretfully suggest" that the visit be "cancelled for the time being". The message expressed the belief, however, that "the day will surely come when we shall be able to receive you in Peking."

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

CONFIDENTIAL

An NCNA release on the same day revealed Peiping's sensitivity on the subject when it referred to the State Department's having made a "big fanfare" and "a great fuss" over the validation of Dr. Rosen's passport for travel to Communist China. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Peiping's turndown of the Rosen visit recalls its sharp reaction against the Hilsman and Fulbright speeches and its determination not to permit exchanges of whatever nature to precede a more general political settlement. The episode should be instructive for non-aligned countries who tend to blame the US, rather than the CPR, for being intransigent.

8. THAILAND: Further Signs of Chicom Support for AntiThanom Movement

Further indications of Chinese plans to assist in the subversion of the Thanom government appeared this week. A reliable informant on December 18 told the Consulate General's Foreign Assets Control Officer that the Po Sang Bank during the past two weeks had purchased 20 million baht (about US$1 million) on behalf of the Communist Bank of China. The purchases were made in lots of one or two million baht, and Po Sang Bank was reportedly willing to pay premium prices. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Comment: The purchase of this large sum of Thai currency is probably connected with the announcement of the founding of the Thailand Independence Movement (Weeka 51), and indicates that a well-financed national front promoting neutralism, the expulsion of the US and the overthrow of the Thanom Government may be in the offing in the near future. (CONFIDENTIAL)

9. Visitors Roster: Heavy Traffic in Afro-Asian Visitors

Algeria: Minister of Tourism Amar Ouzegane paid a twenty-four hour visit to Peiping December 16-17 in the capacity of Special Envoy of Algerian President Ben Bella. During his brief stay he met with Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, and Chen Yi. He was the dinner guest of Chen Yi on the evening of December 16. From Peiping he left for Djakarta where he paid a two day visit.

North Korea: North Korean President Choi Yong Kun arrived in Kunming December 20 enroute home after state visits to Algeria, Mali, Guinea and Cambodia. He was met at the airport by 30,000 people, including Vice-Chairman Tung Pi-wu who absented himself from the opening of the NPC in order to be in Kunming.

UAR: Deputy Prime Minister Aziz Sidky, leading an industrial and economic delegation, arrived in Peiping December 18 as the guests of Chinese Vice-Premier Po I-po. Aziz Sidky met with Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, and Chen Yi, and on December 21 it was announced that the two

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

0 9 8 0

CONFIDENTIAL

sides had signed: 1) an economic and technical cooperation agreement, 2) agreed on a three year extension of the trade and payments agreement, and 3) agreed on a protocol on trade between the two countries during 1965.

Lebanon: A Lebanese Parliamentary delegation led by Socialist Progressive Party leader Kamal Jumblatt arrived in Peiping December 16 as guests of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. At a banquet hosted on the evening of the delegations arrival by Chang Hsi-jo, President of the People's Institute, Kamal Jumblatt is reported to have asserted that "Lebanon and other Arab countries were starting a large scale movement to promote political, economic, and cultural cooperation with China and restore their ancient friendship." (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: With the exception of the Lebanese delegation, all of these visitors to China appear to be part of a sharply increased number of foreign visits by high level officials in the Afro-Asian area. This fact, coupled with a report received from Japanese Consulate General sources that the Afro-Asian conference set for March may have to be postponed for three months, ostensibly due to construction difficulties. may indicate that divergencies exist among the organizing Afro-Asian states. (CONFIDENTIAL)

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

Although the distribution was inadvertently omitted from A-427, the document was given the usual distribution to the following addressees:

BAMAKO	CANBERRA	KATMANDU	NEW DELHI	SEOUL	VIENTIANE
BANGKOK	CINCPAC	KUALA LUMPUR	PARIS	SINGAPORE	WARSAW
BELGRADE	DAR ES SALAAM	LONDON	PRAGUE	SOFIA	WELLINGTON
BLANTYRE	DJAKARTA	MANILA	RANGOON	TAIPEI	COMNAVPHL
BUCHAREST	GENEVA	MOSCOW	ROME	TOKYO	500MIGPJAPAN
BUDAPEST	KARACHI	MUNICH	SAIGON	VIENNA	5AFJapan
					7FLTTOKYO
					USTAIWANDEFCOM
					13AFMANILA

(See O.M. of Jan. 11, 1965from Hong Kong--RM/AN files)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE (RM/AN)

DATE: January 11, 1965

FROM: AmConsul HONG KONG

SUBJECT: RECORDS MANAGEMENT: Information Addressees

REF: ConGen A-427, Dec. 24, 1964; 5 FAH 233.4-2; Dept's OM, Jan 5, 1965

Although the distribution was inadvertently omitted from Hong Kong's A-427 of December 24 (Communist China Joint Weeks No. 52), the document was given the usual distribution to the following addressees:

BAMAKO	CANBERRA	KATHMANDU	NEW DELHI	SEOUL	VIENTIANE
BANGKOK	CINCPAC	KUALA LUMPUR	PARIS	SINGAPORE	WARSAW
BELGRADE	DAR ES SALAAM	LONDON	PRAGUE	SOFIA	WELLINGTON
BLANTYRE	DJAKARTA	MANILA	RANGOON	TAIPEI	COMNAVFEL
BUCHAREST	GENEVA	MOSCOW	ROME	TOKYO	500HIGPJAPAN
BUDAPEST	KARACHI	MUNICH	SAIGON	VIENNA	XX
					5AFJapan
					7FLTTOKYO
					USTAIWANDEFCOM
					13AFMANILA

JMacPherson:jm

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FORM 9-61 DS-682

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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ACTION

INR-10

	REF	AF
1		5
	EUR	FE
	5	6
		IND
		IO
	STEP	ARA
	1	12
RMA	EUR	PC
1	1	2
AGR	COM	FRB
2	2	
INT	LAB	TAR
	2	
TR	XMB	AIR
2		10
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
10	20	10
OSD	USIA	NSA
24	11	3
	HEW	NSC
	1	6

50

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 CHICOM

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A-414
NO.

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CLASSIFICATION

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals. Not automatically declassified.

TO DEPARTMENT

INFO BAMAKO, BANGKOK, BELGRADE, BLANTYRE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, CANBERRA, CPNAPLAD, D'ES'LAAM, DJAKARTA, GENEVA, KARACHI, KATMANDU, KLUMPUR, LONDON, MANILA, MOSCOW, MUNICH, NDELHI, PARIS, PRAGUE, RANGOON, ROME, SAIGON, SEOUL, S'PORE, SOFIA, TAIPEI, TOKYO, VIENNA, VNTIANE, WARSAW, W'NGTON, USTAIWANDEFCOM, 13AFMANILA, COMNAVPHL, 500MIGPJAPAN, 7FLTTOKYO

FROM: AmConsul HONG KONG

DATE: December 18, 1964

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 51

REF:

DEC 22 AM 9 13

POLITICAL

External

1. Sino-Soviet Relations
2. Vietnam: Warnings against "Limited" Expansion of War
3. Japan: Fresh Attacks on Sato Government
4. Thailand: Peiping Gives Indirect Support to Anti-Thanom Movement
5. Central African Republic: Meng Ying Appointed First CPR Ambassador to Bangui

Internal

6. Youth Journal Documents YCL Apathy
7. Canned Adulation for Foreign Guests
8. Drive to Purify Commercial Decoration Under Way

MILITARY

1. Communist China's Military Strength

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
☑ In ☐ Out

FORM DS-323

Drafted by: POL:HIsham/NPlatt/DAnderson:jm

Contents and Classification Approved by: Oscar V. Armstrong

Clearances: ARMLO: Col. Treadwell

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

POLITICAL

External

1. Sino-Soviet Relations

As the Chinese leaders presumably concentrated this week on the final stages of preparation for the forthcoming session of the National People's Congress scheduled to open December 20, news generally dropped off, and the Sino-Soviet conflict was muted. No Peiping media have yet mentioned the abortive effort of Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko who according to Western press stories citing informed Moscow sources asked for an interview with Mao in order to present a message proposing a preparatory meeting of Communist Parties on March 1 (instead of the original December 15 date approved by Khrushchev). Flatly turned down by Mao, Chervonenko reportedly asked to see Chou En-lai, but this was also rejected, and he had to settle for a Vice Foreign Minister who, informed of the contents of the note, promptly handed it back. The Chinese had presumably been tipped off as to what was coming, perhaps by the Rumanians. Among the continuing signs of acute strain were the following:

1. Liu Ning-yi, speaking at a December 16 rally commemorating the fourth anniversary of the founding of the "National Liberation Front of South Vietnam," renewed attacks on the Soviet delegates to the recent Hanoi conference of international solidarity with the peoples of Vietnam, maintaining that "the overwhelming majority of the delegates indignantly refuted the absurd arguments and erroneous stand of the revisionists who on the one hand pretended to support the Vietnamese peoples' struggle and on the other hand spread the idea of begging the US aggressors for peace and asking the US imperialist-controlled United Nations to intervene in the questions of Vietnam and Indo China." (See also Item 2.)

2. The International Union of Students' eighth congress, held in Sofia from November 28 to December 10, appears to have been just as acrimonious and sterile as other sessions of Front and Afro-Asian organizations this year. The NCNA account recited grievances against the Soviet and Czech "manipulators" of the congress, depicted the Chinese delegation as supported in its harsh anti-US stand by a significant number of delegates from Africa, Asia and Latin America, and derided the final "erroneous" resolution (voted against only by the Chinese and Albanians) by noting that it had received 39 votes but that 37 delegations had abstained.

The congress appears to have been another edifying spectacle of mutual recrimination: NCNA spoke of "frenzied attacks on China" by the Soviet and Indian delegates and decried the "mean tricks" of "some people" who "booed and hooted and set the voting machine in motion." To judge from the NCNA version, another Communist Front organization appears to be shattered beyond repair, although the Chinese limited themselves thus far to issuing a separate statement and have not announced their intentions on participating in future activities of the IUS as presently constituted.

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3. A December 8 speech by Senator Fulbright at the Southern Methodist University in Dallas occasioned a lengthy NCNA summary interspersed with acid comments directed as much against the Soviet leaders as against the US, such as "The Senator saw in the modern revisionist trend within the international Communist movement 'important opportunities' for the United States." What seems to have particularly exercised Peiping was the Senator's exposition of the thesis on "building bridges" to the East, taking into consideration the "common humanity" of Communist leaders and their peoples with the West as a possible factor for constructive change, while differentiating between Communist countries which show a greater inclination to confine the practice of their ideology within their own frontiers and those which continue to pursue expansionist policies. The Senator's description of the CPR as the most fanatic, extreme, aggressive, and expansionist of the Communist countries was reported by NCNA as an expression of the "seething hatred and enmity which the US ruling circles felt toward China."

4. The conclusion of the USSR Supreme Soviet session on December 12 was reported by NCNA in the tight-lipped brevity reserved for distasteful proceedings which may later be attacked. The reduction of the military expenditures in the 1965 state budget was not reported, merely its approval. NCNA did include reference to the removal of Khrushchev as chairman of the constitution commission and his replacement by Brezhnev. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. Vietnam: Warnings against "Limited" Expansion of War

Both Chen Yi, speaking at a Kenyan Embassy reception December 12, and Liu Ning-yi, addressing a December 16 rally for the SVNNLF (see Item 1), echoed previous warnings over the possible expansion of the war to the north, with Chen citing "four successive infringements and provocations" against the DRV within ten days and declaring that the "Chinese government has repeatedly stated its position and will unfailingly live up to its words" and Liu reiterating the line that the Chinese people would never stand idly by when aggression was committed against their brotherly neighbor. Neither spokesman added any precision to Peiping's previous language of deterrence, and both coupled their remarks with discussion of other topics, Chen attacking the Congo intervention and the MLF, and Liu discoursing on the "erroneous" stand of the Soviet delegates to the Hanoi conference.

Meanwhile, a People's Daily "Observer" article of December 12 sought to discount reports from Western sources that the expansion of the war in South Vietnam would be limited, warning that "The peoples surely will not be taken in. They have learned from the experience of their own struggle that they must strike back as soon as the aggressors extend their tentacles over them." The article reaffirmed that "China and the other fraternal socialist countries have an unshirkable internationalist duty to support a fraternal country in resisting aggression." and declared that "US imperialism will be severely punished if it has the guts to attack them." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

COMMENT: The reference to "striking back" was obviously designed to give the impression that strong counter-blows against US forces coming from within or without South Vietnam might result from any strikes/outside South Vietnam's limited or otherwise borders. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Japan: Fresh Attacks on Sato Government

After a week of steady, biting news reports on each new indication of the Sato government's "anti-China policy," the Peiping press on December 12 assailed Foreign Minister Shiina's December 4 UNGA speech, using the most extreme terms employed to date. People's Daily "Observer" (as well as the Ta Kung Pao "Commentator") attacked the Sato Government's "despicable role" of serving as a "vanguard in the US anti-China farce in the United Nations." Describing the Japanese government as "cudgeling its brains" to keep China out of the UN, the "Observer" article again charged (as a November 25 article had done) that these tactics were "an out-and-out revelation of the Japanese militarists' covetous designs to re-occupy the Province of Taiwan." But this time "Observer" raised the pitch of invective, lashing Shiina as the "number one anti-China thug in the UN under the US baton" who had "bared his fangs and unmasked his ferocious features as a Japanese militarist." "Observer" charged that Shiina was an official under the Tojo cabinet and "committed crimes" during the Japanese occupation of China's Northeast.

The "Observer" article concluded that the Sato government's line of "open enmity" against China is "doomed to failure." The Japanese people are described as "insistently demanding friendship with China," and whoever goes against the will of the Japanese people, warned "Observer," "will come to grief." (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: It is significant that the three most virulent attacks on the Sato government have all been made under the highly authoritative "Observer" byline in People's Daily. A Japanese Consulate General officer expressed the view that this tough line may have influenced the government's decision to admit to Japan on December 14 the Indonesian PKI delegation headed by Lukman which had been barred from attending the JCP Party Congress. He also noted that Sato had stated before the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives that, "quite separate from the previous case," the government would give favorable consideration to a new visa application by Peng Chen should he apply "on other occasions."

However, Peiping has not carried its propaganda outbursts into the field of trade relations. Most of the contracts under the Liao-Takasaki agreement have now been signed after a brief suspension owing to Japan's "unfriendly attitude," and Chou En-lai is reported by Kyodo correspondent Reizo Yamada in Peiping as having promised that China will execute the 1963-1967 trade agreement "without fail." (CONFIDENTIAL)

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4. Thailand: Peiping Gives Indirect Support to Anti-Thanom Movement

NCNA on December 13 reported without comment that a "Voice of the People of Thailand" broadcast on December 8 had carried a manifesto of the "Thailand Independence Movement" issued November 1 which set forth a four-point program of action against the US "imperialists" and the Thanom government. The "Thailand Independence Movement" describes itself in the manifesto as "a political organization aimed at uniting all patriots and democrats, irrespective of their class and stratum, their sex, age, history, profession and past record." The movement states that it is prepared to cooperate "fully or to a certain extent" with any individual, group, organization, or political party so long as they are "genuinely patriotic and democratic" and "have political ideas consistent with our program and policies." The movement's four-point program and policies are:

1) "Drive out the US imperialist aggressors from Thailand;"
2) "Overthrow the traitorous, despotic Thanom government and set up another to be composed of patriotic and democratic political parties and individuals and committed to a policy of neutrality and peace;"
3) "Fight for the salvation and preservation of the genuine democratic rights of the people;" and
4) "Fight for a policy of neutrality, peace, democracy, prosperity, and the people's well-being." (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: The manifesto's denunciation of the Thanom government as a "new-type colony of the US" and its offer to unite with all "patriotic" classes, organizations, and individuals in an effort to expel US "imperialism" and overthrow the Thanom government is strikingly similar in "revolutionary" language and content to the October 1 greetings to the CPR sent by the pro-Peiping Thai Communist Party, also disseminated by NCNA. The appearance of these two militant incitements to revolution suggests that the ChiComs may feel that the time is now ripe for stepping up subversive and propaganda efforts against the Thanom government.

In this context, the fact that Thai is among the first three foreign languages to be studied in Peiping's new (September 5) Foreign Language Institute (WEEKA 37) is also suggestive of a heightened interest on the part of the Chinese in influencing developments in Thailand. This view has been substantiated recently by reports which describe the Institute as designed to train people for political work as part of an effort to return Thailand to the "Asian family of nations." (ConGenTel844) (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Central African Republic: Meng Ying Appointed First CPR Ambassador to Bangui

NCNA on December 13 announced the appointment of Meng Ying (STC:1322-5391) as China's first Ambassador to the Central African Republic. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: Meng is an experienced African specialist and a diplomat of some fifteen years standing. Following a tour as Deputy Director of the West Asian and African Affairs Department of the Foreign Ministry from 1961 to early 1964, he was appointed as China's first Ambassador to Zanzibar and presented his credentials on April 7, 1964. Following the formation of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and the consequent downgrading of the CPR Embassy in Zanzibar to a Consulate, Meng Ying returned to Peiping in July and was appointed a Deputy Director on the newly-created Department of African Affairs.(WEEKA 40) (UNCLASSIFIED)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

Internal

6. Youth Journal Documents YCL Apathy

A surprisingly frank set of articles in the December 3 China Youth Journal shows that the Ninth YCL Congress call for "revolutionization" of youth has failed to set young China afire, at least in "some rural, factory, mine, and school YCL branches." In fact half of the 400 youngsters in one Hopei Province village "did not know what the Ninth YCL Congress was all about." In Wuhan a young YCL Branch official in a rolling stock factory admitted in a rare burst of candor that although he had read all the Congress documents "word for word at least four times" he still "could not make out even the most fundamental contents."

Ignorance and incomprehension among the duller youths has evidently been matched by a surprising degree of defiant boredom among the brighter elements. If the young people have all heard speeches on the Congress, taken notes, fully comprehended and commented in writing on the concept of revolutionization, then "why should we still discuss it?" asks a Branch Secretary from a commune in the suburbs of Changchun. Some of the young women in this commune (the Ninth Congress urged that many more female members be recruited into YCL ranks) felt that the female role in rural life was to "feed pigs, raise chickens, and baby-sit; they don't need revolutionization." Others, compelled by even more basic urges, unashamedly maintained, "eating is most important of all!"

To heal the ideological ague described above, the China Youth Journal has started a half-page discussion column catchily entitled, "How to Bring about Revolutionization of the YCL and Youth," and invited all interested parties to participate. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: Letters-to-the-editor discussions in the mainland press are usually started to test public acceptance of ideas the regime considers dangerous or widely held and to correct these notions. This discussion may produce further evidence that large protions of China's youth are indeed human beings with strong propensity toward revisionist thinking, notwithstanding the injunctions of YCL First Secretary Hu Yao-pang (age: over 50) and other elderly regime leaders. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Canned Adulation for Foreign Guests (CONFIDENTIAL)

A recent participant in the British Industrial Fair in Peiping told Consulate General officers that the "spontaneous" Chinese Communist welcome for visiting foreign dignitaries is even phonier than we had surmised - the Chinese use canned crowd noises to beef up the applause. Our informant had learned of this technique when watching the preparations for the arrival of the King of Afghanistan, the road from the airport being near the hall housing the British exhibition. After the trucks from various factories, organizations, schools, etc. had disgorged their loads of people to greet the King, the Communists had then proceeded to test out loudspeakers emplaced at strategic intervals behind the lines of spectators, playing not only martial music but a medly of resounding shouts and cheers. Meanwhile it had begun to rain, and the people themselves had remained suddenly impassive during the preparations, waiting patiently for the procession to pass by. They duly cheered when the signal was given, but their own applause was drowned out by the electronic aids behind them. Twenty minutes afterwards the crowd had completely - and silently - dispersed. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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COMMENT: Visiting foreign dignitaries impressed by what appeared to be spontaneous love of the Chinese people for their home countries may be disillusioned to discover that so much of the tumult in China can be artificial, and disturbed by the thought that the cheers they heard may originally have been taped during the welcome of someone else. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

8. Drive to Purify Commercial Decoration Under Way

Radio Hofei reports (December 3, 1330 GMT) that the Nanling County Arts Supply Retail Store has established a new vogue by making and selling large quantities of glass plaques and plates decorated with socialist designs. The store used to produce plates painted with superstitious pictures such as "Fairy Maku Offers a Toast" or "The Unicorn Brings a Son." Now that the political consciousness of the artisans has been raised, pleasing designs entitled "Long Live the People's Commune" and "Standing at the Front Door Looking Towards Tien An Men" adorn the store's output. Business reportedly has never been better. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: The campaign to rectify commercial decoration, which has been gathering momentum for the past six months, extends to the design of trademarks and prints on cotton piecegoods as well as to decoration on all items of daily use, from fans (classical poetry is to be replaced by pithy Maoist epigrams) to vacuum flasks. The campaign is one facet of a broad attempt to drive from Chinese daily life all vestiges of past belief and custom. In recent months there have been attacks on sentimental love songs, "whimsical" (beehive, ducktail) hairdoes, and form-fit tailoring (expecially "bizarre" tight slacks). A nationwide program is under way to change the names of any place, street, hotel, railway station, and even flower species that may have bourgeois or feudal connotations. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

MILITARY

1. Communist China's Military Strength

A recent report has placed the strength of the Chinese Communist militia at 12 million. Under plans to intensify the training and equipping of the militia, the force is reportedly due to be fully armed by 1970. (CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMENT: The estimate of 12 million appears to be a reasonable figure for that component of the militia which includes demobilized soldiers, is relatively well-organized in standard military units and has been performing a local defense role in Shantung, Kwangtung, and other coastal areas.

The plan to complete the arming of the militia force by 1970 appears consistent with previous information on issuance of weapons and equipment to some militia units and is probably related to a concurrent program for the regular CCA. (CONFIDENTIAL)

For the Consul General:
John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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ACTION

INR-10		
1		5
	FOR 5	6
4	5	
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		17
U/IE 1	S/P 1	S/S-RO 2
ASD 2	COM 2	FRB
INT	LAB 2	TAR
TN 2	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 10
OSD 22	USIA 11	NSA 3
	HEW 1	NSC 6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 Chicom

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A-398 NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals. Not automatically declassified.

DESIGNATION

TO DEPARTMENT

INFO :BAMAKO CANBERRA KATMANDU NEDELHI SEOUL VNTIANE 7FLTTOKYO
BANGKOK CPACPLAD KULUMPUR PARIS SINGAPORE WARSAW USTWANDEFCO
BELGRADE D.SALAAM LONDON PRAGUE SOFIA W'NGTON 13AFMANILA
BLANTYRE DJAKARTA MANILA RANGOON TAIPEI COMNAVPHL
BUCHAREST GENEVA MOSCOW ROME TOKYO 500MIGP
BUDAPEST KARACHI MUNICH SAIGON VIENNA 5AFJAPAN

FROM AmConsul HONG KONG

DATE: December 11, 1964

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 50

REF:

POLITICAL

External

1. Chen Yi Concludes Visits to Djakarta and Rangoon
2. Chinese Communists Clarify Terms for UN Entry
3. Sino-Soviet Relations: Fresh Signs of Old Conflicts
4. Congo (Leopoldville): "Wave of Anger" over Stanleyville Incident Ebbs
5. Peiping Condemns Sarnath Buddhist Conference as Part of "Two Chinas Plot"
6. A Japanese Socialist Takes Revenge

Internal

7. PLA Journal Hits "Natural Redness"
8. Red Flag Renews Attacks on Peiping Philosopher
9. Now Its PLMP Congresses

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

MILITARY

Negative

CONFIDENTIAL

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FORM DS-323

Drafted by: POL:HIsham/NPlatt/DAnderson/GMetson:jm

Contents and Classification Approved by: Oscar V. Armstrong

Clearances:

COPYFLO-PDR

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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POLITICAL

External

1. Chen Yi Concludes Visits to Djakarta and Rangoon

Foreign Minister Chen Yi arrived back in Kunming December 6 after a surprise ten-day trip which took him to Djakarta and Rangoon. (WEEKA 49) After final talks with Subandrio December 2 and a farewell banquet December 3, Chen Yi left for Rangoon where he met on December 3 and 4 with Ne Win and Acting Foreign Minister Colonel Maung Lwin.

A joint press release issued December 3 on Chen Yi's departure from Djakarta indicates that one of the points agreed upon during his talks with Indonesian leaders almost certainly was an increase in ChiCom support for Sukarno's campaign to "crush" Malaysia. Given Chen Yi's exalted position and this sudden arrival in the midst of the anti-Malaysia confrontation, he gave what can be regarded as the most forthright Chinese policy statement on the subject thus far: i.e. he "reaffirmed the full support of the government and people of China for the struggle of the government and people of Indonesia to crush the tool of British neo-colonialism, Malaysia, which constitutes a direct threat to the security and growth of the developing countries in Southeast Asia." (Earlier Chinese pronouncements, such as the People's Daily editorial of September 9 and Chen Yi's August 17 remarks at the Indonesian National Day reception in Peiping, while perhaps more vitriolic in their attacks on US and British "imperialism," were more equivocal in character, avoiding any direct Chinese linkage with the "crush Malaysia" campaign other than that provided by the weight of Peiping's name.)

Among other subjects reportedly discussed by Chen Yi and Subandrio were: 1) "various problems connected with the preparations for the Second Afro-Asian Conference," 2) 'the question of holding a world summit conference to discuss the question of complete prohibition and total destruction of all nuclear weapons," and 3) "the development of the existing bilateral cooperation" between China and Indonesia and "the means of developing and extending it further." In addition, Indonesia reaffirmed its "strong support" to restore the CPR's "lawful rights" as the only representative of China in the UN and all its agencies.

The first installment on Peiping's commitment to give "full support" for Indonesia's crush Malaysia campaign came in the form of a December 8 People's Daily editorial hailing the second anniversary of the armed uprising in North Kalimantan. After condemning British "imperialism" for its "suppression" and "savagery," the editorial rather hollowly claims that the "patriotic forces have grown stronger" and "the revolutionary developments are extremely favorable." The US is depicted as watching "hawk-eyed" the struggle for the riches of North Kalimantan, "looking for an opportunity to penetrate into this region to bring it under its own control." The editorial ends with the rather feeble assertion that, "the North Kalimantan people are not alone in their struggle. They have won the sympathy and support of the people the world over." As for US and British "imperialism", they are said to be "completely isolated and in a pretty bad fix in Southeast Asia."

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Chen Yi's three-day stop in Rangoon has thus far received only pro-forma coverage, and no joint press release or communique has appeared. CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMENT: From various sources, most notably the joint press release itself, it seems quite clear that the lengthy negotiating sessions in Djakarta produced a somewhat stronger commitment by the Chinese to support the Indonesian "crush Malaysia" campaign, perhaps as a means of giving Sukarno the subsidy he needs - economic if not military - to keep the "confrontation" going. References to "developing and extending" bilateral cooperation between China and Indonesia tend to confirm reports from other sources that China's support for Indonesia's staggering economy will be increased as part of the bargain. The trouble Sukarno is capable of causing, both against Malaysia and in the wider context of the Afro-Asian and nonaligned worlds, would make the expense to Peiping worthwhile.

As the quid pro quo, Sukarno appears to have agreed to give stronger support to ChiCom positions regarding the upcoming Afro-Asian conference, Peiping's proposal for a nuclear summit conference, and perhaps more urgently, the "restoration" of China's "legitimate rights in the UN." We wonder, too, if the recent Indonesian attacks on USIS libraries might be an outgrowth of Chen Yi's visit, in that the Indonesians took this means of identifying themselves more firmly with Peiping's anti-US "struggle" in the pattern laid down in several African countries. (CONFIDENTIA: We also speculate that Vietnam was on the agenda at Djakarta as well as in Rangoon.

2. Chinese Communists Clarify Terms for UN Entry

In a noteworthy People's Daily editorial December 4, the Chinese Communists amplified their previous insistence that GRC eviction from all UN organs was a pre-condition for CPR entry (October 24, 1963, Foreign Ministry statement), and categorically ruled out all current efforts by what it termed "some well-intentioned friends" to seat the CPR first in the United Nations General Assembly and then to have the GRC "evicted," declaring 1) nobody else /but the CPR/ can occupy a seat in the United Nations as representing China or part of its territory under any other name (emphasis added), 2) the UN must evict the GRC from all its organizations simultaneously with admitting the CPR, since these two matters are "two sides of the same question and must be settled at one and the same time." The editorial specifically rejected not only "two Chinas," and "one China one Taiwan," but also a) the proposal advocated by the New York Times on December 20 for CPR entry providing Taiwan kept a separate UN vote, b) UN trusteeship over Taiwan, and c) permitting the GRC to send an observer to the UN (although U Thant's proposal, as we understnad it, related only to Communist states not belonging to the UN).

Thus the Chinese Communists have put forward terms which would require the UN to break all association with Taiwan as a separate and distinct entity from mainland China, and to do so in a coordinated action expelling the GRC from all the positions it holds in UN organizations while concurrently admitting Chinese Communist representatives to these positions. Taiwan would not only be expelled from the UN, it would be consigned to a kind of international limbo unique since the founding of the United Nations, condemned to a presumably dwindling series of bilateral relations. Were such terms to be accepted, the UN would in effect be underwriting Communist China's claim that Taiwan belongs under its control.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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The UN thus would be contributing to the attainment of an objective which the Chinese Communists have been unable to secure by their own efforts. In framing such demands the Chinese Communists reveal they consider the tide is running in their favor in the UN; they name nine states sponsoring ChiRep resolutions in the UNGA, including five from Africa but excluding the USSR. However, they probably are not counting on early entry, for they state that China's growing strength "does not in the least depend on whether it is in the UN or not...if the US continues to keep China out of the UN, the UN alone will suffer." The editorial's choice of language revealed unbridled malevolence toward the United States: "Your present insolence in the world and in the UN is but a passing phenomenon...if you regard this hot spot /into which the US has been landed by its efforts to seize Taiwan/ as a bed of roses, it only proves that you are the most stupid as well as the most shameless imperialists the world has ever seen."

with its "take it or leave it" terms for Chinese entry,
This editorial/should prove illuminating to governments which are looking for signs of reasonableness on the part of the ChiComs in hopes that the ChiRep issue will not turn into a bitter battle which could hurt the UN. (CONFIDENTIAL) (CONGENTEL 810)

3. Sino-Soviet Relations: Fresh Signs of Old Conflicts

Peiping continued this week both directly and through the words of ChiCom-aligned Parties to identify continuing sources of conflict with the new Soviet leadership and to prepare public opinion for resumption of open and protracted struggle with neo-Khrushchevism. Except for Peiping's restraint in not attacking the new Soviet leaders by name, the polemics followed the essential pattern of the period just before Khrushchev's fall.

in Sinkiang, which
The clash of Soviet and Communist Chinese interests/since 1963 has been alluded to with increasing frequency by both sides, appears to have dominated discussions at a meeting held December 4 in Artush, the capital of the Kezlesu Khalkhas autonomous chou, celebrating the tenth anniversary of the chou's establishment (NCNA December 5). Memet Esha, the head of the chou, claimed that the national unity of the peoples living there could not be undermined by the modern revisionists or any class enemy. Chang Chieh, representing the NPC nationalities committee and the State Council's Commission for Nationalities' Affairs, stated that the fight against imperialists, reactionaries, and modern revisionists remained a protracted, complex, and arduous historical task, and declared that "any ambition to seize its /China's/ territory by force was doomed to failure." Iminov, vice chairman of the Sinkiang Uighur autonomous region, stressed that the people of this border region should "redouble their vigilance and be ready to crush any subversive and sabotage activities by the imperialists, reactionaries, and modern revisionists."

In the struggle to control the Japanese Communist Party, whose pro-Chinese orientation has now been openly challenged by the formation on December 2 of a Soviet-backed Party claiming legitimacy, Peiping made another gibe at "anybody who still tries to make use of such political scum as Yoshio Shiga and his like"

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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and predicted that they would "come to the same ignominious end as Khrushchev" (People's Daily December 3 editorial). The thrust recalled a passage in Peng Chen's November 25 message to the Japanese Communist Party Congress: "No matter how many Khrushchevite revisionists may support them, and no matter what kind of seemingly almighty prop they may have, nothing will save these renegades from complete bankruptcy."

Peiping also publicized a summary of the proceedings at the International Union of Students Congress in Sofia which opened November 28 and was marked by heated debate over a Chinese proposed draft protest on the Stanleyville operation which the Soviet and Bulgarian delegates sought to "obstruct." The Chinese delegate, demanding the condemnation of the US as the "arch criminal guilty of invasion of the Congo," expressed extreme regret that "some people" paid lip service to opposing imperialism but "tried in a thousand and one ways to shield imperialism whenever it was attacked."

As to the future, three statements carried by Peiping media urged varying degrees of readiness to continue the struggle against the CPSU. PKI Chairman Aidit, speaking to a group of pro-Chinese Australian Communist Party leaders headed by E.F.Hill, said that with the fall of Khrushchev and other "brilliant" achievements, "only thirty percent of our task has been fulfilled and the remaining seventy percent is still to be completed." In Indonesia, he said, non-Communist revolutionaries had also begun to recognize the danger of revisionism and the necessity of linking the struggle against imperialism closely with that against modern revisionism. JCP Secretary General Miyamoto's report to the Party Congress, extensively cited by People's Daily December 2 and printed in full in pamphlet form, said that the conditions for settlement in the "debate" were absent for the time being and said that "the struggle will be protracted and complicated in days to come." Finally, Enver Hoxha's November 28 speech at the 20th anniversary celebrations of Albanian liberation was carried in full by People's Daily December 5. (Although not disseminated by NCNA English, it can be found in FBIS Nov 30, Dec 1, Dec 2,) The speech will be a signal for China's cadres that, as Hoxha put it, "the course, policy, and social and economic roots of revisionism have not been liquidated" along with Khrushchev and that "Khrushchev's downfall marks the beginning of a new stage in the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism which will lead to the total defeat of modern revisionism and the inevitable triumph of Marxism-Leninism." Hoxha declared that open polemics would "continue increasingly until Khrushchevite positions are annihilated all along the line." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

COMMENT: With the return of Politburo member and Finance Minister Li Hsien-nien on December 8 from his mission to Albania to attend the anniversary celebrations and perhaps to receive new Albanian aid requests (Hoxha mentioned that the Chinese "will assist us generously, they will give us credits and other aid to enable us to continue the work of the third five year plan and the Communist building of the country") and the return of Foreign Minister Chen Yi from his trip to Indonesia and Burma (see item 1), the Politburo may be taking stock of further moves to strengthen its position vis-a-vis both the West and the Soviet Union, particularly with a view to the NPC session scheduled for December 20. The reduction in size of the daily NCNA file to one third of its usual length suggests that some major new policy statement or anti-Soviet broadside may be in the offing. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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4. Congo (Leopoldville): "Wave of Anger" over Stanleyville Incident Ebbs

The eight million indignant Chinese people who demonstrated against US-Belgian "aggression" at Stanleyville finally came in out of the cold and warmed their clenched fists as Peiping's agitprop machinery rumbled to a halt after five days of protest rallies throughout China. As expected, African leaders of the "national liberation" struggle based in Accra, Conakry, Dar Es Salaam and Cairo all responded with adulatory praise for Chairman Mao's "historic" statement on the Congo. Perhaps the most unconsciously ironic comments of all those reported were those of Stanley G. Parirewa of the Zimbabwe African National Union who said, "Chairman Mao's statement shows once again that the Chinese people are genuine friends of the African people fighting for national independence. This is all we expect from a genuine friend."

Signalling the end of the sound and fury over the Stanleyville operation was a People's Daily editorial December 5 "saluting the embattled Congo." The editorial adds nothing new to previous ChiCom pronouncements on the subject of the necessity for revolutionary violence in Africa, but formulates in explicit terms the "real" reasons for the rescue mission to Stanleyville as seen by Peiping. They are: 1) to give cover for Tshombe's forces to capture Stanleyville, 2) to wipe out "at one stroke" the rebel forces and stamp out the national liberation struggle in the Congo, and 3) to open up a testing ground for US "special warfare" in Africa. (UNCLASSIFIED)

5. Peiping Condemns Sarnath Buddhist Conference as Part of "Two Chinas Plot"

In an effort to discredit the World Fellowship of Buddhists' claim to be a non-political organization, the Chinese Buddhist Association issued a statement December 3 protesting to the Headquarters of the WFB and to the Indian "authorities" against the "illegal" Seventh Conference of the WFB at Sarnath which opened November 29. The protest alleged that the Headquarters of the WFB had revealed its "stubborn hostility towards China," first by improper protocol in convening the November 24 Bangkok WFB General Council Meeting, and secondly, by "flagrantly" inviting GRC Buddhist delegates to attend both the meetings at Sarnath and Bangkok, thus engaging in a "two Chinas plot." The message also protested the admission to the meetings of the Dalai Lama (called simply "Dalai" in an apparent effort to play down his religious role), who was described as "the ringleader of the Tibetan rebellion clique" who has been "betraying his motherland" abroad. The protest concluded that the move of the headquarters of the WFB to Bangkok and the meeting at Sarnath were both unconstitutional and illegal.

An NCNA despatch of the same date also denounced the Indian government as the "active organizer of this anti-China conference," which was convened by a "handful of followers of US imperialism." Describing the conference as "in the service of US imperialism and the Indian reactionaries," a meeting where Asia Foundation personnel were "seen working," the article claimed that many delegates were dissatisfied with the WFB Headquarters' "subservience to the United States," and noted that Buddhist organizations in Cambodia, Burma, Laos, Pakistan, Indonesia, Korea, and Vietnam, "which represent the great majority of Buddhists in the world," refused to participate in the conference. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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COMMENT: The violence of the attack on the WFB is another example (see WEEKA 47) of Peiping's determination to block any activity which includes representation of the GRC in any form, including, as in this case, representation as a regional delegation of China. Interestingly enough, however, Peiping has not yet withdrawn from the WFB, and may be biding its time for another attempt to dominate the organization, perhaps in its next meeting in Tokyo in 1966. (LIMITED OFFICIALUSE)

6. A Japanese Socialist Takes Revenge

According to a Japanese correspondent who was there, some ill feeling was spilled along with the wine at the final banquet which the Chinese gave the Japan Socialist Party delegation in Peiping. One of the Japanese delegates, Tsubaki, who felt hurt by Chinese strong arm tactics in the communique-writing session, took out his revenge by staggering up to each of his Chinese hosts and bawling out: "I am a revisionist." (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Internal

7. PLA Journal Hits "Natural Redness"

A PLA Journal essay reprinted in China Youth Journal on November 17, entitled "Lay Down the Load, Advance with Light Equipment" attacks with eloquence the attitudes of youth who consider themselves exempt from socialist education because they were "born red." There are three categories of offenders: a) youths of exemplary peasant or worker class origin and status; b) the children of cadres; and c) other youths who feel that birth into the new society untainted by direct contact with old ideas is a guarantee of revolutionary salvation. The fact is that while good class origin can indeed enhance a person's revolutionary consciousness and hate for class enemies, it can also make one "blind, uncritical, and complacent." Having a revolutionary parent can provide a valuable impetus and example, but it can also make one "self-important and divorced from the masses." The sense of having grown up under the Red Flag can lead one to depend on others, "covet a life of ease, live in luxury, and squander away the fruits of victory at will."

This sense of "natural redness" can even cause a person to reject ideological molding, shutting oneself up in an illusory "red safe" and engaging in "self-intoxication." The truth is, the article concludes, that revolutionary spirit cannot be transmitted hereditarily, it can only be instilled. Once instilled, it must be nurtured in life-long struggle. Young people throughout the army should therefore lay down the heavy load of "natural redness" and advance with light equipment down the revolutionary path. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: It is obvious from the tenor of this forthright and articulate sermon that even the most effective organ of indoctrination of youth in Chinese Communist society, the General Political Department of the PLA is finding thought problems among the very sectors of youth which should be most susceptible to the Maoist line. If this tacit admission is correctly interpreted, the training of revolutionary successors will be difficult indeed. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

8. Red Flag Renews Attacks on Peiping Philosopher

The most recent Red Flag (combining issues 21-22, November 21) devoted five out of a total of eight articles (25 out of 38 pages) to criticizing Peiping philosopher Feng Ting (WEEKAS 40, 41, 44, 48). In the course of their attacks on the book "Commonplace Truth" (labelled "a chop suey of subjective idealism") and other Feng works, the authors, a decidedly mixed bag consisting of a professor, a peasant, a university student, a YCL member, and two hsien-level Party hacks, rake over old charges, and add the following new ones:

1. In explaining that deep-rooted emotions often negate the effects of ideological indoctrination, Feng is denying ideological reform as an expression of class struggle and creating a theoretical foundation for opposition to socialist education.

2. In maintaining that the working class love for labor and the bourgeoisie's corresponding urge for dissipation both spring from surplus energy produced by the metabolism process, Feng is insulting the working class and defending bourgeois decadence.

3. The fact that statements in support of class harmony remained in the 1959 and 1960 editions of Feng's works after Mao and Liu strongly advocated the continuation of class struggle in 1958, is evidence of deliberate heresy. (UNCL)

COMMENT: While shriller than ever, the campaign against Feng is scraping the intellectual barrel. His books have not been available to us for full comparison with the charges against him, but it is obvious that Feng's critics are quoting him out of context, distorting his theses, and filling his mouth with words he never said. Most noticeable of these hatchet tactics is the practice of accusing Feng of defending phenomena he is only trying to explain.. The very intensity of the attacks on Feng for views which were once mouthed by a wide range of the leadership may be considered a useful lightening rod, diverting the attention of the public from the memory of past associations, but it may make many intellectuals who were once identified with such views vulnerable to similar or post facto attacks, thus building a much greater atmosphere of repression. (UNCLASSIFIED)

9. Now It's PLMP Congresses

Radio Taiyuan (28 November 1150 GMT) reports that 96 counties and cities throughout Shansi Province recently held Congresses of Poor and Lower Middle Peasants (PLMP) to discuss socialist education problems and winter production. 47,000 participants including brigade and team cadres and leadership office work-groups personnel from all levels made 49,800 proposals (1.059 proposals per peasant according to incomplete statistics) on the improvement of cadre work style and related questions. The PLMPs came away from the congress inspired.

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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In one of the week's more confused metaphors (presumably rendered in unison), they said, "The Party is propping us up by the waist, we must shoulder the responsibilities of masters!"

Meanwhile, next door in equally frigid and idle Shensi, Radio Sian (23 November 1000 GMT) announced the Provincial Party Committee's decision to hold a Provincial Congress for Poor and Lower Middle Peasants next January (UNCL.)

COMMENT: The addition of congresses to the array of standard organizational ploys (PLMP associations, PLMP "schools" etc., see WEEKAS 38, 39, 43, 48) designed to ease the task of indoctrinating the peasantry more than ever strengthens the impression that the PLMPs are targets father than tools of socialist education. The reasons why are not hard to find. The same candid PLA Journal article that discusses "natural redness" (see item 7), admits "the Poor and Lower Middle Peasants are after all small producers and owners of private property, and narrow-mindedness, selfishness, and yearning for free and unorganized life constitute their inherent weaknesses." (UNCLASSIFIED)

OUTER MONGOLIA

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MILITARY

Negative

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FROM : AmConsul HONG KONG

DATE: November 27, 1964

SUBJECT : COMMUNIST CHINA JOINT WEEKA NO. 48

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1964 NOV 29 AM 9 14

POLITICAL

External

1. Sino-Soviet Relations: Once More Unto the Breach
2. Japan: Sino-Japanese Relations Take Early Turn for TheWorse Under Sato
3. New Rationale for Chicom Boycott of Arms Control Talks
4. Vietnam: Continued Cries of US "War Preparations" - Liu Ning-yi Attends DRV Conference in Support of South Vietnam

Internal

5. Another Feng TingWork under Fire
6. NPC Reportedly to be Held By Year's End
7. Poor and Lower Middle Peasants Winter Training Schools to be Established in Shansi

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

MILITARY

Negative

1964 NOV 29 AM 11 51

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Drafted by: POL:HIsham/NPlatt/DAnderson:jm 11/26/64

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Clearances:

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

POLITICAL

External

1. Sino-Soviet Relations: Once More Unto the Breach

Signs multiplied this week that Peiping's immediate post-Khrushchev tactics, including suspending polemics, sending respectful salutations to the new Soviet leadership, designating Chou En-lai to renew high-level talks with the Soviet leaders for the first time since July 1963, and reprinting extracts from major Soviet statements such as the Brezhnev speeches of October 19 and November 6, had failed of their objective and were fast giving way to something closer to the pre-October 16 expressions of outspoken rivalry and hostility. Even while Chou was in Moscow, Liu Ning-yi and Peng Chen had reiterated in no uncertain terms the adamant Chinese stand against any form of reconciliation or cooperation with the United States and their belief that both US political parties were "birds of a feather" (a slap at Soviet expressions of approval for President Johnson's victory). On the eve of Chou's return, a November 13 People's Daily editorial had driven the same point home.

On November 21 Red Flag carried an editorial commenting at length on the causes for Khrushchev's downfall in a way which left no doubt that if Chou had made a major effort to secure radical changes in Soviet policy, exploiting Khrushchev's fall and the Chinese nuclear explosion, he had obtained so little satisfaction that the new Soviet leaders could now be publicly warned, using Khrushchev as the target, that they would suffer his fate if they followed the essentials of his revisionist line. Red Flag dismissed "hundreds or even thousands of charges" which "some people" may list to explain Khrushchev's collapse, specifically those relating to his old age or ill health and mistakes in methods of work and style of leadership, and declared: "Khrushchev's downfall is the inevitable result of the anti-revisionist struggle waged staunchly by the peoples of the Soviet Union and revolutionary people throughout the world....it marks the bankruptcy, the fiasco, of modern revisionism." The editorial then catalogued twelve cardinal "errors" made by Khrushchev during the past eleven years ("when he committed all the bad things he possibly could in contravention of the genuine will of the Soviet people"), including de-Stalinization; cooperation with the United States; conclusion of the partial nuclear test ban treaty; formulation of the peaceful transition and peaceful co-existence lines; rapprochement with Tito; hostility toward Albania; nourishing "inveterate hatred" for the CCP (e.g. "slandering" Mao, cutting off Soviet aid, engineering border disputes and conducting "subversive" activities in Sinkiang, granting military aid to India); policies in COMECON; carrying on "subversive and disruptive activities" towards other parties, including the recruiting of "political degenerates, renegades, and turncoats to support his revisionist line" and "illegally expelling Marxist-Leninists" from these parties, thus creating splits; ordering the convocation of the "illegal" meeting of 26 Parties on December 15; and pursuing policies in the USSR "leading back to capitalism," including the concepts of the "Party of the whole people" as opposed to the proletarian dictatorship (an element of the new CPSU Party Program adopted at the 22nd Party Congress).

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Authority NND 939503
By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

To make this indictment unmistakably applicable to the fundamental policies publicly reaffirmed by the new Soviet leaders since October 16, including the lines set forth at the three Party Congresses, the editorial summed up that "everything Khrushchev did over the last eleven years proves that the policy he pursued was one of alliance with imperialism against Socialism, with the United States against China, with the reactionaries everywhere against the national liberation movements and people's revolutions, with the Tito clique and renegades of all descriptions against all Marxist-Leninist fraternal parties and all revolutionaries fighting imperialism." And, to make more explicit the warning to the new leaders, and to Eastern European Communists who backed Khrushchev, the editorial decried efforts to proclaim his contributions and meritorious deeds in the hope that "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" will prevail. "It can be asserted categorically that theirs is a blind alley."

In addition, there were other signs of impending storm, including 1) a frigid sendoff of USSR Transportation Minister Beshchev, the chief Soviet delegate to the Bolshevik Revolution ceremonies in Peiping, who had been effusively greeted on arrival (WEEKA 45); 2) the designation of Peng Chen (which proved abortive - see item 2) to head a strong delegation to the Ninth Congress of the Japanese Communist Party, riven by pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factional disputes; 3) the reappearance in Peiping, according to Japanese press sources, of anti-CPSU pamphlets which had been initially withdrawn; and 4) the issuance of a major Chinese rebuttal of various nuclear disarmament proposals, some of which had been supported by the USSR (see item 3); and 5) the reporting, without comment, but at considerable length, of CPSU decisions to rescind restrictions on private plots and privately owned livestock and of the high-level attention given to a large delegation of US businessmen discussing improved Soviet-US trade relations.

Finally, People's Daily November 21 resumed the practice, begun on October 30, of publishing extracts from the reactions of different Communist Party leaders to Khrushchev's fall. As before, the dissemination of statements by those leaders supporting Peiping reflected a large measure of Chinese approval, and the following were the principal points made: 1) "We must not think that Khrushchev's removal from office means the end of the struggle to smash modern revisionism...therefore we must not stop the fight to smash modern revisionism... it must be understood that the revolutionary people's movement and Marxist-Leninist movement of the world want /the resolutions adopted at the 20th, 21st, and 22nd CPSU Party Congresses/ amended...." (Aidit, November 11) 2) "However, these circumstances /surrounding Khrushchev's removal/ do not in themselves mean that the CPSU leadership has started an all-round, thoroughgoing criticism of the revisionist, schismatic line which it pursued...modern revisionism, introduced into the CPSU by Khrushchev and his supporters, should be uprooted without any vestiges left behind. This is an indispensable condition for the Party of Lenin and Stalin once again to become the shock brigade of the world Communist and workers movement." (Akahata, November 4) 3) "the political liquidation of the person of Khrushchev...does not mean the liquidation of his political, ideological, economic, and organizational line..." (Zeri i Popullit, November 1).

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Contrasting with these assessments were statements by the French, Austrian, Danish, Italian, British, and Finnish Parties which in varying degrees praised Khrushchev's merits, expressed approval of the new Soviet leaders' reaffirmation of fundamental Khrushchevian policies in foreign affairs and toward the international Communist movement, and criticized the Chinese. (ConGenTel734) (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Japan: Sino-Japanese Relations Take Early Turn for the Worse Under Sato

Within two weeks of his installation as Prime Minister, Eisaku Sato has drawn vitriolic attacks from Peiping as a result of his government's approval of the docking in Japan of US nuclear submarines and its denial of entry visas to the CCP delegation headed by Peng Chen which was to have attended the 9th Party Congress of the Japanese Communist Party. These actions, coupled with Sato's critical remarks concerning China's nuclear test, have provoked attacks on the GOJ reminiscent of those during the administration of Prime Minister Kishi.

Peiping's most bitter denunciation of the Japanese Government's refusal to issue entry visas to the CCP delegation was contained in a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement of November 21, which was followed up on November 23 with a People's Daily Commentary. Both the statement and the commentary held that the GOJ's action was aimed at undermining the good relations between the people of China and Japan, playing down the fact that the GOJ's decision applied equally to all foreign Communist Party delegations. The Foreign Ministry statement thus alleges, "It is not a question of whether to issue entry permits, but a question of what attitude the newly-installed Sato government adopts towards the Chinese government and people." People's Daily commentator, going even further, said, "The dispatch to Japan of such an important delegation like this headed by comrade Peng Chen is intended not only to strengthen the fraternal unity of the CPC and the CPJ; it will have a major bearing on the furtherance of friendship between the Chinese and Japanese people."

The Commentary refutes the GOJ's statement that the presence in Japan of foreign Communist parties is "inimical to Japan's interests and security," and, adopting a caustic, lecturing tone, alleges that friendship between China and Japan "precisely conforms" to the Japanese people's interests and security. In the same vein, the commentary sternly advises the Japanese government that "the national interests of the Japanese people require that Japan break away from US imperialist control, gain independence and improve relations with China." Both the Foreign Ministry statement and the People's Daily commentary conclude with rather ominous warnings, e.g. the Foreign Ministry statement points out that "if the Sato government persists in its unreasonable measure, grave consequences are bound to arise." The commentary concludes, "We must warn the Sato government your perverted /sic/ course of action will definitely bring you to no good end."

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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Obviously stung by this latest rebuff at the hands of the GOJ, which followed so closely the decision to permit entry of US nuclear submarines, NCNA on November 22 hardly disguised its anger as it reported Sato's expression of "heartfelt regret" over the Chinese nuclear test and his demand that the Chinese "accede to the partial nuclear test ban treaty speedily." This was followed on November 24 by a splenetic People's Daily "Observer" article entitled "Sato government Is Blind to the Trend of the Times," which a) denounces the Japanese government for its expressions of "regret" and "protest" over the CCNE, blandly alleging that "the broad masses of the Japanese people have joyously acclaimed China's successful nuclear testing," b) describes the Japanese government's attitude on China's nuclear test as "poles apart" from the attitude of the Japanese people, asserts that the Japanese government "has no right whatsoever" to protest against it, c) maintains that "The people of China and all other countries in Asia are fully entitled to lodge protests with the Japanese Government against its policy of serving US imperialism," d) asserts that further nuclear tests fall "entirely within /China's/ own sovereign right and no outsiders can interfere.... No amount of ravings by Eisaku Sato and his like will make China change its position."

Proceeding from one sore point to another, the "Observer" article mocks the GOJ's "glorious diplomatic record" of admitting the "Sea Dragon" as proof that it is "following a policy of more closely tailing after US imperialism, the very opposite of an independent foreign policy" and contrary to "the powerful historical current in Japan today, a current which none can resist." (CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMENT: Although we doubt that Peiping will permit its ire to affect significantly its rapidly developing trade and cultural contacts with Japan or lead to prolonged retaliation similar to 1958, Peiping's angry and intemperate responses to these early rebuffs by the Sato government clearly indicate that a much chillier attitude will be taken by Peiping toward Japan's new government in the future. The lecturing tone and the strong language used graphically illustrates the extent to which Peiping arrogates to itself the right to tell the Japanese how they should conduct their internal and external affairs. If properly exploited in Japan, these expressions should do Chinese Communist interests there no good. (CONGENTELS 729, 733, 744) (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. New Rationale for ChiCom Boycott of Arms Control Talks

In an authoritative follow-up to the October 16 proposal for a summit meeting on nuclear disarmament, a November 22 People's Daily editorial extended the range of Peiping's negative position beyond the limited test ban treaty to five other proposals on nuclear disarmament advocated by several non-aligned nations and France, and voiced specific and categoric objections to: a) participation in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC), condemned on the grounds that as a UN-sponsored body the ENDC could never have CPR support so long as the ChiRep issue was not settled and further that the ENDC, like all UN-sponsored disarmament efforts, had proved ineffective to check the steady increase in US military expenditures (the latter argument seemed to be a fallback position in the event the first argument were to be removed by UN admission of the CPR); b) talks among the five nuclear powers, as proposed, under OAU

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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sponsorship, by Nkrumah in his October 26 reply to Peiping's summit proposal; c) the concept that a complete ban on nuclear testing would be a desirable sequel to the limited test ban treaty, as proposed by the Afghan Foreign Minister on October 27; d) the proposal, advanced by deGaulle in his message, to begin with the destruction of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, rejected with the argument that since the US had highly developed tactical nuclear weapons, this would give the US the advantage ("Devils are devils, whether they have short or long legs.") and e) the establishment of nuclear-free zones, which the Chinese themselves had continued to advocate as recently as last August 4 when Liu Ning-yi spoke at the Tokyo Anti A-and H-Bomb Conference.

Coupled with this was a proposal for US-CPR bilateral talks to "guarantee" the non-employment of nuclear weapons pending summit agreement on total prohibition as proposed October 16. The proposal was an obvious attempt to "pin the US down," as the local Communist Wen Wei Pao expressed it, and its total lack of serious purpose was suggested by the tone of the editorial's asking the US to agree "if your peace babbles are of any worth at all." (CONGENTEL 750) CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Vietnam: Continued Cries of US "War Preparations" - Liu Ning-yi Attends DRV Conference in Support of South Vietnam

American aircraft in Vietnam, both piloted and pilotless, received Peiping's attention this week, and prominent coverage was given to DRV claims that five US aircraft were downed by North Vietnamese forces November 18 as well as a DRV Foreign Ministry statement protesting these alleged "attacks and provocations" against North Vietnam. The Foreign Ministry statement points out that "obviously the Laotian territory has been used once again by the United States as a springboard for activities of provocation jeopardizing the security of the DRV." People's Daily Commentator, November 21, alleges that these provocations are "contemplated steps of the Johnson Administration to expand the war in Indo-China. These steps are neither fortuitous nor isolated." From this, the Commentary concludes that "only firm retaliation can stop US imperialism from indulging in war provocations and military gambles."

Statements by leading US officials and news media have also been seized upon as proof that the US is planning an expansion of the war in Vietnam. Most recent example of this was the coverage given Ambassador Taylor's Life magazine interview in which he discusses the possible necessity for striking at Viet Cong through supply routes.

Liu Ning-yi, heading a ten-member delegation, arrived in Hanoi November 19 to participate in the "International Conference for Solidarity with the People of Vietnam, Against US Imperialism, and for the Defense of World Peace" (WEEKA 47).

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A message of greetings to the conference from Chou En-lai on November 24 again stressed that "US imperialism is attempting to extend the war in Indo-China," and pointed out that the Chinese people, as "closely related kinsmen" of the Indo-Chinese, "will never allow US imperialism to ride rough-shod in Indo-China." The "Vietnamese brothers" are assured that the Chinese people will "forever stand by them" in their struggle against the US (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

COMMENT: Peiping's repeated attacks on US "preparations to expand the war" in Indo-China reveal a continued and growing concern. Chou's assurances that the Chinese people will "stand by" the Vietnamese, however, continue to allow for a wide range of interpretations as to what type of support, moral or material, will be provided in the event that ChiCom warnings of an expanded war materialize. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Internal

5. Another Feng Ting Work under Fire

Having spent several weeks pounding Peking University Philosophy Department Deputy Dean Feng Ting for three books written during the early 1950s (WEEKAS 40, 41, 44), sheepish China Youth editors (who were guilty of printing his works in the first place) have switched their sights to a "recently published" work entitled "On Life." A lead article in the mid-November Issue of China Youth (No. 21) by three young Peking University teachers accuses Feng of failing to describe the far-sighted Communist ideal in life and leading youth in pursuit of materialistic personal enjoyment. In "On Life," Feng is alleged to have advocated a bourgeois theory of human nature, thereby "blurring the younger generation's recognition of the class line and weakening its will to engage in class struggle." (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: In their discomfort at having been forced to criticize old books that they originally printed and reprinted, the editors of China Youth must have searched hard for, and been relieved to find, a less-known and more recently published work to rake over.

Most of the published works under attack in the current clamp-down on Chinese intellectuals date from the early and mid-1950s. Even Yang Hsien-chen, whose "two into one" heresy (ConGen A-204) sprang from unpublished lectures at the Higher Party School, has been criticized recently for articles he wrote on economic policy during the early part of the past decade. (See WER 45) The authorities' enforced reliance on ancient material as grist for the current campaign is indicative of the thoroughness and pervasiveness of the anti-Rightist drive in the late 1950s. Since then, most Chinese intellectuals have kept their thoughts, especially those even slightly tinged with potential controversy, strictly to themselves, thus leaving nothing of a contemporary nature for the authorities to dig their teeth into. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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1006

6. NPC Reportedly to be Held by Year's End

According to the Japanese Consulate General, Liao Cheng-chih informed Japanese correspondents in Peiping recently that the next session of the National People's Congress would be held "by the end of this year," and that the main order of business will be to consider the new five-year plan commencing in 1965. (CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMENT: Although the opening date was not specified, we estimate that the NPC will not convene before mid or late December, a speculation based on the fact that P'eng Chen, who also functions as Secretary General of the NPC, and Yao Chen, an NPC Deputy Secretary General, were designated to attend the Japanese Communist Party Congress opening November 24 (see Item 2). If the NPC were to have been held before the end of November, for example, these high-ranking NPC officers would not have been scheduled for a trip abroad at this time. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. Poor and Lower Middle Peasants Winter Training Schools To Be Established in Shansi

On November 15 the Shansi Provincial Party Committee and People's Council issued a directive which termed the establishment of Poor and Lower Middle Peasant (PLMP) training schools as the foundation of the winter study program, an urgent task for Party and government organs at all levels (Radio Taiyuan Nov 16 2300 GMT). These institutions of "reeducation", scheduled to open by mid-December, are designed to:

a) raise class consciousness and foster a "backbone force of PLMP organizations;"

b) train a leadership core and teachers for additional PLMP schools;

c) cultivate candidates for Party and YCL membership and basic level cadres.

"Students" at the PLMP schools will squeeze the following curriculum in between winter production, procurement work, and militia duties:

a) Political Education - Instruction will be given on socialism, collectivism, patriotism, and internationalism. PLMPs will be taught how to distinguish between capitalism and socialism, learn from the PLA, connect their daily labor with the revolutionary causes of people throughout the world, oppose old ideas, and change old customs. "Red books" will be read, revolutionary songs sung, and stories told.

b) Technical Education - Skilled workers and educated youths will join to organize all kinds of scientific experiments, and technology will be popularized.

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By YJH NARA Date 5/14/01

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c) Cultural Education - "Students," will learn the relationship between culture, the modernization of agriculture, and the three great revolutionary struggles.

Last (and apparently least) the elimination of illiteracy is also to be regarded as an important part of the program. (UNCLASSIFIED)

COMMENT: The "training schools" are a temporary seasonal measure designed to occupy the peasants' every waking winter moment and will probably be discontinued after the weather gets warmer and the work load heavier. In the meantime, the long North China winter promises to be longer than ever for Shansi peasants this year, many of whom may rue the day they were classified "poor and lower middle."

The heavy dose of indoctrination directed at the PLMPs is evidence that, despite efforts to use PLMP organizations as implements of socialist education (see WEEKAs 38, 39, and 43) they remain as much a target as a tool. The fact of the matter seems to be that the concept of the poor and lower middle peasant, so dear to the hearts of Peiping ideologues, has lost its meaning since ladd reform. Apparently nowadays, if one is looking for PLMPs to rely upon, one has to spend a large amount of time and effort teaching them who they are and what they should be. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

OUTER MONGOLIA

Negative

MILITARY

Negative

For the Consul General:

John H. Holdridge
Chief, Political Section

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